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Preface
If excellence in financial reporting is to be maintained in the United
States, one of the necessary ingredients is communication and coordination
among the groups involved in preparing, using, and regulating financial in
formation. Such communication must take place on a continuing informal
basis as well as within an organized framework.
Recognition of this need led to a symposium which was organized and
held in the fall of 1968 at Seaview, New Jersey, under the sponsorship of the
four professional groups most concerned with financial reporting: the Ameri
can Institute of CPAs, the Financial Analysts Federation, the Financial Exec
utives Institute and the Robert Morris Associates. Its objective was to foster
both organized and continuing informal contacts among members of these
groups with the intent of improving the reporting process. The papers and
proceedings of this symposium were published in 1969 under the title
Corporate Financial Reporting: Conflicts and Challenges.
The groups and participants at the time felt that the meeting was success
ful in this respect, and in the years since this meeting continuing benefits have
been felt. The Accounting Principles Board, for example, has broadened its
consultations at an earlier stage in its decision-making process. A financial
analyst has been included in its membership. There has been an increased
number of joint panels and discussions at the meetings of the four sponsoring
organizations, and there has been some coordination of research effort. Be
yond this, personal relationships established at Seaview have been the basis
for continuing informal contacts and conversations.
It would be presumptuous indeed to assert that all of the items men
tioned above were the result solely of the first symposium, since many might
have occurred in any case, and others required much work by many people
subsequent to Seaview. Nevertheless, that meeting can be identified as a sig
nificant event in the developing cooperation among the organizations in
volved.
One specific outcome was the development into a continuing organiza
tion of the Symposium Steering Committee, which had originally been estab
lished to organize and supervise the first meeting. This group of eleven men,
comprised of the chief professional staff members of the four organizations,
held meetings every four months and served as a means by which the organi
zations could keep up-to-date on the activities of others and could plan vari
ous joint efforts.

In the fall of 1970, this group concluded that a second symposium
should be held. A number of topics were considered and after concurrence
on the part of all the groups, the topic of ethics in financial reporting was
agreed upon. The Steering Committee spent many hours in the development
of the program and the selection of paper and case preparers and of discussion
leaders. The editor, who served as committee chairman, is deeply grateful for
the invaluable help of all members of this group, both in this specific respect
and for the continuing application of common sense and intellectual rigor in
the process of bringing the proceedings to this form.
While all members of the Steering Committee were deeply involved in
the symposium, a special note must be made of the efforts of Michael Pinto of
the AICPA who coordinated the entire program and took responsibility for
the hundreds of details which had to be attended to. He was aided in making
physical arrangements at Seaview by Douglas Heath of the AICPA. These
two men deserve the credit for the smoothness with which the meeting was
handled.
In addition, Margaret Williams handled the many problems associated
with the distribution of materials to participants as well as the typing of the
final manuscript, and Marie Bareille of the publications staff of the AICPA
showed talent and patience in dealing with a frequently delinquent editor.
Without these many effective efforts, the end result would not have been
possible.
Readers of these proceedings will feel on many occasions a sense of
frustration resulting from the brevity with which some of the subjects dis
cussed are covered. This is due primarily to the limited time available at the
Symposium and to the fact that participants rightfully assumed considerable
experience and expertise in their audience. Those readers with an interest in
sharing the background of the participants and in studying the area of finan
cial reporting in greater depth are referred to the professional journals of the
sponsoring organizations: The Journal of Accountancy, the Financial Ana
lysts Journal, the Financial Executive and The Journal of Commercial Bank
Lending. Many of the subjects considered at the Symposium have been dis
cussed at much greater length in these productive sources.
The editor must also express his own personal appreciation to the Steer
ing Committee for their continued willingness to involve him in exciting
professional activities of this sort and for their judicious application of both
needling and encouragement to urge him to greater efforts.
John C. Burton
Graduate School of Business
Columbia University
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Introduction
Accurate and reliable information is the cornerstone upon which an
economically effective capital market is built. If such a market is to allocate
capital resources among competing claimants, there must be adequate data to
appraise the utility of capital in various enterprises, and there must be con
fidence on the part of investors and lenders that the data is accurately pre
pared and presented in good faith by the seekers of capital.
Corporate financial reporting in the United States is almost certainly the
best in the world. Most corporate financial officers have grown up in a cli
mate where full and fair disclosure is normal good business practice, and the
reports of an overwhelming majority of publicly held corporations reflect a
conscientious effort to tell the corporate story “like it is,” at least within the
framework of the conventional accounting model.
Despite this generally commendable record, a number of situations have
arisen in recent years which give evidence of less-than-good-faith reporting,
and these cases have received notoriety far out of proportion to their number.
Similarly, there have been cases of less than totally professional practice in
the auditing and analytical use of financial information which have been
brought to public attention.
In addition, there have been criticisms of the basic accounting model and
its application in some circumstances where it was not felt to describe busi
ness activities adequately, and there have been several suggestions that the
historical accounting approach did not present sufficient information on which
to base investment decisions.
In the light of these challenges, the four principal organizations profes
sionally involved in corporate financial reporting concluded that a discussion
of ethics in reporting would serve a useful purpose in identifying the relevant
issues in this changing area and in considering them jointly.
Accordingly, leading members of the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants, the Financial Analysts Federation, the Financial Execu
tives Institute, and the Robert Morris Associates gathered at the Seaview
Country Club, Absecon, New Jersey, in mid-November for a two-day sympo
sium. Also present were representatives of the Securities and Exchange Com
mission, the New York Stock Exchange, and the legal profession.
Three years ago, the same four organizations sponsored the first Seaview
1

symposium on conflicts and challenges in corporate financial reporting, and
from that meeting came significantly improved communication among the
groups.

Objectives of the Symposium
The second symposium, like the first, was not designed to produce any
legislative result. No formal group report was contemplated or issued, nor
should this edited transcript be viewed as a report of group conclusions. The
objective of the program was to provide a forum where ideas about ethics in
reporting could be discussed, and new ideas for the improved performance of
the reporting process could germinate. In this connection, a number of back
ground papers were prepared which were read by the participants in ad
vance of the meeting. The symposium itself, after a keynote address by Dr.
Clarence Walton, president of The Catholic University of America, was entire
ly devoted to discussion under the leadership of five discussion leaders drawn
from academic ranks. Reflecting this emphasis, the volume begins with an
edited transcript of the discussions, rather than with the papers. Since the
papers served as background for all aspects of the meeting, it was not practi
cal to associate specific discussions with specific papers. The meeting itself
was not organized by papers, but by topics, and this approach is reflected
herein. The valuable contribution of the papers was in laying ideas on the
table and stimulating the thinking of the participants.
The transcript of the discussions ran to 460 pages which indicated, at
least, that participants talked about ten per cent faster than at the previous
symposium. The editor’s task was made more difficult by the tendency of
various issues to come up at various times during the two days, and accord
ingly a chronological organization of the discussions was impractical. In this
report, therefore, the editor attempted to gather together, under major topical
headings, discussions which took place at different times. In so doing, com
ments frequently had to be eliminated to avoid repetition, and some had to be
edited to place them in context. In no case, however, was the occasionally
fertile imagination of the editor used to create comments that did not exist.
Only in the introduction to each section is the editorial prerogative of com
ment exercised.
A part of each day’s discussions was devoted to consideration of a case.
These two cases were written for the symposium by Professors Robert Grinaker and David Hawkins, who also led the case discussions. While these cases
contributed significantly to the insights of the participants by testing their
ideas against certain specific factual situations, it did not seem desirable to re
produce the transcript of the case discussions as such. Certain segments of
these discussions dealt with general principles, and these are included in ap
propriate sections of the edited transcript. The responses to the specific situa
tions were summarized by the editor and accompany the text of the cases.
2

Keynote Remarks

The stage for the discussions was challengingly set by Dr. Clarence Wal
ton in his keynote remarks. He developed the changing philosophical views
of the role of the corporation and its management in society, starting with the
representationalist view which held that the management represented the
stockholders and was responsible to them alone; this was the historical and
legal view of the entity. In contrast, he identified the trusteeship concept
which implies that a corporation holds a franchise from society and that man
agement must therefore take a view of a larger universe that transcends stock
holder interests. This latter concept, which he perceived as dominant today,
has implications for both business and reporting decisions, and these were
considered frequently in the discussions at the symposium.
Within this framework he also identified the essential criteria of an eth
ical system. These included freedom of choice, the assumption of rationality,
a system of sanctions so that rewards and punishments are attached to ethical
effort, and a monitoring system with the ability to exercise sanctions. These
criteria also were returned to frequently in the consideration of the ethical
system associated with financial reporting.

Responsibility for Reports

The first substantive ethical issue to be considered by the group was the
possible conflict of interest between the decision-making role of management
and the financial reporting role. In two of the background papers, authors
had suggested that there was an ethical problem arising from this joint role
that management plays since it could not impartially report on its own
achievements. The possibility of an outside “public reporter” was considered,
and the public accountant was generally felt to be the most likely to fill this
role if it developed. A substantial majority of the group, however, felt that the
responsibility for reporting on corporate activities should remain with manage
ment, subject to the review of the independent auditor as to the fairness of the
financial statements. This conclusion was based on the ground that manage
ment reporting had largely worked well, that an outside reporter could not
possibly be as fully aware of the activities of the business as could manage
ment, and that even the establishment of the public accountant as public
reporter would not assure the absence of ethical conflict due to the fee rela
tionship existing between the auditor and the corporation.
Most participants seemed to agree that altering the basic structure of
responsibility for reporting would represent an overreaction, and perhaps an
ineffective one, to the small number of cases in which unethical and mislead
ing reporting had occurred. Such a solution would require a definition of who
was responsible for a firm’s information system and what legal responsibilities
would fall on the public reporter—both difficult problems. Substantial addi
3

tional reporting expense would also probably be incurred if this responsibility
were turned over to an outside party, and considerable doubt was expressed
as to whether any benefits gained would warrant this cost.
While there were still a few participants who believed that auditors
would not have to expand their work substantially to become public report
ers and that their independent professional outlook would significantly im
prove the quality of reporting, the majority seemed to feel that a more modest
change in the outside auditor’s responsibility would mend the few situations
where reports failed to reflect the reality of the firm’s activities. The sugges
tion was made that if the auditor accepted responsibility for and attested to
the fairness of financial reports rather than simply their conformity with gen
erally accepted accounting principles, most of the dramatic cases of using an
accounting formula to misstate results would be eliminated.
"Fairness" and Accounting Principles

The suggestion that auditors be made responsible for fairness of state
ments as well as conformity to generally accepted accounting principles led
to a discussion of both the definition of fairness and the definition of account
ing principles. Here a major controversy arose. One part of the group essen
tially harked back to Dr. Walton’s hypothesis that an ethical system required
a dimension of freedom to be operative. From this, it was argued that the
rigorous and detailed definition of accounting principles would tend to elimi
nate ethics from the reporting process and lead to “letter-of-the-law” reporting
which would not reflect the realities of the business in some cases. This group
seemed to prefer to define fairness in terms of professional judgment about
the adequacy of reports in reflecting economic reality, and by implication to
prefer a common law approach whereby accounting propriety would be de
fined through a series of case decisions about appropriate accounting under
various factual situations, as compared to the Roman law approach in which
a fixed code of principles would be developed with the intent of solving prob
lems in advance through detailed proscription.
On the other hand, a significant group argued that when fairness is iso
lated from generally accepted accounting principles, one has nothing; without
defined principles, fairness becomes a purely subjective term, not amenable
either to analysis or enforcement. This group argued that the route to im
proved reporting was a more comprehensive and specific definition of account
ing principles which would then represent fairness as generally agreed upon
by an authoritative professional body.
After considerable discussion, a consensus seemed to emerge that brought
together these views. It was generally felt that the definition of acceptable ac
counting principles was a step toward fairness of presentation, and that the
comparability of various statements which resulted was part of that fairness.
At the same time, it seemed to be felt by most participants that a total defini
tion of accounting principles that would meet subjective ethical canons of
4

fairness was not possible due to the diversity of situations existing in the eco
nomic world. It seemed that while such a step as the definition of accounting
principles by industry might be useful, there remained an overall criterion of
fairness which could be applied on a common-sense basis by a professional
accountant which could not be totally supplanted by any institutional or leg
islative means. Thus, the idea that auditors express an opinion on such over
all fairness as well as conformity with established principles retained substan
tial support. At the same time, there was general agreement that the process
of definition taking place in the Accounting Principles Board should be
continued.

Timeliness and Interim Reports

This discussion led to consideration of the timeliness of disclosure and
the extent to which reliance on a public reporter or increased responsibility
for public accountants would delay corporate reports to the public. Financial
managers felt that the potential for delay was considerable if outsiders were
to have either primary or audit responsibility for interim reports. Analysts
emphasized the need for reliability in quarterly reports and felt that auditors
should be associated with them in some fashion even if a full audit opinion
were not included. They felt, and the auditors present seemed to agree, that
the acceptance of some audit responsibility for interim reports should not re
quire large amounts of additional audit work or any substantial delay in the
publication of results. No clear consensus was reached in this area.

Published Forecasts and Financial Reporting

Another major subject considered at some length in the symposium was
whether or not the publication of historical financial statements constituted
sufficient financial disclosure by corporations. In this connection, the group
addressed itself to the comment of one of the paper preparers that one prin
cipal objective of good corporate reporting to the financial community is the
minimization of surprise. There seemed to be fairly general agreement with
this proposition, and its implementation led to a discussion of the role of pub
lished forecasts in financial reporting.
This topic had been discussed at the first Seaview symposium, and at
that time there seemed general distrust of the whole idea. In three years a
significant change in viewpoint could be detected. Among the participants,
the analysts seemed generally in agreement that public forecasting was an
idea whose time had come, while corporate executives, although not agreeing
that regular published forecasts were the right answer, did concur that finan
cial management had a responsibility to avoid surprises and that the publica
tion of explicit forecasts might be one of the ways of meeting this responsibil
5

ity. Several executives, however, preferred the approach of giving assistance
to analysts so that their forecasts were not too far away from reality as cur
rently perceived by the corporation.
There was considerable debate as to the appropriate form for forecasted
financial data. Some people seemed to advocate a full set of projected finan
cial statements for a period of time into the future, while others suggested a
more general forecast of a range of earnings per share and the identification
of the crucial events which management anticipated would occur in subse
quent periods.
There was considerable dismay expressed over the potential legal liabili
ties that might accrue in any scheme requiring the publication of explicit fore
casts as a regular part of financial reporting. In this connection, Commis
sioner James Needham of the Securities and Exchange Commission com
mented that the Commission was re-thinking its historical opposition to the
publication of forecasts in registration statements and other published
documents. He also indicated that he recognized that consideration of the
problems of liability was an important part of the re-thinking of this and
other proposed adjustments in financial reporting.
There was some discussion as well regarding the role of the auditor in
corporate forecasts, and the British experience was referred to in which the
auditor does associate himself with forecasts but does not take responsibility
for the assumptions on which they are based. Auditors indicated that they
were thinking seriously about their possible role in this area, but there seemed
to be no strong sentiment among the group that an auditor’s attestation would
add significantly to the reliability of a forecast.
While it was apparent from the discussion that total agreement was far
from being achieved on the subject of published forecasts, there was consid
erably greater feeling in favor of some form of forecasting than had existed
three years before. In considering appropriate steps to take to build on the
discussion at Seaview, there was general agreement that one logical step was
to pursue the forecasting issue in a systematic fashion at a subsequent meeting
of representatives of the four sponsoring organizations. Such a meeting might
be charged with the responsibility of developing recommendations for the
SEC and the public as to the forms public forecasting might take and the
risks associated with it, including the problems of competitive disadvantage,
legal liability, and behavioral constraints on management which were touched
on at the symposium.

Development of Increased Professionalism
The papers and the discussions at Seaview also urged the development
of increased professionalism both in the preparation and use of financial re
ports. It was agreed that professional competence in both areas was an im
portant part of the ethical system covering financial reporting, since the basic
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qualities of honesty and integrity must be placed in an appropriate setting if
they are to be operationally effective.
In this connection, it was noted that the AICPA Code of Ethics requires
members to adhere to technical standards and a proposed revision of it greatly
expands these requirements. The current codes of ethics of the Financial Ana
lysts Federation and the Robert Morris Associates tend to emphasize relation
ships among members rather than professional competence. It was felt that
all three codes might well be supplemented to include definitions of profes
sional objectives and some statements that would define the parameters of
competence in each professional area. In addition, standards of performance
in the demonstration of competence might be articulated in the codes so that
an inadequate effort could be identified and criticized.
It was also observed that at this time the Financial Executives Institute
did not have a published code of ethics, although representatives of that or
ganization said that one was under consideration. The feeling was expressed
that the FEI and the other groups might well consider the development of
an ethical code covering all corporate reporting which would be promulgated
both to the professionals in the area and to the chief executive officers of cor
porations who are ultimately responsible for the reports of their enterprises.
This code would not replace the codes of individual organizations since they
have more than one purpose and specialized interest to consider, but it would
blend their joint professional competence in the reporting process.

A Surveillance System
A final area related to professionalism that received considerable atten
tion was suggested by the keynote speaker’s reference to the need for sanc
tions and a monitoring system in connection with any ethical system. The
group discussed at some length the need for additional surveillance over ethi
cal practice in financial reporting. Concern was expressed that the temptation
to indulge in unethical conduct tended to be inversely related to corporate
size and success, and it was felt that any surveillance system would have to
include the entire range of public reporting corporations. On the user side,
examples of unprofessional use of financial reports would also be difficult to
detect.
There was also considerable discussion related to the distinction between
ethical and legal standards for defining good practice in the reporting sphere.
Some participants felt that only through the development of legal standards
and enforcement through the legal process could sound ethical practice be
satisfactorily achieved. They pointed out that once ethical standards became
norms they would be applied by the courts and would become part of the
legal structure of the reporting environment. Recent cases and decisions have
supported the view that where professional standards lag behind public ex
pectations, the latter may serve as the basis for determining both legal liability
7

and ethical judgments as to what represents the proper course of action.
Those who declined to rely solely upon legal sanctions and the regula
tory surveillance system now in existence indicated that they felt a need for
an institutional vehicle by which users of financial statements could complain
about what they consider to be unethical practice. It was agreed that the ac
counting profession’s institution of practice review had not been effective in
this area and several analysts believed that there should be some means by
which reports that met technical standards, but not ethical standards of com
pleteness and economic accuracy, could be brought to the public’s attention.
The Financial Analysts Federation’s current procedure of presenting an
award to good annual reports was seen as a step in the right direction, but a
need was also felt for applying sanctions to inadequate reporting as well.
Symposium participants seemed sympathetic to this idea, but there were no
concrete suggestions for the institutionalization of a complaint mechanism,
such as a review body or a professional ombudsman. It was pointed out that
at the present time many such reporting deficiencies are brought to the atten
tion of the public through the press, particularly by a few reporters who
regularly mention accounting matters in their columns.

Suggestions for the Future

At the conclusion of the symposium, there was general agreement among
the participants that it had been successful in achieving its objectives. Several
suggestions were made for the continuation of the communication process
among groups. One of these advocated the creation of a Council on Corporate
Reporting constituted of four to six representatives of each of the sponsoring
organizations which would meet on a continuing basis to discuss general and
specific issues and to make recommendations. Another suggestion was for
more frequent symposiums devoted to more specific topics. The consideration
of these and other ideas was left to the Symposium Steering Committee for
the development of recommendations as to further activities.
Commissioner Needham gave the symposium a charge for future action
when he indicated a general recognition of a desire for change in financial re
porting and the need for the organizations both to define their respective roles
in the process of change and to commit themselves to assume responsibility
for a higher level of conduct in day-to-day business affairs. He urged the
groups not to wait two or three years for their next symposium, and stated the
interest of the SEC in specific recommendations that might arise from this or
other joint efforts, since he felt that the private sector really has a better ca
pacity than government for dealing with problems of the sort discussed at
Seaview.
As was apparent from the objectives of the symposium, its success must
be measured not in terms of the specific output but in terms of what follows.
The final measure of value must await continuing steps for the structuring of
continuity and change in corporate financial reporting.
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Symposium Discussions

Responsibility for Reports
Management has traditionally had the principal legal and ethical respon
sibility for reports on the activities of the business which it controls. There
have been some observers, including Professor Douglas Hayes in his paper,
who have raised the question as to whether this arrangement creates an eth
ical problem of conflict of interest between the responsibility for operating a
business and that of reporting on its activities.
In the discussions that follow, it is clear that this ethical problem is not
solved, but at the same time, there are major questions as to the competence
of others to serve as public reporters without the depth of background and
knowledge of the business which management possesses. In addition, it is
pointed out that the conflict of interest problem is not really solved by having
public accountants, paid by management, as reporters, and other alternatives
are not readily available.
While disagreements remain, there seems to be a consensus that the sys
tem of reporting by management, attestation by auditors, and analyses by
analysts has not worked badly except in a very limited number of cases. It
seems to be felt that if auditors were to attest to something beyond concur
rence with a formula called generally accepted accounting principles, and if
analysts could improve and perhaps institutionalize their surveillance over the
reporting process to bring to light dubious practices, the present basic system
of responsibilities might prove better than any reasonable alternative in view
at this time.

Discussion
Discussion Leader: It has been suggested in one paper that there is a
basic conflict of interest between management’s responsibilities for operating
the business and its responsibility for reporting thereon. First we have to con
sider whether this is a basic conflict, and if so, then we must look to whether
it should be resolved by changing the basic responsibility for reporting.
Analyst: I don’t think there is any question whatsoever but that the
conflict exists. Doug Hayes has cited some reasons for it in his paper. In the
final analysis, one of the basic missions of management is to minimize the
cost of capital. Where there are alternative reporting methods available, they
have the responsibility to select the one which would be most favorably re
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ceived by investors and creditors and hence facilitate the attraction of both
debt and equity capital.
If they do not do this, they are not performing the function that their
shareholders have appointed them to. I don’t see any way around this kind
of a conflict of interest, because there will be times when managements are
forced to choose between public responsibility and shareholder responsibility
at a point where these two are in conflict.
Financial Executive: I wonder if this conflict is really so clear. I
think that most companies report in a responsible way because they have
found that in the long run this kind of reporting is just plain good business.
It is better business than looking for the highest short-term presentation:
“Fast-buck” shenanigans don’t pay off.
Discussion Leader: Is it sufficient to rely on managements, some of
whose interests are intensely short-run, to be guided by such long-run consid
erations? Wouldn’t it be safer simply to assign reporting responsibility to
some outside party?
Financial Executive: I doubt that anybody outside a company is able
to write an annual report or to adequately tell the investing public what the
problems of that company are, or what progress it is making. No one else can
do it.
As close as the public accountant might be—and they are often very
close—I don’t think that he could tell the “story” of the company. They now
attest to the financial statements, and that is their responsibility.
Analyst: I would judge that more annual reports are written by out
siders than by insiders. This is what the existence of the financial public
relations industry is based on. I would question whether management is the
only one that can tell the “story.”
Financial Executive: I think you have to be more definitive when you
say that the annual report is prepared by an outsider. The president’s letter
is prepared, generally speaking, by the chief executive. When you get into
the theme of the report, there may be assistance from a public relations firm.
Financial Executive: Isn’t the real question who is the provider of
the factual input? Having an outsider dress up your language for you so that
it communicates better doesn’t change the fact input that you are dealing with
in the first place.
Financial Executive: In a good many fields of endeavor in this world,
ghost-writers are used—not the least in politics. Whether a person is sufficient
ly articulate in the written word to put a series of letters and words together
better than someone else has nothing to do with responsibility for the content.
Whether the financial public relations field is flourishing, therefore, has noth
ing to do with the responsibility for the written word in the annual report.
The content, the thrust, the theme, the disclosures are the responsibility
of management, regardless of whether a PR firm is used or not; that is the
important thing. I also do not think there is any way the responsibility for
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words of the report can be divorced from the financial statements; judgments
as to what is significant must be reflected in both.
Discussion Leader: Perhaps the public reporter should report, and then
let the management explain what it perceives to be most significant. In this
way you will have a set of financial data which is presented by a public re
porter who identifies these as the best that can be presented in his professional,
external, independent judgment, but management will retain responsibility for
interpretation.
Financial Executive: Right now the management presents the data;
the accountant testifies as to its acceptability; and then the financial analyst
interprets it. He criticizes, condemns, and does everything else in the course
of either accepting of not accepting what the management says. To put the
public accountant between the financial analyst and the management of the
company is to make everyone’s task harder.
Financial Executive: My first reaction is certainly negative, but I’m
willing to explore how you would do this. How far would you have a third
party’s responsibility go? Would he be responsible for maintaining the under
lying data that you are going to use to report to the public?
There are decisions made all through the year that have to go through
the books. Does he have to run all the accounting departments in the
country? And, if he reports to the public, who, then, is going to audit his
work? Are we going to have a reporting group and auditors to audit the audi
tors? Where do we stop?
Discussion Leader: I don’t want to take the position of an advocate
since my mind is not made up on the desirability of third-party reporting, but
let me offer a hypothesis as to how it might go.
Today, the auditor has responsibility for reviewing the adequacy of his
client’s information system and internal controls. As a public reporter,
he would not change this part of his role. The basic data would still be main
tained by the corporation, and the auditor would have to satisfy himself that
the output of the system is mechanically accurate. Then the public reporter
would use this basic data to report on the operations of the firm. Perhaps the
public accountant will be the public reporter, or perhaps this role should be
assigned to chartered financial analysts, to a totally new cadre of experts, or
to a public accountant different than the one who audits the information
system.
CPA: One financial executive implied that all management reports are
complete, but I think history will show that many management reports are
incomplete.
Who is going to be the monitor of those management reports that lack
real, substantive content? I think this is a serious issue.
Financial Executive: I think, in general, reports from management are
basically complete. It is an unusual organization that does not want to re
port completely.
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Let me turn to another question which would arise if we asked auditors
to expand their function. Suppose we have a plant coming on stream and we
report this in our annual report. What could our public accountants do to
improve disclosure about the capabilities of that particular plant? Do they
have as much competence as management to evaluate the benefit of that par
ticular new plant, what its capacity is and what its effect will be on our or
ganization?
CPA: I agree that the public reporter might have to do a lot more work
than we do now, but auditors are today evaluating your company’s conclu
sions in writing off start-up costs and estimating the life of the plant and set
ting unit-of-production statistics.
There would be some extension of the work, certainly, and possibly a
lot more subjective decisions, but I don’t think it’s as hard as you make it out
to be. It would be a fascinating task.
Financial Executive: I would submit that the public accountant is not
competent to talk about the quality and the capabilities of the management,
because the public accountant, by definition, has had his education, his train
ing, in a relatively narrow field of the business endeavor, and there is no rea
son to think that a man who has been thus schooled is competent to evaluate
a marketing executive, or a manufacturing executive, or a chief executive. Per
haps he can evaluate the financial officer, but beyond that field I don’t think
the public accountant has competence.
CPA: That’s why it’s going to take us ten years to do it.
Financial Executive: I don’t know who is going to pay that bill to
make you competent.
Financial Executive: I think that most companies today give their
public accountants an opportunity to review the president’s letter and the text
of the report, comment on it, and recommend changes. So there is much joint
effort on the part of management and their public accounting firm in the re
porting process. There is a lot more cooperation than conflict.
Analyst: Since so much of this is already being done, it shouldn’t be
much of an adjustment for the proxy rules to be changed to make the ac
countants responsible for everything in the annual report.
Financial Executive: I would say that there is an overwhelming gap
between the knowledge of the public accountant about the financial state
ments and about future projects and nonaccounting items in the body of the
report. Some of them, perhaps, would lend themselves to certification, but the
basic nature of what management says in the body of the report about what
is going on in the business is quite far removed from the historical financial
statements. My company, for one, would not like to pay the bill for having
an accountant familiarize himself sufficiently with our business so that he
could certify the annual report.
CPA: CPAs are having enough trouble with the current attest function.
I don’t think we should worry about extending what we are doing. What we
must do is to see what ethical constraints can be added or improved upon in
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what we are already doing. We have not reached any kind of perfection in
our current role. How can we push forward to try to attest to the competency
of management or the quality of the products they are producing?
Financial Executive : I agree. If the accountant is to be required to be
responsible for the complete annual report and for reporting on management,
the expertise required of him is going to include the fields of engineering, sales,
purchasing, and many others. Even beyond the need for such expertise, we
cannot hope that the accountant could be sufficiently acquainted with every
thing that goes on from day to day. To do this job, he would have to be an
overall expert in every field, and he would have to take part in day-to-day
operations as they occur. I don’t think it’s possible.
CPA: I have two comments. First, I reject the suggestion that CPAs are
simply experts in accounting and accounting principles and not aware of the
business as a whole. We have to be—and we are—involved in the general eco
nomic aspects of the business as they relate to the background of what’s be
ing developed in the financial statements. Without that background, you
can’t do a good job of auditing in the first place.
On the other hand, I agree that CPAs are not generally equipped to
come in and be appraisers of management, outside of the financial area where
we have constant exposure. There is nobody who can be all things to all peo
ple. We and management have different roles to fill, but we can contribute
to each other.
CPA: It seems obvious to me that the auditor is not in a position to ex
press opinions about the quality of the management, as such, in the present
circumstances; it also seems that the input for the financial report has to come
from management in the first instance.
This does not solve the question of responsibility, but I think this ques
tion would lose much of its significance if the auditor accepted the responsi
bility of expressing an opinion on the fairness of the financial statements. If,
in fact, he puts himself on the line for the fairness of the statements, I think
the public is getting what is needed.
CPA: One middle ground might be to have the accountants assume pri
mary responsibility for only that portion of the report which relates to the
application of accounting principles. The responsibility for underlying data
and other facts and assertions would remain as at present.
Financial Executive: Implicit in many of the remarks that have gone
before us is that there is no conflict on the part of the public accountants like
the conflict that management has. But the fee relationship is a very funda
mental conflict here. How do we eliminate conflicts of interest by merely
transferring this responsibility to the public accountant?
Banker: As a user of financial statements, I would like to feel that I can
continue to look to the management of the company to tell me what is going
on, and that I could believe what he said after having worked with him over
a period of time and judged his character. I would prefer to be able to talk
to him and not have to feel that I had to go to the accountant to get the facts
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about the company, its projections, how it was going to operate, and what its
game plan was.
I think the accountants certainly have a very important role to play,
but I think we are downgrading the competence and the integrity of manage
ment when we talk about the auditors as the principal reporters of corporate
results.
Banker: In one way, what we are saying is that we are going to imple
ment a very complicated and cumbersome system of review to isolate a very
small amount of unethical conduct. Since whatever individuals that assume
this responsibility will also be human beings, there undoubtedly will still be
some of them who do not achieve ethical perfection. And so you haven’t
solved the problem. Indeed, you have made it worse.
Discussion Leader: I sense from this discussion that there is some con
cern about the conflict of interests that exists when management reports on its
own activities, particularly because those relatively few cases where manage
ment does not report properly assume an importance that is out of proportion
to their numbers. On the other hand, there is no agreement that designating
an auditor or anyone else as a public reporter would solve the problem.
There seems a greater inclination to stay with the present system of basic re
sponsibilities while perhaps increasing that of the auditor to include as part of
his report an opinion on overall fairness of presentation as well as congruence
with generally accepted accounting principles.
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Fairness in Financial Reporting
Throughout the symposium, there was continued discussion of the con
cept of fairness in financial reporting. Several issues were discussed in this
regard.
In the first place, a number of the participants were clearly concerned
with the thrust of recent court decisions which established a principle of fair
ness as taking precedence over generally accepted practice when the two
came into conflict. One part of the group felt that the appropriate response to
these cases was to increase the degree of definition of accounting principles,
while others felt that it would be better to assign to management and the au
ditors a responsibility for fairness above the simple application of rules.
From this, the group was led to a general discussion of whether codifica
tion of rules led to greater fairness or whether it might hamper the application
of ethical canons of fairness by encouraging a letter-of-the-law kind of think
ing. The problem of developing standards for fairness in a general sense was
identified, as were the difficulties of applying fairness to new business situa
tions where there was little experience with the realities of the business
situation.
It was noted that the courts and regulatory agencies might make law
out of the ethical concept of fairness through case decisions, and it was sug
gested that perhaps the corporate, analytical, and accounting communities
should establish some means by which reporting fairness could be appraised
before the fact on a case-by-case basis.
The discussion indicates the difficulty which participants feel exists in the
definition and application of an ethical standard of fairness, but at the same
time, a feeling seems to emerge that something more than specifically defined
accounting procedures is needed.

Discussion
Discussion Leader: A number of recent legal cases have raised ques
tions about the adequacy of financial statements, even though they were pre
sented in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles. Does this
mean we should look beyond general acceptability as defined by the
Accounting Principles Board in evaluating both the legal and ethical respon
sibility of accountants and financial executives?
17

CPA: I would like to ask a question of one of the lawyers present. In
the Continental Vending case that has brought the problem of liability most
conspicuously before us, the key question was one of disclosure rather than
one of accounting principles, and our rules on disclosure are simply that the
financial statements shall adequately disclose all necessary information; that’s
a fairly subjective determination.
My question is whether, if we were dealing with a matter of principle—
that is, whether an asset should be carried at cost, or cost or market, or
whether amortization should be over a certain period—would the jury have
felt as free to come to a conclusion in opposition to the professional posture
on the subject?
Attorney: What you are asking is whether you would have had the
same result if you had a rule that was clearly set forth. I would rather doubt
it in that case; but by the same token, I think it’s implicit in the case that if
the evidence is that the application of a fixed rule would result in something
less than fair disclosure, you might end up with the same result.
There is another recent case where it appeared that there had been ade
quate compliance with generally accepted accounting principles, but never
theless the court felt that the statement of one long-term investment was mis
leading because it was carried at a once written down figure from the cost of
the asset. The court felt that, in view of the circumstances that existed at the
time of the publication of the financial statements, it should have been writ
ten down again.
Therefore, I don’t think you can say as a flat statement that if there is
a clear-cut rule which is the basis upon which an item is carried on the balance sheet or income statement, the rule automatically relieves the possibility
of liability, if it can be shown that it is not consistent with a fair presentation.
From these decisions there has been created a general overlay of fairness
which indicates that you have to look past accounting principles and account
ing rules to find out whether fairness is served.
CPA: Would you then discard the terminology “generally accepted
accounting principles”?
Attorney: No, I think there has to be something like that, whatever
you call it. There have to be guidelines, and the effort of the APB, of course,
is to narrow those guidelines, make them more precise.
Whether the precision of the rule-making effort will ever result in a situ
ation where you can apply the rules and not be concerned about this over
view of fairness, I don’t know; but I would think there would always have
to be some guidelines as a starting point.
The principle laid down in the Continental Vending case was that de
fined principles are useful tools. The Court said that a presumption of fair
presentation is created if you have complied with generally accepted account
ing principles, but it’s not a conclusive presumption in every case.
CPA: I am concerned with this idea of separating fairness from gener
ally accepted accounting principles. It seems to me that we ought to be con
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cerned with making the rules covering accounting principles fair. If the
rules are fair, the application of the rules is going to result in something that
is fair, and if it doesn’t in some circumstances, we will change the rules and
learn to make the rules better. But this vague notion of fairness seems to me
to be rather frightening.
Attorney: My concern is whether you ever can get the generally ac
cepted accounting principles defined with such precision and in such detail
that you never have to be concerned whether the application of those rules
would result in a fair presentation.
The standard form of certificate speaks of “fairly stated in accordance
with generally accepted accounting principles.” I think what the Court was
doing in the Continental Vending case was going beyond this and saying that
it had to represent two assurances: first, that generally accepted accounting
principles were followed, and second, that the auditor had made an indepen
dent determination of fairness. The CPA was not home free with only the
first assurance, despite the fact that there was a strong presumption that the
matter was fairly stated.
CPA: I think it is very disturbing to the profession if that language
holds up, because it’s a whole new ball game.
Financial Executive: I’d like to make an observation on this point of
separating accounting principles from the question of fairness. I think that
all managements take a stand regarding the fairness of their presentation
when they publish financial statements, and in that sense management is way
ahead of the accountants with respect to taking a position and having a will
ingness to accept responsibility for fairness.
CPA: Let me ask a question about that comment. Suppose there is a
large item of goodwill required under generally accepted accounting princi
ples which management personally believes shouldn’t be on the balance sheet
at all. You still have to put it on the balance sheet.
Financial Executive: You are stating that responsible corporate man
agement will publish what they believe to be misleading financial statements,
and I can’t accept that.
CPA: But take the situation I have cited. If this particular management
happened to feel the presentation was unfair, and yet it was required under
generally accepted accounting principles, what will they say about it?
Financial Executive: They can say a lot about it. They can say that
they are publishing financial statements that are not a fair presentation of the
condition of their company, but their auditors require them to do so.
CPA: Turning to the practical question of whether it would have a ben
eficial effect if fairness and generally accepted accounting principles were two
separate things that the accounting profession had to deal with, I believe it
would have a salutary effect, even though it would be bad from a liability
standpoint.
If anyone has to take the blame for not keeping in bounds the “go-go
boys” or those who used accounting gimmicks which don’t reflect business
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reality but are within the confines of generally accepted accounting princi
ples, I believe it has to be the accounting profession. We were in a position
to do something about the problem, and we should have done so. I don’t
think any set of rules, no matter how broadly based or how finely written,
are going to absolve our profession from calling a spade a spade when gen
erally accepted accounting principles are used to create profits not produced
by business operations.
CPA: My favorite solution to this problem is that generally accepted ac
counting principle number one should be that the financial statements be fair
and not misleading. This would widen our liability, but it would increase the
value of our service.
Financial Executive : I would like to pursue this question of how any
increase in legal liability can be created by reason of the separation of the
two concepts. I think the management of the corporation does represent that
the statements are a fair presentation, and also that they are in accord with
generally accepted accounting principles. Since management is already re
sponsible for that, I don’t see why liability is increased by making such a
statement explicitly.
Attorney: I think that question leads us to a consideration of the dis
tinction between ethics and law, and what’s happening to that distinction.
When you move an ethical responsibility into a sanction system, you have
ceased to have an ethical principle. You now have a legal duty for neglect
of which somebody can suffer detriment or harm.
Historically, it has been found that ethical standards are really inade
quate protection for society, with the result that more of the things that have
been regarded as ethical principles and responsibilities have become sanc
tioned by law and become legal responsibilities.
The “fairness” that we have been talking about is a good example.
“Fair” isn’t a legal category. “Fair” is an ethical category; yet legal respon
sibilities are now being attached to a failure to be fair.
You have the same thing in the case of the constitution of the National
Association of Securities Dealers. It says that the members shall conduct
themselves in accordance with just and equitable principles of trade. Well,
just and equitable principles of trade to me is an ethical concept, and yet
people are being put out of the securities business because they are not com
plying with just and equitable principles of trade.
CPA: Isn’t “fairness” a terribly difficult standard to apply? Take the
oil industry, for example; some oil companies show oil reserves in their state
ments and others do not. Some companies use a full costing approach for
their producing property while others use the individual well or lease as their
property unit. Companies in both these categories honestly feel that they are
being fair. Is it possible for both to be fair when significantly different state
ments result?
CPA: It boils down to the fact that when you isolate fairness from gen
erally accepted accounting principles, you have absolutely no standards
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whatever. There is absolutely no such thing as a standard of fairness in ac
counting apart from generally accepted accounting principles. Without gen
erally accepted accounting principles you are cut adrift in any attempt to
determine fairness. That’s purely a subjective term when you remove it from
the accounting sphere which is what’s being attempted here. I don’t think
you have such a thing as an isolated standard of fairness.
Analyst: It may be difficult to define what fairness is, but I believe it
is possible to look at some situations and conclude that the presentation is
not fair. Let me cite an example of a real, live company, the Allis-Chalmers
Company.
During 1970 the management of the company generally let it be known
in the financial community that the earnings would be $1.50 a share. Came
September and the third quarter report, they were still letting the $1.50 sit
out there, but they did mention in the third quarter report that there would
be an accounting change made when the annual report came along, and it
would affect the earnings by about $.09 a share.
Nothing more happened until mid-December. In mid-December, the
Chief Executive Officer had an interview with the press and said: “I know we
have been talking about that $1.50 a share and we’re terribly sorry—it’s not
going to work out that way. It’s going to be $1.20 a share.”
So he corrected his forecast in plenty of time, and nothing more hap
pened, and in the early February before statements for the year were released
a three-plus million share transaction in Allis-Chalmers stock took place on
the New York Stock Exchange, at a price of 17 or 18 a share.
Three or four or five days later the annual statement was released to the
press. What do you suppose the earnings were? The earnings per share
were exactly $1.20, with four accounting changes raising the earnings by $.41
a share.
If you looked at each one of those accounting changes, they were per
fectly respectable. You could agree with each one of them. They were
appropriate. They put in a computer out in the finance subsidiary, so now
you could account on an individual account basis. Fine!
The Hydroturbine Division had never previously got around to putting
in accounting for long-term contracts on a percentage-of-completion basis like
the competitors did. Great!
But what happened to that company and its stock and the credibility of
its management? The stock dropped below 12. Was the statement “fair”?
It was certainly acceptable. That’s real life.
Discussion Leader: This seems to lead us to the question of whether the
specific definition of accounting principles does lead in some respects to un
ethical reporting by giving a shield behind which people who wish to be
unethical can be so, meeting the letter of the law, but not the spirit.
Does this situation exist? Is this something that will become more dan
gerous if the Accounting Principles Board follows along its way of specifying,
in increasing detail, what accounting principles are?
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Analyst: I think that the earlier discussions have indicated that you can
stay within generally accepted principles and still be somewhat unethical.
Without trying to place blame, I think there has been a lowering of
ethics in the accounting-reporting area coming about as a result of the “per
formance” orientation of the mid-sixties, forced partly by money managers
and partly by the public.
The accounting profession has not come up with any real standards that
solve this problem, nor have the financial analysts or the financial executives.
I think that there is a real conflict of interest built into different goals
and needs of managements, accountants, and perhaps even of analysts that
requires some standards beyond accounting principles to bring the level up to
where it was before people started using creative accounting and reporting to
enhance stock values.
CPA: There has been some movement in that direction through the es
tablishment of audit committees, which is a very sound move. That isn’t the
whole answer, and it needs improvement because even audit committees in
some cases do not really understand what their function should most appro
priately be.
Financial Executive: I think it can be said that the credibility of cor
porate reporting has been damaged by events of the last few years, and this
has had a detrimental effect both on business and the accounting profession.
Perhaps our biggest problems in reporting have occurred in three relatively
new situations which have come into being within the last five years—franchis
ing, leasing, and land development.
When these companies and divisions sprang to life, the corporations
themselves were not prepared to handle the accounting problems they cre
ated; neither were the public accounting profession, the SEC, or the Wall
Street analysts. As a result we have had some very unusual financial and
analytical reports, and some price/earnings ratios have gone out of line.
This development put a stigma on all reports and has come back to
plague the companies, their auditors, and the analysts.
Analyst: Doesn’t this demonstrate the shortcomings of trying to write
specific rules and regulations? There were and could be no rules and regula
tions sufficient to deal with these new businesses prior to the time they first
had to report to the public.
If the accountants had been asked to attest to the fairness of these state
ments, perhaps they would have come up with a different set of standards a
lot earlier.
Discussion Leader: Now we come back to the CPA who said: “What
is fairness if it’s not defined?”
CPA: I think that when the innovative situation arises, we do start with
the basic fairness, but it’s a matter of opinion what fairness in a given situa
tion is.
As a profession, we have to react more quickly to such situations, and
we are moving in that direction with the APB interpretations that are being
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issued, as well as with greater rapidity in the issuance of Opinions. Even
though we may start with fairness, the fact is that opinions will differ as to
what fairness is in any situation, and we can’t take a broad principle such as
fairness and think it’s going to work effectively in reporting, because it won’t.
Professor: Rather than defining accounting principles in general,
shouldn’t we think about establishing a body that will respond to particular
situations as they arise, either upon the application of interested parties or
on that body’s own initiative? If fairness is a subjective judgment, shouldn’t
a body of really independent professionals make that judgment based on the
facts of a particular case rather than leaving the judgment to the management
or the auditors in the case where no specified principles exist? This is an al
ternative to attempting to codify everything at once.
Financial Executive: I’d like to point out one thing that I think is
apropos and that particularly applies to these new situations. Charges of un
fair presentation and implications of unethical presentation frequently are
made in retrospect. They have to do with situations that had no precedent,
such as land development companies. In the beginning a lot of these land
development companies were presenting these sales when there was only a
two per cent down payment.
If, in fact, most of these purchases had been completed, this accounting
would have been an accepted practice today, but because many of them are
not, it has turned out to be unacceptable. Today most companies do not re
port sales unless a seven or nine per cent down payment is received.
Now we look back and say management might be called unethical or
unfair, but perhaps they really believed they had made sales, and they felt
that they were reporting properly. What guidance did they have beyond
their own convictions or expectations?
Financial Executive: I’d like to throw a question at the analysts about
their own performance in dealing with such companies. There were substan
tial companies with a record of growth which carried a normal price/
earnings ratio at that time. Then we had franchising companies and leasing
companies and land development companies; they were carrying exorbitant
P/E ratios and were still being underwritten by substantial firms and rec
ommended by many analysts. How can you put a 60, 70, 80 P/E ratio on
a situation that may not have ever shown any cash inflow at all, but a pros
pective income over the next three, four, or five years? These are the situa
tions that reflect on the ethics, integrity, and professional judgment of
everyone involved.
Analyst: You look at what is reported, and see a growth curve that
looks like one side of the Matterhorn. The companies had sales, earnings,
and a beautiful growth rate. The earnings statement looks respectable, and
a lot of people haven’t recognized the problem that’s really involved in rec
ognition of income and expense. That is how the multiples happen.
Analyst: There were a number of analysts who went through the re
ports of such companies and saw that it was quite evident that what you were
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reading was pure fiction, because if you looked at the amounts of money ac
tually flowing into and out of the company there was a net outflow. And a
lot of analysts didn’t recommend such companies.
Analyst: This is a very hot potato, really. What should you do about
those companies whose reports you have read which you feel are “bad” from
a reporting sense? Not that their statements do not fall under the umbrella
of general acceptability, but where earnings are raised in the accounting de
partment rather than by operations.
Should the analyst write a report on such a company indicating that
they are using something which is proper according to the principles but im
proper according to the intent? This is a very difficult thing, because analysts
don’t get much credit for writing memos which tear apart a company. Per
haps we should view ourselves as being in the education business, and such
reports are a fulfillment of that part of our responsibility.
Professor: Even when reports are written which raise the issue that
something in the accounting statements doesn’t look right, the question nor
mally raised by the writer of this report is whether other people will notice
the deficiency and thus affect the market price.
In other words, the analyst is taking the very cynical view that if a prob
lem is well enough hidden it is OK. He’s not dealing with a normative con
cept as to whether this company is indeed following practices which should
be recommended for permanent investment, but he’s taking a purely prag
matic course: Will the thing work or not?
The analyst should do a much better job here. He should tell what is
going on and recognize that it reflects upon the potentials of the company,
because any company that does not level with their investing public should
be viewed with extreme caution. If analysts merely ask whether the company
can get away with it, their reports are as unethical as those of the company.
Analyst: Perhaps what is really needed in these cases is an early warn
ing system by which a review function is established to perceive danger areas
in accounting, analyze them, and then disseminate the information.
Analyst: I think it is clear that a lot of the consuming public of finan
cial statements is unaware of the possible unreliability of generally accepted
accounting principles in some situations. Perhaps one solution to this ethical
problem would be to follow the practice that certain government agencies
have adopted in required labeling practice. Perhaps the accountant’s state
ment should include the warning: “Undiscriminating acceptance of generally
accepted accounting principles may be injurious to your financial health.”
I am only being partly facetious!
Analyst: New problems are always coming along one after another,
and I believe that when we are in a new or uncharted area, a lot of these
problems would be solved if we simply determined, when in doubt, to take
the conservative side in reporting.
Managements of companies in development situations in order to get
more capital have a natural bias to be optimistic, and it seems to me that the
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accountant should therefore take the more conservative side, whatever that
may be in a particular case. This wouldn’t solve all problems, but many of
them wouldn’t develop to the extent that they have.
Financial Executive: And yet a company is criticized if it holds
earnings back for a future period by setting up reserves through one tech
nique or another. So we’re damned if we are conservative, and we’re damned
if we’re not.
Attorney: I would suggest that one of the problems here is that dis
closure isn’t carried far enough, and that a little bit more can go a long way.
One of the things that the FEI has recently proposed is that where there are
choices of the application of accounting principles, the alternatives be set
forth. That, I think, is a very significant extension of disclosure.
It seems to me that the format of financial statements has become ritual
ized; an extension of disclosure would go a long way toward solving our
problem. At the present time, we live with a narrow set of standards for the
information that goes into the financial statements. Perhaps we shouldn’t
even be satisfied with a simple income statement and balance sheet for a given
period.
At the present time, the accounting profession is left in a weak position
when confronted by strong client pressure. As long as there are a multiplicity
of accounting principles, as long as it is permissible to make changes by some
standard—and the recent tightening of that standard is a major advance—
the auditor is in a very difficult spot which I don’t envy. His client says, “We
don’t have to do it the way we did it last year. We can do it this way.”
And what does the auditor say? If it’s a generally accepted accounting
principle, he says: “Yes, you’re right, you can do it that way. Now, of course
from the standpoint of consistency I’ll have to say you have made a change;
but, yes, you can do it.”
So if the client runs through three or four of these changes, what does
the auditor do? The only thing he can say is that each one of these individu
ally is a generally accepted accounting principle, “Taking them together, you
distort the results, and it’s an unfair presentation, and I quit.” And that’s a
damned hard thing to do, because the auditor is not in a position where he
is relying upon anything more objective than his own instinctive fairness,
which, as I think everybody agrees, is a very difficult standard to go by.
This problem, of course, doesn’t just relate to changes but also to the
selection of new principles when new operations are started. The profession
has recently taken steps which make it tougher to make changes and to im
prove disclosure. But a relatively small additional advance would improve
the situation further, and you should strive for it. You could then say to the
client: “Go ahead and do it, but the rules of my profession require that I tell
the public in a very obvious way that if you had used a different principle,
here is how the results would look, or if you had done it the way you did it
last year, your earnings would only be so-and-so.”
If the auditor did something like that he would take away a lot of the
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benefits that management thinks accrue to it by opting for principles that are
most favorable. If you set up a standard by which there is disclosure in addi
tion to that appearing in the footnotes and the opinion today, you have
taken a very simple but a very significant stride in the direction of making
it very tough for management to manage earnings in the fashion in which
they have been capable of doing.
Commissioner Needham: I think we have to put this matter in perspec
tive. Let me tell you what our experience is.
We have 8,000 issuers filing with us every year a variety of documents,
and if 50 out of 8,000 present an accounting problem, it’s a lot. If the prob
lems were of the magnitude that some writers would have us believe, the
whole mechanism of the Securities Act would break down.
I do feel that we recognized at the Commission that as more people
talked about the conflict between auditor and client, it seemed to become truer
and truer just by the repetition. The amendments we made to Form 8K were
designed to create an atmosphere for discussion of very difficult accounting
problems, and at the same time, to retain an atmosphere of independence for
the accountant and to give him some firmness in dealing with his clients by
requiring disclosure if his engagement were terminated over an accounting
dispute.
But on the other hand, this new requirement of notifying us when an
issuer changes accountants imposes additional responsibilities on the outside
auditor, and we definitely had that in mind as well; he must be thoroughly
familiar with what his decision is and the subject matter that he is dealing
with. When he says “No,” he had better know what he is talking about; oth
erwise, another accounting firm could come in there, making him look rather
silly, and I think his professional reputation would be damaged.
One other point that needs to be made in the area of fairness and ac
counting principles is the importance of intent. What is management trying
to do? Is there the intent to defraud? It is difficult, but you have got to mea
sure intent. It’s somewhat misleading to be looking for a cookbook list for
ethical behavior. You’re just not going to get it. Our lawyers wouldn’t put
up with it; they like to have flexibility, and I think I do too. Just because it’s
not written down that “thou shalt not” do something, it does not mean it’s not
a violation of the Securities Act. We feel we have flexibility, and we use it.
CPA: This whole discussion of fairness arises in part from the use of
that word in the auditor’s report. Historically, the certificate used to say that
the statements were correct. Since it was impossible to say that absolute ac
curacy had been achieved, the words “present fairly” were substituted which
was thought to mean “reasonably correct.” Absolute concepts of fairness
were not really thought about when the word was inserted into the standard
report.
There has been considerable discussion about changing the report to
increase the emphasis on fairness as a concept in itself, but we are troubled
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by the practical and legal problems of doing so. If there are no guidelines on
fairness, every individual CPA will be applying his individual judgment in
each case, and the result will be utter chaos, in no way in the public interest.
Financial Executive:When we are talking about fairness and ethics,
we must remember that we are talking about something which is relative to
our times. Fairness in financial reporting is fairness in terms of what people
expect us to report, but it could be held in a later day that one of the things
we should be taking into consideration, for instance, is the amount of money
the corporation is spending for antipollution devices or for contributions to
various organizations.
In other words, fairness today is fairness as we see it. Tomorrow’s guide
lines may indicate that we have been totally unfair today. Whatever we do
in terms of fairness or ethics is based on what society today expects and is
willing to tolerate.
We have all been talking in an environment here according to our own
understanding of law and our own understanding of ethics, but twenty years
from now somebody reading back and looking over this record may think
how antiquated we really were.
Analyst : Relative to that point, it should be added that we are not just
talking about those items that are certified by the auditors. We’re talking in
many instances about other segments of reports; and, as an analyst, I have
found more trouble there than I have in the areas that are certified. Fairness
appeals to me, if we can define it, and even, perhaps, if we can’t, but it must
apply to the entire reporting process, not just the accounting section.
CPA: I concur with most of these remarks and comments. I think we
need to build on what we have, but I think it’s more important that we un
derstand what we have on which to build. We should move toward fairness
even if it is a moving target, but in doing so, we have to first make certain we
understand the present.
Discussion Leader: If I were to try to piece together a “sense-of-themeeting” on this subject, I believe I perceive on the one hand feeling that
fairness is a standard which can be applied over and above defined account
ing principles despite the difficulties which arise in making the concept opera
tional. There is a sense that auditors should be able to attest that statements
are in congruence with reasonable perceived business realities as well as with
generally accepted accounting principles, even though the former may be
hard to prescribe before the fact in general terms.
On the other hand, there is a feeling that increased efforts at definition of
accounting principles and increased disclosure requirements will play a major
role in improving financial reporting, and that these efforts should be encour
aged and supported.
In other words, both fairness and defined accounting principles are nec
essary but not sufficient conditions to assure reporting excellence. We must
combine the two.
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Interim Reporting
Part of ethical reporting behavior relates to the timeliness of reports be
ing issued. Relevant data published too late to be of value is no better than
inaccurate reporting since both can lead to uninformed investment decisions.
The traditional reporting period is the year, but since the investment
process is a continuous one, annual financial reports do not provide sufficient
ly timely data. The New York Stock Exchange and recently the SEC have
therefore required companies to report quarterly earnings figures. In addi
tion, the SEC requires more frequent reports of any material happening.
In the following discussions, the extent to which corporations have in
terim reporting responsibilities and the nature of these reports is considered.
In addition, the role of public accountants in such reporting, both presently
and prospectively, is discussed.

Discussion
Discussion Leader: In recent years, greater emphasis has been placed
upon interim reports. Perhaps we should therefore turn our attention to the
responsibility for these reports and the form they should take.
Stock Exchange Representative: The stock exchange was the first
body to require quarterly reports. This was done in our listing agreements.
The recent SEC actions have strengthened these requirements primarily by
applying them to other companies and by expanding the information require
ments somewhat. Our listing agreements also require that stock exchange
companies will issue quarterly reports on the same basis as annual reports
and will set forth therein any unusual nonrecurring items and any change
in accounting principles.
Analyst: The requirements of both the stock exchange and the SEC
are beneficial and necessary. We are applying evolving standards to interim
reports, and we must recognize that. Some years ago an interim statement
almost by definition was thought of as a first approximation, while the annual
report was the precise figure. Today we are in the process of moving to the
point where each quarterly report has equal validity with any other quarterly
or annual report. Investors are rightly or wrongly placing increasing reliance
on interim reports, and I believe more attention must be paid to this form of
disclosure.
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CPA: Let me ask a general question. Are the present sanctions that are
imposed on interim statements adequate?
Attorney: Although I know of only one case, I believe that Rule 10b5 has within it ample grounds for adequate sanctions on interim statements.
Remedies can be well developed by the SEC under 10b-5; and additionally,
you can have class actions on behalf of all shareholders who engaged in se
curities transactions during the period that the misleading information was in
the marketplace. I think that the sanctions are there. The Commission has
power, as they have demonstrated, to bring action, suspend trading if neces
sary, and do a number of things.
What should disturb accountants is the problem of reporting interim
statements and all the complexities of accounting for various items on an in
terim basis. The question of materiality takes on great significance in this
area as do the problems of special charges, accounting changes, and income
taxes to the proper interim period.
My guess would be that the courts will be reasonably sympathetic if it
appears that honest judgments were made, but many problems are difficult.
Analyst : May I ask about the responsibilities of the auditor for interim
statements? What does he consider his professional obligations and his ethical
obligations with respect to such statements, which, obviously, he is not pre
pared to certify? Should he, as a matter of routine, screen interim reports
prior to issuance because of the depth of his knowledge about the company
which would alert him to anything unusual, even though he has not gone
through the steps which would permit him to certify?
Is he under any professional responsibility to do this? What are his ob
ligations if the interim report is released without his seeing it previously, and
there is something in that report which alarms him because of his knowledge
or the general corporate situation. Should he speak out immediately? And,
if so, to whom?
CPA: Suppose that something is part of an arrangement that the com
pany’s banker had been deeply involved in, and he knows the report is mis
leading as does a leading financial analyst who has visited the company
recently. Should they speak out publicly? And if they shouldn’t, why should
the auditor?
CPA: I think the auditor should interject himself, but I don’t think he
can interject himself beyond the management level. He should tackle man
agement uninvited if he sees reports going out which might be misleading or
which might get the company in trouble. In general, I don’t think he has
any obligation or right to go beyond management at that point. It would de
pend upon the situation.
Banker: I would say that the banker shouldn’t go further than that. If
a banker sees interim reports that are wrong, he should immediately confront
management, but I don’t think he should publish a Wall Street Journal article
on it.
Analyst: Suppose that whatever happened in the interim occurred in
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the third quarter statement, and it went unchallenged. What’s the auditor’s
responsibility at the end of the year?
CPA: The fact that it was unchallenged makes no difference to the au
ditor’s responsibility.
Analyst: Suppose there was a footnote in the interim statement which
would immediately lead a CPA to conclude that it was not published in ac
cordance with generally accepted accounting principles. If the auditor goes
to management which, in its turn, resists any change, is the auditor under
any obligation to the public at large or to the stockholders to set them right
when he knows that the information in the interim statement is misleading,
and when he knows that he is going to be reporting on the year-end figures?
Or does he have any obligation at year end to speak out on the quarterly
report?
Financial Executive: I don’t really see how the auditor can be held
accountable for interim results unless we go to the position that all interim
results should be audited, because sooner or later the kind of situation that
you described is going to lead to a direct confrontation between management
and the auditor, and what seems like a simple position, or a simple set of
facts that the auditor was considering, turns out, in fact, to be quite complex;
he is really not in a position to substantiate his opinion with respect to an in
terim statement without doing a comprehensive audit of the position of the
company.
This leads me to the point of view that the question here on interim re
porting is whether management has a responsibility to have its representations
audited.
Analyst: Even if an auditor is not asked to audit interims, if he has
already been hired to do the year-end audit, and an interim comes to his
attention of which he does not approve and which represents a departure
from generally accepted accounting principles, then I think he has an ethical
problem which may go beyond his relationship to management and extend to
the stockholders and the investing public.
Financial Executive : It seems to me that whether or not the auditors
actually audit a quarterly report, the investor assumes that there is some de
gree of assurance that these reports have been reviewed or “blessed” by a
CPA firm even though the certificate is not there, because the investor knows
that they are going to be incorporated in a broader picture within six to nine,
or maybe even three months, as part of an annual report.
Financial Executive: I have a feeling that the instances in which an
interim report may not follow accepted accounting principles are few and far
between. Most companies consult with their auditors throughout the year.
The auditors know what is going on, and they feel quite free to go to man
agement if they are dissatisfied. I have trouble accepting the idea that man
agement will disregard the opinion of the auditor during the year and face up
to reality at year end. So I think we are almost making a mountain out of a
molehill.
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Analyst: I don’t find any satisfaction in the defense that because abuses
are rare they can be excused. Numerically, they may not be very frequent,
but they occur when there are problems, and the risks of loss on the part of
the users of the financial statements typically are much greater in those cases
where the relatively rare abuses take place.
If you want to improve the ethical standards that are applied in these
cases, it seems that there has to be a third-party sanction system of some type
that forces changes.
CPA: Why shouldn’t there be some type of certificate from management
to accompany the quarterly report in which they explicitly state that the
statements are prepared consistently with past statements and with what will
be done in the annual statement?
Banker: Doesn’t the fact that they publicize the quarterly report in effect
do this?
CPA: Then it would put management to no trouble to sign a certifying
statement of some sort. Signing an explicit statement might also encourage
management to think even more carefully about its interim reporting
practices.
Banker: As a minimum, shouldn’t the SEC require companies to file
copies of their quarterly reports to stockholders with the Commission so that
they can be compared with quarterly 10-Q filings?
SEC Representative: At the present time, companies are permitted to
use published figures as part of their filings. It would be an easy amend
ment to adopt to require filing of published reports, though I hope it wouldn’t
be necessary.
Analyst: Aren’t there companies that just publish quarterlies in the
newspaper without sending a release to shareholders?
Stock Exchange Representative: There is no stock exchange require
ment that anything be sent to shareholders. The only requirement is publica
tion in the news media. As yet, we haven’t felt that it was appropriate to
require companies to spend this money, although we encourage it.
Analyst: I think the question of whether a company publishes a
report, sends it to the shareholders, or simply sends the information to the
SEC, but doesn’t give it to the shareholders in the annual report is an ethical
question. It seems to me that the shareholders ought to be the number one
constituency of all the constituencies that the company ought to be interested
in keeping informed. They are the people who have put money in the
business.
Discussion Leader: It seems apparent that interim reporting is a subject
of increasing concern to all parties represented and that some significant is
sues as to both the ethics and the responsibilities associated with such reports
remain to be settled. Perhaps some systematic research is called for to articu
late the problems and suggest solutions.
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Forecasting
The subject of forecasting was one which received considerable attention
at the symposium. This subject was brought up at the first symposium three
years ago; there was some interest on the part of analysts, but active opposi
tion by financial executives and little enthusiasm from other groups. The
tone of the discussion was set by the executive who said, “I am petrified at
the thought.”
In 1971, there was still considerable disagreement, but perceptible
movement toward the view that the time had come for serious consideration
of the topic. There were even a few executives who viewed with favor the
idea of public forecasts in one form or another, although the majority was
still in the other corner. There was clear evidence both from the remarks of
an SEC representative at the meeting and from a speech given in New York
by the chairman of the SEC that the regulatory approach to forecast disclo
sure was changing and that most of the participants seemed to want to pur
sue the various ways of implementing public forecasts even if they were not
ready to take the step of endorsing such forecasts as desirable.
The background paper by R. Gene Brown and the critique of that
paper by George Bissell were available to participants, and it was clear that
the subject had been carefully thought about by many before the discussion
started.
As is obvious from the discussion which follows, no consensus was
achieved, and strong pro-and-con feelings remain. The subject is one cur
rently being exposed to substantial research efforts; perhaps when these
are complete, more light will be available by which to appraise the argu
ments advanced.

Discussion
Discussion Leader: Forecasting is an area where there are few facts
available—which makes me feel uncomfortable—and I judge from papers and
comments that others share this feeling. Although the waters are uncharted,
there are clearly many who wish to move ahead, and this is why the prob
lem is before us.
The paper and critique present a number of basic issues which we can
discuss in turn.
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First is the issue as to whether forecasting really can be considered fi
nancial reporting. If reporting is defined as relating to events that have al
ready transpired, then forecasting is the antonym of reporting. I think how
ever, that Gene Brown refutes this very well when he says that for most users
the financial reports are mainly useful as clues to the future. I am sure that
most financial analysts and bank credit people would agree that they only
regard financial reports as useful to the extent that they represent some sort
of an indication as to the probabilities that may lie ahead for the company.
If we concede that forecasting is within the realm of financial reporting,
we must then move to the question of who will be responsible for forecasts.
Should there be, for example, any CPA responsibility? Should the Account
ing Principles Board come out with some Opinions as to what the appropriate
guidelines for forecasting are?
Related to this is the question of the format of forecasts. Should fore
casts be put in the format of highly conjectural, generally stated ideas, such
as, “This company is going to do better than last year,” and end it right
there? Or should the forecast be considerably more extended in information,
including such matters as sales, earnings, and so forth, in a specific way? Or,
alternatively, should there be some kind of estimated ranges for forecast data?
Gene Brown reports that there is very little literature or information on
the ethical or behavioral questions involved in forecasting. We are exploring
new ground here. We must consider the constraints on forecasts, and the ad
vantages and disadvantages attached to them.
Financial Executive : I think we have to accept the fact that forecast
ing is inseparable from financial reporting, for the simple reason that the very
process of turning out a balance sheet or a current period income statement
involves forecasting in the decisions made to defer costs and relate them to
future periods.
Discussion Leader: While current accounting statements certainly in
volve forecasts, I think we are mostly concerned with the process of an exten
sion of the forecasting process to the point of communicating specific estimates
of future results. The question is how specific we should be.
Analyst: I think when you go beyond the fairly general statements
that managements often make, you open up a terrible Pandora’s box if man
agements make forecasts. You have a major control problem. If reporting
of past history isn’t satisfactory, I don’t know how you can begin to get to the
point of forecasting the future.
Discussion Leader: This scares me as well. In my more cynical mo
ments, I sometimes have trouble distinguishing between forecasting and tout
ing. Aren’t many forecasts essentially touting the stock of a company?
Shouldn’t there be ethical, legal, or professional constraints on this whole
area? At best, aren’t forecasts subject to a “credibility gap”?
Analyst: I think the answer to that is more disclosure, not less disclo
sure. Historical information has not been sufficient to enable the analysts’
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fraternity to appraise security values. We are going to have to focus attention
on future developments, and appraise them more than we have in the past.
To do this, we will spend the next ten years trying to measure risk and
express forecasts in probabilistic terms. To even begin this process, we are
going to have to get more information about future developments than we
have had to date from providers of financial information, and we are going to
ask for probabilistic expectations as well as more general answers about cor
porate actions and intentions. The first stage in this process may be improved
product-line reporting on both a historical and future-oriented basis, where
the company comments in specific terms on the outlook for each product line
as well as on its historical results.
Financial Executive: What do you mean by comment on the future of
each product line? Do you mean putting a number on it, forecasting what the
sales are going to be, what the profits are going to be?
Analyst: Yes. I think if one of the company’s products happens to be
computers, they are going to have to say what they expect to do in the com
puter market and why—in order to allow the analyst to consider their forecast
and make a judgment as to how realistic it is, along with the forecasts of
other companies comprising the industry.
Financial Executive: There probably isn’t a financial executive in the
room who has not been burned by trying to predict the future a little bit.
There also probably isn’t a man here who hasn’t dealt with analysts who
come in and ask as many questions and get as much information as the fi
nancial executive can possibly give without giving them something that’s priv
ileged, and who then come up with an estimate that is about 100 per cent
different than that of the financial executive himself.
Analyst: The answer to that is to have the corporation give more infor
mation, not less.
Financial Executive: There have been times when an analyst’s esti
mates about our company’s earnings were so optimistic that I thought they
were simply touting our company to customers. In these cases, I did my
best to talk them out of it; but this is a difficult spot for a corporate officer to
be in. It wouldn’t be good for my company to have somebody say that our
earnings were going to increase by 70 or 80 per cent when that was absolute
ly wrong.
Financial Executive: Actually, management may have to take on
forecasting in self-defense, for the simple reason that if an analyst makes a
projection which is unrealistic—even if management neither made nor agreed
with the projection—management had better be in a position to say some
thing.
Financial Executive: I think we should focus on this point. What is
the responsibility of corporate management to correct or guide reports of ana
lysts when the management is convinced that an analyst’s projection is hay
wire and that it does not reflect what the management can reasonably
achieve?
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Analyst: I have one suggestion on this point. If the estimate is that ir
responsible, I think very seriously that you would be doing the employer of
that analyst a favor by calling him. That might correct the problem very
quickly. While some of the damage might have been done, you are promptly
involving the management of the firm concerned to take proper action to
redress an irresponsible action that may have been committed. We could then
investigate what went on and take any necessary action to redress any harm
done.
Financial Executive: Let me be a little more explicit in terms of ex
actly what we do do. Usually we will know what an analyst is going to
come out with before the report comes out. When analysts come up to see us,
one of the questions we always ask is what they are expecting for us this
year. We make notes on it in the file and keep a formal file of these.
We have an internal rule that if an analyst is projecting a figure which
is outside the ball park—and this is a subjective sort of thing—then we focus
on that before he leaves. We don’t forecast; we don’t project. But what we
do is tell him what everybody else in the Street has foreseen for us, and we
try to get him to go back and re-do his work, to see if his number can approx
imate what the rest of the Street is expecting. We don’t want someone to go
off base. We do everything to make sure that the range of expectations on the
Street are within the range of what we expect.
I don’t know whether this is typical or not. I suspect it is. Are we act
ing ethically or not?
Analyst: Wouldn’t it be much more ethical to just say what that ball
park range is? You wouldn’t have to name a single figure. You might say,
“We expect currently to earn somewhere between $1.75 and $2.00.” That
would be your present definition of the ball park. Release it to The Wall
Street Journal and be done with this problem. And if your expectations
change, release that change as well.
Financial Executive: The reason we don’t do that is that we don’t
think it is our business to do your work for you. We think you have the re
sponsibility to measure your expectations.
Analyst : Do you think we can serve the stockholder better on that
score than you can? Can we know better than you what the ball park should
be now; can we then tell the stockholder? I don’t believe it. I think you can
do a more honest job of communicating with your shareholders what you
perceive to be most likely.
Financial Executive: We perceive our responsibility to our stockhold
ers differently from you; in our view you are asking us to do your work for
you, and we won’t do it. That’s our position. If we do the forecasting, what
is the analyst’s role?
Analyst: The analyst will then be analyzing and questioning the fore
cast. He will be looking at the supply-and-demand situation for the com
pany’s products, evaluating the gross national product projection, and gener
ally working on the underlying fundamentals. In other words, he will do
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much of what he does today, but he will be starting from a more informed
position. And, of course, the final responsibility of relating the forecast to the
value of the security remains with him.
Analyst: I agree. You have to remember that there are times when
there is something happening internally in your business that no one can
know from the outside. All the external factors can be considered in calcu
lating a range, but there may be some development in the company that re
quires a correction.
Let me give you an example in the stock market recently where a cer
tain stock dropped significantly when the actual earnings increase was only
about one-half of the very optimistic increase forecast. In that particular case,
the analyst worked with a lot of detail. He was very well informed on the
business. He made the best estimate he could. The management gave him
about 25 minutes, and said nothing about the accuracy of his forecast. Then
the earnings report came out, and the stock dropped. This management never
talks to analysts, really.
I think management has to have some way of getting the story out and
getting it corrected—pinning it down to a more reasonable range—particularly
in cases where there are factors which even an astute analyst cannot perceive
by study of the data available to him.
Analyst: This comment introduces the ethical problem of the financial
executive disseminating the appropriate information to his entire audience,
rather than to just a few. It appears to me that if the corporate executive is
willing to discuss the future prospects of his business in detail with a knowl
edgeable professional on the other side—whether or not he mentions any num
bers—then he has some ethical responsibility to similarly inform the rest of
his shareholders or possible shareholders in the investment community. The
method could be a public forecast. And, once a forecast has been published,
the corporate executive should feel more free to discuss details of corporate ex
pectations without the insider information problem being present.
Financial Executive : We’ll give him all the historical information he
needs. Then it is up to him to use it. We would have the SEC on our back if
we started to tell him what we were going to make next year.
Commissioner Needham: I wouldn’t want this group to think that the
historical position of the SEC with respect to forecasts is cast in cement. We
have announced that we are going to conduct an in-depth study, and, as part
of that, we are going to examine in the broadest context the question of what
information an investor has to know in order to make an intelligent invest
ment decision. We’re also concerned about the availability of research to the
investor.
If I may speak on behalf of the constituency that I represent—the inves
tor—I really believe that he has a right to know the future prospects of a com
pany in which he has invested or is about to invest. So I would repeat what
I said at the outset; our historical position is not cast in cement.
36

Discussion Leader: You would, however, reserve the right to monitor
the general accuracy—whether or not it was completely wild. Isn’t that right?
If I put myself in your shoes, representing the constituency of the investor, I
would not want these forecasts to be misleading.
Commissioner Needham: We have Section 10b-5; I think that’s about
all the ethics necessary.
I would say that we have not reached the question of whether or not
federal regulation would be needed in this area because we haven’t decided
where the disclosure would take place. If we were to decide that the disclo
sure were to take place in a prospectus, our position might be somewhat dif
ferent than it would be if we were to decide to approach this through the
proxy rule or require disclosure of this type in the annual statement.
So I can’t answer your question. I don’t know what requirements we
would have with respect to the authenticity or whether the data presented
would have to have an accountant’s certificate.
I think, too, that it doesn’t necessarily follow that forecasting would
have to be as comprehensive as a historical statement. It might be more use
ful, or as useful, for forecasting to simply zero in on certain significant infor
mation such as technological changes within the industry, the development of
international markets and competition, and similar data. There are other
ways to accomplish disclosure without fitting it into what I already conceive
as being the very rigid format of the income statement and balance sheet.
Analyst: I would hope that any step taken by the SEC would be per
missive rather than mandatory in effect. I don’t believe that companies should
be forced into making public forecasts, although they should be able to do so
if they want. If you force forecasts, you may open the way to abuses and
legal liabilities. We have all known of cases where five-year forecasts were far
off the mark; if they were required there might be a lot of misinformation
floating around.
Financial Executive: Let me give an example. In 1966, the book pub
lishing industry was growing at a very rapid rate. Some analysts were incred
ibly optimistic in their estimates of what was going to happen to our earnings.
In 1967, government spending dried up, and instead of going up, earnings
went down. Analysts then couldn’t wait to sell the stock. If we had been
forecasting three or four months before, we would have been as far out in left
field as those analysts; we don’t want to be in that position.
Financial Executive: I think it goes without saying that forecasting
has become an integral part of corporate management, and it’s an impor
tant tool today. As a matter of fact, in our company we make more decisions
based on forecasts of results than we do on the actual results.
If you think about the ability to make forecasts, you would have to
agree that the management team is the one best equipped to make a forecast,
and that anyone else trying to look over its shoulder or second-guess it is at a
disadvantage.
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Now, it seems to me that perhaps the situation could be resolved by let
ting management make forecasts and publish them, but without saying more
than, “We, the management, are making our corporate plans based on this
expectation for next year, but we do not in any way assert that this will hap
pen, though we will exert our best efforts to make it happen.”
If something is put forward that way, I think people will respond with
appropriate caution. They would still look to the analysts to evaluate that
forecast, and to examine other sources of information about the company. If
we put forecasts in this light and eliminate the need for people certifying fore
casts which would give a false sense of security, we might be able to handle
the publication of this data without too much trouble and without giving out
siders access to information that management feels might be detrimental to
the corporation’s interest.
Financial Executive: I am pleased to hear such a statement since our
corporation is about to issue a forecast on Monday, and I would not want to
feel guilty of unethical conduct.
Discussion Leader: I’d like to ask what motivated your company to
issue this forecast.
Financial Executive : The decision was motivated by a desire of man
agement to assist in the creation of an orderly market for a stock which has
been very volatile. The disruptive influence of a particular interim report
which is not representative of future prospects of the company leads to a very
disorderly marketplace, which is undesirable in the view of management. We
also felt that the security price would reflect its investment value—whatever
that is—more accurately if our forecast were disclosed.
Discussion Leader: Is it your intention to report on how the forecast
worked out?
Financial Executive: I suspect we will be forced into it—at least in
the president’s letter that goes out with the annual report—should actual per
formance differ substantially from forecast performance.
Banker: The late Marcus Nadler used to say, “If you are going to fore
cast, forecast frequently.” Do you have any intentions of revising your an
nual forecast on an interim basis?
Financial Executive : I think that anyone who publishes a forecast has
a responsibility for disclosing promptly—not on a quarterly or semiannual or
any other fixed basis—any new information that comes to light which would
materially affect that forecast. If you made an annual forecast, and nothing
happened between that time and the time you issued your next quarterly re
port, I believe that it would be prudent to reaffirm your faith in the forecast
at that time.
Banker: I have another question. Don’t you feel that the publication of
forecasts and the requirement to explain variations will lead to judicious un
derstatement on the part of corporate officers?
Financial Executive : This effect is certainly possible since the costs of
overestimating are significantly higher than the costs of underestimating,
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though I hope that various approaches such as publishing ranges rather than
single figures will make those costs less significant. These questions seem to
lead to a need for groups such as this one to undertake research in the area.
At the present time we do see forecasts, but there are no guidelines as to what
is ethical or desirable. We are in a permissive situation with no controls.
There are many questions unanswered; we do not really know whether fore
casts are beneficial or disruptive, whether they should be attested to or not,
what form they should take.
CPA: I’m interested in the views of the other organizations on whether
public accountants should be lending credibility and some sort of attestation
to forecasting. A subcommittee of the AICPA’s committee on auditing proce
dure is working on this project, with the possibility of issuing a statement on
it, and I’m curious about opinions as to whether, on balance, the accountants
can add enough credibility to forecasts to justify that effort.
Analyst: I would say the first step would be to try it on the basis of
the British system, to learn from the problems that they have had, and to see
whether this can be done. And as you know, under their approach to the
audit function of the forecast, the chartered accountant attests to the mechani
cal accuracy rather than to the commercial assumptions that underlie it.
Financial Executive: I do believe that there does have to be some kind
of surveillance over forecasts. The question is open as to whether or not this
should be performed by the accounting profession, and I guess I would, for
lack of a better alternative, say yes.
However, I would like to point out the difficulty and danger of embark
ing upon a program such as the British one. It is not unlikely that the case
would arise where the auditor would find one or more assumptions which he
believed to be inappropriate, either through basic disagreement on observa
tions about the general economy or industry, or even when he might possess
privileged information about a particular industry segment through having a
variety of clients in that particular industry. He might not be in a position
to accept the assumptions as stated; yet he is not asked to render an opinion
on the assumptions, but only on the forecast based on those assumptions.
Discussion Leader: I have talked with a couple of British public ac
counting firms, both of whom have asserted that, while they do not attest to
the assumptions, they now have a policy whereby, if they do not feel comfort
able with them, they will not allow their name to be associated with a forecast
based on such assumptions. This is a difficult position to be in, particularly if
there is a merchant banker who is willing to lend his name to the assump
tions, which in the British system is generally the case.
CPA: I think this issue represents a very real problem. If you are in
volved at all, and the assumptions are totally unrealistic, do you have an ob
ligation to do anything about it? I think inevitably an auditor would be
drawn into that position. But I think it’s a problem that can be coped with
by developing standards which would provide some guidance for what to do
in such cases.
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As far as research goes, we have a study nearing completion which is
being conducted jointly by the English Institute, the Canadian Institute,
and the American Institute—a comparative study of the attitudes, procedures,
and practices in forecasting in the respective three countries.
The conclusions of that study are that we should move toward forecast
ing and should, basically, follow substantially the British practices at least for
the time being. And we hope to have that published within a few months.
Financial Executive : It would probably be of interest to add that the
Financial Executives Research Foundation recently approved a full-scale re
search study on the subject of forecasts. The project is to begin at an early
date, and the first phase is to be finished some time next summer.
Stock Exchange Representative: Perhaps a reasonable way of start
ing this would be the pilot program approach. We found that to be a very suc
cessful way of trying something out, because the result is an attempt at do
ing rather than theorizing about the reasons that it can or can’t be done. This
could be done by a cross-section of corporations that are willing to
participate.
Analyst: I think we must recognize that while we are sitting around
still discussing whether or not management should forecast, the SEC is con
sidering going ahead. It seems to me that, if we are realistic, we must get to
the point of recognizing that we are going to forecast and start considering
how we do it. If we start discussing how we do forecast, it is possible that we
will come up with some valid reasons to present to the SEC as to why it
shouldn’t be done. But as long as we simply say it shouldn’t be done, we run
the risk of having somebody else tell us that we have to as well as how to.
Financial Executive : I agree. I think that each group in this Symposi
um has something to contribute to the others, as well as to the SEC, on this
particular topic, and therefore it might be appropriate for some collection of
talents from the four groups here to be brought together to prepare a recom
mendation on how forecasting should be done, if it is required or even per
mitted by the SEC.
I feel strongly that considerable thought and several disciplines should
be brought to bear on any recommendations.
Attorney: To round out the cast of people who are working with fore
casts, the American Bar Association Committee on Federal Regulation
of Securities has a subcommittee working on this question, with particular em
phasis on the potential liabilities.
Beyond that, I would like to support the comment just made. I think a
good precedent of the impact that the private sector can have on the public
was in the line of the business-reporting area, in which the Commission was
persuaded to forgo action until such time as there had been adequate study of
the problems outside of the governmental area.
I like the idea of getting together—and quickly; then when hearings are
held on it, as they seem likely to be, everyone is in a position to outline in a
constructive fashion the manner in which this problem should be approached.
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I also believe that when the subject is explored, there should be agree
ment that the place to start forecasts is not in registration statements, where
the liability of the issuer is subject to no defenses. Due care is of no conse
quence to the liability of an issuer. Innovative reporting of this sort should
start where penalties are not so enormous.
Financial Executive: Before we get carried away with enthusiasm, I
believe I should express my concern that I don’t hear many protestations to
the implied conclusion that we should drive full speed ahead toward forecast
ing. I think a part of the record of our discussions should be a question as to
the propriety of that which seems to have gathered such momentum here.
While this was discussed, I am not sure that the dissents have received suffi
cient weight. Let me add one additional problem which relates to published
forecasts.
In general, I believe that making a forecast is not too difficult because,
within our companies, we are constantly planning strategies to deal with un
certainties and we have alternative strategies to cope with these things as they
evolve.
What distresses me is the necessity to reveal those strategies publicly in
order to substantiate the forecast. If these strategies that form the assump
tions that we discussed would have to be revealed and spelled out, they
would be the subject of very specific questioning by analysts—and I would
like to say that I don’t think it’s anybody’s business to know what strategies
management devises to achieve our program.
I won’t even say that we don’t reveal many of our strategies—we do.
But the critical parts are those that relate to the competitive environment in
which we work. The things that we reveal are generally the nonconfidential
aspects of our competitive strategies. The confidential aspects of our competi
tive strategies we do not reveal, and I think it is improper to suggest that bus
iness managements should reveal such items. I question whether meaningful
forecasting can be done without revealing precisely that.
Discussion Leader: It is clear that we have not achieved consensus on
the subject of published forecasts, but at least we have most of the crucial is
sues out on the table. I am sure that the next few years will bring considera
ble research to bear on the topic, and perhaps the continuing progress
outlined in our discussions will be the prologue to a more definitive solution
to the problems of this area in the future.
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Surveillance
Despite what is generally agreed to be a high level of technical and ethi
cal behavior in corporate financial reporting in the United States, there have
still developed in recent years a number of examples of conspicuous deficien
cies in corporate reporting which have raised doubts in the minds of financial
statement users about the total reporting environment. These deficiencies
have been of several sorts. In a few cases, intentional misstatement has oc
curred, but more often the problems have arisen where reports are made in
areas where limited reporting experience exists, where major uncertainties
about the future are present, or where generally accepted accounting princi
ples are unable to cope with complex economic realities. In addition, there
have been cases where disclosure was felt to be inadequate.
At the present time, no systematic surveillance takes place over corpo
rate reporting to identify problem areas and defective reporting practices or,
for that matter, to applaud innovative approaches. The Securities and Ex
change Commission has acted in conspicuous cases, but in many situations the
problems cannot be defined as technical or legal deficiencies.
From the user viewpoint, there has also been a lack of surveillance over
defective analytical reports. This might prove even more difficult to establish
professionally since such a large percentage of analytical efforts are under
taken privately by bankers and institutional investors. Only the tip of the ice
berg appears in published analytical reports.
There was considerable discussion of the role of various parties in sur
veying corporate reporting practices. It was not clear what group or groups
should undertake such an effort or what sanctions, if any, should be applied.
Nevertheless, a definite feeling emerged from the discussion that some profes
sional effort should be undertaken in this area.

Discussion
Discussion Leader: It has been suggested that some professional sur
veillance of corporate reporting would be desirable. Is anything being done
today? Should more be done?
Commissioner Needham: I would like to explain our enforcement pro
gram because I don’t think it is generally understood. In the first place, we
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know that we do not get every violator of the securities laws. We don’t get
every broker-dealer, every investment advisor, every mutual fund, every is
suer, or every accountant that fails to fulfill his responsibility under the acts.
Secondly, we do not believe that we should have the primary responsi
bility for maintaining a high level of conduct in these areas. This belongs in
the private sector. The SEC may have a gun behind the door, but we don’t
like to trot it out all the time because if we do we create an atmosphere of
distrust on the part of investors—which in turn has an adverse effect on the
capital markets.
We believe that we have the best capital markets in the world and the
finest accounting and reporting standards of any country, and we want to re
tain that position. As we make changes to accomodate the needs and de
mands of the investing public, we want to be sure that we do so in an en
vironment that doesn’t jeopardize the existing system. This is why we never
take action against an issuer or a professional without struggling over it and
spending days in discussion.
We are therefore very happy to see a symposium of this sort develop in
the private sector since it shows a recognition of the need for maintaining a
high level of conduct. To the extent that this sector performs well, our activ
ity becomes less—which is an acceptable solution.
Let me pose a question for the financial analysts in this regard. As you
read a corporation’s reports, suppose you react with a visceral feeling that the
management of the company does not measure up to the standards of report
ing to which you think businessmen generally should. What have you done
as a group or individually to solve this problem? Do you adjust price/earn
ings ratios; or do you go to a market-maker, or in some way put pressure on
the price of the stock? This is the kind of action the private sector can take
effectively, and it doesn’t bring in the heavy hand of the federal government.
Analyst: I would like to answer the question from the institutions’ point
of view. Institutions account for a majority of trading on the New York
Stock Exchange, so they are significant disciplinarians in terms of market ef
fect. Each institution has a varying degree of internal research, and it also
uses the outside Wall Street research in making its investment decisions. In
vestment ideas produced from that research must then be sold to the decision
making group in the organization.
When a negative idea recommending sale arises internally, the analyst
can report directly to his superiors. The information is nonpublic, and a sale
can be effected without any ramifications other than the corporation eventual
ly noting that the shares have been sold, if they do watch that particular ac
tivity.
The problem for those in the brokerage community, however, is much
greater because their recommendations are of a public nature, and the conse
quences are more far-reaching in respect to the analyst. His future contacts
with that company might be jeopardized, which of course he does not want
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to do, because this is part of his livelihood as a man who is gathering informa
tion, evaluating it, and passing it on to his clients.
Nevertheless, I think the market’s reaction to reporting phenomena and
to economic evaluations has quickened through the years. I think this is
due to the increase in communications, to the increase in sophistication of
those who are in the analytical profession, and to the sophistication and the
size of the institutional market which addresses itself to these problems more
quickly than the investing public at large.
It’s my feeling that the price adjustments that seem appropriate do occur
and occur more quickly than in the past. Those that have perceived the sit
uation more quickly will leave the security first. Those who are less in
formed, or less capable of coming to an appropriate decision will, of course,
linger on. Nevertheless, as that information becomes more broadly under
stood, there is, sooner or later, a correction in the marketplace.
As a system it is imperfect, but I don’t know of any other which would
be better.
Attorney: One of the things that worries me about these remarks is
the fact that the institutional investors get out of the market faster than the
public investor because they can analyze these accounting principles better.
I think that’s a real problem.
Analyst: That is not entirely true. I was involved in an incident in the
last two years where we developed a piece of analysis which indicated that a
company which was selling at around $45 a share had, in fact, no earnings.
We informed our clients of this, and they laughed and refused to believe us;
it took at least two weeks for that material to eventually sink in, and then the
stock dropped sharply.
I should emphasize the very heavy responsibility which an analyst feels
when he comes up with this kind of information. Others must have looked at
the company and failed to perceive the realities of the situation. An analyst
who publishes a report which is highly damaging to the price of the stock
hurts a lot of people. It would be much better if company reports had not
indicated the earnings in the first place or if their dubious quality had been
immediately perceived.
Analyst: I agree. The corporate report which is issued is the one that
gets published through the media and included in the statistical manuals.
This has a greater weight than anything you can say later to try to correct it.
So it’s extremely important to try to get the information on the right basis in
the first place.
Analyst: I wouldn’t want you to leave the impression that there are no
controls over brokerage analysts who publish their reports and face the diffi
cult ethical and practical problems you point out. As institutional investors,
we are major consumers of these reports, and it is true that we don’t publish
anything either for the benefit of the public or by way of critical observations
with respect to the work that is done on the Street. That in no way implies,
however, that we are not continuously evaluating their work “in house.” I
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think that some of the conversations that go on, both among ourselves with
respect to the capabilities of certain of the analysts outside of our shop, and
between ourselves and these analysts and their supervisors, have a continuing
salutary effect on the quality of the analytical reporting that is done for insti
tutions. While these controls are not visible, they are nonetheless effective.
Analyst: There is a program, which is evolutionary in nature, that has
been under way for some time—the Corporate Information Committee’s pro
gram for making awards for excellence in reporting to the investing public.
In this program we do not give awards for first, second, and third place.
What we are doing is attempting to set standards of excellence in reporting
to the investment community. We hope to have as many people as possible
qualify for such awards.
We are moving along to the next step, which is a formalized program for
informing those who do not qualify why they did not qualify. Most of them
are finding out now anyhow because an analyst in their industry area tells
them.
There have been a number of rejections of otherwise excellent perform
ances both in annual reports and interim statements and other items where,
wittingly or unwittingly, the report indicated something that may not have
been accurate. In other words, there was perhaps a deceptive piece of infor
mation. When this occurs, one or more members of the subcommittee will
object, or a member of the senior committee will raise the issue, and it will be
reviewed. If the award is denied on this basis, the company will be informed.
This is an element of surveillance and control. It is not fully developed at
this stage, but it is growing.
Analyst: I think that, as a group, analysts have done very little in
terms of their complaints. In two years as chairman of the Accounting Policy
Committee, I sent a number of cases to the practice review committee of the
AICPA. There was next to no help from 13,000 other analysts. In the last
year and a half, I don’t know of any cases that the Committee as a whole has
sent in.
I was never amused when the Committee would complain to the prac
tice review committee, only to have the Corporate Information Committee
give the same company an award for excellence in reporting.
What happens today, as a practical matter, is that the criticism of a par
ticularly bad report is leaked to Alan Abelson of Barron’s or Metz of The
New York Times. It is easy to suggest that we write, but when major corpo
rations threaten to sue, one’s wife and partners get a little upset. I think we
need a new mechanism.
CPA: There is a statement in Don Scott’s paper that the role of the pub
lic in the enforcement process is limited, that publicity is the principal means
of enforcement. So long as the marketplace uncritically accepts published
earnings-per-share figures as the main performance indicator, adverse pub
licity on accounting practices of a particular company will have little effect
as a deterrent.
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I suggest that a year ago that was a true statement. Today it is no
longer true, and the public is reacting quickly and violently. Abe Briloff’s
latest article on the question of accounting practices among the land develop
ment companies resulted in a writedown of something between $100 million
and $200 million in the first two days in the securities of those companies.
And in our stock-watch efforts, we have seen the effects of rumors of an arti
cle that might come out which might reflect on the accounting practices of a
particular industry.
So the public has increasingly shown its distrust of both the companies
and the way they report, and the accountants and the way they attest.
Attorney: Perhaps the answer is to institutionalize Abe Briloff!
Analyst: I think it should be mentioned that when analysts speak of
accounting problems, we are not necessarily speaking of cases where current
accounting norms are violated. We are more concerned with areas which 1
am not yet sure the accounting profession is even willing to recognize as prob
lems. That is when the management of a company starts to work within gen
erally accepted principles to adjust earnings per share in accordance with its
wishes. There is plenty of leeway within generally accepted accounting prin
ciples to do this, and the accountant doesn’t even realize that a problem is
being presented.
Commissioner Needham: The real question here is one of intent. The
propriety of the reporting may depend in large part on whether there is an in
tention to mislead. It may be that firms have employed accounting practices
which primarily serve their best purposes rather than those of investors. Per
haps as a result of this symposium, it will be concluded that the ethical
standards imposed by the Commission are not quite high enough in terms of
the audiences that are involved. Reexamination may be required both by the
Commission and by the groups represented here.
CPA: I would like to put in a word for one control mechanism that we
do have at the present time—the audit committee of the board of directors
which meets with the outside auditors. The experience we have had with
this has been excellent, if somewhat limited. We have found that outside di
rectors on such committees have encouraged us to be extremely candid, and
we have accomplished some things with management that we might not
otherwise have been able to do.
Financial Executive: I speak only from the limited experience of my
company on this. We have had an audit committee for as long as I have been
with the company, and I agree that it is an effective tool in helping to main
tain the independence of our public accountants. We have our arguments
with our public accountants, but there has never been any feeling that their
services would be terminated if they didn’t agree with our thinking.
We have honest disagreements of opinion which we settle one way or the
other. Too many times I lose the argument because the auditor has the club
in the final analysis, and we recognize it.

46

Analyst: I am not sure that the audit committee improves the auditor’s
position. The audit committee, after all, represents the management point of
view, and thus represents simply another problem for the auditor to overcome
when disagreeing with management.
Analyst: As readers of financial statements we see incident after inci
dent that upsets us. We need some kind of mechanism other than Rule 10b5 and other than a shareholders’ derivative suit to dissent and, perhaps, to
find out if our complaint is really justified. I think we need some kind of
structural change that achieves this without a lawsuit. Don Scott in his paper
points out that serious consideration should be given to the establishment of
an accounting court, which is one possible solution.
Analyst: I really can’t quantify the number of problems, but I think
that as analysts we have had substantial experience with situations we don’t
like. I don’t think the AICPA practice review mechanism has done the job
of satisfying our concerns.
Commissioner Needham: I think you are right. We know we have this
problem, but response is difficult. You have undoubtedly noticed that in the
last few years we have had more enforcement actions involving financial
statements than we have had in a long time, and we have a few others com
ing down the pike. But I think your point is well made. I’m a little frus
trated in terms of what to recommend to my colleagues.
One procedure which might be responsive to your concern would be to
institute a public information program about the types of accounting decisions
that are made internally. Many of the matters that you see and have trouble
with in filings we have already questioned; we have a memo in the file that
indicates that we have had a conference with someone and they have ex
plained to us why this method of accounting is an acceptable one.
This would be similar to our policy of making no-action letters public, a
procedure we instituted about a year ago; it is probably desirable in the ac
counting area to make public the more significant types of accounting deci
sions that are made at the Commission, without necessarily disclosing the
name of the issuer.
We might take that step, and I think it would be helpful in overcoming
your concern.
Discussion Leader: From this discussion, it is apparent that some ana
lysts feel the need for an improved surveillance mechanism. What remains
unclear is exactly what should be surveyed, who should do it, and what
standards should be applied. The small matter of who should pay the bill
also remains unsolved. Certainly this is an area which the organizations rep
resented here at Seaview should jointly explore and develop in the years to
come.
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Professionalism and Codification
Of Ethical Codes
Ethics and professionalism are closely related. An ethical code has tra
ditionally been one of the significant characteristics that define a profession.
At the same time, professional standards of competence have served to en
courage a high level of ethical behavior in dealing with those outside the pro
fession who rely upon it.
In the area of corporate financial reporting, professionalism and ethical
standards are concepts relevant both to preparers and users of financial infor
mation, although there are different dimensions to the tasks and responsibili
ties of each group. The definition of these dimensions and the establishment
and enforcement of standards of professionalism are major problems which
require attention and about which there are major disagreements.
There are some who regard the simple virtues of honesty and integrity
as sufficient to insure both professionalism and ethical behavior. Accounting
and financial reporting in general are pragmatic disciplines which have devel
oped to a significant degree from the application of common sense to a variety
of problems. The attempt to apply defined standards of competence and be
havior is felt by this group to add little to the quality of the reporting environ
ment.
There are others who feel that while honesty and integrity are necessary,
they are not sufficient. In both reporting and interpreting results, many situa
tions arise where these attributes do not point to one path or even one direc
tion among viable alternatives. Such problems come up both in the process of
reporting and in the many relationships that exist among those concerned
with the area. This group feels that without more defined standards of ethical
behavior and professional competence, honest and well-meaning persons will
be left in uncertainty which may lead to contradictory behavior.
These issues underlie most of the discussion in regard to the codification
of ethical and professional standards which follows. Among the problems
considered are those of establishing and enforcing standards, and the relative
lack of success of formal procedures for enforcement in those organizations
with ethical codes now in existence—along with steps some have taken to im
prove this situation.
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Discussion Leader: In reviewing the papers and critiques prepared by
the four sponsoring organizations, one of the ideas which seemed to be fre
quently expressed was a need for professionalism both in corporate reporting
and in the use of such reports. Perhaps we should start by asking what pro
fessionalism means in this context, and then consider how standards of profes
sionalism should be set and enforced.
Public Relations Society Representative: The definition of profes
sionalism must begin with the definition of a profession. In our field, we face
this problem every day. We don’t have an answer, but we do have some
guidelines which are the usual, predictable things: a body of knowledge, a
method by which that knowledge is passed on, a professional organization for
assuring the professional growth of members, and a code of ethics with a
means of enforcing that code.
But there is another element which I think is of interest. A profession is
an activity which the average layman is not in a good position to evaluate.
The average layman is not in a position to know whether the legal advice
given by an attorney is good or bad, or whether the diagnosis by a physician
or a surgeon is good or bad. I assume that this is true in your professions.
If that is the case, a professional must ultimately be judged by his peers.
The profession, by definition, is that body which is best informed and which
necessarily must take upon itself the obligation of policing. Whether we do it
well or not is a good and legitimate subject for debate.
CPA: I think professionalism implies a set of standards but not necessar
ily formal written ones. Some of our standards are codified, but some are not.
Nevertheless, a member of our profession has to adhere to the standards, just
as a doctor or lawyer or teacher would.
CPA: I agree. I am sure that accountants do apply standards instinc
tively to the decisions they must make. These are really moral standards; al
though not reduced to writing, they are an important part of professionalism.
CPA: When we look at professionalism, aren’t we really talking about
what might be called philosophical problem-solving? This is an approach by
which we define the best and the shortest solution to a problem. As profes
sionals, we encourage the best solution but require compliance with the
minimum.
Financial Executive : This discussion leads to the question of whether
there are standards of professional conduct which could be used to discipline
a member of a professional society even though they have not been codified.
Attorney: There is certainly a due-process question involved in disci
plining somebody for violation of an uncodified ethical rule unless virtually
everybody in the profession could be made to agree that an unwritten rule
was violated, or unless the conduct was so bad that nobody could dispute the
violation of ethical principles.
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CPA: In our state society, we have a first rule of conduct which requires
a member to deal fairly with the public, his clients, and his fellow practition
ers. Of course, if we all knew exactly what that meant, we wouldn’t have
needed any more rules. It is a sort of golden rule for us, but it is one ap
proach toward codification that relates to professionalism in its broad sense.
CPA: Even more related to professionalism is the statement in our pro
posed new code of ethics which states that “a member shall not undertake
any engagement which he or his firm cannot reasonably expect to complete
with professional competence.” This reflects the professional’s basic responsi
bility for not accepting a job which he cannot perform adequately. Since the
public is not qualified to judge our competence in technical areas, they have
a right to rely upon us to make that judgment. I understand that a similar
provision gave the American Bar Association the most problems in passing its
new code, and it may be that we will have trouble with this too.
Analyst: It is very difficult to enforce a code of ethics and standards of
professional conduct even when they are codified. An enforcement procedure
requires elaborate machinery involving both an investigative and a judicial
function. When there is no code, or when the code represents only vague
statements subject to multiple interpretation, enforcement is almost impossible
because of the legal aspects involved. Yet if a profession is to mean anything,
it must have an enforceable system of ethics. Mere words mean nothing at
all.
Public Relations Society Representative: In the Public Relations
Society of America we have a very detailed code of ethics and standards, but
all of our proceedings against members who are charged with violations of it
must necessarily be kept secret until such time as some kind of disciplinary
action can be taken. Much of the procedure is informal pressure—calling a
member and saying, in effect, “Stop doing that; if you don’t, you are going to
be in trouble.”
I think this is true in most professions. There is a great deal of informal
pressure brought to bear by peers who force compliance with ethical and
technical standards by the implied threat of bringing charges or halting refer
rals. Only when there is still a problem after these efforts should more formal
and legalistic steps be invoked. These informal pressures do not show up in
the statistics of enforcement cases, but they are a real factor nonetheless.
Financial Executive : I think we can expect too much of both ethical
codes and formal standards. In the final analysis, such codes and standards
as accounting principles primarily keep an honest man honest. Devious per
sons can find a way around them. This isn’t to say that they have no value,
but only that our expectations shouldn’t be too high.
Financial Executive : I think that a discussion of this sort is not com
plete without bringing in the question of professionalism in financial journal
ism. There are well-known financial writers who have on numerous occa
sions criticized the reporting practices of companies in a fashion that is grossly
unfair. They have selected cases of reporting which are in complete accord
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with generally accepted accounting principles and have asserted that they
give a misleading impression or that they did not go far enough in particular
situations, leaving the general feeling that the reporting company was unethi
cal. Shouldn’t we have some standards and enforcement of professional re
sponsibility in this area?
Discussion Leader: While there is no formal participant representing
the press, we do have one member of the financial press covering the sym
posium who might like to respond.
Reporter: While I could agree that from your standpoint such prob
lems may exist, I should point out that reporters do not invent their stories.
They either find material on their own or obtain the data from someone who
feels that he knows something about the inside situation. In the financial re
porting area, the latter is more often the case. A person with access to the
inside story tells the reporter, who checks it out and writes it. I spend a lot
of time checking out what people tell me; I don’t believe it just because it is
told to me.
Discussion Leader: One aspect of professionalism that we have not
touched upon is the continuing demonstration of competence. Both account
ants and analysts have professional credentials which require an initial dem
onstration of competence. After the credential is achieved, however, nothing
is required to sustain it. Should something be necessary?
Analyst: I think that there is an extension beyond the initial qualifica
tion for financial analysts. This is done through the enforcement of a code of
ethics and standards of professional conduct.
As we all know, it’s very nice to have a code. It’s relatively easy to put
together some fine-sounding words, but to enforce a code is extremely diffi
cult. We have worked on this for several years to develop a machinery con
sisting of rather detailed procedures, including both investigation and a
judicial function. If you are to have a meaningful professional designation,
then the acid test of it is the continuous enforcement of that designation. We
require every one of the 3,000 Certified Financial Analysts to respond to a
detailed professional questionnaire which asks very specific questions as to
whether or not his personal or professional conduct has ever been questioned.
While we are on the subject of ethical codes, I would like to ask the fi
nancial executives why they do not have a code or any articulated standards
of performance? Wouldn’t this be a good start, even though the enforcement
mechanism might develop slowly?
Financial Executive: If we are going to take that line, we must start
first with a code of ethics for the chief executive officer. If we parcel out ethi
cal codes so that the financial officer has a code, but the person to whom he
reports does not, our efforts are a waste of time. You have to start at the top.
Financial Executive: This is correct. The financial officer is not the
one who is responsible for the report. Responsibility for ethical reporting be
havior must start with the top man, whether the chairman of the board or the
chief executive officer.
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We as financial executives may have a code of ethics, but if our ethics do
not agree with the chief executive, and he won’t change, we either have to ac
cept his or resign. That’s our choice.
CPA: It strikes me that we need interlocking and supporting codes of
ethics on the part of management, financial executives, financial analysts, and
CPAs, which are designed to provide the kind of objective financial informa
tion that the user needs, as well as intelligent use of that information.
When we approach ethical codes in our individual, segmented fashion as
we have in the past, problems have been created.
Analyst: I don’t believe that the absence of a code for chief executives
is a worthy reason for financial executives not to develop a code of their own.
I don’t say a code works wonders, but I think it may offer support, and very
important support, for the financial officer who on occasion gets in a situation
where he must confront his chief executive. It can be of considerable help to
have something to point to and say, “This is an accepted standard for people
in my line of work.”
Analyst: An additional benefit in creating a code is that anybody who
has some degree of good will in pursuing his own career objective derives a
tremendous amount of benefit from going through the process of defining the
valid criteria, in exchanging some of these definitions with other members of
his own profession, and gradually, on an evolutionary basis, working toward
some modestly higher standards of behavior.
Financial Executive: We have been placing emphasis on a code of
ethics for financial representatives, but perhaps what we really are talking
about is a code of ethics in financial reporting to which the corporation or
business enterprise could subscribe—a code that would be agreed to and
signed by the corporation and its officers as a whole.
Financial Executive : Everything is subject to change and improve
ment. As many of you probably know, the Financial Executives Institute is
looking at the possibility of developing a code of ethics. It won’t come tomor
row or even within six months, but it is being considered.
Discussion Leader: We seem to have put a number of good ideas on
the table for consideration by the various groups in the months to come. Not
only can we await a possible code of ethics from the Financial Executives In
stitute, but we can consider the possibility of interlocking codes and the devel
opment of new dimensions of reporting professionalism from the corporate
community as a whole.
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Conclusion and Thoughts About
The Future
At the end of the symposium, participants were asked for their views on
the success of the program and their suggestions for subsequent steps to be
taken by the sponsoring organizations. The discussion which follows, together
with the written comments of participants, serve as the charge to the Sympo
sium Steering Committee by the group.

Discussion
Discussion Leader: Commissioner James Needham of the Securities
and Exchange Commission has been a participant for the entire meeting and
has indicated a desire to say a few words summarizing his reactions.
Commissioner Needham: One of the clearest messages I have heard
here has been an expression of the desire for change. This desire is pressing on
us from all sides, and we may as well recognize it. We all have new roles to
perform. The difficulty is going to be in establishing the respective roles to
the various groups involved in reporting.
There must be a joining of interests in the public interest to strengthen
the confidence of the investor in order to improve the capital markets of the
United States. The more confidence we can build into our system, the greater
benefits will inure to all of us.
The other side of the ethical question is that of legal responsibility;
while we don’t have time to consider that in depth today, I do want to tell
you that the Commission is not just focusing on increasing the level of per
formance of the groups present here, but we are also studying what the im
plications are from the liability point of view. We have taken some
preliminary steps to try to focus on the problem, to determine what kind of
liability situations are arising over which we have some control, and what the
long-term implications of strike suits are—suits against accountants and law
yers, suits against directors and officers. While law suits have a role, we are
exploring the possibility that they have reached the point where they are
really counterproductive. At this point, we haven’t gone too far with the
question, but it is being examined. We know, however, that we can’t take
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away from the people the rights to which they feel they are entitled, so it is
important for you in the private sector to raise the standards of business
conduct.
It may be that, after we have made this preliminary analysis, we will
announce a public hearing on this in the not-too-distant future to give all of
the interests in the country an opportunity to discuss this question of in
creased liability of people involved with publicly owned companies.
When I asked last night how long ago it was since the other symposium
was held, I was told three years. I would suggest to you that it would not be
appropriate for you to let so long a period of time elapse before you recon
vene; there are many things to do, and the private sector is really more capa
ble than the government in dealing with these kinds of problems.
I urge you to consider having this type of meeting on an annual basis,
and I would hope that as a result of such a meeting some specific recommen
dations could be made to the SEC. In addition, I would hope to find a wil
lingness on the part of the organizations that are present here to commit
themselves to a higher level of conduct in the day-to-day course of business
affairs, perhaps through an expansion of their rules of conduct or by other
means.
I want to thank you very much for allowing us to come. We have a
common interest here; it’s been very informative and educational for us.
Discussion Leader: Are there other reactions to the symposium?
Analyst: I have attended both symposia and found them most helpful.
I think we ought to think about an annual meeting, since I believe fully in
the exchange of ideas that took place here. On the other hand, we have not
solved some of the problems which came along—particularly the problem of
forecasting which seems to be steam rollering down on us. I believe we
should attempt to formulate a collective idea on this subject, and soon.
Analyst: I would like to see this program continue. I think it’s very
valuable, but I believe that particular problems should be focused on and an
attempt made to find some answers.
Financial Executive: I think the symposium should be continued.
Perhaps, in retrospect, three years was too long to wait for the second. I think
it has been confirmed for us that the pace and sweep of events is quite swift,
and we must keep abreast of them.
I hope in the future that we can be more definitive in identifying and
reaching a broad consensus on some principles, as opposed to dealing more
with the philosophical aspects or expressing our concern about problems; we
don’t ever seem to reach the definitive stage.
Finally, it appears to me that we have an open gap in the composition
of our participants, which would be filled by the attendance for half a day or
a full day of a representative group of chief executive officers of various com
panies. While we can now go back and talk to our chief executive officer,
something gets lost in translation because he hasn’t heard it first-hand.
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CPA: I think this has been a very useful symposium. The benefits from
the interchange have been immense, and I would favor continuing it in some
fashion; but I don’t think it is reasonable to expect this sort of group to be a
decision-making body. I don’t think we are going to come up with conclu
sions. We haven’t taken any votes, and my guess is that you couldn’t get any
majority in favor of anything, even though there has been, perhaps, a seem
ing consensus from time to time.
Financial Executive: I subscribe completely to that, because this is not
an organization designed to come to conclusions or specific decisions. Its pur
pose is an interchange of ideas that we can all carry back to our own associa
tions.
Discussion Leader: Is there anything else that need be done in terms of
an action program?
Analyst:It occurs to me that there is some opportunity to institutional
ize the Steering Committee, which has already been functioning for four years.
With some expansion of that committee, it could be converted into something
of a center for financial reporting; here would be the opportunity for a con
tinuing dialogue, and perhaps even a deliberative assembly which would give
the opportunity to develop position papers, to sponsor some joint research,
and to talk to each other. This might serve as an organization within which
communication and dialogue could be pursued.
CPA: I was going to make a very similar observation, though perhaps
not with as formal an organization in mind. It is important that there be an
“on-going” dialogue between these four groups, and maybe a few more, that
continually clears the air on differences and what might be done about them,
so that individual groups could act upon them.
Discussion Leader: Thank you for your thoughts and your participa
tion in our discussions. I hope the seeds have been planted in these two days
which will result in productive changes in the financial reporting environment
in the months and years ahead.
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Symposium Papers and Critiques

The Role of Ethical Standards
In Business
By Clarence C. Walton, President, The Catholic University of America

When men define ethics as a practical, “ought” science, they do so with
an intuitive sense for accuracy. All ethical codes are built from a conceptual
platform which sustains the premise that certain human activities ought or
ought not to be done. The force of the injunction depends, of course, on a
logic influenced by the individual involved, the nature of the act itself, and
the circumstances surrounding the act. To use a simple illustration, one may
observe how the American penal code distinguishes conceptually between
two kinds of acts —those that are malum in se and those that are malum
prohibitum. The former includes such things as assault, arson, rape, and mur
der because they are actions which no society can tolerate, if it wishes to
survive: malum prohibitum acts are those which may not be considered uni
versally evil but which are disallowed by society and punished under the
criminal justice system. In Japan, it is perfectly legitimate for businesses to
discuss pricing policies whereas similar practices in this country are outlawed
under the Sherman Anti-trust Act; gambling is disapproved in Utah and en
couraged in Nevada; England permits the sale of certain drugs, such as mari
juana, which are outlawed here.

The Human Element

Regarding the human agent, psychologists make much of individual
differences and ethicians are also aware of these factors. Minors are treated
differently from adults when crimes are committed; the mentally retarded
are rarely held fully culpable by the courts; insiders are dealt with more
harshly than outsiders in certain cases of fraud and deception; and in times
past the buyer carried the major burden for his own faulty purchasing habits.
The varying nature of the action itself and of the person involved is
related to motivations to make more uneven and tortuous the road of ethical
inquiry. To mix metaphors, while every effort has been made to develop a
logical tapestry, let it be noted only that there is awareness that unraveling
occurs when one moves from generalization to specificity, from conceptualiza
tion to concretization, from principle to practice. There is the ever-present
danger that ethical principles can degenerate into delectable ambiguities pre
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cisely at that point of decision-making when they are most needed.
In a real sense, however, it is the practitioner himself who must refine
general rules of conduct to make them meaningful to his own profession; it
is the practitioner, too, who is in the best position—and who has the primary
responsibility—to develop codes which assure clients and competitors that
the rules of the game are understood and honored. The philosopher can
proffer a general design and building materials. The professional must erect
a bridge which allows transit from theory to action.

Some Critical Questions
How the architectonic features which characterize ethics are developed
becomes clear only by asking questions. These questions fall within general
and specific categories—the second of which are generated by a certain in
trigue with practical problems unique to American business. The interroga
tion can proceed along these four lines:

1.

What is ethics? Or, more properly, what is ethical inquiry? What does
it yield?

2.

How are principles derived through ethical inquiry institutionalized with
in the large American society?

3.

How are the societally approved norms influenced by business manage
ment and how is management, in turn, influenced by them?

4.

What are the early warning signals which constitute the “DEW lines”
for the future?

What Is Ethical Inquiry?

Because ethics deals with human behavior, it is too often assumed that
ethics can provide prefabricated and automatic signals on the highway of
life. Ethical guide posts tell where to go: warning signs tell when to slow;
traffic lights tell when to stop. In practice, this complex industrialized society
operates within a complex democratized society in ways which generate con
flict situations for which traditional precepts seem remote and inadequate.
But it is helpful to ask where and how ethical inquiry begins; what yield we
can expect from it; what is its ultimate utility?
Ethical inquiry begins with relationships. These relationships are essen
tially two-fold: (1) man’s relationship to the cosmos and (2) man’s relation
ship to other men. Often built into the marrow of these relationships, however,
are unstated assumptions which may be totally acceptable to some men and
totally unpersuasive to others. Simple illustrations drive this crucial point
home. The term cosmos generates discussion in terms of popular words
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which seem to communicate but which fail to carry exact meaning. Think of
the radically different meanings attached to the cosmos by Moses and by
Monod. In the rich imagery of the Old Testament is the towering figure of
Moses who says that the cosmos is something which has emerged from the
hand of God. The story of man is the story of his creation by an Omnipo
tent Being who made a physical universe to serve as man’s temporary abode.
Behind all—and permeating all—is a Supreme Intelligence who has given the
human habitat a symmetry of organization and a logic of construction that
finds expression in a set of natural laws. All who have been profoundly in
fluenced by the Judaic-Christian tradition are caught up with this vision of
the cosmos. Man’s nature forces him to seek contact with this transcendent
being, and this contact may be experienced in various ways—externally
through scripture, cult, oracle, or human intercession, and internally through
prayer and other mystical devotions.1
Against the traditional religious views is an interpretation recently ad
vanced by Jacques Monod, the brilliant French Nobel scientist, whose book,
Chance and Necessity, commands growing interest in the Western world.
Monod’s postulate, in oversimplified terms, is this: the Cosmos, a product of
chance forces, represents no great feat by an omnipotent intelligence but a
great fluke. Through some inexplicable random assemblage of physical for
ces, human life and the cosmos itself evolved into their present states. Man
is, therefore, no different from a baboon or from a fish except in terms of
superior genetic endowments which are, in turn, the product of the random
assemblage of physical forces. And the earth is not simply man’s temporary
home—his half-way house to heaven, as Moses averred—but the only home
he will ever know.
Modern intellectual history is writ large in terms of a bias toward the
scientific position. Under traditional religious views, men were presumed to
sacrifice and to suffer on this earth in the sure knowledge that afterlife would
bring rewards and evenhanded justice. The new rubric provides powerful
incentives to believe that, if our cosmos is the product of chance forces alone,
one should enjoy this time and this earth to the full. It can create a subtle
kind of hedonism which scorns traditional sacrifice. In the face of so much
obvious tragedy, it can also induce a fatalism bordering on nihilism.
If different assumptions about the cosmos lead to different conclusions
regarding human goals, it is equally true that different assumptions regard
ing human nature will produce the same effect. Theological and philosophi
1

The way thoughtful men approach the study of the Transcendent is, in itself, a fascinating
exercise of intellectual exploration. For example, Emile Durkheim concluded that all of
man’s gods are but man-created symbols of society itself. See the Elementary Forms of the
Religious Life, Trans. Joseph W. Swain (London: G. Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1950). If
Durkheim approached the Transcendent through sociology, Rudolph Otto approached the
Transcendent through philosophy arguing that the Divine can be known only by first
analyzing human feelings. The Idea of the Holy, Trans. John W. Harvey (London: Oxford
University Press, 1923).
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cal reflections on the nature of the human being illustrate not only dichoto
mous views but significant practical lessons for social engineering, that is to
say, the way men construct social organizations such as corporations, govern
ments, labor unions, churches, and the like.
One viewpoint holds that human nature is essentially perverse, essen
tially greedy and lustful, essentially unreliable, and essentially irrational.
On the other hand, we are told by some moralists and philosophers that
human nature is essentially reasonable, essentially accomodating and respon
sible, essentially creative, and essentially good. In theology men like Augus
tine, Calvin, and Jansen took a dour view of human nature; and they were
paralleled in philosophy by Machiavelli, Hobbes, and others. Against this es
sentially critical model of man is a theological position represented by Aqui
nas, Bellarmine, and a philosophical interpretation found in Rousseau, Con
dorcet, and Locke who believe human nature to be fundamentally good and
noble.
Practical consequences flow from these assumptions. If the prevailing
belief is in the pessimistic view of man, there are found political and business
structures which repose power at the top and which build in tight controls
over members of the enterprise. Max Weber reflects this trend when he de
veloped a typology where all authority is focused on the top and trickles
downward in a series of precise commands. Somewhat the same view per
meates the thinking of Henry Taylor on industrial management and Alexan
der Hamilton in his political designs.
The more optimistic view results in a social structure that is broadly
democratic, permissive, and open. In politics, Thomas Jefferson reflects this
philosophy; in organizational theory, Chris Argyris, Mason Haire, and Doug
las McGregor are expositors of this viewpoint. By way of incomplete
summary, we can say that assumptions regarding the cosmos and man give a
bias to our ethical perceptions. One of the first problems of ethical inquiry,
therefore, is to expose those assumptions.

The Ethical "Yield"

The next and almost inexorable question is the one of “yield.” Why
should a statesman or a businessman or a spouse concern himself with ethical
inquiry if there is no practical result? Are there some postulates which have
value to all men? An affirmative response requires specification and this, in
turn, is dealt with in terms of four items: rationality, freedom, sanctions, and
monitoring. These form the ethical pillars of a just society.
There can be no ethical choice for animals or babies or idiots. This is
an oblique way of saying that man is a creature who can think things out,
who has the capacity to perceive and to pursue his own best interests, and
who has, uniquely, the further capacity to reflect on what he has done in
terms of its goodness or its badness. This elemental truism may seem little
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more than a cliche; in fact, however, it is important because there can be no
democracy, no free enterprise system, no network of interacting voluntary as
sociations without the “rational man” premise.
Also, there can be no ethical choice without freedom. If a man lacks
meaningful options, he is incapacitated in making an ethical choice. Freedom
is painful because it means accountability. Despite all talk about “delegating
authority,” anyone in a leadership role knows how difficult it is in crisis to
get people to accept authority which enlarges their freedoms. The higher one
climbs on the political or business ladder the heavier is the burden. This ex
plains why greater ethical demands are made upon leaders in our society
than are made on the followers. Like Caesar’s wife, the man “on top” must
be above reproach.
The third thing which emerges from ethical inquiry is a realization that
rational and free acts inevitably require rewards or punishments in the ethical
effort. Built into the spirituality of the Judaic-Christian tradition is the con
cept of deferred benefits; built into the whole concept of capitalism is this
same ideal. Through innate endowments or through social engineering, this
sanction system must be seen as reasonable and attainable; otherwise the eth
ical code on which it relies collapses.
The final product of ethical inquiry is the realization that without a mon
itoring system ethical behavior by the many is jeopardized by irresponsible
behavior by the few. In the ideal order, monitoring is self-imposed and oper
ates through the individual conscience; when, however, human actions are in
tersocial and when such actions have long-term consequences for large num
bers of third parties, then a monitoring system eventually comes into being.
It has been a tendency in business to develop self-policing devices which ex
press themselves usually in professional codes of ethics; when such codes fail,
the external force of government may be employed.
Thus far a summation of the argument would tell us that the human
agent is a reasonable fellow who has freedom to play the game and who be
lieves, further, that the game is worth playing under the watchful eye of an
impartial umpire. It tells us that whether one interprets human nature as
glorious or subversive, creative or destructive, responsible or irresponsible,
there must be an ultimate result. What are these finalities? The answer, sim
ply put, is a peaceful society based on justice. Religious men are motivated
to go beyond justice to practice a higher form of living by placing the good
of the neighbor in parallel track with the self. This small group makes up
our heroes and our saints.
The average man seems content to let the honor roll of heroes or saints
remain small. For himself, he expects justice from others even as he practices
justice toward others. No political order and no business system can long sur
vive if based on any other concept.
Justice, of course, expresses itself in various ways. Within the economic
order one perceives quickly two forms which might be described as transactionalist justice and equity justice, respectively. Transactionalist justice is
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simply an arithmetic one-to-one exchange; it is a quid pro quo where one vol
untarily surrenders something in order to acquire something else of greater
subjective utility. Medieval philosophers spent a great deal of time on ex
change justice and developed theories for a “living wage” and “fair prices”
to further this goal. It was the genius of Adam Smith to devise a theoretical
construct which made justice the automatic result of a free market system;
men did not have to will to do the just thing because the market literally
forced it. In our day of vast conglomerates and highly sophisticated exper
tise, the simple Smithian formula cannot be presumed to yield justice auto
matically.
A second form, called equity justice, is concerned with one’s fair share
of the gains by an enterprise. Again, in our kind of industrial order, the ful
fillment of this ethical imperative is difficult; it is a rather amazing fact, none
theless, that through personnel policies (including job descriptions and salary
scales) we have approached equity justice with more wisdom than critics of
the system care to admit.

Justice in America—Making Dreams Come True

How does a society make the ideal of justice into an existential reality?
This chapter in human history is of perennial concern to moralists and histor
ians. For purposes of economy one perforce cuts through an enormous range
of complexities in American life to learn how justice was achieved. Our legal,
political and economic traditions spell out a fascinating story. By focusing on
these three interdependent and interrelated constructs, one can understand
how Americans have taken big dreams to little fives.
Suppose we were asked to create a society which best could achieve jus
tice. At a point in time our forebears wrestled with this very challenge. Their
response was a series of social innovations that, in the aggregate, built an ad
versary system as the best method for assuring justice. Illustrations drive
the point home quite effectively. In the legal realm, a cherished social crea
tion is “due process,” embodied in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
With this technique was developed an elaborate adversary procedure where
the accused is brought to trial, is given adequate defense, is allowed to chal
lenge witnesses, is allowed to remain silent. A mantle of confidentiality cov
ers relations between lawyer and client. Then the opponents engaged in oneto-one peaceful “combat” before a group of good and true men sitting as ju
rors. To ensure justice we insist on a simple rule: “The truth, the whole truth,
and nothing but the truth.” This suggests, incidentally, that in other kinds of
human exchange, partial truth might be acceptable on an ethical basis. Un
derlying this legal jousting is a win-lose premise: a verdict is reached by the
jurors; a sentence is passed. And that is it!
In the political realm our Founders also introduced the adversary con
cept on a one-to-one organizational confrontation. Perhaps the most elaborate
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theoretical formulation is found in Madison’s essay in The Federalist which
brilliantly expounded the idea of group conflict. At a time when men wor
ried whether large states would dominate small states, rich states dominate
poor ones, populous areas control less populous ones, Madison cut through
the size issue to assert that throughout American society there are group con
flicts based on a variety of economic, religious, political, local issues. In a
sense Madison anticipated Galbraith’s Countervailing Theory as a mechanism
which would work to the good of all. Madison then moved to politics.
The political system was built on a simple proposition of peaceful con
flict resolution. The further assumption was that small groups would merge
into large groups and then into ever larger groups which would eventually
be incorporated into a political party. At one point in time (election day)
Republicans and Democrats would enter into the arena, and through the ad
versary process one would emerge as the winner and the other as the loser.
In business we accepted as part of our secular scripture the notion of
market competition. But Smith added an interesting variation on the old
adversary theme. Instead of a simple win-lose proposition, both parties to the
exchange system wind up winners. Because of specialization of labor and
because of multiple units in the competitive field, each man’s utility would
be generally enhanced through the market mechanism. It was not simply
happenstance that we talk of an exchange of “goods.”
This conceptual framework Americans developed and, for a century,
sought to elaborate with increasing refinement. Unhappily, the age of indus
trialization was precisely at the Rostovian take-off point when Charles Dar
win published his famous Origin of Species (1859). In it he argued that ruth
less competition and survival-of-the-fittest were laws of nature. Herbert
Spencer was so entranced by these general ideas that he applied them to the
social order. As a country—and above all others—America embraced whole
heartedly the concept of Social Darwinism. Business was part of life, and life
represented the jungle ethics in the fight for survival. There were winners
and there were losers; the struggle was intense and vicious.
The post-bellum society moved through an age of robber barons and
muckrakers, tough-muscled and tight-lipped buccaneers who took the infant
country into industrial manhood—at a price! In the interim, a compliant court
rendered a series of decisions which apotheosized property rights, winked at
ruthless competition, allowed labor to be treated exclusively as a factor in pro
duction, and kept government intervention to a minimum.
Men still preached the values of Jeffersonian agrarianism, small-town
virtues—the essentially “good man” model. But the gap between reality and
myth widened. There seemed to be a wholesale refusal to face facts and to
recognize that personal competition had been superseded by organizational
competition, that the win-lose concept had now been moved fully into the
economic sphere, that those that failed to succeed were victims of a system
and not victims of their own corrupt natures.
As freedoms were curtailed for many, as the monetary systems creaked
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into inefficiencies, as business cycles became more severe, business was put
on the firing line, and the great depression of 1929 marked the nadir of con
fidence in the American dream.

The Ethics of Business
It is now opportune to recall some general criteria that emerged from
our ethical inquiry. Postulated was the notion of rationality, and the distinc
tion was made between the infant and the adult. In a social sense, the Ameri
can corporation was still an infant whose managers had no clear notion of
how a corporation fitted within the larger goals of American society. The
lack of relevant corporate data meant, further, that rationality was han
dicapped—if rationality is defined as an ability to perceive and pursue en
lightened self-interest and to be aware of long-term consequences. Postulated,
too, was a notion of freedom, but freedom of initiative was drying up at such
a rate that Congress was driven to pass the Sherman Anti-trust law. The
rewards system, premised on Darwinian concepts, made it only a matter of
time until the working masses revolted against rules of the game that were
slanted against them.
It was his powerful appeal to the working classes that helped Roosevelt
to victory in 1932 and ushered in what was to be a radical transformation
in the numerical strength of the two major political parties.
It may be unfair to say that a depression was required to bring reform.
But the depression did induce serious and agonizing reappraisals of business
ethics. Challenged was the dictum, given by R. E. Badger, author of a major
book on investment analysis: “let the buyer beware.”2 In their landmark
book, Berle and Means argued in 1932 that there was a desperate need for
new ethical principles to govern disclosure policies;3 working along parallel
tracks were Graham and Dodd whose remedy for ethical deficiencies was
advocacy of a more activist stockholder policy as a kind of countervailing
force to the power of insiders.4 When business moved slowly to clean its own
house, the government moved promptly and the passage of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 represented a new monitoring force of great power—
and considerable uncertainty—in the business community.
It need only be remarked at this point that the old concept of simple
adversary relationships was no longer regarded as the automatic safeguard
for the promotion of justice. The evolutionary process had begun.
The most dramatic developments have occurred since the end of World
War II. Approaching the problem of business ethics, men tended to divide
2
3

4
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between those who advocated a representationalist ethic for business and
those who advocated a trusteeship ethic for business. Under the former rubric,
corporate managers were asked to behave like members of the British House
of Commons who were elected for one purpose: to represent their constitu
ency. The Member of Parliament was not expected to act out Edmund
Burke’s dream of the independent statesman leading his people; rather, he
was to behave in the sense of a delivery man. What the voters wanted was
what he expected to get.
In a similar vein it was argued that corporate managers were responsible
to one client—the stockholder. It was a manager’s obligation, therefore, to
get what the stockholder wanted. And what he wanted was maximization
of his investment. The ideas of the representationalist ethic are articulated
today by scholars like Milton Friedman of Chicago and Henry Mannes of
Rochester and by businessmen like Arnold Maremont and Nathan Cum
mings. The business of business is business: any attempt to accommodate to
larger sets of claimants is foredoomed to failure.
Against this tradition is a new view which argues persuasively that a
corporation holds a franchise from the entire American people. It follows,
therefore, that the corporation must behave like a good citizen and discharge
certain civic responsibilities. These obligations transcend the claims of a single
constituency called stockholders and require something more than mere
profit-maximizing. Men like Alfred Sloan of General Motors and David
Rockefeller of Chase Manhattan, support this concept. The trusteeship model
holds that in a complicated society like ours, management decisions affect
not only stockholders and competitors, but the entire society. The claimants
go well beyond one-to-one relationships embodied in a simple adversary mod
el. The model recognizes that corporate decisions can shake the entire society.
If one were to venture a judgment on the relative strengths of the two
positions, it seems that the trusteeship model is gaining ascendancy. Clearly,
in the area of corporate financial reporting, the public auditor enjoys no role
similar to the privileged position of lawyer to client. By the nature of things
he is expected to take a broader view of societal needs. He must slap wrists
when hands attached thereto are reaching for the wrong things. Wrong things
could include, of course, conflict-of-interest situations, negligence, inadequate
or dishonest disclosures, and even errors of judgment.
It seems, however, that a more difficult problem is arising. It is recog
nized, on one hand, that upon management falls the burden of success or
failure for the corporate enterprise; presumably it is management’s right, there
fore, to determine what is economically relevant in disclosure. On the other
hand, it is the public auditor who, increasingly, is held responsible for devel
oping ground rules in preparing financial statements; and, such financial
statements cannot escape concerns with economic relevance for the long pull.
At this point, the professional will be driven to develop greater precision in
defining the concept of “generally accepted accounting principles,” of sharp
ening professional codes which will tell both management and the public
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the accountant’s range of responsibilities and limitations thereon. Judicial de
cisions increasingly demonstrate a single fact: whereas deliberate wrongdoing
was prohibited and negligent wrongdoing often condoned, the area of respon
sibility has been extended to include negligence. The burden is less on the
buyer and more on the vendor: the accountant who sells his services does so
today under the watchful eyes of judges and legislators.

Ethical Behavior and the Future

There often occurs in human affairs an event which signals momentous
changes. Such an event was the Associated Gas and Electric case of 1942
which distinguished between formal compliance with generally accepted ac
counting practices and the reality of service to truth. One can argue persua
sively that this distinction was a warning the full import of which was not
understood by the auditing community.
It is in this sense that one looks at the larger society to discern trends of
importance to business. There has always been a “hostile elite” operating in
the world so far as business is concerned. It has consisted, at various times,
of the intellectual, the moralist, and the politician. Today a new dimension
is added with the youth culture. If ever these hostile elites should coalesce,
business would face powerful adversaries. At the moment, one can look only
at the most numerous of these elites, the young, to ask what is the message
in their so-called counter culture. The messages are numerous, crisp, jolting.
1.

We are being told there is massive dissatisfaction with all major institu
tions of our society (church, state, corporation, family).

2.

We are being told that adversary relationships are not the best way to
achieve justice.

3.

We are being told that competition has a limited utility and that what
really counts is harmony and complementarity.

4.

We are being told that in an affluent society there ought not be winners
and losers; the new heresy affirms that everyone should be a winner.
The implications of this for a competitive society and for the Protestant
ethic are enormous.

Clearly, the judicial arm is getting ever longer and the judicial fingers
ever more grasping. The court decisions would suggest strongly that in cer
tain conflicts there is a measure of predictability for the outcome. Illustra
tions might include the following:
1.
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If there is a conflict of rights between the individual and the organization,
the individual will receive preferential treatment.

2.

If there is a question of judging decision-making on the basis of shortversus long-term consequences, the judgment will be concerned with the
long-term result.

3.

If there is a conflict between the innocent and the expert, between the
ignorant and the informed, between the layman and the professional, the
preference will be in favor of the innocent, the uninformed, the layman.

4.

If there is a conflict between the weak and the strong, the bias is toward
protecting the weak.

5.

If there is a conflict between serving a narrow constituency and the larger
society, the support will be for the greater number of claimants.

The accounting profession, in a very special way, deals with objective
reporting of facts to serve justice. It deals with the material prosperity of the
entire American people; it involves highly complex human and social rela
tionships between client and professional.
If society is moving toward new directions, the professional must adjust.
Such adjustments may be achieved by forces external to the profession or by
men of vision within the accounting fraternity. If justice and prosperity are
to be the fortunes of all Americans in these troubled days, then one hopes
for the emergence of new Colonel Carters and George O. Mays who in the
past sensed significant changes and responded creatively.
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The Changing Ethical
Environment in

Financial Reporting

Ethical Standards in
Financial Reporting:
A Critical Review
By Douglas A. Hayes, Professor of Finance, University of Michigan; mem
ber of the Professional Grievance Committee, The Institute of Chartered
Financial Analysts

If we accept the premise that extensive public holdings of corporate secu
rities, including both bonds and stocks, roughly coincided with the transfor
mation of this country from a largely agrarian, economy to an industrial
economy near the end of the nineteenth century, then the doctrine, which
would be consequent to this event, that corporations have an obligation to
provide reasonably accurate and extensive financial information to their out
side investors is necessarily of fairly recent origin. As recently as 1925, for
example, a leading book on investment principles was reluctantly obliged to
offer the following statement:
But for the securities of manufacturing and industrial companies
generally, investment principles degenerate into a series of caveats,
until it seems as if the only dictum of common application is the cau
tion of caveat emptor, “let the buyer beware.”
It is no reflection on the class of securities called “industrial
bonds” that they do not receive treatment in these pages. The infer
ence is merely as implied above, that the conditions governing their
issuance are not sufficiently uniform for safe generalization.1

The language clearly suggests that commitments to industrial securities at
that time could be regarded as suitable only for “insiders” or perhaps as short
term speculative vehicles because of the inherent lack of relevant corporate
data for an intelligent investment appraisal.1
1 Lawrence Chamberlin, The Principles of Bond Investment (New York: Henry Holt & Co.,
1925), p. iv.
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Corporate Reporting: The Early Phase
One of the first extensive books on valuation methodology also reluc
tantly concluded that the art of financial reporting was then in a primitive
state. Badger, in his landmark book, Valuation of Industrial Securities, was
one of the first to hold that expected long-term earning power capitalized at
an appropriate rate should be the basic approach to the determination of the
investment value of a common stock. But in discussing analytical techniques
for determining earning power, it is almost ludicrous to note that Badger
recommended the earnings be determined from a comparison of the change
in equity between successive balance sheets rather than from direct use of
income statements because the latter were likely to be arbitrary and often
misleading.2
Perhaps because the “Corporate Establishment” invoked the respect, if
not the awe, of all but the lunatic fringe of academic economists (such as
Thorstein Veblen) during the New Era of the twenties, the literature on in
vestment analysis of that time did not include a protest against the paucity
of financial information and the lack of generally accepted standards for its
preparation. With the onset of the Depression, however, the doctrine that
economic progress would best be served by a laissez-faire policy toward cor
porate management quickly evaporated. The shocking revelations of price
rigging and manipulations in the securities markets, sometimes abetted by
corporate insiders, indicated clearly that the public interest required sweeping
reforms as to both market and corporate attitudes if the system was to sur
vive. The almost religious faith that the American public had in laissez-faire
was demolished, and a trend toward economic controls was set in motion that
has continued to the present day.
In the context of these times, it is not surprising to find that the first
edition of Graham and Dodd, Security Analysis, written in 1933-1934, se
verely criticized the prevailing policy of corporations to provide only a mini
mal amount of financial data in their annual reports. In fact, for the first
time, leading members within the Wall Street community raised the ethical
issue concerning corporate disclosure policies:

Concealment of the sales total or the depreciation charge severe
ly handicaps the analyst and the intelligent stockholder because it
renders impossible any thoroughgoing study of the results. Nor can
it be denied that the restriction of this important information to a
small group identified with the management may at times be of great
benefit to them and a disadvantage to the general public. The same
is true of the failure to issue reports oftener than once a year. [Em
phasis mine.]3
2
3
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It is perhaps also significant that the authors did not recommend gov
ernmental intervention to remedy the situation as might be the case today.
Instead an activist stockholder policy was recommended, and it is quite pos
sible that one reason for the leading role occupied by Benjamin Graham in
organizing the first Financial Analyst Society may be related to the following
statement: “If the stockholders of companies pursuing such archaic policies of
concealment would bring sufficiently vigorous pressure upon their manage
ments, many changes for the better could speedily be brought about.”4

Statutory Reforms: Objectives and Results
Whether the “stockholder pressure” strategy would have accomplished
the desired results will never be known because shortly thereafter the Secu
rities Exchange Act of 1934 became the law of the land. As we all know,
Section 13 of that Act stipulated that all listed companies must file financial
reports at such intervals and in such form as the SEC may require to provide
“proper protection of investors and to insure fair dealing in the security.”5
The language of the statute clearly indicated that ethical considerations mo
tivated Congress to seek a legal remedy for the intolerable state of corporate
reporting; it was apparently concluded that ethical standards had to be im
posed from the outside and enforced with legal sanctions because of the lack
of an effective self-regulating mechanism to produce the desired result.
It seems fair to conclude that so far as the specific complaints voiced
by Graham and Dodd were concerned, the statutory requirements as imple
mented by the SEC largely achieved the desired result. Their concern, as
suggested by the quotation, was primarily with an inadequate quantity of
financial data and not with the accounting concepts related to their prepara
tion. Within a reasonable period of time, the development of Form 10K cer
tainly seemed to provide the necessary corrective for listed companies.
Moreover, most major unlisted companies tended to follow the general pattern
imposed by 10K although they were not brought under the Act until 1964.
However, even after the legal disclosure requirements were implemented,
there is some evidence that the annual reports of some major companies con
tinued to provide only a minimal amount of financial information. For exam
ple, the R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company did not publish an annual report
until 1947 (for the year 1946) which included a standard form income state
ment, a management review of the previous year, and the outlook for the
coming year. Up until that time the company had merely sent its sharehold
ers once a year a two-page document entitled “Financial Statement” which
set forth only a condensed income statement and balance sheet for the year

4 Ibid., p. 44.
5 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Section 13(a).
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in question; in retrospect, it is shocking to recall the primitive status of finan
cial reporting in a period as recent as the 1940s. In fact this particular com
pany, which had long been listed on the Big Board, did not reveal its gross
revenues in its income statement until 1937. Because this concession followed
the 10K requirement by a year or so, it would seem a reasonable conjecture
that statutory compulsion was the lever that reluctantly induced the change
of policy.
Unfortunately, therefore, in reviewing the history of corporate reporting
policies there would seem to be considerable justification for the position that
adequate disclosure had to be forced on corporations through statutory sanc
tions. There is no substantive evidence that an enlightened attitude of man
agement toward its responsibilities produces the wealth of information
available in most annual reports today. While some may regard the analogy
as unfair, the fact that many corporations had to be threatened with legal
sanctions to take a more responsible position toward their shareholders may
suggest that a voluntary restructuring of policies will not be adequate to meet
the current emerging social responsibilities, such as the need for pollution
control, and that statutory remedies are the only viable means of inducing
satisfactory corporate performance in areas of crucial public interest.
Some analysts still argue that certain deficiencies exist with respect to
the amount of disclosure offered by some corporations. For example, for the
most part the integrated oil companies do not reveal estimated crude oil re
serves and the changes therein produced by exploration activities during a
given year. And there continues to be controversy concerning whether multi
line corporations should report earnings as well as sales by major product
groups. However, these alleged deficiencies in disclosure are of an entirely
different dimension than those preceding SEC days. With respect to most of
the additional disclosures presently advocated, corporations may have the
legitimate defense that the data cannot be prepared with a reasonable degree
of accuracy and may necessarily involve estimates subject to a wide margin
of error. Estimates of proven oil reserves and of profit contributions by prod
uct lines (where arbitrary allocations of joint expenses might be required)
would seem to be of this nature.
However, these measurement problems did not exist for such funda
mental matters as total sales, sales by product lines, and major types of ex
penses that were previously withheld; the earlier defense was a vague allega
tion that disclosure of additional information would somehow result in a
“competitive disadvantage” although just how and in what ways were never
made clear. Therefore, the ethical overtones alluded to by Graham and Dodd
in 1934 concerning the secrecy policies of those days cannot readily be trans
ferred to a reluctance to supply data which cannot readily be quantified ex
cept on the basis of rather uncertain estimates.
Although ingenious financial and credit analysts will undoubtedly sug
gest analytical techniques that will require additional financial or operating
data of some sort or other, the principle of diminishing returns may be appli
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cable to many proposed extensions of financial and economic information on
both industries and companies. For example, the statistical supplements of
some of the major oil and utility companies seem to provide more quantitative
data than can readily be digested by even a professional analyst.

The Stewardship Theory: Development and Ethical Premises

There is considerable doubt whether the same sense of relative satis
faction can be applied to a second dimension of financial reporting that is
equally crucial. Reference here is to the state of ethical behavior that has
sometimes seemed to govern some managements in their decisions as to the
basis for determining financial information. While the extent of disclosure
is important, it would seem equally important that all disclosures be free
from conflict of interest biases, be consistent, and be reasonably uniform in
application. In short, reporting standards should so far as possible minimize
interpretational problems in the financial and credit markets.
The issues here are subtle, complicated, and controversial with respect
to both ethical considerations and accounting theory and its related principles.
But in my opinion the issue that transcends all others is the emerging contro
versy concerning a basic premise of the corporate institution: the stewardship
theory of management responsibility. This theory is based on the empirical
evidence that in the large corporation there is a de facto separation of owner
ship on one hand and management control on the other. As a consequence,
the doctrine has emerged that managements of publicly owned corporations
should be considered fiduciary-professionals who necessarily must be given
discretionary authority to manage corporate property for the benefit of out
side shareholders to whom they render periodic reports.6 By inference the
doctrine almost seems to suggest that management should assume the role of
a common law trustee and behave accordingly, although advocates of the
theory have notably been silent on the question of whether the legal respon
sibilities incumbent on common law trustees should be applied to corporate
management.
The theory is of relatively modern origin, and although perhaps not
originating it, Berle and Means’ The Modern Corporation and Private Prop
erty, published in 1932, gave the concept wide visibility in the academic and
legal communities. In fact, this milestone work probably had considerable
influence on subsequent legislation; the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934 in

6

Cf. J. C. Burton, ed., Corporate Financial Reporting: Conflicts and Challenges (New
York: American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 1969), pp. 5-6. The stewardship
theory was used in these pages to argue that under it financial reporting becomes an im
portant responsibility of management and, as a consequence, management also must have
the ultimate authority to decide upon the accounting principles applicable to their situation.
The assumption of no “conflicts of interest” would seem clear, though unstated, in this con
clusion.
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eluded remedies for many of their specific concerns, such as the lack of full
disclosure on public offerings and the vulnerability of the public to insider
trading abuses. Although it is phrased in terms of a recommendation for
legal liability because their primary objective was a revision of legal stand
ards to govern corporate behavior, the following extract from the original
edition could easily be restated as a major element in an ethical code for
disclosure under the stewardship theory:
Granting the economic thesis that a share of stock is primarily
a capitalized expectation, valued by an open market appraisal of the
situation existing in the corporation and the industry, and granting
further that it is reasonably foreseeable (as it certainly is) that ap
praisals will vary with the information given out, it is not difficult to
suppose that the management of a corporation will be liable (a) for
willful misstatement of fact designed to induce action on the part of
anyone buying or selling in the market; (b) perhaps also on account
of a negligent misstatement of fact not designed to induce action in
the market but resulting in a material fluctuation; (c) possibly, for a
failure to disclose a material fact leading to faulty appraisal.7
Despite their concern with legal remedies, Berle and Means did raise the
specific issue of ethical standards under the stewardship theory and concluded
that if disclosures are made with the intention of inducing market action, they
should be interpreted as unethical because “it is not the business of the man
agement to create market movements,” unless it is to correct erroneous rumors
that clearly appear to be affecting the price of the securities.8 The need for
ethical standards to supplement legal requirements resulted, in their opinion,
from the inherent ambiguities concerning definitions, such as what is a “fact”
and what is “material.” As a consequence, it was their conclusion that the
law could only intervene in obvious situations, and that legal remedies, there
fore, could not correct the basic problems related to managerial responsibili
ties in this area.
Berle and Means, therefore, offered a persuasive case for establishing
strict ethical codes to govern disclosure policies with the primary goal to be
that of facilitating appraisals of credit quality and security values by outside
lenders and investors. The reference to this work has been emphasized be
cause a case can be made that it still offers the most penetrating and exten
sive analysis of the ethical issues related to corporate disclosures. However,
their final conclusion that the failure of corporate managements to meet their
responsibilities indicated the desirability of quasi socialization of corporate
property was certainly too extreme since they largely ignored the basic eco

7

8
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nomic question of what alternative system would maximize economic growth
and welfare in the long run.

The Stewardship Theory: An Ethical Dilemma

Although for the great majority of corporations reporting standards
have undoubtedly improved considerably from those practiced in 1932, re
current revelations of alleged illegal or unethical disclosures can still be found
in the financial press. It is apparent, therefore, that the problems in this area
have not been entirely resolved. The proposition was advanced earlier in
this paper that any reporting policies, or changes therein through time, that
make a long-term appraisal of a company difficult (or erroneous) should bear
the burden of proof to vindicate their ethical justification. Therefore, the pos
sible motivations for less than optimal disclosure policies must be evaluated
because a consideration of such motivations may go far toward establishing
evidence as to whether such policies can be considered unethical. In this
connection, a review of a number of instances of corporate reports that seem
to have failed to meet the desired objective as set forth above included one or
more of the following motivations:

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.
6.

The self-preservation motive which usually takes the form of manipulat
ing the financial reports to cover up an inadequate earnings performance
in order to avoid shareholder criticism possibly leading to a proxy fight.
The motive reflected in a desire to maintain continued access to bank and
other loan markets. This may induce management to find means of im
proving their earnings and balance sheet figures through adoption of
“favorable” accounting interpretations.
A desire to remove the vulnerability of the company to unfriendly take
over bids; this motive is usually implemented by attempting to improve
the market price of the shares through adopting accounting principles
which will increase per share earnings and their trend.
A political motive which usually takes the form of adopting accounting
interpretations to reduce reported earnings; the objective has usually been
to offset governmental criticism of product price increases.
The motivation to obtain or maintain a high multiple for a common stock
in order to facilitate acquisitions through exchange of stock.
The motivation of management-shareholders to show earnings results that
will facilitate disposal of all or part of their holdings at favorable prices.

There may be other motives which may induce management to depart
from a strict adherence to the basic goals of financial reporting; however, this
list should indicate that strong behavioral incentives may intrude from time
to time to impede compliance with purely objective reporting standards. The
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question remains, though, as to whether some or all of these motivational con
ditions are unethical based on the stewardship theory of managerial respon
sibility.
Some seem relatively easy to resolve. Certainly the slanting of financial
reports to cover up a poor performance can only be regarded as unethical in
the context of the stewardship theory. Therefore, any changes in accounting
methods or interpretations during a period in which earnings reverses have
taken place would be suspect if the changes had the effect of improving the
results that otherwise would have been reported. Moreover, because it cannot
be supposed that the large majority of the beneficiaries are expert financial
analysts, disclosure of the changes in technical footnotes would not seem to
be an acceptable defense against the presumption of unethical behavior. By
these standards, decisions to reduce allocations to pension funds (U.S. Steel in
1958) or to change from a writeoff to a capitalization policy on research and
development expenditures would be presumed unethical if they occurred dur
ing adverse years.
Motivations (2) through (4) above are more difficult to evaluate. On one
hand, it can be argued that they represent ulterior motives which are incom
patible with the fundamental goals of financial reporting, and as a result, if
there is evidence to suggest any biases along these lines, criticism on ethical
grounds is justified. On the other hand, the case can be made that these are
defensive measures whose primary purpose is to protect the interests of the
shareholders in a long-term sense. Bankers no doubt would deplore reporting
practices designed to obtain more favorable credit terms than otherwise would
be granted, but under the stewardship theory, the obligation to shareholders
may be regarded as having first priority, particularly if management has only
a nominal personal interest in the company. If, however, the obligation is to
offer equitable and equal treatment to all classes of investors, then any reports
which incorporated this motive would be open to ethical criticism.
But no existing class of investors can claim injury if the company at
tempts to ward off takeover bids which are viewed as undesirable from
a long-term standpoint or if it moves to counter adverse political pressures on
pricing policies. Therefore, if these motives can be identified as compatible
with the long-term objective of all the parties of interest, the fact that the re
sultant reports may inhibit the valuation process may be considered as an
unavoidable tradeoff which must be sacrificed.
Although the evidence is purely circumstantial, the several changes in
depreciation policies instituted by Inland Steel over the past decade suggest
the existence of both of these motives during these years. In 1962, it will be
remembered, political criticism of the steel industry for increasing prices ob
tained considerable visibility. During that year Inland Steel increased its de
preciation charges from $42.1 million in 1961 to $60.9 million in 1962
although gross plant assets increased only modestly; the maximum accelerat
ed depreciation allowed for tax purposes was applied to the financial reports
and, as a consequence, net income declined by the modest amount of $2.7
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million from 1961. In other words, during a recovery year in corporate prof
its generally, Inland Steel managed to show a declining level of profitability
coincidental with attempts to buttress a case for higher steel prices.
Then in 1968 several of the steel companies became prime targets for
takeover bids, and of course Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., conducted a successful
bid for Jones & Laughlin at that time. In the annual report for 1968, it was
announced that two accounting changes had been made to bring “accounting
practices in line with those generally followed in financial reporting by major
companies.” Henceforth, the company would use the straight-line method for
computing depreciation and the flow-through method would be applied to the
investment credit. By these changes alone, earnings per share were increased
by more than $1.20 per share in 1968, and not surprisingly the price of the
shares became stronger in the market.
There would seem to be little doubt that these successive changes in
policies with respect to a major category of operating expenses have made
the appraisal of Inland Steel’s shares more difficult; in fact, it would seem
practically impossible to obtain any accurate insight into the real trend and
fluctuation of earnings during these years. However, some might hold that
because their purposes in instituting the policy changes were not inconsistent
with long-term shareholder interests, they were not unethical. But the end
results seem clearly at odds with the basic objectives of financial reporting
under the stewardship theory.
Finally, a conscious structuring of reporting policies to obtain a high
multiple for a stock, either to enable large inside shareholders to dispose of
their holdings at favorable prices or to facilitate acquisitions, would seem open
to serious criticism on ethical grounds. By definition, the objective is to mis
lead investors into an appraisal higher than otherwise would be justified. Al
though the first edition of Security Analysis in 1934 devoted considerable
attention to the need for a critical analysis of reported earnings, and others
have frequently repeated the caveat since, stock prices still seem highly sensi
tive to changes in the percentage growth of reported earnings per share. This
observed fact, deplorable as it may be, has provided a definite temptation to
unethical managements to make earnings “perform” accordingly.9
In my opinion, the trend distortions introduced by some applications of
pooling of interests accounting on the part of a few conglomerates before re
medial measures were taken by the SEC and the Accounting Principles Board
represented classic examples of “performance” reporting. The allegations of
the SEC with respect to data filed by Performance Systems, Inc. represent a
fairly recent example of these motives. The allegations charge material over

9

The technical means used to achieve performance in earnings usually include revisions in
accounting methods to accelerate revenue recognition (on leases, for example) and to defer
expense recognition or some combination of both. Also large writeoffs in a single year
may be used to relieve future income statements of normal expense charges. “Flexibility”
in accounting principles makes these devices open to management.
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statements of earnings in a registration statement covering both a debenture
offering and insider shareholder sale of common stock. In short, the inference
is clear that accounting policies used to determine earnings were influenced
by the desire of insider management to unload shares at favorable prices. In
this case, it is interesting to note that the disputed reports had been “certified
by a prominent national accounting firm” and this fact represented the major
reported defense against the allegations.1011
The fundamental issue that emerges from the above discussion is whether
the stewardship theory which makes management primarily responsible for
the financial reports should not be discarded because of inherent and irrecon
cilable conflicts of interest. Although the formal position of the accounting
profession still supports the theory, the dissents have grown more numerous
and more visible in recent years. In this connection, the prestigious publica
tion of Duke University’s Law School, Law and Contemporary Problems,
devoted an entire issue in 1965 to the subject of “Uniformity in Financial Ac
counting.” To my knowledge, this publication still represents the most com
prehensive collection of views on the legal, ethical, and institutional frame
work of financial reporting. In a number of these independently prepared es
says, there is a pervasive theme that some type of sanction should be imposed
to subordinate management’s control over the financial reports rendered to
outside investor interests. The following statement in support of this proposi
tion, while it was not universally accepted, is illustrative of the views of sev
eral contributions:

Management is primarily responsible for the choice among al
ternative accounting principles used in compiling annual reports. Yet
accounting statements are essentially reports on managerial perform
ance. Apart from the obvious conflict of interest in such a situation,
there is little assurance that management, beset by a variety of pres
sures to mould accounting results purposively, uses the best mea
surement criteria in reaching its accounting policy decisions. . . .
Freeing external accounting measurement from strong managerial
influence may be an important first step in gaining acceptance for new
accounting principles in which the inevitable compromise between
objectivity and economic relevance is weighted more heavily toward
the latter.11
Some might argue against imposing more rigorous constraints on man
agement on the grounds that they would be incompatible with the tenets of
a free enterprise economy. In their view, an excess of extraneous regulations
already unduly inhibits the private sector to the detriment of economic effici

10 The Wall Street Journal, April 19, 1971, p. 6.
11 Charles E. Johnson, “Management and Accounting Principles,” Law and Contemporary
Problems (Duke University School of Law, Autumn 1965), p. 705.
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ency and growth. Therefore, further intrusions whether by legal means or
otherwise should be strongly resisted at all costs.
However, a major, although usually implicit, assumption of free enter
prise economics is that reasonably extensive and accurate information is avail
able to the consumer and investor components of the private sector because
only with such information will optimal decisions be reached both as to con
sumption and investment. Business firms can obtain external financing only
if they can convince the financial markets that they offer an attractive risk
return matrix superior to available alternatives. If the information on which
financial market decisions must be based is misleading or can only be com
pared to alternatives with extreme difficulty, then capital cannot be efficiently
allocated at best and may be completely misallocated at worst. As the scope
and complexity of economic activity have increased, the problems of efficiently
allocating savings flows have consequently become more difficult. To have
these difficulties compounded by a serious lack of agreement on appropriate
reporting standards quite possibly would seem intolerable even to the most
dedicated free enterprise economists. In fact, such economists might well ad
vance the proposition that effective controls over reporting standards are
greatly preferable to the possible alternative that might develop if the quality
of information flows do not improve: direct controls over capital allocations.

The Ethical Interface: Financial Reporting
And Investment Strategies

In the pre-SEC era, the preponderance of historical evidence suggests
that the strategies which dominated stock market activities were short-term or
at most intermediate-term in nature. Common stocks generally were either
regarded as short-term trading vehicles (the casino strategy) or alternatively
were to be traded according to the popular Dow theory or through some other
means of forecasting the probable direction of the market in a cyclical sense.
The implementation of these strategies required a minimum of corporate fi
nancial information because they were primarily based on technical market
analysis supplemented by economic business cycle analysis.
It is quite possible that these strategies occupied a dominant position be
cause the crude state of financial reporting made other strategies difficult to
implement. This may have been particularly true in the 1925-1930 period
because after Smith originated the theory of common stocks as long-term in
vestments in 1924, Badger, Rose, Van Strum, and Irving Fisher, among others,
refined and popularized it for a wide audience.
The trauma of the Great Depression merely led the adherents of the
long-term strategy to modify the theory to include the caveats that satisfactory
results would probably also depend on prudent selection techniques, wherein
long-term values were estimated and compared to prevailing prices. The
financial reporting revolution engendered by the legislation of the early thir-

83

ties made implementation of these caveats seem possible for the first time.
Although trading strategies never were completely discarded, the orien
tation definitely seemed to shift toward a long-term approach based on funda
mental analysis. The scorn that John Maynard Keynes had shown for stock
market investors in his famous General Theory gradually seemed to become
undeserved. Keynes had compared the market to a game of musical chairs.
Then followed the much quoted observation that most decisions were based
not on an intelligent estimate of long-term economic expectations but upon
what “average opinion expects average opinion to be,” and he concluded that,
based on the historical record, the stock market was a net detriment to eco
nomic stability and progress.12 Although one cannot point to conclusive evi
dence that the casino strategies that Keynes had satirized so effectively
occupied only a minor role in the markets of the forties and fifties, the fact
that the turnover ratio remained well below that of the twenties suggests that
a greater proportion of stocks were acquired for relatively permanent invest
ment.
In the context of the revised approach to investment in common stocks,
serious literature on investment analysis, including successive editions of Gra
ham and Dodd (and three editions of my own book), stressed the need for a
critical examination of reported earnings and for considerable skepticism to
ward “concepts” and short-term results unsupported by a seasoned earnings
record tested by adversity.
If the trend in this direction had continued, the incidence of questionable
reporting practices may well have declined. Managements might ultimately
have become sensitive to the fact that their reports would be subject to careful
scrutiny, and reports offering misleading or inadequate information might
well have become counter-productive in terms of their effects on the related
securities. In other words, there seemed to be developing a salutary interface
between the slow trend toward improved professional standards in security
analysis and improved reporting policies. The aspiration level in this connec
tion probably reached a high point with the founding of the Certified Finan
cial Analyst program in 1963, which had as its major objective the develop
ment of a professional status for financial analysts.
Unfortunately, however, the vogue for performance investment strategies
which developed in the mid-sixties has had serious regressive effects on pro
fessional and ethical standards within the investment community and again
there was an interface response from the corporate community. A new set of
robber barons emerged in a portion of the mutual fund industry who used the
new techniques of letter stock writeups, reappraisals upward of nonmarketable assets on the basis of contrived evidence, and concentrated activity in
thinly traded “concept” stocks to generate self-propelled performance that in

12
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J. M. Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money (New York:
Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1936), pp. 156-59.

turn provided huge self-enrichment through incentive fees based on near-term
upside performance with no penalties for subsequent declines. The Keynesian
comparison of the market to a game of musical chairs proved to be more dis
mally accurate than amusing as rapid advances in some thinly traded stocks
were followed by one collapse after another. Those that failed to gain
a “chair” by an early exit suffered catastrophic consequences. A veil of se
crecy has obscured the effects on the personal fortunes of the performance
fund managers, but there is no reason to believe they have not retained their
ill-gotten plunder.
As might be expected, the reporting policies of numerous “concept” com
panies aided and abetted performance strategies oriented to rapid trading on
the basis of changes in quarterly reports turned out by these unseasoned
“concept” companies. The temptations were great because if a company
could catch the fancy of the performance funds for several months or so,
large insider shareholders, including management with large stock options,
could realize fantastic gains and become wealthy overnight. With this “pot
of gold” awaiting them, apparently entirely within the law, it is not surpris
ing that abstract ethical considerations were sometimes submerged by some
managements in establishing criteria for financial reporting. Some might dis
miss these comments as merely historical in nature while our concern should
be with the future. But let us not delude ourselves. Greed will continue to
be a strong behavioral motivation; and, if control over financial reporting
policies remains with those who can use the policies for huge self-enrichment,
then no amount of pious exhortation will eliminate unethical behavior.

Conclusion and Recommendations

The events of the late sixties have merely reinforced my conclusions con
cerning the desirable guidelines for imposing more effective controls over
financial reporting that were set forth in 1965. In short, they seem more per
tinent today than then and, therefore, are reproduced below. They were, in
part, paraphrases of recommendations made by Dr. Herbert E. Miller,13 then
a professor of accounting and now a partner in Arthur Andersen.
1.

2.
3.

Financial statements should reflect an objective and impartial re
port on management’s performance.
The accounting profession has the obligation to correct any de
ficiencies in financial statements that impair an objective evalua
tion of managerial performances.
Disclosure of the use of unusual accounting principles or pro
cedures in technical footnotes to the statements should not be re

13 See Miller, “Audited Statements—Are They Really Management’s?” The Journal of Ac
countancy, (October 1964), p. 43.
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garded as alleviating the responsibility of the public accountant
for their use in statements which receive unqualified opinions.
4. The accounting profession should not tolerate or advocate an
“either-or” position on alternative procedures because of some
uncertainty concerning which alternative is best. It should make
a single choice from among the alternatives, even though some
practitioners might dissent from the choice, in the interests of
improved consistency and comparability.
5. Management’s freedom of action in choosing alternative account
ing procedures that have a material effect on the reported results
should be strictly limited, if not eliminated, as there is a natural
inclination for management to select the alternative that will
make its position appear most favorable.
6. The outside auditor and not management should be in full con
trol of the “ground rules” for the preparation of financial state
ments. Improved consistency and comparability cannot be achiev
ed under the basic presumption that financial statements are
primarily the responsibility of management, subject merely to
modifying constraints of law and accepted principles in certain
respects, but with alternatives open for choice in many areas.
It would be sanguine to expect that the above guidelines will re
ceive general implementation within the foreseeable future. Never
theless, they do provide a clear and unequivocal framework for the
development of more useful accounting data. Therefore, financial an
alysts would be well advised to support vigorously the above recom
mendations. The result may be at least evolutionary improvements in
accounting standards to provide more reliable, consistent, and com
parable financial statements.14

14 Douglas A. Hayes, “Accounting Principles and Investment Analysis,” Law and Contempo
rary Problems (Duke University School of Law, Autumn 1965), p. 771.
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The Accountant's Changing
Legal Environment
ByA. A. Sommer, Jr., Esq., Partner, Calfee, Halter, Calfee, Griswold &
Sommer

The eternal struggle in the law between constancy and change
is largely a struggle between history and reason, between past
reason and future needs.
justice felix frankfurter

The barrage of litigation which commenced in the sixties and has carried
over into the present decade has jolted the accounting profession harsh
ly. Like the victims of an earthquake or the fist of Joe Frazier, many wander
dazedly asking what happened: where did the force come from; why wasn’t
it foreseen; how could it have been avoided; was it deserved; is the future to
be simply more of the same; or is there a means of avoiding a repetition of the
shocks of the last decade? In response to this disquiet and these questions,
many proposals have been put forth: amend Section 11 of the Securities Act
of 1933 to limit the perils to accountants posed by that statute; accelerate the
move toward uniformity of accounting principles to reduce the dangers flow
ing from alternative treatments; double the amount of liability insurance (rap
idly increasing premiums notwithstanding); legislate further to codify the
common law; and deaden the puzzling, imprecise, and unpredictable impact
of Rule 10b-5 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Some look as
kance at the cries of the wounded and say, in effect, that they brought it up
on themselves by inadequate standards, failure to recognize professional
responsibilities, refusals to recognize portents, and deafness to the warnings of
their leaders.
Truth has many faces and speaks with many voices—and in most of the
foregoing there is a grain of truth. The purpose of this paper is to identify
those grains with the hope that with understanding may come an ameliorat
ing wisdom, a comforting balm, a less discouraged vision of the future. How
ever, it may be that for some time to come the profession will have
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to be content with Charlie Brown’s avowedly new philosophy, “I only dread
one day at a time.”
Among the cases which have jolted the accounting profession, two stand
out. The first, Escott v. BarChris Construction Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643
(1968), unfolded judicially for the first time the implications of the liability
provisions of the Securities Act of 1933, with resulting liability for one of the
“Big Eight,” accompanied by strong judicial language suggesting that the
work of the auditors was less than professionally done. The effect of this
decision on the profession was, however, mild indeed compared with that con
sequent on the jury verdict, affirmed on appeal, finding two partners and an
associate of another national firm guilty of criminal conduct in certifying the
financial statements of Continental Vending Machine Corp., (U.S. v. Simon,
425 F 2d 796 (1969)). Accompanying these judicial catastrophes has been
the increasing tendency on the part of the Securities and Exchange Commis
sion to fault financial disclosures and, increasingly, to include the auditors
among those attacked, as witness the Utilities Leasing Corporation complaint.
In addition, there appear to have been other disquieting developments within
the domain of common law and that “jolly green giant” threatening to engulf
all—Rule 10b-5. Enough indeed to intimidate and to cause questions con
cerning the financial survival of the profession. Where did it begin, where will
it end?

The General Trend of Law

Of overriding significance in the development of accountants’ liability is
a broad legal trend. Prior to fairly recent times, courts had elaborated a body
of restrictive rules concerning liability for torts or civil wrongs. Essentially
they were intolerant of the deliberate wrongdoer, but when confronted with
the negligent wrongdoer they were inclined to articulate substantial limita
tions on the reach of liability. For instance, until the fifties it was basic law
that only someone in privity with a manufacturer, that is, someone who pur
chased directly from him, could bring an action for injuries arising from a
“breach of warranty,” that is, a claim that the manufacturer had expressly or
impliedly warranted concerning his product. Thus, for instance, the pur
chaser of an automobile could sue his dealer for breach of warranty but not
the manufacturer since he had privity of contract only with the dealer. Sim
ilarly, the manufacturer’s liability under negligence law was limited to “cases
where the . . . manufacturer knew of the defect unless the chattel [was] one
dangerous to life, in which latter case the . . . manufacturer [was] under a
duty to use ordinary care to warn prospective users of the chattel of the dan
ger.” In most states charitable institutions, including hospitals, were not lia
ble for negligence in their activities.
The law has swung significantly in the last two decades. Now the pur
chaser of an automobile generally has no difficulty in pursuing an action for
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injuries against the manufacturer if the automobile was defective and caused
the damage. No longer does the law throw up a shield in front of the hospi
tal and bar the victim of a nurse’s negligence. On a hundred fronts the courts
have opened their doors to the consumer who has cause to complain of the
vendor, purveyor, or manufacturer of products and services. Impatient with
the speed of the courts, the legislatures have hastened this process with a vast
outpouring of consumer-oriented legislation designed to assist the consumer in
asserting and realizing upon claims against manufacturers and suppliers.
The social roots of this trend are simple. First, the courts are shifting the
burden of care onto the one who can do something to prevent a loss to the
consumer. In this highly mechanized society, it is impossible to control com
pletely the multitude of occasions when negligence may intervene, for
instance, in the manufacture of an automobile; but the courts conclude—and
certainly not without reason—that the manufacturer of the car can conceiv
ably prevent negligence in the manufacturing process while the user has no
opportunity to forestall it at all. Second, the courts increasingly “socialize”
the risks and harms that are an inevitable concomitant of living in a civilized
and industrialized society. The manufacturer can theoretically spread the
cost of his mistakes over a larger totality—all the buyers of his products—by
raising his prices to cover the liability exposure or by purchasing insurance
and working that cost into his pricing structure. The victim of the manufac
turer’s negligence, on the other hand, has no means of spreading his loss, but
must instead bear the brunt of it alone, with only the limited and often expen
sive opportunity to insure against some of the risks.
This concern with protecting the “consumer” is seen clearly in the secu
rities field. What are the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, as well as other federal securities enactments, but consumer leg
islation—legislation intended to shift the burdens and the detriments of an in
ferior product from the buyer to the seller? Forty years before cereal
manufacturers were compelled to explain to the customer that the “large eco
nomy size” really cost more per ounce than the small “expensive” size, the
seller of securities was required to furnish an abundance of information con
cerning his product.
In 1937, the significance of this trend for accountants was spoken of by
Professor T. H. Sanders:

For issuers and accountants to deny any responsibility to the
considerable army of investors who act not directly on their own
knowledge and judgment but on the judgments of intermediaries in
whom they have placed confidence seems out of step with the general
trend of the law, which is disposed to hold a producer responsible to
his ultimate consumer through all the increasing complexities of dis
tribution.11
1

Sanders, T. H., “Accounting Aspects of the Securities Act,” Law and Contemporary Prob
lems (Duke University School of Law, April 1937), p. 216.
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The accountant renders a service, purveys a product—his opinion of the
financial statements of his client. When the issue is who shall bear the risk
that there is error in certified financial statements, the courts are more prone
than they were to place it on the one who has the means to, and the one who
can, “socialize” it in fees or insurance premiums. Thus the accountant is the
victim of the reorientation of courts as they swing to stronger protection of the
users of goods and services.
To some extent this new approach of the courts is the result of the elimi
nation of the mythos of our society that revered the businessmen, the entre
preneurs, the commanders of great wealth—an attitude that began to perish
in the sordid disclosures following 1929. It is probably also a reflection of
the conviction that businesses no longer need the protections once afforded
by the courts and are able to fend for themselves.

The Maturing of the Accounting Profession

The inclination of courts to deal somewhat more sternly with account
ants is also a reflection of the fact that the accounting profession has matured
with the result that more is expected of it, and it is presumably able to reach
higher levels of responsibility—financial, legal, and ethical. Not without sig
nificance, the first volume of the authoritative history of the profession by
John L. Carey, The Rise of the Accounting Profession, is subtitled “From
Technician to Professional.” Saul Levy in his landmark work, Accountants’
Legal Responsibility, published by the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants in 1954, called the accounting profession “a relatively new pro
fession” and stated that “civil liability is a normal aspect of professional sta
tus and . . . being subject to it is an inevitable attribute of the development
of the profession.”
The maturity reached by the profession is not confined to an intellectual
or social maturity; it also connotes financial maturity. At a time when the
firms which certify the financial statements of the bulk of large publicly held
companies are world-wide organizations with hundreds of offices and part
ners, thousands of professional and nonprofessional employees, and with reve
nues into the hundreds of millions, it is not surprising that courts are less in
clined to treat the financial dangers of enhanced liability with the same con
cern they did in earlier days. One writer has pointedly remarked that “in the
light of the economic maturity of the independent accounting profession, fur
ther dependence on judicial tenderness seems ill-founded.”
With maturity has also come the capacity for penetrating criticism within
the profession, a criticism which has undoubtedly served the purposes of those
pursuing claims against members of the profession. Be that as it may, such
criticism is a necessary part of the development of the profession. Similarly,
with maturity has come a deeper and more extensive effort to develop profes
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sional standards for the profession. And again, as these have been articulat
ed, they have been turned against the profession. Carey has stated:

Thus, as the legal liabilities of professional accountants in the
United States have seemed to be extended by court decisions and
legislation, the [American] Institute [of Certified Public Accountants]
has become increasingly aware that pronouncements and rules which
encourage higher standards of performance might be used against its
members unfairly in the courts.2
This progressively sterner articulation of standards is evidence of a con
fidence born of maturity and undaunted by the concerns expressed by Mr.
Carey. (Some question may be raised as to the extent to which these
pronouncements or rules have been used “unfairly” against members of the
profession: Were they used unfairly in the BarChris case discussed below?)

Definition of the Role of the Auditor
The role of the auditor has increasingly been the subject of introspective
analysis by the profession itself and critical comment by those outside. As
this role has been more sharply etched, significant consequences emerged.
Where once the connotation of “public” accountant meant one who held
himself out as available to any member of the public, now it connotes a re
sponsibility to the public. One writer has said pointedly:

. . . Some thirty years later, after Ultramares, the auditor is not
a member of a new profession. He is a sophisticated member of so
ciety. Society has placed a sophisticated role at his disposal and so
ciety is now requiring sophisticated responses from him . . . the audi
tor has tried to impress upon society over the last 30 years the need
for audited financial statements. He has been fairly successful in that
attempt. . . . What society was doing at that time [enactment of the
Securities Act of 1933] was making auditors the watchdogs of the fi
nancial community. ... It is no wonder that now, some 30 years
later, society is demanding from the accounting profession that they
do precisely what they said they would do.3

Long before the Securities Act of 1933, though, this role of auditors had
been recognized. Carey states:
In the mid-nineteenth century English law created the independ
ent auditor as a protection to stockholders against the incompetence
2
3
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or malfeasance of the managements to whom the investors had en
trusted their money. With the acceptance of responsibility to investors
as well as to the employer, the accountant-auditor assumed the mantle
of professionalism. He became a “public accountant,” accepting a
responsibility to the public as well as to the client who paid his fee.4

An executive director of the Institute has put the same proposition suc
cinctly: “The certified public accountant owes a moral responsibility and un
der the Securities Act this is made a legal and financial responsibility, to be
as mindful of the interests of the stranger who may rely on his opinion as of
the interests of the client who pays his fee.”5
This statement contains the seeds of a thought-provoking notion. In a
sense, the history of legal advances has been the translation of ethical consid
erations into legal duties. No one doubted the ethical responsibility of the
auto manufacturer to turn out a carefully made product; the law now trans
lates that into a legal duty. The moral dictum expressed by the securities ex
changes and the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., to the effect
that their members shall conduct their businesses in accordance with “just
and equitable principles of trade” has increasingly taken on legal content as
it has been used to impose severe disciplinary penalties upon those who trans
gress this essentially ethical precept, and has increasingly become a source of
pecuniary civil liability.
But has the profession fully accepted and recognized the role which so
ciety has given them—and which in some measure they have sought and have
been compensated for assuming? Another commentator (a federal prosecu
tor) stated the thought tartly: “How can we explain the tremendous increase
in recent litigation against accountants? I think the answer lies in the fact that
members of the accounting profession itself have not recognized in re
cent years just who and what they are. In my opinion, his [the accountant’s]
legal problems stem, in part, from the fact that he has not fully understood
the role he is playing in society. .. .”6
In the complicated maze of corporate finance, the auditor became the
surest friend of the investor; and inevitably, given the trends of the law and
the accountant’s own proclamation of his professionalism, the courts demand
ed proportionate performance.
Inevitably, if a professional group fails to sufficiently articulate its iden
tity, its duties, the identity of those to whom it owes a duty, and the manner
in which the duty is to be acquitted, and if society assigns it a role which, de
spite its professional standards, it does not fulfill adequately, the courts,
vested by society with the responsibility to define and enforce duties, will

4 Carey, The Rise of the Accounting Profession, Vol. 1, p. 5.
5 Ibid., p. 148.
6 Ibid., p. 135.
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undertake to do it. And that in some measure has been the fate of the ac
counting profession.

The Ascendancy of Disclosure

The insistence upon disclosure—full, complete, accurate, informative—
since 1933 has been a coursing stream. Hard on the heels of the Securities
Act of 1933 came the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 which supplemented
the disclosures at the time of securities distributions with a system of continu
ous disclosure for listed securities, with the auditor called upon under both
statutes to render his service to insure the integrity of the investment process.
The previous pressures for disclosure were augmented substantially by
a brief, broad, and, at the time, seemingly innocuous rule promulgated in
1942 by the Securities and Exchange Commission which was intended to do
nothing more than apprehend a greedy corporate officer who was committing
fraud in the purchase of securities at a time when the statutory scheme some
what shortsightedly imagined that frauds only existed in the context of sales.
The rule became much more and became, once plaintiffs’ counsel and the
courts discovered its potential, the enforcer of officer and director integrity and
a powerful goad to corporations to make accurate and reliable disclosures.
Quickly many of the barriers which previously provided comfort to auditors
—such as privity, the requirement that the defendant have been a seller to or
buyer from the plaintiff—fell under the imaginative expansion of Rule 10b-5.
Out of this came dramatic reinforcement of the transcending theme of disclo
sure, echoed often to the exclusion of its limitations. The Exchanges published
guidelines for disclosure. The Commission importuned the business commun
ity to make a practice of prompt and complete disclosure. Analysts’ and insti
tutional investors’ demands for more reliable information grew.
It was inevitable that accountants, who figured so prominently in the
birth of the new world of full disclosure under federal parentage, should be
burdened with new responsibilities. Through Colonel Arthur H. Carter, sen
ior partner of Haskins & Sells, the profession had, after all, fought vigorously
to establish its foothold in the new arena by opposing strongly, when the
1933 Act was under consideration, the notion that federal employees should
assume auditing responsibilities and by asserting the competence and respon
sibility of private practitioners.
Disclosure, of course, is nothing more than communication. It has been
said—too many times to dwell upon—that accountants must be constantly
concerned with communication and with the arts of communicating, for other
wise there is no reason for their being. There is the constantly trying problem
of seeking to translate the dynamics of economic events into the rigid symbo
lism of accounting, and as the dynamism of those events increases, the job of
forecasting becomes more difficult.
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These problems of communication have given rise to the now common
place notion that the accountant communicates to different people who have
need for different kinds of information and different modes of presentation,
and who are capable of responding with varying sensitivity to varying de
grees of complexity. While it has been suggested that the complexity of events
sought to be translated by the accountant has increased to the point where
one should not expect the average uninformed layman to understand financial
statements, there is no assurance that the courts are yet ready to accept this
judgment.
The case that perhaps more than any other has convinced the account
ing profession that indeed the legal atmosphere has changed to their detri
ment is the celebrated case of U.S. v. Simon, in which a jury verdict of guilty
rendered against two partners and an associate of a national accounting firm
was affirmed by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.
The defendants were indicted for violating the federal Mail Fraud Stat
ute and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 because they had allegedly will
fully and intentionally certified a financial statement which was false in mate
rial respects (interestingly, the firm withdrew its opinion within a week after
the statement was issued). The allegations all focused on footnote two to
the consolidated financial statements of Continental Vending Machine Corpo
ration and its subsidiaries. This note said:

. . . The amount receivable from Valley Commercial Corp. (an
affiliated company of which Mr. Harold Roth is an officer, director
and stockholder) bears interest at 12% a year. Such amount, less the
balance of the notes payable to that company, is secured by the as
signment to the Company of Valley’s equity in certain marketable se
curities. As of February 15, 1963, the amount of such equity at cur
rent market quotations exceeded the net amount receivable.

The government alleged that this note was deficient in several respects,
including its failure to disclose that a substantial portion of the collateral for
the receivable consisted of securities of Continental; its representation that the
Valley receivable and the Valley payable could be netted (the payable to
Valley had been negotiated prior to the time of the statement), and in failing
to disclose a post fiscal year-end increase in the amount of the Valley receiv
able. The charge with respect to netting was admitted, but the defendants
contended this was not material and that the error was not intentional.
Besides contesting, of course, the question of knowledge and intent, the
defendants sought to barricade themselves behind “generally accepted ac
counting principles,” which had always been considered central to the integ
rity of financial statements. They based their defense largely upon testimony
of eight witnesses, all acknowledged experts, who testified with varying de
grees of certainty that the note was prepared in accordance with generally
accepted accounting principles. Against these, the only contrary witnesses
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were a staff accountant of the Commission and the esteemed Chief Account
ant of the Commission.
The defendants were tried twice. The first trial resulted in a hung jury,
the second in a conviction. In instructing the jury in the second case, the
judge said:

A firm of public accountants . . . engaged to perform an inde
pendent audit, represents that it will perform the audit in accordance
with generally accepted auditing standards and accounting principles
and that it will render an opinion, based on its audit, as to whether
the financial statement of the company fairly presents its financial po
sition and the results of its operations.
Proof that a defendant, in conducting the 1962 audit, departed
from such auditing standards, or participated in the preparation or
approval of a financial statement that did not fairly present Conti
nental’s financial position, results of its 1962 operations in accord
ance with generally accepted auditing standards and accounting
principles, is evidence, not necessarily conclusive, that the defendant
did not act honestly and in good faith, and that statements contrary
to such standards and principles may have been materially false or
misleading. On the other hand, proof that the defendant did act in
accordance with such generally accepted auditing standards and
accounting principles is evidence which may be very persuasive but
not necessarily conclusive that he acted in good faith, and that the
facts as certified were not materially false or misleading. . . .
So the auditor’s responsibility in accordance with his engagement
is, first, to render an opinion that must satisfy the auditor that the
statement fairly presents the results of the operations about the finan
cial position of the client; and, second, to be satisfied that the state
ment contains no misstatements of fact, or, at least, no misstatement
of facts known to the auditor.
The critical test, therefore, is whether the financial statement here,
as a whole, fairly presented the financial condition of Continental
as of September 30, 1962, and whether it accurately reported the
operations for fiscal 1962. [Emphasis supplied.]
While the Court acknowledged the persuasiveness of adherence to gen
erally accepted accounting principles, nonetheless the Court unequivocally re
jected the notion that such adherence would be a complete defense. Rather
both the trial court and the appellate court established the primacy of “fair
presentation” of the financial position of Continental.
In commenting on this case, the author of the brief amicus curiae on be
half of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants has said in ex
plaining the Institute’s submission of that brief that, “it was this seeming in
vitation to apply a lay standard rather than to look at the balance sheet as
an accountant does—and as the defendants by their opinion on Continental
had represented that they had—that prompted the Institute’s concern.”
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He then construed the opinion of the Court of Appeals as “substantially
narrow[ing] the possibility which the trial court had left open, of a jury’s be
ing allowed to take a purely layman’s view and to disregard the standards
of the profession in a future case.”
In my estimation, thus narrowing the opinion of the Court of Appeals is
a dangerous course—one that misconstrues the atmosphere in which the case
was decided, an atmosphere in which the consumer is king, an atmosphere in
which it has been spelled out that smoking may cause cancer, that the unit
cost of cereal is so much, that Profile Bread won’t recreate one’s physique
without the discomforts of dieting.
Accounting is communication. The accountant is a sophisticated, albeit
specialized, communicator who must wield the symbols in which he expresses
himself in a meaningful manner, so that others may understand that meaning
and form accurate conceptions of what he said. Does he speak only to other
accountants? Does he speak only to the upper reaches of financial sophistica
tion? In 1947 the SEC surely did not think so:
It is not enough to say that here perhaps much ... of the factual
background was given in footnote data. . . . Even if [all significant
data] had been given there is an additional obligation to present the
material in a way in which it will be useful to the informed but less
sophisticated readers. (Emphasis supplied.)

And in at least one case a federal district court flatly rejected this notion:

The purpose of the financial statements is to inform the man on
the street; and the underlying policy of the Securities and Exchange
Acts and of Rule 10b-5 is to assure that he can have truthful infor
mation in buying securities, regardless of the intended victim of the
fraud. Moreover, the defendants have set themselves up to be in
dependent certified public auditors. As such, they have assumed a pe
culiar relation with the investing public. As accountants, the defend
ant clearly cannot be immunized from suit. [Emphasis supplied.]

Is the thought that generally accepted accounting principles are subordi
nate to fair presentation or that generally accepted accounting principles have
value only to the extent that they assist in fair presentation so novel a notion?
Hardly. In 1942, after discussing at tremendous length a multitude of
technical accounting matters involved in determining whether to suspend or
withdraw the registration of the common stock of Associated Gas and Electric
Company under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the SEC said:
We think, however, that too much attention to the question
whether the financial statements formally complied with principles,
practice and conventions accepted at the time should not be permitted
to blind us to the basic question whether the financial statements per
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formed the function of enlightenment, which is their only reason for
existence. Each of the accountants’ certificates in question contained
the opinion that, subject to various qualifications therein, the financial
statements fairly presented the financial condition of the registrant, in
accordance with generally accepted accounting principles. If that basic
representation was not accurate as to the financial statements as a
whole, no weight of precedent or practice with respect to the minutiae
of the statements could justify the accountants’ certificates. . . . For
the average investor [read layman?] the financial statements of this
system contain not a hint of the rot hidden beneath the surface of this
holding company system.
We believe that, in addition to the question whether the indi
vidual items of financial statements are stated in accordance with ac
counting principles, practices and conventions, there must be con
sidered the further question whether, on an overall basis, the state
ments are informative.7
With the increased emphasis on disclosure and the development of rem
edies for failures of disclosure, inevitably accountants, whose very profession
is “presentation” or disclosure, are caught up in the trend.

How Radical a Change in the Atmosphere?
There is more than a trace of reason to suggest that in many respects
there has been some exaggeration of the extent to which the accounting pro
fession’s posture vis-a-vis the law has changed sharply in the 40 years since
Ultramares. Rather, in many respects the changes have been evolutionary,
not revolutionary.
When three of the most significant developments are examined, there is
reason to think that the departures are less dramatic than they might appear
and that, in some respects, what has happened is simply the making explicit
of forces that have long been latent and intimated.
The case of Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E.
441 (1931) had been, until midway through the sixties, the definitive des
cription of the extent of an auditor’s liability to persons other than the one
who retained him. For the accounting profession this was considered some
thing of a safe harbor, though, interestingly, at the time the decision was ren
dered it was regarded with hostility and dismay by the profession.
In this case the New York Court of Appeals, speaking through the elo
quent Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo, later to gain additional renown as a Jus
7

“In the Matter of Associated Gas and Electric Company, 1942,” Securities and Exchange
Commission Decisions and Reports, Vol. 11 (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing
Office, 1945), pp. 1058-9.
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tice of the United States Supreme Court, analyzed with characteristic skill and
expressed with typically rich words, the standard which should determine the
liability an auditor has to a third party who relies upon the audited state
ment to his detriment. Justice Cardozo was awed by the consequence of suc
cumbing to the urgings of the plaintiff who sought to have the court adopt
a rule that an auditor was liable for simple negligence to anyone who relied
upon his work product:
If liability for negligence exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder, the
failure to detect a theft or forgery beneath the cover of deceptive
entries, may expose accountants to a liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class.
To avoid this consequence, Justice Cardozo engaged in a careful exami
nation of existing New York precedent and concluded that liability for negli
gence in making an audit extended only to the party with whom the contract
was made and only to those for whom it was explicitly prepared—that is, cases
where the delivery of the financial statements to a specified person was the
“end and aim” of the contractual relationship between client and auditor.
While recognizing that the ancient doctrine of privity had been pretty well
diminished in importance, nonetheless he salvaged a substantial portion in this
context. The opinion recognized that if there was fraud or a degree of negli
gence that really constituted recklessness or gross misconduct, then the result
would be different.
The holding, that there could be liability to anyone other than the client
for negligence, sobered the profession. However, they lived with it and even
tually regarded it as a friendly barrier to further liability, until the sixties
when new assaults were made on it.
The first significant questioning of its rationale was uttered in the dis
senting opinion of Lord Justice Denning in a British case, Candler v. Crane,
Christmas & Co. , High Court of Justice, King’s Bench Division 2 K.B. 164
(1951). Lord Denning was deeply troubled that though the majority found
the auditor guilty of being “extremely careless in the preparation of the ac
counts,” nonetheless the court determined there was no liability since the audi
tor owed no duty of care to one whom the accountant knew would be shown
the financial statements. Lord Denning said:

[To] whom do these professional people owe a duty? They [ac
countants] owe the duty, of course, to their employer or client; and
also I think to any third person to whom they themselves show the
accounts, or to whom they know their employer is going to show
the accounts, so as to induce him to invest money or take some
other action on them. ... In my opinion accountants owe a duty
of care not only to their own clients, but also to all those whom
they know will rely on their accounts in the transactions for which
these accounts are prepared. [Emphasis supplied.]
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Lord Denning’s dissent became law in England in Hedley, Byrne & Co.,
Ltd. v. Heller & Partners, Ltd., (1964) A.C. 465 (House of Lords, 1963).
The first dent on the Ultramares doctrine in the United States appears to
be Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85 (1968). The court here con
fronted anew the possible economic consequences to the profession, which had
so alarmed Justice Cardozo, of a rule broader than Ultramares:

The wisdom of the decision in Ultramares has been doubted . . .
and this Court shares the doubt. Why should an innocent reliant
party be forced to carry the weighty burden of an accountant’s pro
fessional misconduct? Isn’t the risk of loss more easily distributed and
spread by imposing it on the accounting profession, which can pass
the cost of insuring against the risk onto its customers, who can in
turn pass the cost onto the entire consuming public?
The Court then added this pregnant thought: “Finally, wouldn’t a rule of
foreseeability elevate the cautionary techniques of the accounting profession?”
The Court concluded after this renewed weighing of social consequences
that an accountant should be liable in negligence “for careless financial mis
representations relied upon by actually foreseen and limited classes of per
sons.” (It should be noted that the onslaught has not been a rout; recent
Florida cases have followed Ultramares.)
The Proposed Restatement of Torts, which is considered a summary of
the thrust of American common law, limits the liability of a professional who
fails to exercise due care to:
Loss suffered (a) by the person or one of the persons for whose
benefits and guidance he intends to supply the information, or knows
that the recipient intends to supply it; and (b) through reliance upon
it in a transaction which he intends the information to influence, or
knows that the recipient so intends, or in a substantially similar trans
action.

It further states that “the liability of one who is under a public duty to
give the information extends to loss suffered by any of the class of persons for
whose benefit the duty is created, in any of the transactions in which it is in
tended to protect them.”
This brings us to the question: How radical has the change been since
Ultramares? There the Court established, in effect, that the only one who
could recover for negligence was the client or the one for whom the statements
were prepared—those whose use of them was “the end and the aim.” Is there
such a radical extension when account is taken of the trends in securities laws
since 1931?
Increasingly, audited financial statements have been oriented toward
public investors in securities in addition to their use for longer-standing and
more conventional purposes—securing credit, inducing small groups of new
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investors, reassuring suppliers, and the like. This trend was accentuated in
1932 when the New York Stock Exchange adopted the rule that all listed
companies had to furnish to their shareholders certified financial statements.
A further strengthening of the trend was in 1933 when Congress, confronted
with the alternatives of having financial statements authenticated by federal
auditors, or having them certified by private professionals, opted for the latter
and required as a part of a registration statement under that act that certain
financial statements be certified by an “independent public or certified ac
countant.” The 1934 Act reinforced the exchange requirements by requiring
the filing of certified financial statements with the Commission.
Through this process it became apparent that the financial statements of
companies which sought to secure capital from the public and those which
had their securities listed on the exchanges had to avail themselves of the pro
fessional competence of the accounting profession, and just as obviously, that
this was intended to give to the public additional protection it would not have
if they were not so certified. Thus, in a very specific sense, it may be said that
the public investors were the ones whom the accountants could reasonably
forsee would rely upon them (the test in the Rusch Factors case) or those for
whose benefit and guidance he intended to supply the information (the pro
posed Restatement test). In fact it truly becomes the “aim and end” of the re
lationship between the auditor and his client that statements be available to
the investing public.
It is evident that as a consequence of the increased reliance of industry
upon publicly raised equity capital, and in many instances, debt capital, and
the increased effort to assure to those investors fairness and full disclosure, the
burden upon the auditors has grown heavier. Indeed, one writer has said,
The factors which may affect accountants’ liabilities and to
which they call attention have developed in the market place. The
significant dissatisfaction is not that of the law professor, but is ex
pressed on the part of the users of financial statements. Judges, soon
er or later, would have taken note of the conditions in the market
place which impel matters toward a broadening of liability.8

A second case which aroused concern was Escott v. BarChris Construc
tion Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (1968). In this case, a national firm of auditors
was held liable for negligence in preparing certified financial statements and in
its “S-l review” in connection with a registration statement under the Securi
ties Act of 1933. There may be legitimate concern about the factual conclu
sions of the trial judge and about the manner of his application of the relevant
law to those facts, but surely his conception of the Securities Act of 1933 as it
applied to auditors was beyond reproach.
8

Edwin J. Bradley, “The Public Auditor,” in Accountants’ Liability, p. 42.
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The decision was alarming, not because it established new law, but sim
ply because, for the first time in the 35 years since the enactment of the 1933
Act, its implications for auditors were exposed clearly: auditors may be liable
for faulty financial statements to anyone who buys a registered security if
they fail to establish their due care, regardless of any notion of privity. As far
as “foreseeability” is concerned and as far as “end and aim” are concerned,
the 1933 Act carefully avoids those considerations by requiring a consent
from an accountant before his opinion may be incorporated in a registration
statement. Thus, in effect, he acknowledges that the public’s reliance on his
certificate is foreseeable and that the “end and aim” of his certificate is the
transaction in the marketplace.
The law was not in the case; the case was in the statute. All the raw
nerves exposed by the BarChris opinion were foreseen by that genius of the
accounting profession, George O. May:
I cannot believe that a law is just or can long be maintained in
effect which deliberately contemplates the possibility that a purchaser
may recover from a person from whom he has not bought, in respect
of a statement which at the time of his purchase he had not read,
contained in a document which he did not then know to exist, a sum
which is not measured by injury resulting from falsity in such state
ment.9

Few today would question the justice of the 1933 Act; few would ques
tion its efficacy in raising the standards of disclosure; and there is probably
no court today in the country which would strike it down. It has stood for al
most four decades and promises to be preserved in substance in the codifica
tion project headed by Professor Louis Loss.
Statutory enactments, of course, have significance in the development of
law beyond the areas governed by them. They are expressions of public pol
icy, and often their thrust carries through into matters outside the technical
scope of the statute. Justice Holmes once stated:
[It] seems to me that courts in dealing with statutes have been
too slow to recognize that statutes even when in terms covering only
particular cases may imply a policy different from that of the common
law, and therefore may exclude a reference to the common law for
the purpose of limiting their scope.

And James M. Landis stated succinctly that “much of what is ordinar
ily regarded as ‘common’ law finds its source in legislative enactment.”10
Thus, the decisions of the courts in the sixties concerning matters out
9 Carey, The Rise of the Accounting Profession, Vol. 1, p. 192.
10 J. M. Landis, “Statutes and the Sources of Law,” in Harvard Legal Essays, ed. Roscoe
Pound (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1934), p. 214.
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side the reach of the 1933 Act have undoubtedly felt the influence of the
determinations made in drafting the 1933 Act—the abrogation of privity, the
imposition of liability without a foreseeability more certain than presence of
the financial statements in a registration statement, and no necessity of
scienter. These concepts have clearly been absorbed through an osmotic pro
cess into the common law without perhaps the judges, who are the means
through which these influences are manifested, realizing the extent to which
the statutory determinations have influenced their judgments.
Perhaps a more accurate analysis would be that the same growth of val
ues, the same shift in emphasis, which gives rise to statutory innovation even
tually manifests itself in judicial innovation. Thus the common law and
judicial developments were anticipated in statutory development.
The foregoing would indicate that the change in atmosphere has not
been a radical or abrupt development; rather, it has the earmarks of a stage
in a development with roots in basic conceptions of the accountant’s role
which began to be elaborated in England in the middle of the last century,
found confirmation in statutory developments in this country during the
1930s, and gained explicit judicial recognition in the 1960s.
But in one particular there has been a significant change. Despite state
ments long ago about the accountant’s role as a protector of the investor, the
accountant’s opinion was in years past almost universally directed to a small
group or to one party, such as a creditor, a bank, a supplier, or a potential
investor. In more recent times the “consumer” of its product has become mas
ses of people, the investors in publicly distributed, held, and traded securities.
The Securities Act of 1933 specifically recognized this thrust as did the New
York Stock Exchange in its requirement of audited statements from listed
companies. This somewhat abrupt change of emphasis is amply seen in the
litigation pattern. Until fairly recently the landmark accounting cases almost
invariably involved creditors, suppliers, banks, and others susceptible of being
identified by precise and small numbers. Now those who rely on the financial
statements may be numbered in the hundreds of thousands and even the mil
lions. The result is that all of the landmark cases of the sixties and seventies
involved statements prepared and published by publicly held companies,
statements reasonably intended and expected to be relied upon in investment
decisions. In this significant respect, there has indeed been a sobering change
of accountants’ exposure to liability.
And of course this shift has meant far greater monetary exposure. The
liability of an auditor whose statements are used by a corporation in securing
credit or satisfying a supplier of its solvency is usually significantly less than
the potential liability when masses of shareholders rely on those statements in
committing funds in connection with a distribution of securities or trading in
the market.
More than anything, this expansion of dollar exposure has been alarm
ing, and no amount of analysis concluding that recent developments are mere
ly gentle extensions of basic principles will quiet that alarm. It may well be
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that the sharply enhanced danger of unbearable losses to firms in the profes
sion with accompanying personal exposure on the part of partners will result
in a reversion to the concerns expressed by Justice Cardozo in the Ultramares
case.
In the midst of deploring the consequences of the litigation storm which
has hit the accounting profession, it is well to step back a moment and ponder
whether these adversities have been entirely without redeeming social benefit.
It is very doubtful if that can be said. As a consequence of Fischer v. Kletz,
266 F. Supp. 180 (1967) the AICPA developed Statement on Auditing Proce
dure No. 41 which provided the additional safeguard to the investor that the
error or deceit discovered after completion of an audit would not be concealed
by the silence of the auditor. It is reported that, as a consequence of the Si
mon decision, the auditing firm involved there has instituted a procedure
whereby a partner not involved in the audit, as one of the final steps before
release of the opinion, steps back and considers the financials as a whole in
terms of their understandability for laymen. Unquestionably the S-l review
procedures of the profession as a whole were sharpened up as a consequence
of the criticisms of the court in the BarChris case. This and other litigation
has undoubtedly stimulated even greater endeavors to eliminate opportunities
for misleading financials marching under the protection of generally accepted
accounting principles.
It is clear that in very large measure the courts have shaped the respon
sibilities of the auditors and provided them with benchmarks against which to
measure their conduct because the auditors were slow in doing so themselves
in response to such “surging” forces in society as a greater demand for disclo
sure, a greater involvement of the public in the securities markets, more insis
tence upon disclosure reasonably understandable in the marketplace, and
more demanding definition of the role of the auditor in this society.

The Emergence of Rule 10b-5

The most recent storm on the accountants’ horizon, and the most recent
impetus to disclosure, has been Rule 10b-5, adopted by the Commission un
der Section 10 of the 1934 Act. This Rule had innocuous origins. It
was designed to close the hiatus in the scheme of federal securities regulation
by affording the Commission a tool by which to frustrate fraud in the pur
chase of securities as well as in the sale of them. Largely because of the in
genuity of private counsel and the responsiveness of the courts to the plight of
those defrauded in securities transactions, Rule 10b-5 was transformed into a
potent tool for seeking private redress. As a consequence the implications of
Rule 10b-5 have unfolded at a frightening pace, and its reach has extended
to a bewildering array of transactions and relationships.
The raw rule is relatively simple: it simply declares as unlawful certain
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fraud-like and deceitful conduct and material misrepresentations and omis
sions, when they occur “in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security.”
The history of the judicial development of the Rule’s implications has
largely been the story of the erection of barriers to undue extension of the
Rule followed by a dismantling of the barriers. The courts have assiduously
sought to relate common-law concepts to the Rule and interpret it in their
light: privity, scienter, negligence, reliance, causation. Some of these, particu
larly privity and scienter in the narrow common-law sense of “guilty know
ledge” or intent, have been discarded: the defendant need not have been in a
transaction with the plaintiff, and it has become established that simple negli
gence may give rise to an action, though questions remain concerning the ap
propriate remedy when negligence is coupled with an absence of privity.
Obviously the involvement of financial statements in the purchase and
sale of securities gave rise inevitably to the inclusion of accountants among
defendants in Rule 10b-5 actions. The first case was an easy one: H.L.
Green Co. v. Childree, 185 F. Supp. 95 (1960), in which the auditor was
charged with fraudulently preparing financial statements in connection with
a fraudulent conspiracy.
Subsequent cases posed more difficult problems. In Fischer v. Kletz, 266
F. Supp. 180 (1967), the Federal District Court in New York was confronted
with charges that an auditor discovered during special work subsequent to the
rendition and publication of his opinion concerning the client’s financial state
ments that the statements were false. He thereafter took no action to disclose
this discovery to anyone. The Court determined both on the basis of common
law principles and Rule 10b-5 that a claim was stated, rejecting the notion
that accountants were immune from attack under Rule 10b-5 because of the
absence of privity or because they did not gain from the alleged misconduct,
thus establishing a new requirement of disclosure which was codified in State
ment on Auditing Procedure No. 41.
In another case, decided in Chicago, Drake v. Thor Power Tool Co., 282
F. Supp. 94 (1967), a national firm was sued because of alleged negligent
preparation of financial statements. Again the Court determined that a claim
was stated. If the Drake case is confirmed in subsequent litigation as the ap
propriate law, then the struggle over the extension of common law discussed
above may be moot, for Rule 10b-5, interpreted to create liability to public
investors for negligently prepared financial statements, given the advantages
of litigation in the federal courts, will provide all the relief previously sought
in state and federal courts under state common law—and more.
Unquestionably the development of Rule 10b-5 has given rise to a con
siderably greater volume of litigation involving transactions in securities. As
the number of cases has mounted, and the courts have eased the restrictions
which previously frustrated plaintiffs in such litigation, inevitably the exam
ple set has given rise to greater temptation for investors and others to litigate
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when they believe they have been the victims of fraud or misleading represen
tations, including financial representations.
With the increased stress upon the responsibility of investing fiduciaries,
a new group of plaintiffs has been added to the list—institutional investors and
institutions themselves. In several instances, mutual funds, banks, and trust
companies have been among the plaintiffs who have initiated litigation under
Rule 10b-5, alleging misconduct on the part of auditors as well as others. Re
cently the New York Stock Exchange brought an action against a national
firm alleging improprieties in the audited statements of a member firm result
ing in outlays from the Exchange Trust Fund. Thus, in many instances, un
likely plaintiffs are impelled to bring actions to protect themselves vis-a-vis
their beneficial owners, thus swelling further the volume of litigation and with
it the concern of auditors.

Conclusion
Despite the apparent broadening of common-law liability of accountants
to include the consequences to relying third parties of auditors’ negligence,
and despite the vast expansion of applications of Rule 10b-5, still there has
not apparently been any final judgment for damages entered against auditors
based upon simple negligence in favor of investors relying upon the state
ments. So far most of the disquieting decisions have been on motions by
which defendants have sought to persuade courts to dismiss the actions be
cause they failed to state a claim under the law, leaving the proof of negli
gence for later. This should not obscure the fact that in instances involving
alleged negligence, such as the Drake case discussed above, substantial settle
ments have been reached (in one case reportedly $4,950,000 was paid by the
auditors or their insurers).
Does this absence of final verdicts mean the concerns of the auditors are
groundless? It should not. If courts continue in directions that portend liabil
ity to relying third parties—public investors who act in response to the certi
fied financial statements in annual reports, filings with the Commission and
other audited statements—then, unquestionably, the time will come when such
verdicts will begin to appear. Out of the welter of litigation now pending, it
is optimistic to expect that there will be no such consequences.
If these consequences do emerge, the courts or legislative bodies at some
point will have to confront the root question: is this extension of liability likely
to cripple a needed profession incapable, given human frailties, of ever effec
tively regulating its conduct sufficiently to avoid all such liabilities? In con
sidering this question, it is obvious that heed will have to be paid to the fact
that the accounting profession, while dominated increasingly by the national
firms, nonetheless is not like the automobile manufacturing business—im
mensely endowed with resources and consisting of only four domestic units.
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The accounting profession consists, in addition to the national firms, of innum
erable small firms and practitioners. These might very quickly be excluded
from the market if the dangers of liability reach too far.
Perhaps the ultimate salvation of the profession lies in the words of one
of the masters of the art of accountancy, Arthur Andersen, who said in 1935:

Fundamentally the financial statements are a vehicle for con
veying information. If they are truly informative and if they are
predicated upon a reasonable examination in accordance with duty
and custom, the question of statutory liability will automatically be
answered. When confronted with the necessity for a decision on a
difficult question of policy with respect to financial statements the
accountant should search his conscience rather than the statutes.1111

11 The First Fifty Years 1913-1963 (Chicago: Arthur Andersen & Co., 1963), p. 110.
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Enforcement of
Ethical Standards in
Corporate Financial Reporting
By Donald A. Scott, Esq., Partner, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius
We live in a litigious society. Accountants, financial executives, and
brokerage firms are rapidly learning this fact, if they had not already been
aware of it. The expansion of the bases for legal liability under Rule 10b-5
and the refinement of the class action for enforcing this liability has resulted
in a flood of suits exposing the preparers and auditors and certain users of
financial statements to massive claims for damages.
For that reason one might immediately think of court litigation as the
principal means of enforcement of ethical standards in corporate financial
reporting. Litigation, however, is only the last step in enforcement and by
far the least satisfactory. It is costly and time-consuming. The delays due to
discovery procedures and court congestion are interminable, with the result
that memories blur and hindsight distorts the reasonableness of judgments
made at a much earlier time. The decision-maker—whether judge or jury—
is likely to be unsophisticated in financial matters, making the outcome a
purely hit-or-miss proposition.
Using the benefit of hindsight, it did not have to turn out this way. The
accounting profession was given a long breathing space by Judge Cardozo’s
Ultramares decision in 1931 when he limited the scope of an accountant’s
liability for negligence to those persons having a direct contractual relation
with him. What would have happened if the profession had taken this de
cision as an opportunity to move firmly and effectively to enforce ethical
standards? Would the present interpretations of Rule 10b-5 have taken place?
The basic thrust of this paper is that there are many means short of
litigation for enforcement of ethical standards which have not been
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adequately utilized. The multimillion-dollar stockholder suit is apparently
here to stay but more effective use of nonlegal enforcement may well serve
to lessen the impact of these suits.
The topic of enforcement of ethical standards in corporate financial re
porting divides itself readily into two sections: (1) the fair presentation of
financial information and (2) the fair use (or nonuse) of financial information.
The financial executive participates in both areas, but the accountant partici
pates primarily in the first, and the financial analyst and credit analyst pri
marily in the second. Within each of these categories, the paper first
will discuss whether existing methods of enforcement are adequate and sec
ond, will suggest various possibilities for improving enforcement. The sur
vey of existing methods is designed to give a background for discussion
purposes and not to be definitive. Statements concerning present practices
are based in a number of cases on informal discussions with various persons.

The Fair Presentation of Financial Information: Are
Existing Methods Adequate?

Effective enforcement of ethical standards has three basic requirements:
First, there must be an adequate definition of the ethical standards; second,
there must be adequate surveillance—a means of detecting violations of the
standards; third, there must be an adequate means of preventing violations,
either through correction prior to public issue or through punishment in order
to deter future violations.
It is assumed for the purpose of this paper that ethical standards can
be adequately defined and that they fit generally under the broad standard
that persons participating in the preparation or audit of financial statements
have a duty to the public to see that those statements fairly present financial
information concerning the particular enterprise.
The Financial Executive. The financial executive is the starting point
in the presentation process. He is generally the most familiar with the finan
cial facts of the enterprise and makes the initial selection of the accounting
principles to be applied.
The pressures on the financial executive to produce a favorable financial
picture are great. While he may rise above the effect which favorable results
will have on his bonus, profit-sharing plan participation, and stock option, it
takes considerable courage to refuse the wishes of his superiors when his job
is at stake. The easy way out is to leave the ethical determination to the
company’s outside auditors.
Officers have fiduciary obligation to the stockholders. Is it a violation
of this fiduciary duty to reject an “acceptable” accounting alternative with
a resulting decrease in earnings per share and the market value of the stock
holders’ interest? The SEC has recently stated in the Douglas Aircraft-Merrill
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Lynch proceedings that “the obligations of a fiduciary do not include perform
ing an illegal act.”1 Are there instances where an accounting treatment may
not be illegal but still be unethical? This distinction is really academic in the
light of the Continental Vending case, U.S. v. Simon, 425 F2d 796 (1969)
since the trial judge’s instructions to the jury made fair presentation the criti
cal test.
At the present time the Financial Executives Institute has no formal
code of ethics. The Simon case, while directly applicable only to accountants,
may do much to improve adherence to ethical standards by financial execu
tives. It may also reduce the pressures from top management when the pos
sibility of their liability is explained. However, the Simon case contains only
the broad standard of fair presentation. It may be that a code of ethics could
be more specific, thereby providing some form of guidance to the executive.

The Board of Directors. The board of directors, charged by state cor
porate law with the management of the business and affairs of the corpora
tion, is the first step in the surveillance process. This surveillance is extremely
uneven since it occurs on an individual company basis. Some boards may
consist entirely of company executives who are subject to the same pressures
as the financial executive. Other boards may have outside directors who have
little understanding of financial reporting. Even board members who are ex
perienced in this field may not have sufficient time available to explore fully
the company statements.
Some corporations have an audit committee consisting of outside board
members to meet with the financial executive and with the accountants to
review the statements. The effectiveness of this committee again depends
on the ability and availability of members to review financial reports.
The state corporate laws have actually tended to discourage this type
of surveillance by providing that a director shall not be liable (at least for un
lawful distributions) if he relied “in good faith” on financial statements certi
fied by an officer of the corporation or by a certified public accountant. If a
director inquires behind the statements, he may become privy to facts which
cast doubt on their validity, thereby removing the defense of reliance.
Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 carries forward this policy to
some degree in its distinction between the so-called “expertised” portions of
the registration statement and the balance. A director may defend against a
suit for misleading statements in the audited financials by showing that “he
had no reasonable ground to believe” the statements were untrue; whereas a
defense for the balance of the registration statement requires showing that “he
had reasonable ground to believe” the statements were true. The key differ
ence between this Act and the state statutes is the requirement of “reasonable

1

“In the Matter of Investors Management Co., Inc.,” SEC Release Nos. 34-9267 and IA 289,
CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ¶ 78,163 (July 29, 1971).
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investigation” by the director. Does “good faith” reliance require a reasonable
investigation?
The board of directors is an inadequate means of enforcement. An out
side director is unlikely to have the comprehensive knowledge of a company’s
affairs which would permit consistent enforcement of ethical standards. Be
cause of the unevenness in surveillance, the company with a conscientious and
knowledgeable board may well be penalized in the marketplace. The pres
sure, therefore, is to produce the lowest common denominator of ethical stand
ards even though responsible boards may resist this pressure.

The Independent Public Accountant. The independent public ac
countant has been given the role, by statute and administrative regulation, of
watchdog over financial reporting. Some state laws require certified annual
reports to shareholders. The Securities Act of 1933 requires certified financial
statements in a registration statement. SEC rules under the Securities Ex
change Act of 1934 require certified statements in Forms 10 and 10-K, in
certain types of proxy statements, and in annual reports. Stock exchange rules
similarly require certified statements for listed companies.
The accountant is interposed between the preparers of the financial state
ment and the public. He is therefore in a position to correct violations of
ethical standards before they occur publicly, at least in audited statements. If
the client refuses to make the correction, the accountant may qualify his opin
ion or refuse to give an opinion. A qualification discloses to the public why
the accountant believes there may not be a fair presentation; a “no opinion”
may trigger action by the SEC or a stock exchange.
In order to ensure that the accountant is objective and not subject to the
pressures mentioned previously, he is required to be independent by SEC
rule and by the Code of Professional Ethics. On paper, the program looks
good. Why hasn’t it worked?

1.

Ethical standards of financial reporting have not been adequately de
fined; consequently, the administration of existing standards varies be
tween accounting firms, giving an ostensible benefit to the company
which has a “sympathetic” firm.

2.

The accountant is still subject to pressures from the client since the client
selects him and pays him. A qualified or “no opinion” can be avoided
by changing to another accounting firm, although the SEC has moved
in this area to a small degree by requiring that the change of account
ants and the reasons therefor be publicly disclosed.

The present annual auditing process also leaves gaps since management
customarily reports to the public on a quarterly basis. Misstatements of quar
terly earnings may appear by mistake as well as design; however, in view of
the expanding scope of liability, accountants are reluctant to review unaud
ited interim reports except when required for prospectuses and proxy state
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ments. Unethical managements have three quarters to report results without
“the watchdog.” This makes downward adjustments for the year more dif
ficult and sometimes rather dramatic for the stockholders. Annual attempts
can be made to beautify year-end balance sheets. Surprise audits are required
in other fields, such as for stock exchange member firms, a requirement
which might alleviate this problem.

The Accounting Profession: Watching The Watchdog. AICPA
Code of Professional Ethics begins as follows:
The reliance of the public and the business community on sound
financial reporting and advice on business affairs imposes on the ac
counting profession an obligation to maintain high standards of tech
nical competence, morality and integrity. To this end, a member or
associate of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
shall at all times maintain independence of thought and action, hold
the affairs of his clients in strict confidence, strive continuously to
improve his professional skills, observe generally accepted auditing
standards, promote sound and informative financial reporting, uphold
the dignity and honor of the accounting profession and maintain
high standards of personal conduct.

The enumeration of rules of ethical conduct does not define further
“sound and informative financial reporting.” Rule 1.02 proscribes “an act
discreditable to the profession” which includes, under Rule 2.02, a failure to
disclose a known material fact, a failure to report any material misstatement,
and a failure to direct attention to any material departure from generally
accepted accounting principles. These nebulous statements hardly provide a
sound basis for enforcement of ethical standards. Content is added by the
definition of generally accepted accounting principles by the Accounting Prin
ciples Board, but the efforts to define these principles have been slow and
hotly contested.
Surveillance is also inadequate. The ethics committees of the state soci
eties and the AICPA generally react only to complaints which usually repre
sent the most egregious violations. There is no systematic review of reports
nor any program for publicizing deficient practices.
As discussed at the last symposium, some state societies have established
practice review committees to comment upon financial reports submitted to
them. This type of surveillance is again on an “impact” basis. Furthermore,
an adverse conclusion by the committee is not even transmitted to the person
submitting the report, let alone enforced by publicity or otherwise.
One of the principal impediments to effective enforcement—and this is
true of lawyers, too—is the reluctance to admit publicly that members of the
profession do not always adhere to high ethical standards. This impediment
becomes even greater when there is such a division within the accounting
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profession over the definition of certain accounting principles. For example,
is the approval of an accounting treatment contrary to APB Opinions Nos. 16
and 17 unethical when the Opinions were adopted by a bare two-thirds vote
of the Board over strong dissents by respected members of the profession?
Eight “expert independent accountants, an impressive array of leaders
of the profession,” testified in the Simon case that the questioned accounting
treatment was in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles.
Consequently, the court was presented with a direct confrontation between
“fair presentation” and generally accepted accounting principles. It has
been suggested that this confrontation need not have taken place if the eight
witnesses had not felt compelled to rally behind other members of the
profession.

The Public. To what extent do the users of financial information assist
in the enforcement process?
Financial analysts and credit analysts exercise a high degree of surveil
lance and are well qualified to detect violations. They may submit question
able statements to the practice review committees mentioned above. Their
reports may point out departures from fair presentation and attempt to recon
struct the published figures on a fairer basis. However, these reports generally
receive limited distribution so that the deterrent effect is minimal.
The financial press also exercises a limited amount of surveillance. Pro
fessor Briloff’s articles in Barrons on “dirty” poolings and purchases, for ex
ample, brought public attention to the treatment of business combinations.
While the public exposure of the columnist is much greater than that of the
financial analyst, the expertise of the columnist in making the accounting
judgments varies greatly.
Stockholders may watch the accounting practices of the companies in
which they invest. Except for the professional stockholder, they are not likely
to complain if management presents the most favorable picture. Accordingly,
it is unlikely that a proxy contest to remove management would be started
over unethical accounting practices, at least until the bubble bursts, at which
time litigation is much more probable.
The role of the public in the enforcement process is therefore limited.
Publicity is the principal means of enforcement; so long as the marketplace
uncritically accepts published earnings-per-share figures as the main per
formance indicator, adverse publicity on accounting practices of a particular
company will have little deterrent effect.
The Underwriter and His Counsel. In the limited area of public of
ferings of securities, the underwriter and his counsel may play an important
part in enforcing fair presentation. The underwriter’s desire to see fair presen
tation comes principally from Section 11 of the 1933 Act which makes the un
derwriter, as well as the issuer and its directors, liable for misleading state
ments unless he can show with respect to the audited financials that, after
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reasonable investigation, he had no reason to believe the financials were false.
For unaudited financials, he must prove that he had reason to believe the
statements were true.
The underwriter ordinarily has available within his firm personnel who
can analyze the financials, request additional information as necessary, and
cross-examine the financial executives and accountants. In offerings where
litigation is likely, such as a contested stock tender offer, the underwriter may
employ another accounting firm to review the company statements and prac
tices. The requirement of a “comfort letter” causes the company auditors to
reaffirm their prior reports and review the accounting practices used for un
audited figures.
If the underwriter disagrees with the company, it can refuse to handle
the underwriting, after which it may be difficult to find a responsible new
underwriter. The threat of Section 11 liability is a strong factor in the under
writer’s review of the financials. On the other hand, the underwriter has a
direct financial interest in the success of the offering and any revisions which
reduce earnings per share might well endanger public acceptance of the
offering.
The Stock Exchanges. The stock exchanges, of which the New York
Stock Exchange is here used as an example, have two areas of concern: first,
the financial condition of companies listed on the particular exchange and
second, the financial condition of member firms.
Section 12 of the 1934 Act provides for the registration of securities on a
stock exchange through the filing of a registration statement with the SEC
and a listing application with the stock exchange. As part of the listing appli
cation, the company must enter into a listing agreement with the exchange
which sets forth certain requirements such as the mailing of certified annual
reports to stockholders and the publication of interim unaudited earnings
statements. Copies of these reports, together with copies of quarterly and an
nual reports filed with the SEC, are filed with the stock exchange. The origi
nal listing application requires certified financials, and subsequent listing
applications for shares issued in acquisitions require financial statements of
the acquired company.
Each listed company is assigned a listing representative who oversees
approximately 100 companies. It is his responsibility to be familiar with the
operations of the listed company and its securities through review of the list
ing applications and annual and other reports as well as direct communica
tion with company officials and counsel. This procedure is particularly valu
able in the area of fair use of information, as will be discussed later. In the
fair presentation area, the listing representative could bring matters of ques
tionable accounting practice to the attention of the Board of Governors of
the Stock Exchange. In practice, however, he tends to rely upon the certifi
cate of the company’s independent public accountants and to raise only for
mal matters in comments on the financial portions of the listing application.
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The enforcement tool for the Exchange is delisting, which is provided for
in Section 12(d) of the 1934 Act. While delisting normally occurs when a
company fails to meet the numerical criteria for market value of publicly held
shares or earnings history, the exchange can also delist a company if it fails
to file the prescribed financial statements or if it fails “to observe good ac
counting practices in reporting of earnings and financial position.”
The New York Stock Exchange has acted on an overall basis to enforce
APB Opinion No. 16 by requiring listing applications for shares to be issued
in a pooling of interests to be accompanied by an opinion of the company’s
auditors setting forth the compliance of the transaction with specified criteria.
The stock exchanges are given authority by the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 to regulate the financial requirements and reporting of member firms.
Surprise audits are required, and the accountants make a detailed report to
the exchange on the results of the audit. In this area, however, the exchange
is principally interested in the financial stability and practices of the member
firm and not in a fair presentation of the results of operations. Prior to 1970,
member firms had no public stockholders, and reports to customers generally
contained only balance sheet information.
The Securities and Exchange Commission. During the legislative con
sideration of the Securities Act of 1933 it was proposed that the auditing func
tion for registration statements be performed by government personnel, such
as bank examiners. This proposal was rejected in favor of audits by indepen
dent certified public accountants. The SEC (originally FTC) was, however,
given power over all other aspects of accounting.

The SEC has authority in all three areas of enforcement: establishment
of standards, surveillance, and correction and punishment of violations. In
establishing accounting principles, however, the Commission has tended to
work through the AICPA, commenting and prodding from time to time to
achieve certain results. This has led to the charge that the procedure whereby
the APB Opinions are put into effect by the SEC violates the provisions of
the Administrative Procedure Act for comments, administrative decision, and
judicial review. In any case, it is clear that the SEC has not fully used the
authority given to it by statute for the establishment of accounting principles.
The SEC is in an extremely well-placed position to exercise surveillance
over financial reporting in view of the large amount of financial information
which is required to be filed with it under the 1933 and 1934 Acts and the
SEC rules. Any company issuing securities which are not exempt from regis
tration under the 1933 Act must file a registration statement containing spe
cified financial information. Companies subject to the 1934 Act must file
certified annual reports on Form 10-K and unaudited quarterly financial in
formation on the new Form 10-Q which replaced the Form 9-K required for
semiannual financial information. Merger proxy statements require financial
statements, and proxy statements for annual meetings must be accompanied
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by annual reports which must be sent to, although not “filed with,” the Com
mission.2
In the past, SEC surveillance has primarily been devoted to review of
the financial information contained in registration statements and merger
proxy statements. The Wheat Report recommended that more emphasis be
placed on the current reports filed with the Commission. This recommenda
tion has resulted in the adoption of Form 10-Q for quarterly information and
a program for current review of the 10-K’s and 10-Q’s which are filed. The
extent to which this program can be accomplished remains to be seen. The
budgetary problems of the SEC are severe and, even with an increased bud
get, implementation depends upon the ability of the Commission to hire a
competent staff to make the review.
The Commission also receives complaints from the public which are
investigated, but complaints of unethical financial reporting do not receive
high priority until the public has been injured.
Enforcement takes a variety of forms. It starts with the review of a reg
istration statement and the resulting letter of comment. The policy of the
1933 Act is basically one of disclosure; that is, as long as the terrible news
is fully disclosed, a registration statement may be allowed to become effective.
However, the Commission went beyond this policy in Accounting Series Re
lease No. 4 (1938) by stating that financial statements prepared in accordance
with accounting principles for which there is no substantial authoritative sup
port “will be presumed to be misleading” despite disclosures in footnotes or
the accountant’s certificate.
The “letter of comment” approach has a number of drawbacks. In the
first place, different branches in the Commission’s Division of Corporation
Finance may take different positions on matters of accounting policy. Sec
ond, the establishment of many policies is not publicly announced and often
can be determined only by a close examination of SEC filings. For example,
the SEC position on the accounting treatment of unrealized appreciation of
marketable securities in the income statement for broker-dealers was deduced
by the more knowledgeable observers from a comparison of the initial regis
tration statement of Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc. with the subsequent
amendments.
Similarly, the Commission’s approach to the treatment of compensating
balances in stating the effective interest rate for borrowings was heralded by
footnotes in a few prospectuses. It was then learned by a telephone call that
all branches would require recognition of compensating balances. Neverthe
less, this policy has never been publicly announced.
2

The foregoing requirements relate to corporations in general. Special types of corporations,
such as investment companies, broker-dealers, and public utility holding companies have
other filing requirements with the SEC. Banks must file with federal and/or state banking
authorities; carriers with the ICC; insurance companies with state insurance commissioners,
etc.
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The power of the Commission in enforcing its letter of comment is great,
for issuers and underwriters normally feel themselves under heavy time pres
sures and do not want to delay the offering in order to do battle. The specter
of a stop order proceeding is untenable in most situations since, even though
it could ultimately be successfully defended, the very institution of the pro
ceeding would kill the proposed offering. The result is that concessions are
made in the prospectus which would not ordinarily be made in more tran
quil times. The program for reviewing 10-Ks and 10-Qs and commenting up
on those filings could change this aspect since the issuer and its accountants
will be able to discuss the comments with the staff in a less charged atmos
phere.
The federal securities laws provide a number of weapons for SEC en
forcement. The Commission can issue interpretive releases on accounting
practice, which it has done relatively infrequently. It can issue a stop order
suspending the effectiveness of a registration statement. It can suspend trad
ing in outstanding securities. It can conduct private and public investigations
into possible violations of the laws and take administrative action against per
sons subject to its jurisdiction, such as broker-dealers and investment advisers.
It can recommend to the Department of Justice that grand jury proceedings
be commenced with a view to criminal indictments. It can institute civil pro
ceedings to enjoin persons from further violations of the securities laws and,
as held in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F2d 1301 (1971), for dam
ages to the corporation and its shareholders.
In the accounting area, one of the principal means of enforcement is
Rule 2(e) of the SEC Rules of Practice which provides for the suspension of
the right to practice before the Commission if it finds, inter alia, that a person
has engaged in unethical or improper professional conduct or has willfully
violated the federal securities laws. This rule has recently been broadened to
permit the Commission to temporarily suspend without a hearing any person
permanently enjoined from violating the federal securities laws or found by
a court to have violated or aided and abetted a violation of those laws.
There may also be peripheral effects from an SEC injunction proceed
ing. For example, Section 9 of the Investment Company Act makes a person
who has been enjoined from violating the securities laws ineligible to serve
as a director of an investment company unless the SEC otherwise orders.
Even the commencement of an investigation may have side effects since it
appears to be staff policy to hold up processing of registration statements of
the company under investigation until the investigation proceedings have been
completed.
The Commission, therefore, has a large arsenal of weapons. Assuming
that informal enforcement can be made more uniform and less undisclosed,
the principal problem is a budgetary one. Review of 10-Qs and 10-Ks alone
requires a large staff; administrative proceedings are time-consuming, and
court proceedings require a tremendous number of additional man-hours.
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The Courts. The Courts are the final step in the enforcement process.
They are the cornerstone of the Anglo-Saxon system of jurisprudence which
goes back to the Magna Carta.
The framers [of the Magna Carta] had grasped the great truths
that jurisprudence is a science; that the law must be administered by
men learned in that science and bound to obey its rules; that uniform
ity, certainty and impartiality are essential to the administration of
justice, and that the highest political liberty is the right to justice ac
cording to law and not according to the will of the judge or the
judge’s master or according to the judge’s individual discretion, or
his notions of right and wrong. They had also arrived at the con
clusion that every Englishman was entitled as of absolute right to a
day in a court that would hear before it condemned, that would pro
ceed upon notice and inquiry and that would render judgment after
a fair trial and then only according to law.3

The courts do not act on their own motion; consequently, they are not
a part of the surveillance process. In addition, they enforce legal standards,
not ethical standards (if there is in fact any distinction between the two).
Access to the courts for correcting or punishing unfair presentation of
financial information comes from several directions. State and federal stat
utes provide criminal penalties for making fraudulent statements, and fraud
also provides a common-law ground for civil recovery. Negligence may also
give rise to a civil cause of action.
The main avenue at the present time is the federal securities laws. The
statutory scheme, as stated in the 1933 and 1934 Acts, looked to the SEC
as the principal enforcer through administrative proceedings and suits for in
junctions and criminal penalties. Private remedies were provided in Sections
11 and 12 of the 1933 Act and Sections 9 and 18 of the 1934 Act, but these
sections have relatively short statutes of limitations and, in the case of Sections
11 and 12(2), a specific provision on the standard of care required.
The courts’ expanding interpretation of the private right of action under
Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5, which is traced so well in
Mr. Sommer’s paper, has shattered the statutory scheme. Since there is no
specific statute of limitations in the Act, the courts have borrowed the various
state limitation periods. This lack of uniformity is compounded by the differ
ing standards of proof required by the various federal courts. Some circuits
require the plaintiff to be a purchaser or seller of securities, others do not.
Some circuits require proof that the defendant knew of the misleading state
ment; others require only gross negligence; some require only negligence.
Some require reliance on the statement, others do not. The United States
3

“Magna Carta,” The Lawyer’s Treasury, ed. Eugene Gerhart, American Bar Association
Journal (Bobbs: 1956), pp. 82-83.
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Supreme Court, which resolves conflicts among the circuit courts, has taken
relatively few 10b-5 cases so that the uncertainty and unevenness of applica
tion continues.
Suits under 10b-5 almost always take the form of a class action—a suit
by a stockholder on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated. The
courts have approved this type of action on the ground that the individual
stockholder has so little at stake he would not be economically able to bring
the action only on his own behalf. Rules have been established for defining
a class, but application of the rules to each case has produced a variety of
results.
The class action has been further fostered by the rule that successful
plaintiff’s counsel may recover his fees from the judgment awarded. In many
cases the size of the class is so large that even the recovery of $1,000,000
will mean less than $1 to the average member of the class. Thus, the real
party in interest becomes plaintiff’s counsel.
It used to be that counsel could only recover his fees if a fund was pro
duced; but the Supreme Court, in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 US
375 (1970), concluded on the basis of the policy expressed in the securities
laws that fees could be awarded without a fund if a violation of law had been
established. Again, this encourages suit even though recovery may be small.
In recent years, the practice has become common for attorneys, to be plain
tiffs as well as counsel. One Penn Central case was brought by an attorney
who owned one share of stock.
Prior to the time 10b-5 became fashionable, a rash of stockholder der
ivative suits influenced a number of state legislatures to pass “security for
costs” statutes which usually required a stockholder owning less than 5% of
the company to post a bond for costs which might be assessed against him if
the suit were unsuccessful. The cost of the bond in many cases effectively
discouraged groundless suits. Section 18 of the 1934 Act contains a provi
sion for security for costs, which may be why that Section is infrequently in
voked. However, under another section of the Act which does not have such
a provision, the Supreme Court held, in J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 US 426
(1964), that security for costs could not be required because it would inhibit
enforcement of the Act.
From the defendant’s standpoint, litigation is a costly process. The dis
covery procedures provided in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are ex
tremely time-consuming. Plaintiff’s counsel customarily serves 20 to 30 pages
of interrogatories which must be answered, followed by a motion to produce
stacks of documents, followed by notices of depositions which may take many
weeks in far-off places. Counsel fees mount up as this procedure continues.
The defendant therefore looks for a means of having the case rapidly
dismissed, but the law is not helpful in this regard. The federal rules require
only “notice” pleading so that a plaintiff need not be particularly specific in
his allegations. Furthermore, the decisions say that, in view of the policy

118

found in the federal securities laws, a court should be reluctant to dismiss a
case until the plaintiff has had a full opportunity to conduct discovery. The
courts are also liberal in allowing discovery so that attempts to narrow the
scope of interrogatories or motions to produce are generally resolved in favor
of the plaintiff.
The extreme to which this type of litigation has gone is illustrated by a
recent suit brought by an attorney who had purchased stock and sold it a
month later for a $400 loss. The suit was brought on behalf of all persons
who had purchased stock during a 13-month period. The basis of liability
specifically alleged was that the assets were overstated, the liabilities under
stated, and expenditures were capitalized which should have been expensed.
Accompanying the complaint were 21 pages of interrogatories containing
such questions as “List all assets of the company as of---------------- “List all
liabilities of the company as of the same date”; “List all expenses of the com
pany during the year ended on that date,” etc.
If a quick dismissal cannot be achieved, then the defendant might look
for a way to have a speedy trial. The federal courts are moving to reduce the
time within which a case can be reached for trial. However, discovery proce
dures must still be completed, and the present state of court congestion mili
tates against a rapid trial.
Finally, the trial itself presents problems in any case involving questions
of accounting principles. Juries are generally composed of people who are
not sophisticated in financial matters and who are likely to have preconcep
tions of the role of an accountant which vary materially from the AICPA
pronouncements. Judges are drawn in many cases from government service
or from personal injury litigation practice, and it is unusual to find a judge
with a background in financial reporting.
Furthermore, suits for unfair presentation of financial information in
almost all cases take place after the fact. Resolution of the suit does not oc
cur until many years after the publication of the statements under attack. A
judgment on what'was or was not material looks very different with the bene
fit of hindsight when a company has become bankrupt. Similarly, a decision
to capitalize research and development costs changes color when subsequent
events show that the product could never be marketed.
It is no wonder, then, that most stockholder suits are settled. The de
fendants can add up the counsel fees which they would incur in a successful
defense and see that settlement would be preferable despite the distaste of,
in effect, paying the plaintiff’s counsel fees. The one benefit of a class action
to the defendants is that a settlement prevents further suits by members of
the class unless they have affirmatively elected not to be included in the class.
The stockholder class suit has been attacked as being a haven for “strike
suit” lawyers. Proponents of this type of action say that they provide a valu
able protection for the public and supplement the enforcement efforts of the
SEC. It is clear that the threat of a stockholder suit is one of the most effec
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tive deterrents against departure from ethical standards. It is also clear that
the stockholder suit as presently constituted does not produce the “uniformity,
certainty and impartiality” which in the quotation at the beginning of this
section was found to be “essential to the administration of justice.”

How Can Existing Methods of Enforcement be Improved?
The foregoing catalogue of existing methods of enforcement may not be
definitive, but it does show that there are many points in the enforcement pro
cess at which available tools are not being effectively utilized. The purpose
of this section is to suggest some ways in which enforcement can be made
more effective. The suggestions herein are for discussion purposes and may
or may not represent the views of the author.
It might be helpful first to look at the possible reasons for departures
from ethical standards in order to determine the most effective ways to pre
vent them.

1.

2.
3.

4.
5.

6.
7.

Executives and accountants are not fully informed on the ethical stand
ards to be followed in financial reporting.
Ethical standards are inadequately defined, making adherence difficult.
Ethical standards are defined in a way which executives or accountants
believe does not lead to fair presentation. An analogy would be a 25
mile per hour speed limit on a dry, uncrowded superhighway.
Another person supposedly subject to the same ethical standards has
“gotten away with it.”
Ethical standards are outweighed by a desire to show a favorable picture
for personal economic reasons (increase in value of stock holdings or op
tion or in incentive compensation, fear of stockholder complaints or suits),
corporate economic reasons (sale of additional stock, acquisitions, stock
holder relations), or simply personal justification.
Ethical standards of the accountant are outweighed by the desire to re
tain the client and/or the personal relationship with the client.
Nobody will discover the departure from ethical standards.

With these thoughts in mind, the principal categories discussed in the
first section of this paper can be reviewed. Once again it is assumed that ethi
cal standards can be defined and in such a way that they do not result in the
25 m.p.h. superhighway analogy mentioned above. It is by no means certain
that this assumption is correct, but without it enforcement can only be effec
tive in cases of clear fraud.
The Financial Executive. It is surprising to find that the Financial Ex
ecutives Institute does not have a formal code of ethics at the present time.
Accountants and lawyers, of course, have a certification process which makes
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discipline for violation of the code effective. Nevertheless, the Financial Ana
lysts Federation and Robert Morris Associates have codes of ethics.
Would it be possible for the FEI to establish a means of certification
which would provide status and perhaps economic benefit to the certified fi
nancial executive?
Education regarding ethical standards is important for both executives
and accountants. Is the FEZ doing an adequate job in this area?
There are various ways in which the personal economic pressures on the
financial executive could be reduced. For example, he could be prohibited
from having stock options or receiving additional compensation based on fi
nancial results; or, he could be hired, and his salary fixed, by the board of di
rectors or by a committee of outside directors.
The first suggestion is not really fair to the financial executive unless
his salary is adjusted accordingly. The second suggestion is inconsistent with
the concept of a chief executive officer having direct responsibility for the
operations of the company and concomitantly the right to select the persons
under his command.

The Board of Directors. The board of directors’ role in enforcement is
a limited one. It can deal only with the individual company, resulting in a
lack of uniformity in enforcement and, perhaps, short-run benefits to the com
pany with an inactive board.
Requirements that every board have a certain number of outside direc
tors or have a financial analyst as a member would obviously be ineffective
since enforcement would still depend upon the ability and availability of the
directors.
Should the state corporate laws and Section 11 of the 1933 Act be
changed to require the directors to look more deeply into the financial state
ments? This change might well accelerate the present movement toward de
parture from the board of nonmanagement directors. Already the threat of
stockholder litigation has begun to outweigh the status and fees of being a
director. Premiums on director and officer liability insurance have skyrocket
ed, and the efficacy of coverage is in doubt. Suggestions have been made that
outside directors be held to a lesser standard of care than management direc
tors. It is apparent that the imposition of further responsibility for financial
reporting is not practical at the present time.
The use of an audit committee of outside directors should, however, be
encouraged. This committee should meet with the financial executive and
with the outside accountants and review the accounting alternatives selected.
In fact, following the Atlantic Acceptance disaster in Canada, the Ontario
Business Corporations Act has been amended to require an audit committee
for companies offering securities to the public. The committee’s duty is to
review the financials before they are submitted to the board of directors and
the auditor is given access to the committee. A majority of the audit commit
tee must be directors who are not officers or employees of the company.
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The Independent Public Accountant. The accountant is not really
independent so long as he is selected and paid by the client. Various alterna
tives suggest themselves:

• Require rotation of accountants every certain number of years.
• Have accountants selected by a committee of outside directors or a
stockholder committee.
• Have accountants designated by the AICPA or the SEC.
• Have the SEC take over the auditing function as suggested in the
early 1930s.
• Have accountants paid from some form of industry or public fund.

The first suggestion would appear to have substantial merit depending
upon the time period selected. On the other hand, this requirement would
penalize highly ethical managements who believe that the accounting firm
selected by them is the most effective in auditing and requiring adherence to
high standards.
How can the accountant’s role be made more effective? Should an audit
or review of the Form 10-Q be required? Should a surprise audit be required
in place of or in addition to the annual audit? Should the common practice
of submitting a post-audit memorandum on internal controls and accounting
procedures be made a requirement? Whom should it be submitted to—man
agement, the board of directors, the AICPA, the stock exchange, the SEC?
Should other detailed reports to the SEC be required—publicly filed or as
supplemental information?
The Accounting Profession. Short of the SEC, the accounting pro
fession has the most room for improvement. It should begin with the educa
tion of the members of the profession in ethical standards of financial report
ing. This could be done by increased use of interpretive releases.
The profession is also in the best position to exercise surveillance since
its members are the most knowledgeable in the field, and supervision over all
reporting companies can be obtained. Filings could be required from member
firms or coordinated with the SEC. The principal problems are budget and
manpower. There is also the question whether AICPA surveillance is neces
sary when the SEC has embarked on a program along the same lines. The
answer may depend on whether the SEC can carry out its program within
its budget and staff. Is there room for cooperation between the AICPA and
the SEC in this program? Should representatives of other organizations inter
ested in financial reporting be made a part of a surveillance task force?
Once violations of ethical standards are found, correction or punishment
is required. It has been pointed out previously that a profession is reluctant
to criticize publicly some of its members since this may tend to besmirch the
entire profession in the public’s eyes. On the other hand, it would seem that
effective discipline should enhance the profession’s standing.
The Philadelphia Bar Association has recently been under fire for al
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leged failure to take disciplinary action. One of the recommendations made
was that the public should be represented on the disciplinary committee since
it is directly affected. The same point has merit for disciplinary action by the
accounting profession.
Serious consideration should be given to suggestions which have been
made for the establishment of an accounting “court.” This court could be
composed of, for example, one accountant, one financial analyst, and one
member of the public designated by the SEC. It would not establish account
ing principles (which is a legislative determination) but would discipline vio
lations and could also resolve current questions of interpretation presented by
members. While a decision of the court would not necessarily be conclusive
in a subsequent stockholder suit, it would obviously be persuasive and would
have been made by persons knowledgeable in accounting.
The court might duplicate some of the present SEC work, but, if it is
effective, one can surmise that the SEC would be happy to have the court
take over enforcement in this field.

The Sec. The Wheat Report produced a beneficial change in direction
of the surveillance efforts of the SEC from registration statements to annual
and quarterly reports. Under the new policy, the effect of SEC review should
be felt evenly throughout the financial community and not just in those com
panies having public offerings. The principal question now is whether the
SEC can adequately review and comment within a reasonable time after fil
ing. While the SEC is a revenue producing agency, its budget is woefully
inadequate for the tasks given to it by statute. It is in the interest of the finan
cial community to see that this budget is increased so that the Commission
can act fully and fairly in the area of fair presentation.
The letter of comment approach, while effective, is not the best means
of enforcement. Accounting policies developed by the staff should be pub
licized promptly. Interpretive releases should also be used more frequently
to call public attention to bad accounting practices. The SEC has been given
a mission by the 1933 Act which should be carried out.

The Courts. The uncertainty and diversity among the various federal
courts in the 10b-5 area needs to be eliminated either by Supreme Court de
cisions or by Congress. The latter would be preferable since it could be
accomplished more promptly on a broad basis rather than case by case, and
the entire philosophy of the federal securities laws could be reviewed includ
ing the respective roles of the SEC and private litigants, the basis of liability,
and the time within which suit must be brought.
The class action needs to be refined to prevent abuses. One approach
would be to fix a jurisdictional amount as is the case in other federal suits, so
that the plaintiff (s) must show that the amount in controversy arising out of
his or their stock exceeds, for example, $10,000. The provisions of Section
18 of the 1934 Act that permit the court to assess defendants’ counsel fees
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against an unsuccessful plaintiff and to require security at the commencement
of the case for such an assessment could be extended to all stockholder suits.
Another approach would be to provide for a preliminary hearing prior
to commencement of discovery in order to eliminate the obviously groundless
suit. The hearing could be held before the court, a master appointed by the
court, a panel of experts, or even the SEC.
The actual trial might also be assigned to a master or arbitration panel
with appropriate review by the court. This is presently provided in most state
statutes for dissenting shareholder appraisal suits which require an under
standing of financial statements and securities valuation. The result would be
to speed up the trial and provide a trier of fact with expertise in accounting
matters.
These are merely a few suggestions. If remedial steps are not taken, it
well may be that the “Securities Act of 1983” will provide for audits by SEC
personnel not because of any change in policy but because there will be no
public accounting firms left.

The Fair Use (or Nonuse) of Financial Information: Are
Existing Methods of Enforcement Adequate?
Ethical standards in the use of financial information take their content
directly from the federal securities laws. The Supreme Court has said: “A
fundamental purpose, common to these statutes, was to substitute a philoso
phy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve
a high standard of business ethics in the securities industry.” (SEC. v. Capital
Gains Research Bureau, 375 US 180, 186 (1963).)
The standard stated in Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F2d 833 (1968), and
recently reiterated by the SEC in the Investors Management Co., Inc., opin
ion4 relating to the Douglas Aircraft-Merrill Lynch matter is that a person
who has material nonpublic information concerning a company which comes
from inside sources should not effect transactions in the company’s securities
nor transmit the information to others who may effect such transactions.
The difficulty in following this standard lies in determining what is “ma
terial” and “nonpublic.” The financial executive is almost always the posses
sor of some inside information which the public does not know. The materi
ality of this information may appear entirely different in hindsight than it
does at the time of purchase or sale of stock.
The financial analyst’s stock in trade is collecting all relevant informa
tion concerning a company and advising on the basis of that information.
While the financial executive may refrain from purchasing or selling in

4 SEC Release Nos. 34-9267 and IA 289, CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ¶ 78,163 (July 29, 1971).
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doubtful situations, it is much more difficult for the financial analyst to refrain
from making recommendations. He also has an additional problem in deter
mining whether the information has come from an inside source.
In recognition of the importance to the securities industry and the in
vesting public of more adequate guidelines, the SEC in the Investors Manage
ment case decided on its own motion to review the decision of the hearing
examiner censuring various broker-dealers and investment advisers. The
Commission found that the following elements should be present for the im
position of responsibility: “that the information in question be material and
nonpublic; that the tippee, whether he receives the information directly or in
directly, know or have reason to know that it was nonpublic and had been
obtained improperly by selective revelation or otherwise, and that the infor
mation be a factor in his decision to effect the transaction.” The footnote to
this statement is instructive:
Our formulation would clearly attach responsibility in a situa
tion where the recipient knew or had reason to know the information
was obtained by industrial espionage, commercial bribery or the like.
We also consider that there would be potential responsibility, de
pending on an evaluation of the specific facts and circumstances,
where persons innocently come into possession of and then use in
formation which they have reason to know is intended to be con
fidential. Our test would not attach responsibility with respect to in
formation which is obtained by general observation or analysis.

The Commission then goes on to discuss each one of the elements as related
to the disclosure by Merrill Lynch of the reduction in earnings of Douglas
Aircraft.
This opinion is a valuable step in the enforcement process for it serves
to educate the users of financial information on the standards to be followed.
The definitional gap is narrowed but, unfortunately, the problem of what
is “material nonpublic information” still remains for each individual case.

Section 16 of the 1934 Act. The blunderbuss which Congress fash
ioned to deal with insider trading is Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934. It applies to the securities of a company registered under the 1934
Act held by its directors, officers, and ten per cent stockholders. Each person
covered must report to the SEC on a monthly basis if any change in his bene
ficial ownership occurs. Any profit made within a six-month period on a pur
chase and sale or sale and purchase belongs to the company; if the company
does not bring suit to recover it, a stockholder may.
Surveillance is excellent by reason of the required reports. While the
SEC does not review the reports on a systematic basis, it publishes summaries
of the information on a periodical basis, and any stockholder can have access
to the reports. The Wall Street Journal and other newspapers also publish
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selected portions of the summaries from time to time. The information pro
vided by the reports may be useful for other than Section 16 purposes since
it covers all changes, whether or not within a six-month period. Further sur
veillance is conducted by certain professional stockholders who review the
SEC summaries and then initiate the enforcement process by requesting the
management of the company to take action on any violations. In the event
management fails to bring suit within sixty days after request, the stockholder
may bring suit and is entitled to receive his counsel fees out of the recovery.
Section 16 provides that suit must be brought within two years after the profit
is realized. If no report is filed, the courts have held that suit may be insti
tuted within two years after discovery of the facts.
The scope of Section 16 is limited. It applies only to directors, officers,
and ten per cent stockholders of the registrant, not to directors and officers
of any subsidiaries of the registrant nor to other persons who may be privy
to inside information, although the SEC has defined officers to include per
sons without title who perform functions corresponding to those performed
by a president, vice-president, treasurer, secretary, or comptroller. Section 16
applies only to purchases and sales within a six-month period. Transactions
within a six and one-half month period, for example, are not covered, and yet
this is much more likely in view of the long-term capital gain provisions of
the Internal Revenue Code.
The conclusive presumption of the statute that any purchase and sale
within a six-month period was made on inside information produces harsh re
sults. It has become a trap for the unwary, but no problem for the person
knowingly trading on inside information.
The principal difficulty has arisen from court interpretation of purchase
and sale and the date on which the transaction occurs. The receipt of an
employee stock option is a purchase unless certain procedural steps specified
in an SEC rule are followed. The conversion of debentures or preferred stock
may or may not be a sale of that security and a purchase of the underlying
security, depending upon which district court hears the case. In two recent
cases it has been held that a merger is a sale of the old security and a pur
chase of the new one.
In one case it was even argued that a gift of appreciated securities to
charity was a sale because the donor received the same economic benefits he
would have received if he had sold the securities and donated the proceeds.
Fortunately the argument was rejected, but there can be no assurance that it
will not be adopted by another court since the modern trend in decisions un
der this section is to adopt the theory that best effectuates the purposes of the
Act, i.e., the theory that finds the defendant liable.
It is difficult to tell how much therapeutic effect Section 16 has had. It
does not prevent an executive from purchasing with inside information and
selling out later at a profit so long as the two transactions are more than six
months apart. It does, however, give publicity to purchases and sales by cor
porate executives and may thereby deter an executive from effecting a trans
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action which could at a later date be tied to a public announcement of impor
tant information.

Rule 10b-5. Because of the limited scope of Section 16, the principal
means of enforcement of ethical standards in the fair use of financial informa
tion has been through Rule 10b-5 adopted under Section 10(b) of the 1934
Act and, to a lesser degree, Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act which is similar in
language to Section 10(b) but applies only to sales of securities. As discussed
in the first section of this paper, it was originally thought that these Sections
of the two Acts did not provide a private right of action, and it was not until
the late 1940s that the floodgates were initially opened.
The stock exchanges monitor by computer the price and volume move
ments of listed securities in order to maintain an orderly market. The SEC
also monitors trading so that any unusual activity comes to its attention and
is followed up by investigation and perhaps direct inquiry of the company
involved. This type of surveillance catches a large amount of trading on in
side information but it does not necessarily detect less substantial transac
tions. The SEC also receives a large number of complaints from the public
which are followed up by the staff and may reveal violations of Rule 10b-5.
Administrative proceedings by the SEC play a more important role in
the fair use of financial information because violations often involve broker
dealers and, to a lesser extent, investment advisers, both of which must be
registered with the SEC in order to stay in business. Section 15 of the 1934
Act gives the SEC authority to censure a broker-dealer or to suspend or
revoke its registration upon a finding that the broker-dealer has willfully
violated, or aided or abetted a violation of, the federal securities laws; the In
vestment Advisers Act of 1940 contains similar provisions. The administra
tive proceedings can be accomplished more rapidly than court proceedings,
but the legal expense and the executive time consumed are still great. Fur
thermore, the hearing examiner, being an employee of the SEC, is likely to
take a strict view of the requirements of the Act. For that reason, persons
named in administrative proceedings will normally prefer to attempt to settle
the proceeding by agreeing to censure or some form of suspension rather
than fight the case through the Commission and ultimately the courts.
The SEC may also move in the federal courts for an injunction against
any future violations of Rule 10b-5. Even though the violation has already
occurred, the cases hold that an injunction should be granted unless it is
absolutely clear that there is no likelihood of further violations. The signifi
cance of the entry of an injunction is that violations by the defendant place
it in contempt of court thus providing a more rapid means of enforcement and
probably heavy penalties. The injunction also has the peripheral effects dis
cussed in the first section of this paper.
The SEC has plowed new ground in the Texas Gulf Sulphur litigation
with the court’s holding that the SEC may recover damages from the defend
ants. The court held the defendants liable not only for the profits they real
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ized on their purchases but also for the profits realized by their tippees. This
extension of the scope of liability will certainly serve as an additional deter
rent against the transmission of inside information to others. Private class
actions may also be brought on behalf of persons who sold (or purchased) as
a result of the failure of the defendants to release the true facts. The previous
discussion concerning stockholder suits is also relevant here. Particularly
pertinent is the fact that the materiality of the information will undoubtedly
look entirely different four or five years after the fact than it did at the time
the transaction occurred.
The SEC proceedings have an educational effect. They also spawn pri
vate suits, sometimes within 24 hours after announcement of SEC action. The
Texas Gulf Sulphur Company has been subjected to a large number of suits
by persons who sold stock between the time the court found the news should
have been released and the time that it was actually disseminated to the
public. Suits have likewise been brought against Douglas Aircraft Company
(now merged into McDonnell-Douglas Corporation) and Merrill Lynch as
a result of the publicity given to the SEC proceedings. Thus, the SEC pro
ceedings have an additional effect on enforcement by providing publicity and
a factual basis for subsequent stockholder suits.
Self-regulation. It is customary in many companies for management
to request counsel to prepare a memorandum for directors and officers setting
forth the liabilities which arise from trading on inside information. Securities
firms likewise generally have a compliance program for employees. The code
of ethics of The Institute of Chartered Financial Analysts does not expressly
deal with the fair use of financial information but does provide that the finan
cial analyst shall comply strictly with all laws, governmental rules and regu
lations of the stock exchanges, and the National Association of Securities
Dealers. The Robert Morris Associates’ Code of Ethics for the Exchange of
Credit Information begins: “The first and cardinal principle in credit investi
gation is to respect the confidential nature of the information received.” In
this regard, it would appear that the credit officer may transmit inside infor
mation to another credit officer, but the inquirer must maintain the confiden
tiality.
As discussed above, the stock exchanges have a dual role under the
1934 Act to supervise (1) member firms and (2) listed companies. Section
6 provides for registration of the exchange with the SEC and makes it a pre
requisite that the rules of the exchange shall contain disciplinary provisions
for conduct by a member inconsistent with “just and equitable principles of
trade,” which shall include violations of the Act and the SEC rules. Section
12(d) states that a security may be delisted in accordance with the rules of
the exchange.
These statutory provisions are expanded in the rules and policies of the
exchanges. The New York Stock Exchange listing agreement, for example,
is designed to achieve timely disclosure of information that “may affect secu
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rities values or influence investment decisions.” The Exchange policy pro
nouncements also discuss in an informative manner such matters as internal
handling of confidential corporate matters, corporate compliance programs,
relationships with security analysts, relationships between company officials
and representatives of member firms, public release policy, and stock transac
tions by directors and officers. Company officials are encouraged to discuss
important matters preliminarily with their listing representative. The educa
tional process is therefore a good one. The policies of the Exchange also pro
vide that a factor in determining whether to defist a company is the failure “to
make timely, adequate, and accurate disclosures of information to its share
holders and the investing public.”
Through the computer surveillance mentioned above, unusual market
activity can be ascertained promptly. If necessary, trading can be suspended
until company officials are contacted and news is released to the public. In
this way the Exchange can maintain public confidence in the fairness of mar
ket trading. The informality of this system enables it to react quickly. If the
Exchange should cease being the principal market place for listed stocks, it is
important that a similar means of surveillance and enforcement be developed
in the new market.
The Exchange supervises its member firms and in turn requires them to
supervise their employees. Personnel of member firms are permitted to act
as directors of listed companies although the Exchange policy is expressed as
follows:
Every director has a fiduciary obligation not to reveal any priv
ileged information to anyone not authorized to receive it. Not until
there is full public disclosure of such data, particularly when the in
formation might have a bearing on the market price of securities, is
a director released from the necessity of keeping information of this
character to himself. Any director of a corporation who is a partner,
officer, or employee of a member organization should recognize that
his first responsibility in this area is to the corporation on whose
board he serves. Thus, a member firm director must meticulously
avoid any disclosure of inside information to his partners, employees
of the firm, his customers or his research or trading departments.5

A confrontation between this statement and the duty of a broker to its
customer was presented in the 1968 case of Black v. Shearson, Hamill & Co.,
72 Calif. Rptr. 157 (1968). Mr. Black claimed that he had purchased stock
of a company through the brokerage firm at a time when one of the firm’s
partners, as a director of the company, knew of adverse financial information.
The defendant cited the foregoing statement as a defense. The court held both
the brokerage firm and the partner liable to Mr. Black, saying:

5

New York Stock Exchange Company Manual, p. A-21, (7/18/68).
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We have been given no sufficient reason for permitting a per
son to avoid one fiduciary obligation by accepting another which
conflicts with it. . . . The officer-director’s conflict in duties is the
classic problem encountered by one who serves two masters. It
should not be resolved by weighing the conflicting duties; it should
be avoided in advance ... or terminated when it appears.
Violations of Rule 10b-5 may result in discipline by a stock exchange
as well as by the SEC. The National Association of Securities Dealers, which
is given statutory recognition by Section 15A of the 1934 Act, is also required
to have rules which are designed to prevent fraudulent acts and to promote
just and equitable principles of trade with appropriate disciplinary provisions.

How Can Existing Methods of Enforcement Be Improved?
It appears that ethical standards in the fair use of financial information
have been more effectively publicized by the professional organizations, the
stock exchanges, and the SEC than those for fair presentation. The definition
of material and nonpublic still remains fuzzy in the individual case, but pro
nouncements such as the SEC Investors Management opinion and the New
York Stock Exchange policies have helped to establish guidelines for the user.
It may, of course, be that ethical standards are more easily defined in this
area.
The principal reason for departure from ethical standards in the use of
financial information, aside from the fact that some people can never keep
a secret, is personal economic gain for the recipient of the information or his
client.
This motive could be removed for the financial executive by prohibiting
his ownership of securities in his employer. Such a prohibition would, how
ever, run contrary to the commonly held idea that directors and officers
should have a meaningful investment in their company and would also de
prive the executive of whatever tax benefits are left in the qualified stock
option. A periodic investment program, as suggested by the New York Stock
Exchange, would solve the purchase end of the problem, but it would seem
inequitable to prohibit sales in view of the likely personal needs of the execu
tive.
Section 16 reports are not seen by most stockholders. More effective
publicity could be given to transactions by directors and officers by amend
ing the proxy rules to require the proxy statement for the annual meeting
to list all transactions by directors and officers during the year instead of
just the directors’ current holdings as now required.
The broker-director continues to be a prevalent condition despite the
Black case discussed above and the much publicized resignations of the part
ners of Butcher & Sherrerd in 1968 from their directorships. It may be that
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the courts will extend Section 16 liability to the brokerage firms, following
the theory of deputization established in Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp.,
406 F2d 260 (1969), which will bring an abrupt halt to this practice. Even
if this does not occur, the practice should be ended.
Another source of conflict is the investment by bank trust departments
in companies which have borrowed money from the bank. If a bank credit
officer receives unfavorable information about a company whose stock the
bank holds as trustee, is he not in the same position as the partner in the
brokerage firm in the Black case?
A means of restricting the use of inside information would be to insulate
the insiders to the maximum extent possible from the public. This occurs
during merger negotiations, for example. Such an arrangement would obvi
ously not be satisfactory to financial analysts or other members of the invest
ing public. It runs counter to the expressed purpose of the federal securities
laws to foster the disclosure of information.
Is it possible to restructure Section 16 of the 1934 Act in order to make
it more effective and yet less of a trap for the innocent? The extension of the
reporting requirement to other employees would flood the SEC, but could not
the company be made the collecting agent for the information with a com
posite monthly filing? While many companies have compliance programs,
should not all companies be required to supervise employees in the same
manner as stock exchange member firms and other broker-dealers? Would a
change in the six-month time period improve enforcement?
One of the most ridiculous effects of the present state of the law is the
trap in which several unsuccessful tender offerors have been caught. Their
purchases put them over ten per cent which made them subject to Section 16
even though they had no access to inside information. Management then
merged with another company within the six-month period, which is treated
as a sale, thereby triggering liability. Should not the Act permit a ten per
cent holder to prove he is not an insider? In fact, should not the Act permit
an officer or director by some strict standard of proof such as “clear and con
vincing” to show he had no inside information?
In concept, Section 16 provided absolute liability within relatively cer
tain bounds. In practice, through court interpretation, these bounds have
become uncertain. Either the boundaries should be redefined or the absolute
liability lifted.

Conclusion

Enforcement of ethical standards is important first in deterring future
violations and second in stiffening the moral backbone of the well-meaning
by showing that “crime does not pay.” In the last analysis, however, the
maintenance of ethical standards must come from the individual: “For from
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the inside, from a man’s heart, come the evil ideas which lead him to do im
moral things.”
The comparison of enforcement of ethics in fair presentation and in fair
use leads to the conclusion that the standards have been better defined, better
disseminated, and better enforced in the fair use sector. It can be said that
standards are easier to establish there. It is submitted, however, that the
real reason for the difference is that the fair use standards have been drawn
from the statute by the SEC and vigorously enforced. The establishment of
fair presentation standards has been left by the SEC to the private sector, and
it has failed. Effective enforcement of ethical standards of fair presentation
will come only when the SEC, through proper administrative procedures, es
tablishes accounting principles.
In summary, the following recommendations are made for improving en
forcement of ethical standards of fair presentation:

1.

Ethical standards should be established by the SEC in cooperation with
the accounting profession and with the participation of other interested
organizations. This could be accomplished within the present statutory
framework by the SEC proposing rules based upon APB Opinions.

2.

There should be a systematic means for reviewing financial statements
to detect unethical practices.

3.

The budget of the SEC should be increased so that it can adequately
carry out these two recommendations. If the budget and staff of the SEC
are not equal to the task of surveillance, the AICPA, FEI, FAF, and
Robert Morris Associates should combine their funds and personnel in
establishing a review body.

4.

Unethical practices should be publicly disclosed by the reviewing body.

5.

An accounting court should be established to take disciplinary action
and to interpret ethical standards on a current basis. In the absence of
such a court, disciplinary action should be taken promptly by the SEC.

6.

The foregoing steps will reduce the need for the “prophylactic” action
of the stockholder class suit. It should be properly confined by requir
ing a jurisdictional amount, fixing a reasonable statute of limitations,
providing a means for an early hearing on the merits of the suit, and per
mitting the assessment of defendants’ counsel fees and expenses against
the plaintiff in circumstances where the suit was not brought in good
faith.

It is submitted that this was the statutory scheme of the 1933 and 1934
Acts and that the present distortions are due in large part to the failure of the
SEC to carry out the rulemaking and enforcement procedures for fair presen
tation contemplated by the Acts.
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The Public Image Problem
By Robert O. Carlson, President, Public Relations Society of America

There is no need to labor the moral and pragmatic importance of finding
better ways for corporations to report on their financial operations. The pa
pers presented three years ago at this symposium were characterized by can
dor and sincerity, and I am persuaded that much careful thought is being
given to trying to establish norms by which the financial performance (both
past and present) of corporations can be measured with greater precision.
Time and again in the discussions of three years ago, the term “compara
bility” was mentioned and, repeatedly, participants noted that even within in
dustries in the same field, “comparability” in financial reporting is often diffi
cult to achieve, becoming almost a nightmare when one seeks to establish it
as a norm for measuring financial performance between industries as differ
ent, for example, as the extractive industries, the data processing and infor
mation retrieval industries, industries operating in the transportation sector of
our economy, or the more conventional manufacturing firms producing estab
lished lines of consumer products.
I am intrigued as a social scientist, a public relations practitioner, and a
small investor with the problems facing the corporate executive who tries to
report on the present health of his corporation and its future prospects. In a
world characterized by chaotic change, what guidelines are available by
which any management can truly describe the potential for its new products
and the possibilities for success of strategies which seek to insure its growth?
Developments of the past three years—consumerism, concern over air
and water pollution, and an increasing clamor that management take into
account the social implications of its investment decisions—all suggest that
noneconomic forces will increasingly impinge on the economic performance
of companies and, in turn, on their efforts at better economic forecasting. If
these and comparable noneconomic factors continue to muddy the waters of
corporate financial reporting, they must necessarily have profound implica
tions for any discussion of the ethical aspects of corporate financial report
ing. As the business community continues to seek better tools for measuring
financial performance by corporations, I suggest that it must also assume a
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far more aggressive and realistic role in alerting its publics to the sizeable
amount of ambiguity and uncertainty which is a necessary concomitant of
any financial report or forecast. And that, in summary, is how I visualize
the ethical problem facing those in the business community concerned about
improving the quality of corporate financial reporting. This paper is an effort
to document that thesis.

Attitudinal Problems as a Focus of Business

Americans have traditionally been nurtured in an intellectual climate
which held that economic and social success were hallmarks of the Almighty’s
approval—the so-called “Protestant ethic.” Several world wars and several
massive economic depressions have badly battered that concept, but some
of its rhetoric still lives on and influences the way tough-minded businessmen
try to describe the state of health of the corporations which they manage.
They are reluctant oftentimes to admit that they do not possess reliable
yardsticks by which to measure the success or failure of their past perform
ances and predictions. In their eagerness to reduce complex problems to dol
lars and cents, they have allowed themselves to be cast into roles as experts
in forecasting on topics about which they should not be expected to have pre
cise knowledge. Since the last meeting of this symposium, we have seen how
difficult it is to assign dollars and cents values to a whole range of intangible
attitudinal problems which have surfaced largely within the past three years
—concern over the quality of our environment, the “right” of the consumer
to have a voice in determining the quality of the goods he purchases, and the
“obligation” which the corporation has to be concerned over the social impli
cations of its investment policies. These invisible attitude changes have carried
a high price tag for American companies in recent years. I am not suggesting
that three years ago, or even today, there were or are any precise tools avail
able for assessing the potential cost of such shifting areas of public concern
which, in turn, influence the way industry manufactures and prices its goods.
For example, how seriously should today’s management take the current agi
tation on some campuses and in some intellectual circles for zero population
growth and zero consumption growth; I don’t know, and I suspect few of our
leaders in the business world do either. Even the more traditional areas
where businessmen have tried to predict the future—new product development
and acceptance in the marketplace or the early identification of management
potential among younger executives—are fraught with sizeable uncertainties
and a spotty history of failures mixed with some success. Projections of future
financial performance by business firms must be made with a full realization
that the business community has only a limited influence on the political,
economic, and social environment in which it will find itself operating in the
years ahead.
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Importance of Communication Processes
In Financial Reporting
In the papers presented at the 1968 symposium, I noted an underlying
assumption which, while highly laudable, deserves a certain amount of scru
tiny and hard questioning. Many of the papers presented at that meeting
were based on the assumption that, given enough time and hard work, the
means will be found for establishing criteria which will indicate when com
panies are being candid and realistic in reporting on their financial operations
and when they are not.
The logical extension of that assumption, of course, is that once the
means of establishing a common language and a set of yardsticks have been
agreed upon, it will be possible to provide more accurate data to the investing
public, the financial press, and the general public.
The Public Relations Society of America has a special committee on fi
nancial liaison which is working with the business community and the Secu
rities and Exchange Commission in pursuit of these same objectives. It has
already made important contributions to informing members of our Society
and the corporations and clients which they serve regarding the legal obliga
tions which govern their corporate financial reporting. Nothing in the remarks
which follow is intended in any way to downgrade the very important work
which PRSA’s Committee on Financial Liaison or the National Investor Rela
tions Institute are doing in the field of improving the quality of financial re
porting by business.
Rather, in these observations I shall be wearing my hat as a student of
the communication processes. I would like to explore some of the sociological,
psychological, and organizational considerations which may get in the way
of realizing total success in producing truly accurate financial reports.
In our highly fragmented world, it is far from simple to gain a consensus
as to what is true and correct even in seemingly simple situations which de
velop on the job or in our own families. People evaluate the same phenom
enon in quite different terms. Currently, the media of communications in
this country (particularly television and the press) are experiencing a form
of the consumerism problem themselves inasmuch as segments of the public
and the government are questioning the degree to which the media are respon
sible and accurate in reporting and editorializing on controversial interna
tional and domestic news events. We know from a great number of sociologi
cal studies that the process of communications begins long before the com
municator speaks, writes, or acts. This is so because the image of the
communicator plays an important, but as yet little investigated, role in deter
mining which publics will listen to him, what they are likely to remember,
and whether or not they will be moved to act as the communicator wishes.
We in the public relations profession make a fetish of this fact, and per
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haps we have done ourselves a disservice in letting this complex process be
oversimplified by the catch phrase “image.” Yet the fundamental truth
remains that the manner in which an organization is perceived—its public
relations—has an overriding role in whether, and in what manner, its words
will be heard and believed.
Typically, financial communicators deal with two kinds of audiences:
peers, as represented by the several professional groups at this symposium,
and “the rest of the world”—the underinformed and somewhat apathetic
public. Each of these audiences has characteristics which make the job of
reaching them easy in some respects and difficult in others.

Problem Identification Within Corporations

To the outside world the four professional societies sponsoring this sym
posium may seem like one homogeneous professional group, with some areas
of specialized interest, of course, but with basically the same perception of
problems and priorities as they relate to improving corporate financial report
ing. Outsiders cannot fully appreciate the extent to which there are honest
differences of opinion among those participating in this discussion—either as
to the precise nature of the problem involved in improving corporate financial
reporting or the remedies which are available. This phenomenon is not
unusual.
Honest differences of opinion as to problem identification are also found
among staff specialists working for large business corporations. To the out
side world a business corporation may look like a monolithic structure. The
outsider may assume that there is general agreement in the ranks of man
agement as to long range corporate objectives and the most profitable means
of achieving them. In point of fact, however, any one of us who has worked
for a large business firm knows how revealing it is to call a meeting of the
heads of various staffs and operating departments and ask each department
head to list the five most serious problems facing his company at the present
time and five possible solutions to these problems. It is rare indeed to find
any general agreement on the problems themselves or the priorities which
management should assign to them. If each department head is asked to
predict which major problems will materialize in the next five years, the areas
of disagreement are likely to be even greater.
It is fairly predictable that some department heads will stress people
problems—the nature of the changing labor market, probable new wage and
fringe benefit demands by unions, or the need for more flexible criteria for
executive development. Others on the management team will talk about
production problems—the cost and availability of raw materials, the likely
impact of competition from existing or from new companies, and possible
changes in the market itself which might increase or decrease demand for a
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product. Still other top management people may very well stress money mat
ters—they would be preoccupied with the cost of money and its availability
today as compared with two or three years from now, the impact of changing
tax laws, the pros and cons of one or another method of depreciating prop
erty, and even the nature of the international monetary market and its impli
cations on the value of the corporate dollar five years from today.
If this picture is fairly typical of a large corporation (and I am persuad
ed that it is), then even within the ranks of top management of a single com
pany in a single industry, one finds deep and significant differences of opinion
with respect to the state of health of the corporation at any given time and
its prospects for growth. Presumably, our private business corporations oper
ate in the belief that top management has the ability to listen to the
frequently conflicting inputs of data from its staff specialists, and by some
elusive and still mysterious process, sort out and evaluate what is sound and
what is extraneous and make correct decisions for the future.

Reporting Financial Performance: Censorship

Given the difficulties which management in a single firm has in securing
a sound reading on the state of its corporate financial health, how can the
financial analysts and the outside experts in financial affairs be expected to
make a realistic diagnosis of a company’s financial well-being? Not having
access to the mass of staff data and studies which go into recent investment
decisions, they must necessarily study past performance records and extrap
olate from them some guess as to the soundness of the latest numbers which
purport to reflect present financial performance. The certified public account
ant is in a slightly different position. He may be privy to the inner counsels
of a company and in time he may come to know something about the idio
syncrasies which characterize the managers making investment decisions. But
even the CPA must basically rely on standard accounting procedures to eval
uate the numbers which are presented to him by management in reporting on
its stewardship. I suggest that the successful CPAs have learned over the
years to add an educated correction factor based on their familiarity with the
top management of a particular company reporting on its financial status.
If these assumptions on my part are in some measure correct, then I
believe that our discussion of the problems in ethical financial reporting goes
beyond whether accounting procedure X or Y is a better tool for evaluating
corporate financial health. I think we are really talking about the need for
the business and financial communities to be more forthright in acknowledg
ing the limitations built into the financial data which they report to their
publics.
Note has already been made of the honest, but often contradictory, opin
ions to be found in any business corporation as to how it can best direct its
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financial resources and energies. Not only do experts within a single company
differ as to “the facts” with respect to corporate financial planning, but an
other very human phenomenon enters the picture to still further muddy the
decision-making picture. Subordinates have an annoying habit of withhold
ing or delaying bad news which they fear might reflect discredit on their job
performance. Lower echelon managers want to look good, and given the
option, they may prefer to accentuate the positive rather than the negative in
the reports they send to top management.
There is a word to describe this very human and understandable trait:
it is called censorship. I do not recall that it was ever mentioned in all of the
discussion which this group had three years ago on improving corporate fi
nancial reporting. As far as I know, there is no systematic method by which
top management can ever know how much bad news is being kept from it
by affiliated companies operating in other geographic areas or even by depart
ments domiciled within headquarters itself.
Bad news, whether it be financial, political, or marketing, is unpleasant,
especially when it translates itself into lower profits and higher costs. It
would be intriguing, indeed, to know when the automotive, petroleum, chemi
cal, paper, and soap and detergent industries’ top management first heard
the “bad news” about a rising tide of public concern over the quality of our
air and water. How well was this reported to them; to what extent did they
correctly foresee the eventual costs to them of this nationwide movement? We
shall probably never know the answers to such questions, but this very lack
of data makes one uneasy that other equally significant clouds on the social
horizon are not now being called to their attention before they become the
occasion of a major dollars-and-cents cost.
The word censorship is so fraught with ominous connotations that it is
understandable it is normally avoided in any discussion of improving corpo
rate financial reporting. But is this a realistic view? I think not.
On the national and international level, governments find they must
impose certain limits on the kind of information they give out. From time to
time they may come under criticism for being too rigid in assigning high secu
rity classifications to information that does not deserve it; witness the recent
confrontation between The New York Times, The Washington Post, and the
United States Government.
Obviously all institutions in our society have a right and obligation to
preserve their existence and ability to grow—whether they be business corpo
rations, churches, political parties, or universities. No reasonable person
would argue that these groups have to reveal all the “bad news” which they
are privy to and which might affect their ability to survive. By the same
token, most of us would recognize that in the name of preserving institutional
integrity, there are great opportunities in the corporate world to cover up
blunders in judgment, bad management of capital, and wasteful uses of plant
facilities and human resources.
A central ethical problem which faces us in our discussion today focuses
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on this issue. What are the criteria which an honest, intelligent, and generally
competent management can employ in knowing when, or whether, to tell the
financial community and the public at large about adverse developments
which probably will affect its earnings and competitive position?

Increasing Creditability of Management
There is, of course, the other side of this coin—when and in what detail
does management have an obligation to reveal good news which it sees devel
oping and which will influence the selling price of its stock? Court battles
have been waged on this tricky subject. In some measure, each piece of cor
porate “good news” is probably unique enough that management can truly
wonder whether previous SEC and court guidelines offer any meaningful
guidance.
With the benign benefit of hindsight, we can wonder today whether
management of some of our largest firms gave the investing public sufficient
early warning when they saw signs of certain investments going sour during
the 1950s. Manufacturers of color television sets appear to have been overly
optimistic in their projections of public demand for their product. So too
were many petroleum companies in the sixties who decided to move into the
petrochemical field, especially into the manufacture of fertilizers. And it took
a long time for the automotive industry to accept the fact that buying patterns
were changing among American consumers and that a market was emerging
for the smaller cars being produced in Europe and Japan. On the other
hand, during the past two years of economic recession, many companies in
the steel, airlines, petroleum, and automotive industries—to cite only a few ex
amples—have made candid and straight-forward announcements about the
problems facing them in trying to improve their profit picture.
The dilemma of when and how to announce good or bad news has
some interesting parallels in the field of social psychology where studies have
been carried out as to the impact on people’s attitudes by presenting only one
side of an issue or telling both sides. While not trying to summarize the
somewhat mixed findings from these experiments, they do seem to suggest it
would be useful to determine whether the financial community and the pub
lic at large react negatively or positively to being given bad news in advance
of the time when either the law or circumstances require that it be revealed.
Are there possibly rewards in terms of increased creditability to be earned by
the business firm which gives out bad news as well as good about itself, in
advance of requirements of its charter or SEC regulations? Perhaps my point
can best be summarized by suggesting that the objective of good financial re
porting ought to be to minimize the surprise factor—whether happy or sad—in
the data which are presented to the public.
To summarize, then, I suggest that censorship of relevant financial and
related data takes place within the ranks of lower management before these
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data are ever forwarded to top management and that, in turn, top manage
ment must make some very difficult decisions about when or whether to re
lease data which might reflect well or adversely on its operations. I am not
for a moment suggesting that these actions are malevolent or consciously de
ceitful, but rather that they are the logical outgrowth of an ethos which places
great store on success and personal achievement.

Evaluation of Intangible Data

Earlier in this paper I referred to the apparent failure of the early-warn
ing network in certain industries in spotting the movements associated with
consumerism, concern over the environment, and the growth interest in the
social implications of corporate investments. It is equally important to under
score a related topic. There is a crying need for management to devise better
methods for evaluating the intangible data which it receives from its public
relations, government relations, and consumer affairs departments—just to
cite three examples—and thereby to ascertain the degree to which these de
partments and their outside consultants are providing the kind of pertinent
data which will allow management to spot problems on the horizon and to
defuse them before they are translated into dollars-and-cents costs to the cor
poration. These periodic audits of the reporting of such staff departments
are every bit as necessary as audits of balance sheets and annual reports by
an outside certified public accounting firm.
One cannot leave a discussion of the general problems of providing bet
ter financial reporting by all business corporations without recognizing that
there is a special kind of headache in trying to evaluate the financial reports
of our very large corporations. Large companies are characterized by a con
tinual movement of personnel into and out of the top ranks of management.
The world outside of these large corporations probably assumes that new
members of the management team are indoctrinated in some formal or infor
mal manner as to the ground rules by which the company makes disclosures
regarding its financial health. There are reasons to question whether such a
passing along of a corporate philosophy does in fact take place. If it does not,
then the possibility exists that subtle changes in evaluating criteria of financial
performance can creep into a company as new managers modify and change
the ground rules under which their predecessors operated.
In addition, in any discussion of how corporate financial reporting may
be improved, it is essential to recognize that corporate reporting is not limited
to the annual reports, quarterly earnings statements, and briefings held for
security analysts. A corporation, like an individual, reveals itself in many
ways and in a variety of contexts which have nothing to do with the formal
financial statements it issues. A facet of corporate financial reporting
which deserves greater attention (because it usually goes unrecognized) is the
usefulness of a formal content analysis of what the corporation is saying about
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itself in publications put out for its employees and shareholders, the content
of its marketing advertisements, and the speeches by its executives before nonfinancial audiences. Such a study may sometimes produce a picture consider
ably at variance with the company’s rather rigid and stuffy financial state
ments.
What does all this add up to—this puzzling business of trying to com
municate more accurate corporate financial information in a world where,
ironically enough, the communications processes which we rely upon are full
of paradoxes? For example, we have hardware today which permits us to
send messages faster and to store more information than we ever dreamed
possible a few years ago. Logically, cine might expect these machines would
insure that management have a clearer current picture of its financial health
and thus be in a better position to report on it. But there is little evidence
to support such an assumption. Data piled on top of still more data do not
necessarily insure better financial reporting.
I do not suggest that corporations should ever stop trying to produce
better balance sheets, better measures of discounted cash flow, and the host
of other technical matters which provide some measure of management’s per
formance. I am suggesting, however, that there is much to be said for pub
licly acknowledging the limitation which the business community faces in
trying to portray its present and future corporate financial health. Those who
have a primary concern with finding better ways of improving the quality of
financial reporting might be pleasantly surprised to discover that their pro
fessional colleagues and the investing public at large would be disarmed by
an admission of these limitations. These publics might be quite prepared to
accept such an admission as a sign of professional maturity. In our own lives,
each of us learns to live with a decent amount of uncertainty and ambiguity.
In fact, psychologists speak about the ability to tolerate ambiguity as one of
the hallmarks of the mature man. In the very commendable efforts by this
symposium to develop criteria for better financial reporting, I suggest that we
all accept the human and bureaucratic limits which will probably always
frustrate our efforts to make perfect our financial reporting.

Conclusion

Business corporations are more than a summation of the numbers on the
bottom line of a financial report. The average management knows this, and
for that reason, seeks to project itself to various audiences as an enlightened
employer, a producer of high quality products, and a concerned citizen of
the communities where it operates. The financial reports which primarily con
cern this symposium are but one part of the mosaic by which a corporation
is judged by its publics. They are an important part of that picture, and I ap
plaud efforts toward improving them. But, at the same time, I am mindful
that shareholders, customers, dealers, and the general public will pass final
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judgment on the corporation in terms of a complex mix of impressions, of
which financial reports will be but one part. If this sounds like a call for
corporations to give more time and attention to their public relations—of which
financial reporting is a vital element—that is exactly what is intended.
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Ethical Problems
Of the Auditor in
Financial Reporting
By Wallace E. Olson, Executive Partner, Alexander Grant & Company;
Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Professional Ethics Division of
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, representing the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants

Since the subject of ethics deals essentially with human relationships in
society, it should not be surprising that it involves some rather complex con
cepts and considerations. The ethical problems of the auditor in financial
reporting are no less complex simply because they involve only one small
area of human endeavor. To the contrary, because of the auditor’s unique
role as an attestor, a review of the ethical conduct required of him demands
an examination of a great number of areas of potential conflict. Each of these
areas is a major subject which would warrant individual papers to cover
them in depth. However, for the sake of brevity, this paper will be restricted
in scope to presenting merely a broad overview of the ethical problems en
countered by auditors in carrying out their responsibilities in expressing their
professional opinions on financial reports.

The Role of the Auditor

Fundamental to an understanding of the ethical responsibilities of the
independent auditor is an awareness of the evolution of his position and role
in society. The auditor’s initial function had its origin in times when business
entities were relatively small, and the owners and management were one and
the same small group of persons. An auditor was sent by the owners to
check on the managers of branches at remote locations. The auditor was an
employee, functioning as an internal auditor, responsible solely to the owners.
As business entities grew in size and public ownership involving large
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numbers of shareholders evolved, the present role of the independent auditor
became a necessity. Management was no longer a small group of owners but
had become an almost self-perpetuating group responsible to a large number
of remote shareholders whose ability to look after their collective interests had
been greatly diminished by the diffusion of ownership. To provide a measure
of protection to the shareholders, it became imperative to employ auditors as
independent contractors to provide assurance that management’s financial
reporting was fair and reliable.
With the advent of governmental regulatory agencies and the growth in
the financial stake of credit grantors in huge impersonal business entities, the
need for independent auditors became even more pronounced. The birth of
the Securities and Exchange Commission was an especially important event
in this evolutionary process.
Today, the wide recognition that the public accounting profession is
vital to the trust and confidence on which the free enterprise system is based
has thrust the auditor into the harsh glare of the spotlight. Even though in
theory he is hired by the shareholders, in practicality he is hired by manage
ment which pays him a fee for his services. He is no longer an employee, but
functions as an independent contractor serving many clients. He is expected
to act as a quasi public servant to provide assurance to all those who may
rely on management’s financial reports that the facts have been fairly reflec
ted and that such reports may be relied upon. His responsibilities extend to an
audience with which he has little, if any, contact except through a written
opinion consisting of two or three short paragraphs. In this type of environ
ment the potential for conflicts of interest and the demands for high ethical
behavior are enormous. It is also understandable that this position of high
public trust has generated a mounting volume of publicity and public con
cern about whether the profession is satisfactorily meeting its responsibilities.

Ethical Responsibilities
Broadly stated, the independent auditor today is expected to meet the
following ethical responsibilities:

1.

He must be independent of his client (including both hired management
and shareholders) and be objective and honest.

2.

He has an obligation to perform audits with competence and due care
and to insist on the application of those accounting and reporting treat
ments which will best achieve the goal of fair reporting.

3.

He has a responsibility to be fair with his client but must recognize that
where there is a conflict his obligations to the public are overriding.

4.

He has a general responsibility to help his profession meet the needs of
the public in the best possible manner.
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While these ethical requirements may not appear too formidable when
stated in such broad terms, they involve a whole host of difficult issues and
problems in their application to everyday practice. The nature and scope of
these considerations are discussed in the succeeding paragraphs.

Independence, Integrity, and Objectivity

Because the concept of independence is basic to the role of the auditor,
it is the subject of a great deal of comment and controversy in the literature
both within and without the profession. Not all of this literature is entirely
clear about what is meant by the word independence in the context of the
auditor’s function.
Independence is intended to mean an absence of relationships with a
client which, if they existed, would, in the eyes of a reasonable man having
knowledge of the facts, be likely to impair the auditor’s ability to attest to
the client’s financial statements with integrity and objectivity. When viewed
in this manner, it becomes clear that independence is not an all-or-nothing
matter, as is often asserted either directly or by implication, but is a matter
of degree of involvement with a client. It is obviously impossible to serve any
client in the capacity of an independent auditor without at least coming in
contact with the client’s management and employees and, in many cases,
some of its shareholders.
Within this context it seems obvious that any relationship poses a poten
tial impairment of integrity and objectivity. However, there are many coun
tervailing pressures which, under normal circumstances, can be relied upon
with a high degree of confidence to insure that an auditor will retain his in
tegrity and objectivity. Examples of these strong pressures are the possible
loss of reputation, the threat of censure or suspension by a regulatory body,
the loss of license to practice, and not by any means least, the threat of litiga
tion. In addition, most professional persons have, ingrained as part of their
training and experience, an inherent honesty.
In weighing whether the pressures of too close association and identifica
tion with a client have tipped the scales too far, a reasonable man must evalu
ate the degree of the threats to integrity and objectivity in relation to the
countervailing pressures. This is obviously a difficult task, and where the pub
lic interest is at stake any extensive doubts must necessarily be resolved
against the presumption of adequate independence.

Possible Impairments of Independence
What are some of the relationships which might raise significant doubts
in the mind of a reasonable man? Perhaps the most obvious is that of having
a financial interest in a client’s business or being otherwise involved in a joint
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closely held business venture with a client. This type of involvement has
been regarded for many years by the profession’s code of ethics as being im
proper when expressing an opinion on the client’s financial statements, and
there is every indication that there is almost universal compliance with the
rule.
A second type of conflict stems from a relationship which is equivalent
to that of being an officer, director, or employee of a client or similar types
of involvement, such as acting as a promoter or trustee. These have also been
regarded for many years as being fatal to the auditor’s independence, and it
is a well-settled issue. However, there continue to be questions raised about
the propriety of an auditor preparing financial records for a client on whose
financial statements he also expresses an opinion. While this practice can be
logically defended if kept within certain restraints, the entire matter is not of
sufficient importance to cover in detail for purposes of this symposium.
A third type of conflict would exist if the auditor had a fee arrangement
which was contingent upon the results attained. This also has been prohibited
for many years in relation to the attest function as well as other types of ser
vices except those involving tax matters. Although members of the profession
may differ in their views regarding contingent fees in connection with other
services, there seems to be no question that such fee arrangements should be
prohibited in connection with the expression of opinions on financial state
ments.
Another frequently expressed concern is whether the auditor can be in
dependent of the management which engages his services. For this reason
great care is taken to have the shareholders elect the auditors; special audit
committees composed of outside members of the board of directors are being
increasingly appointed to maintain separate liaison with the auditors. Even
with these precautions, however, management usually has, in practice, a sub
stantial influence on the selection of auditors. The only apparent alternative
to the present methods of appointing auditors would be some form of govern
mental intervention. Many knowledgeable persons both within and without
the profession are strongly opposed to this alternative on the grounds that it
would lead to a complete takeover of the auditing function by government.
It is asserted that bureaucratic inefficiency would be the inevitable result and
that the public interest would ultimately be less well served than under the
present system. If there are indeed no practicable alternatives, comfort may
still be drawn from the fact that the countervailing pressures previously cited
play an important role in maintaining the independence of auditors.
Closely related to the problem of engagement of auditors by manage
ment is the fact that auditors are paid for their services by the same entity
which they are engaged to audit. It is often asserted that this arrangement
poses a serious conflict with the reliability of auditors. However, a fee is a
normal form of reimbursement of any independent contractor, and any con
flict is greatly reduced by the fact that the auditor serves and is paid by
many clients. There is a substantial safeguard in the fact that the auditor is
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an outsider and is not a salaried employee. Nevertheless, it would seem likely
that the threat to an auditor’s integrity or objectivity increases with the size
of a fee from a single client. This is particularly true where a fee becomes a
relatively large proportion of an auditor’s total practice. Even so, the auditor
continues to feel the strong weight of offsetting pressures; there is little evi
dence that the present fee arrangement does, in fact, cause him to subordinate
his judgment to that of the client.
Various reimbursement alternatives have been occasionally suggested.
Some advocate employment of auditors by the government with some form of
assessment system. A few have posed the possibility of payment of fees out
of a trust fund supported by assessments of entities being audited. All of
such alternatives have serious disadvantages, and on a comparative basis the
present private competitive system would appear to offer a greater potential
for achieving the best audits at the least cost.
The most recent and frequently raised question about an auditor’s inde
pendence pertains to the effect on his integrity and objectivity of performing
management consulting services for his audit clients or acting as an advocate
in areas such as taxation. This question is usually directed primarily at those
situations where the type of service is not directly related to the client’s ac
counting system. Examples of the many types of services which seem to
cause greatest concern are executive recruiting activities and assistance to
clients in searches for business acquisitions.
Those who feel that such services impair an auditor’s independence as
sert that it leads to an involvement in the client’s affairs to such an extent
that the auditor has a vested interest in defending the client’s business deci
sion. If business decisions based upon his advice proved to be disadvantag
eous, it is feared that the auditor would be likely to cover up the poor results
in his report on the client’s financial statements, thus losing his integrity and
objectivity.
Despite the existence of this danger there is little evidence that in prac
tice it prevails over the offsetting pressures previously cited. Perhaps this re
sults from the fact that in the last analysis the client rarely, if ever, allows
others to make his decisions for him. Also the auditor’s opinions on financial
statements do not relate to the quality of management but rather to the fair
ness of presentation of financial position and operating results. It is difficult
to demonstrate how the auditor can cover up bad business decisions simply
through application of accounting or reporting techniques. To achieve this
by altering the underlying transactions and accounting records would require
outright fraud as well as collusion by the client. The penalties for fraud are
so extreme as to render any such action highly unlikely.
The auditor renders advice and has an influence on his client’s decisions
in all areas of service including auditing and taxation. Accordingly, the dan
ger that he will gloss over the results of poor advice also stems from his in
fluence on financial reporting and tax matters, as well as from consulting on
management problems. It is difficult to distinguish between these various
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types of services as to which constitutes a greater or intolerable threat to inde
pendence. To say that any or all of them impair an auditor’s independence
is to deprive the public of the availability of valuable and expert services. If
the auditor is truly acting in the capacity of an outside contractor, the poten
tial conflict of interest which flows from providing advice on accounting, tax,
or other business matters does not seem sufficient to warrant confining him
solely to the expression of opinions on financial statements.
To summarize, auditors cannot, in their daily activities, avoid the normal
relationships with clients or the pressures which arise from such relationships.
These would exist even if the auditors were governmental employees rather
than private practitioners. Countervailing pressures are of such strength that
in most cases they provide ample guarantee that auditors will remain objec
tive and resist any temptation to act dishonestly. Auditors must, however,
avoid undue identification with management or involvement in their client’s
affairs to an extent that would impair the credibility of their independence in
the minds of reasonable men.

Competence and Technical Standards
In addition to being independent, honest, and objective, an auditor has
an equally important responsibility to be competent, to exercise due care in
his work, and to adhere to those technical standards which will result in fi
nancial statements that are not misleading. The reliance of users of finan
cial statements on the auditor’s work places a heavy burden on him to do
everything that a reasonable man would do to assure himself that financial
statements are reliable. Even though this does not mean that the auditor must
be infallible, it is nevertheless a very difficult order to fill within the context
of today’s complex business transactions.
Gaining and maintaining competence involves continuing study, re
search, and consultation with others throughout the auditor’s professional
career. Not only must he be knowledgeable about all of the auditing proce
dures and techniques which may be applied, but he must also be familiar
with the accounting and reporting standards which are appropriate. He must
have an understanding of the peculiarities of the client’s business and form
judgments as to what a user of financial statements needs to know. It is of
utmost importance that the auditor maintain a questioning, “show me” atti
tude, and that he base his opinion on the exercise of common sense rather
than solely on the application of mechanical procedures.
Perhaps the greatest danger, that auditors will fail to exercise compe
tence and due care, arises from the natural inclination to regard continuing
study as unnecessary and the temptation to cut corners because of the fee
resistance of clients. Also involved are the problems of recruiting, training,
and retaining an adequate professional staff. Although all of these are con
tinuing problems for the auditing profession, they have not resulted in any
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serious public concern about the profession’s competence.
The focal point of most public dissatisfaction with the performance of
auditors centers on two main areas. The first of these is the failure of gener
ally accepted auditing procedures to uncover major deficiencies in the client’s
accounting. A considerable number of liability suits are based on the asser
tion that the auditor should have discovered a material overstatement of
earnings. This raises a whole series of questions which are not easily
answered:
1.

Did the auditor fail to exercise due care?

2.

Are generally accepted auditing procedures adequate?

3.

Is the public demanding a higher degree of assurance than it is economic
ally feasible to provide?

4.

Did the auditor simply rely too heavily on mechanical tests and fail to
apply common sense?

5.

Are the liability suits more a result of avaricious plaintiffs than of public
dissatisfaction with auditors?

It may be that all of these elements are involved in the suits. In any
event it is apparent that the auditing profession needs to give far more atten
tion to the problem of how to achieve more effective audits within the eco
nomic limitations with which it is faced. A thoughtful review of the effective
ness of present auditing procedures is imperative if audits are to continue to
be regarded as a satisfactory means of gaining assurance about the reliability
of financial statements.

Accounting and Reporting Principles

The second area of public criticism of the profession relates to the de
ficiencies in accounting and reporting principles. The existence of alternative
principles and their abuse by both management and auditors has given rise
to a flood of critical articles and speeches pointing out that widely varying
results are obtained depending upon which principle is applied. The demand
for the elimination of alternatives and the establishment of principles in prob
lem areas not yet covered by pronouncements has reached such a crescendo
that the profession has appointed two study groups to determine what might
be done to meet these demands.
The first of these study groups has been charged with the responsibility
of determining the objectives of financial statements. While it is obvious that
the broad objective of financial statements is to communicate financial and
operating data which will meet the needs of the user and will not be mislead
ing, it is not a simple task to determine how this can be best achieved.
At the present time the same form of financial statements is used for
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communicating with all segments of the public. Report letters, footnotes,
supplemental schedules and captions, and details on the face of the financial
statements are all employed to achieve fair and adequate disclosure. How
ever, the degree of sophistication and the needs of users vary so widely that
it seems inevitable that multiple types of financial statements must be de
signed to meet the specific needs of each user group.
In approaching this problem consideration will have to be given to the
fact that too much information may have the effect of confusing rather than
clarifying. Emphasis must also be placed on the quality of the information
being communicated and what a reader needs to know to make an informed
judgment, since reporting of different types of information may be critical
to evaluation of a company. Examples of such information might be forecasts
and projections, evaluation of control systems, and data regarding research
and development programs, labor relations, marketing programs, and ade
quacy of plant and facilities.
Reporting on these matters will raise questions as to whether the audi
tor’s attest function should be broadened to cover the reliability of such infor
mation. Judging from the present problems which the auditor encounters in
the conventional financial statement area, it may be a long time before this
can be achieved. Nevertheless, it would seem logical for the auditor to as
sume the responsibility for attesting to the fairness of the reporting of any
factual data regardless of its nature, so long as it lends itself to independent
and objective verification.
A second study group has been charged with a review of how and by
whom accounting and reporting principles should be established. While the
mechanics of establishing principles is not critical to the auditor’s function,
the nature of the principles and the manner in which he applies them are of
great significance. For purposes of discussion of this aspect of the auditor’s
responsibilities it might be more accurate to refer to such principles as finan
cial accounting and reporting standards.
The present short-form report of the auditor contains the wording,
“fairly presents ... in accordance with generally accepted accounting prin
ciples.” Thus the report does not indicate whether in the opinion of the audi
tor the best accounting standard was applied in those areas where there are
acceptable alternative standards. It is largely because there are alternative
standards available and because the auditor does not always take a stand on
what is the right standard under the circumstances that the profession is under
heavy attack.
The auditor must accept the responsibility of seeing that the proper
standards are applied. Where there are alternative choices, the proper stand
ards are those which, in the auditor’s judgment, will result in fair reporting.
Even if there were no alternatives among the profession’s approved standards,
the auditor should ask the question whether application of the standards will
result in fair reporting. No matter how extensive and how refined the account
ing and reporting standards of the profession may become, they will never
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be wholly appropriate under all circumstances. However, if the auditor finds
it necessary to depart from such standards he should be required to clearly
demonstrate that due to unusual circumstances their application would result
in misleading financial statements.
The auditor has an obligation to express his professional opinion that
the client’s financial statements are fairly presented and are not misleading.
This implies that the accounting and reporting are proper even though they
may not conform to the profession’s standards. However, departures from
such standards and the effects thereof should be disclosed so the reader can
judge for himself whether such departure is justified by unusual circum
stances.
In summary, the auditor is beset by many problems in the area of tech
nical standards. Practical economic limitations prevent him from auditing in
sufficient detail to discover every defalcation or impropriety. In addition, the
accounting and reporting standards have not been sufficiently developed to
provide him with guidance in dealing with new and complex forms of trans
actions which are subject to abuse. At the same time, he has become the
prime target for liability suits by all who have suffered losses either as a re
sult of their own poor judgment or by the misdeeds of management. In the
face of these difficulties, the profession is striving to find ways to meet those
criticisms which are legitimate and to better meet the needs of the public. It
is a formidable challenge.

Responsibilities to Clients
Private business entities have a fundamental right to retain the privacy
of their affairs within the ranks of their owners and managers. For this rea
son the independent auditor has an obligation to treat his knowledge of his
client’s affairs as confidential. However, where this conflicts with his obliga
tions to the public, he is faced with either persuading his client to permit full
disclosure or resigning from the engagement. Under no circumstances should
the auditor allow confidentiality to take precedence over his responsibility to
see that the client’s financial statements are fair and not misleading.
The auditor also encounters conflicts with confidentiality in connection
with litigation and in response to inquiries by duly constituted disciplinary
bodies either of the profession or under state statutes. The overriding public
interest involved in such cases requires that he comply with any validly issued
subpoena or reply to any inquiry of a disciplinary body. The client’s right
to confidentiality must not be allowed to thwart either legal justice or the
disciplinary machinery which supports the integrity of the auditing profession.
In spite of these overriding obligations to the public, the auditor must
exercise caution to avoid disclosing more confidential information than is
necessary to meet his responsibilities. In all cases he should inform his client
before making any required disclosures.
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In addition to confidentiality, the auditor must be candid with his client
and be concerned with the client’s best interests. He must never hide his true
opinion for the sake of pleasing his client. Neither should he exploit his rela
tions with his client for his own personal advantage. For example, he should
not accept a commission or fee simply for the referral of goods or services of
others to a client.
In general, auditors have an obligation to be completely fair both with
their clients and in meeting their responsibilities to the public. Where conflicts
exist, the public interest must take precedence. Meeting this dual responsibil
ity to clients and the public requires a high degree of ethical conduct on the
part of the auditor

General Responsibility to Meet Public Needs
The needs of the public for confidence in the reliability of financial re
porting require that there be a strong public accounting profession. To create
strength within any profession it is necessary to maintain harmony among its
members. Accordingly, the accounting profession has adopted a number of
behavioral rules which are designed to avoid the types of internal strife which
would tend to destroy its ability to serve the public.
Principal among these are rules prohibiting encroachment by one auditor
upon the practice of another and soliciting or advertising for professional en
gagements. While auditors may respond to any requests for services, it is often
extremely difficult to distinguish between a solicitation and a legitimate
request.
Closely related to these rules are the problems which stem from compe
titive bidding for engagements and from clients shopping among auditors to
find one who agrees with his views as to the proper accounting or reporting
standard to apply. All of these practices enhance the danger that the auditor
who succumbs to them will be tempted to cut corners or will be beholden to
the client at the expense of meeting his responsibilities to the public.
Because these self-imposed rules of conduct contain the conflicting ele
ments of restraint of competition and protection of the public they are very
difficult to interpret and apply without tipping the scales too far in the direc
tion of self-interest. Nevertheless, the profession must continue to police its
members in these areas to avoid losing its independence and to avoid being
torn by dissension. To permit this to happen would be to render its services
useless to the public.
Members of the public accounting profession also have a responsibility
to contribute their time and knowledge to advancing the state of the art of
accounting and auditing. This requires being more than an outspoken critic
of the failings of the profession. It involves a duty to make constructive sug
gestions for improvement so that the public can be assured that it is being
served in the best possible manner.
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If the auditor does not concern himself with the support of his profession
and its knowledge he will not be helping it to meet the needs of the public.
If his primary motivation is that of profit rather than service, the fundamental
reason for his role will have been impaired.

Disciplinary Problems
Education and voluntary compliance with the ethical standards of the
accounting profession are generally far more desirable than enforcement.
However, disciplinary proceedings will always be necessary to police those
who fail to meet the profession’s ethical requirements and to provide impetus
for voluntary observance of the rules. A comprehensive code of ethics and
effective machinery to vigorously enforce it is the public’s assurance that the
profession will in fact be self-regulating and will maintain its reliability.
Unfortunately, under present circumstances, there are numerous defects
in the enforcement machinery. The problems begin with the multiplicity of
jurisdictions which results in confusion as to which will take the lead in dis
ciplinary action. At the present time the CPA is subject to discipline by state
boards of accountancy, state societies, the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants, and in some instances, by governmental agencies. The
statistics indicate that the number of cases handled by each of the disciplinary
bodies of these organizations is very low in relation to the total number of
practicing CPAs. In addition, a majority of cases deal with violations of be
havioral rules and very few involve failure to comply with the technical
standards of the profession.
It is probably safe to conclude that with few exceptions, the state boards
of accountancy and state societies are ill-equipped to carry out disciplinary
action and are largely ineffective, particularly in the area of technical stand
ards. This leaves the job primarily in the hands of the AICPA, which also
has significant problems with enforcement.
In the enforcement of technical standards, which is of primary impor
tance to the public, three main problems are encountered by the AICPA’s
division of professional ethics and Trial Board. The first consists of the nat
ural reluctance of both practitioners and persons outside the profession to file
a complaint when a violation is encountered. Even the Institute’s practice
review committee, which is specifically barred from instigating any discipli
nary action, has a dearth of questionable financial reports referred for its re
view. While one might conclude from this that there are relatively few
failures to observe technical standards, this seems highly unlikely.
A large majority of the cases involving possible violations of technical
standards comes to the attention of the Institute’s ethics division as a result of
newspaper publicity regarding lawsuits against CPAs. These tend to involve
publicly held companies where the plaintiff typically claims damages of large
amounts. Because such cases are newsworthy they catch the attention of the
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public and shake confidence in the reliability of the profession to the Very
core.
In coping with these cases the ethics division encounters a second major
problem of enforcement. Where litigation is pending against the auditor, he
is understandably reluctant to disclose any information to the ethics division
since it is not privileged, and the information might well be subpoenaed and
used to his detriment. Because the ethics division does not have subpoena
powers, it has little choice but to defer its investigation until the litigation has
run its initial course. To discipline a member for failing to disclose all the
necessary information prior to the completion of litigation would not seem
to be a satisfactory alternative. In most instances the litigation extends over
a long period of time, and by the time disciplinary action can be taken the
public has long since concluded that the profession is not interested in polic
ing its members.
A third hurdle is encountered when the ethics division is finally able to
proceed. Since it presently has a staff of only three full-time employees, ex
clusive of clerical and secretarial help, it must rely very heavily on members
to voluntarily devote part-time to investigation, prosecution, and sitting on
trial boards. Although members involved in the disciplinary process are gen
erally well versed in the technical pronouncements of the profession, they are
normally inexperienced in investigation and prosecution procedures and have
a tendency to let sympathy for a fellow colleague take precedence over public
interest.
Self-discipline by any profession is extremely difficult and is not entirely
satisfactory in most cases. This is also true of the public accounting profession
at the present time. However, strenuous efforts are currently being made to
improve the Institute’s disciplinary machinery to meet the increasing demands
for better regulation of its members. A first step in this direction is a complete
restatement of the Code of Ethics which more clearly specifies those technical
standards which will be enforced. It is anticipated that the new code will be
voted on by the members late in 1972.
In addition to a restated code, great emphasis is being placed on making
continuing education a requirement for maintaining a license to practice. Al
so, new ways of achieving effective surveillance and enforcement are being
studied both by the state and the Institute. These steps indicate that the pro
fession is mindful of its responsibilities and is taking action to see that it con
tinues to merit public confidence.

Summary

The role of the independent auditor today imposes a heavy burden of
ethical responsibility. First and foremost he must be independent of his clients
and be honest and objective in his work, both in fact and in appearance, in
the eyes of reasonable men. At the same time he must be fair with his clients
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and be concerned about their best interests. Meeting this dual responsibility
to both clients and the public requires both strong character and an acute
awareness of ethical concepts. Where there is a conflict between the two inter
ests the needs of the public must come first, and in such circumstances, the
auditor must be prepared to resign from an engagement rather than subordi
nate his position to that of the client. While there are many pressures which
might cause the impairment of an auditor’s integrity and objectivity, there are
also very strong countervailing pressures which in most instances are sufficient
in strength to eliminate the need for concern.
In addition to the need to be independent, the auditor is confronted with
the need to be aware of and understand the technical standards of his profes
sion. These are nonexistent in some areas, ill-defined in others, and in some
instances are so complex as to defy application without extensive study. Be
sides being faced with these uncertainties, he must carry out his work in an
environment that bristles with exposure to lawsuits which are frequently
based more on the fact that he is covered by indemnity insurance than on any
malpractice on his part.
With increasing frequency the courts are making it clear that auditors
cannot escape the responsibility of seeing that financial reporting is fair and
not misleading. This imposes the need for the auditor to make judgments
about whether the profession’s accounting and reporting standards are appro
priate in all cases, or whether unusual circumstances and the test of fair re
porting require a departure from such standards. In short, he is expected to
exercise good judgment, and if he fails to do so, he is faced with an over
whelming exposure to financial liability.
Less visible but also important are the auditor’s responsibilities to sup
port his profession by observing the rules of behavior and applying the golden
rule in his relations with his fellow practitioners. He is also expected to make
his contribution to the knowledge of accounting and auditing through active
participation in the profession’s organizations.
In view of the foregoing ethical responsibilities and the many problems
encountered in meeting them, it would be reasonable to assume that the per
formance of the profession is less than perfect. Although the number of dis
ciplinary actions are relatively small, this fact is more likely the result of the
difficulties inherent in self-regulation than an indication of perfection.
Despite any shortcomings of the profession in its present form, the alter
native means of meeting the public need for the attest function appear to have
even greater flaws. Under these "circumstances the goal should be to continue,
through education and discipline, to tighten up the ethical restraints of the
auditing profession and to eliminate those practices which run counter to the
objectives of fair financial reporting.
There is reason to be optimistic about the future since the American
Institute and others are continuously studying the problem areas and seeking
better solutions. Examples of these efforts are the two special study groups
on financial statement objectives and accounting principles, a proposed re
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statement of the Code of Ethics, and reviews by ad hoc committees as well as
the ethics division of how the disciplinary machinery can be made more
effective.
When viewed in the light of its unique role and the many conflicting
pressures in today’s environment, the public accounting profession has dis
played a surprisingly high level of ethical conduct. Auditors have reason to
be proud of their past record, but they must continue to improve their tech
nical and ethical standards if they are to successfully meet the ever increasing
demands of the public for higher standards of performance. There are many
reasons to believe that auditors will be equal to the challenge.
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Ethical Issues for the
Financial Analyst
By C. Reed Parker, Duff, Anderson & Clark, Inc.; past President, Financial
Analysts Federation, representing the Financial Analysts Federation

The first portion of this paper presents a brief review of the function of
the financial analyst. Although probably all of those attending the sympo
sium are familiar with what analysts do, it seems important in this back
ground discussion to recall these fundamentals so that they can be kept in
mind as specific ethical issues are outlined. The following analysis of ethical
issues is dealt with under four broad topical headings: (1) inside information;
(2) communication with clients, customers, and employers; (3) buying and
selling of securities; and (4) communications with corporations. The final sec
tion of the paper comments on the enforcement and educational aspects of
promoting adherence to ethical standards.

What Constitutes Professional Financial
Analytical Performance?

Perspective—What is the function of the financial analyst? At root, the
financial analyst is involved in the economic process of apportioning capital.
In politically democratic and economically free-market oriented societies, a
very large role in the capital apportionment process rests with individuals
and nongovernmental institutions. The theory, in simplistic form, is that the
enlightened self-interest of individuals and institutions operating within a sys
tem of a relatively free flow of information and open markets will achieve
optimum efficiency in directing the society’s capital resources to their most
satisfying use.
Financial analysts operate at a number of levels in the capital appor
tionment process. Perhaps the most familiar is the securities analyst. Prior
to World War II the person performing this function was called a “statisti
cian,” but perhaps a more universally recognizable title would be invest
ment research analyst. Research analysts are the men and women engaged
in collecting data, and reasoning to specific conclusions about relative invest
ment values. In local societies of the Financial Analysts Federation, those
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engaged in the research function are the largest single group of members but
account for little, if any, more than half of the total.
A nearly equal-sized group of FAF members1 are portfolio managers.
These are the people making the final capital commitment. Some have a
relatively small degree of authority in security selection such as is often the
case for managers of individual portfolios in trust companies. Others include
the key policy makers and deciders as to securities for trust companies, in
surance companies, mutual funds, investment advisers, self-administered pen
sion, charitable or endowment funds, and the like. The professional portfolio
manager or final investment-decision-maker type of financial analyst is also
found in the brokerage-dealer firms in investment advisory departments and
in the underwriting decision-making area.
In summary, the financial analyst works at many levels of the capital
apportionment process either as a principal or as an adviser to or agent for
principals—with the principals being both individuals and institutions.

Methodology of investment research and portfolio management. In es
sence, investment research—like any kind of research—involves three basic
processes: (1) collecting information; (2) selecting the most relevant informa
tion and reasoning to a conclusion; and (3) communicating the conclusion
to the decision-maker.
For the portfolio manager, the basic processes are two: (1) determining
the purpose of and the appropriate performance and risk-tolerance goals for
the funds being invested; and (2) selecting securities which best fit these per
formance and risk-tolerance goals.
Setting Professional Standards of Behavior
For the Analyst
In the first place, the mastery of specific facts and techniques is relative
ly less important for the financial analyst than it is for many professions. The
analyst’s basic frame of reference in securities analysis principles is of course
a sine qua non, but it carries him less of the distance to appropriate final de
cisions than is the case for the physician, the engineer, the actuary, or the
accountant.
Secondly, the analyst’s relevant information base rests in an unusually
large number of disciplines beyond financial analysis itself. Economics is
key among these disciplines. Because capital apportionment is a primary
macroeconomic function and because so much of the relevant data on issuers*

1

For this purpose, supervisors, often including chief financial or investment officials and
even chief executives (of such investment institutions as mutual fund management com
panies, investment counsellors, independent investment research firms, financial publishers
and the like) are counted as investment researchers or managers. The remaining small pro
portion of FAF members include such persons as teachers of financial analytical subjects,
individual investors, and government personnel engaged in financial analytical work.
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of individual securities is best organized within the discipline of economics,
the professional analyst must be more than an amateur economist. Account
ing is also crucial. The translation of the economic facts of individual corpo
rate transactions into the language of monetary numbers provides another
all-important tool for the analyst. The price paid for investment securities is
denominated in money. Further, the final rewards of investment—interest or
dividends and capital appreciation (or depreciation)—are also denominated in
money. Accordingly, the financial statements of security-issuing corporations
(and the principles underlying their construction) prepared for the own
ers (and their advisers) of these securities must be understood by the analyst.
Given the important role of government in business and the internation
al nature of many securities issuers, the analyst must also have a profes
sional interest in the discipline of political science on both an international
and domestic scale. The list continues: because much relevant data is sub
jective and much comes via oral communication, human psychology is an
important discipline to the analyst. And so is scientific technology and so is
sociology. Indeed, because the end result of the analyst’s work is essentially
predictive and because private capital is employed pervasively in industrial
ized society, the analyst as researcher and portfolio manager approaches the
government leader, the philosopher, and the theologian as the ultimate
generalist.
Thus, the role of academic standards and formal professional credentials
cannot be dominant, since the primary quality of excellence for the financial
analyst is his reasoning ability and judgment. However, the professional
credential is important in the field of financial analysis as it is in any en
deavor with professional attributes (a definable body of knowledge, a high
degree of public interest or fiduciary responsibility, and agreed-to standards
of conduct).
The Institute of Chartered Financial Analysts was created by the FAF
at the turn of the past decade. Since the first CFA designation was awarded
in 1963, its importance and impact have increased enormously. The exami
nation and experience requirements are generally regarded (both inside and
outside the profession) as at least challenging and at most severe. Only one of
the three examinations can be taken in any year, and the subject matter cov
ered includes economics and accounting, as well as financial analysis and
ethics. The experience requirement is five years. The grandfather clause pro
vided award of no charters without passing at least the last one or two of the
examinations. As the average of those taking the examinations has become
younger and less experienced, “flunk ratios” have risen (25 to 40 per cent in
recent years). Yet the current status (September 1971) of this nine-year-old
program is: (1) number of charters granted totaling around 3,000 (of some
13,000 FAF members) and (2) numbers sitting for the examinations at an
all-time high.
As suggested earlier, although the role of the CFA program is important
and growing in importance, formal testing is a relatively weak tool for meas
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uring the analyst’s key qualities of excellence—reasoning ability and judg
ment. Further, although the grandiloquent description of the place of
financial analysis in the capital apportionment process is accurate (and under
standing of it a prerequisite for optimum motivation of and performance by
the analyst), it serves only as a broad framework within which the specific
day-to-day problems of professionally ethical conduct can be examined.

Ethical Problems Faced by the Financial Analyst
Inside information. The sometimes confusing overlap of law and ethics
is well illustrated in the doctrine of “inside information.” In the earliest days
of merchant law, “caveat emptor” was the key measure of legal responsi
bility, and nearly the entire area of fairness as regards relevant knowledge
of buyer and seller was solely in the field of ethics. Today, securities law is
embodying another significant area of ethical principle via the inside informa
tion doctrine.
The inside information doctrine also illuminates a principle common to
the law and to ethics—boundary marking to resolve conflicts of interest. The
conflict involved here is the profit motive of the investor and the fiduciary
duty of portfolio managers to customers, clients, and employers on the one
hand and, on the other, the public interest in fair and open securities markets.
Further, via inside information, financial analysts are learning more
about our common law judicial system since the inside information doctrine
is taking shape entirely in the judicial sector rather than in the more familiar
legislative arena. First, the common law system unfolds new legal rules piece
by piece, as judicial decisions are typically related to the facts of the case at
hand and do not promulgate standards for deciding issues not directly raised
in that case. Second, the inside information doctrine involves an apparent
conflict of laws. Fiduciary investment law in the U.S. (largely interpreted by
state courts) says the fiduciary investor ought to use every legal means to
serve (obtain good investment performance for) his beneficiary or principal.
The inside information doctrine, initiated in the U.S. by the Securities and
Exchange Commission and interpreted largely by the SEC and in federal
courts, seeks to establish the legal boundary of fiduciary responsibility some
distance from where many have long believed it to lie.
At present, it would appear that these are the elements of a violation of
the doctrine of inside information:
1.

The information is of “bombshell” variety; that is, it is such that its dis
semination in the investment community would all but assuredly result
in a sizable and sudden change in the price of securities to which
it relates.

2.

The information has not yet been widely disseminated in the investment
community.
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3.

The information is used in buying or selling securities.

Beyond these basic elements come questions of how the information is re
ceived (i.e., the relationship of the “tipper” and “tippee”) and who is liable,
and to what extent, when a breach occurs.
Since the Circuit Court of Appeals decision in the Texas Gulf Sulphur
case in the summer of 1968, the FAF has published a growing body of liter
ature on the analyst and inside information.2 However, one senses that some
(and perhaps many) analysts have yet to grasp the elements of the inside in
formation doctrine and its implications for their work. In the meantime, mem
bers of FAF societies are parties in a number of inside information actions
before the SEC and in the courts.

Conflicts of interest. The inside information doctrine has also focused at
tention on a number of conflict of interest problems within the financial com
munity. These involve institutions performing more than one function, with
one part of the business accustomed to receiving and using inside information
and another being an investor or adviser to investors. The best known exam
ples are: (1) banks—commercial lending versus trust investing; and (2)
broker-dealers—underwriting versus brokerage and investment advisory.
Some cry at once for the divorce (by legislation if necessary) of such po
tentially conflicting functions. Most are seeking improved salutary procedures
for preventing the flow of inside information from areas where its use is legit
imate to those where its use would violate the inside information doctrine.
It is hoped these potential conflicts can be solved on the basis of increased
sensitivity and of reason, without drastic surgery. However, the gravity of
the problems can hardly be overemphasized. For example, once inside infor
mation is “inside the house,” not only does the problem of its proper contain
ment exist but also, should a violation be alleged, the practical problem of
proof of the facts arises. For example, if one and the same person legitimately
has inside information and is also an investment decision-maker as to secu
rities of the related issuer, how is it to be proved that the inside information
did not affect the investment decision even if, in fact, it did not? Or, once
inside information reaches very senior officials of a firm, how can it be proved
that investment decisions were not affected even if these officials do not di
rectly make the investment decisions?
In any case, the writer (and to his knowledge, most analysts) has no
fear whatsoever that the inside information doctrine threatens the utility or
the worth of the financial analyst. Basically, the public interest in fair mar
kets is shared by the analyst for, in a democratic society, if the public should
2

In the writer’s opinion these articles are the most important:
The so-called “Loomis Panel” on Corporate Disclosure and Insider Information transcribed
at the FAF Fall Conference in Atlanta in October 1968; Alan R. Bromberg, “The Law of
Corporate Information,” Financial Analysts Journal, March-April 1969, pp. 26-31; “Trouble
at Quigley,” Financial Analysts Journal, July-August 1969, pp. 171-181. John Gillis, “The
Tippee in Transition,” Financial Analysts Journal, January-February 1971, pp. 6-14.
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become convinced that securities markets are palpably unfair, those markets
(and analysts’ jobs) would very likely be legislated out of existence. Further,
it takes no professional expertise to reason from inside information to an ap
propriate investment recommendation and decision. Given the “bombshell”
definition of inside information (and clearly the alleged inside information in
every case to date is of this variety), even the proverbial Aunt Minnie should
know instinctively what to do with it once received. Thus, the analyst’s stockin-trade—his specialized knowledge, reasoning ability, and judgment—logi
cally allies him with the public as a foe of unregulated use of inside informa
tion. Viewed another way, the analyst has no need for inside information.
The inside information doctrine purports to in no way fetter the analyst’s rea
soning and judgment processes; and, his very reason for being is to use his
abilities to anticipate and to set odds on the happenings which in the future
might, for a time, become inside information.

Communication With Clients, Customers, and Employers
The ethical caveat for the research analyst regarding communications
with his “boss”—the portfolio manager or the investor who hires him—derives
mainly from the aphorism “a day’s work for a day’s pay.” Refinements of
communication include: adequate homework, proper labeling of sources, and
adequate disclosure of assumptions. The recipient of an analyst’s recom
mendation is entitled to know the general scope of his work. The recipient
also is entitled to know how much of the work is the analyst’s own and to
what extent he has relied on the work of others (and who the others are).
Perhaps most important of all, the recipient of a research analyst’s recom
mendation is entitled to know the key assumptions upon which the recom
mendation rests. For example, what economic assumptions has the analyst
used? Also, what qualitative assumptions has he made: where and to what
extent does he disagree with management expectations and why; in predict
ing earnings some years into the future, what assumptions has he made as
to financing and as to the number of shares expected then to be outstanding?
Further, what are the risks involved in individual assumptions and in the final
conclusion?
The section of the FAF Standards of Professional Conduct applicable to
this topic states: “The financial analyst shall be objective in his opinions in
advising his customers, clients, and employer, and when making a recom
mendation, must have a basis which can be substantiated as reasonable. He
must be accurate and complete when reporting facts.”
For the research analyst reporting to an in-house investment committee
or portfolio manager, much of this is understood, and the analyst’s obligation
is simply to live up to house norms. This may also be true of research work
going to the public in standard form. Temptations come, however, and they
are hard to resist. An unexpected question may be asked about a company
which the analyst feels he is expected to be able to answer and without think
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ing, he passes on the “general feeling of the Street” as his own. A report is
nearly finished, and some missing details should be checked with company
management; but, there doesn’t seem to be time, so one is tempted to guess
and decide it couldn’t be all that important anyway. As to risk assessment,
naturally, accepted assumptions and the final investment conclusion are pre
dictions of the most likely outcome. But there is a vast difference in reliability
between a “most likely outcome” being three chances out of ten assured and
being seven or eight chances out of ten assured. The former indicates poor
forecasting climate and alerts the investment decision-maker of above average
risk. Television and radio weather forecasters use this technique. One may
well carry his umbrella when the forecast is for rain six chances out of ten,
whereas the lesser insurance of the plastic raincoat in a pocket of his briefcase
may suffice when the forecast is three chances out of ten, and one may dare
no protection at all when the forecast is one chance out of ten.
The portfolio manager faces the dual ethical problem of (1) perceiving
for himself the purpose of the account, and determining basic policy as to the
types of securities that will best fit the purpose within acceptable risk limits
and (2) reaching a meeting of the minds with the investor whose portfolio he
is managing as to the purpose of investment and the appropriate kinds of se
curities.
A typical problem is a conflict between the investor’s reward desires
and the risk-taking ability of the portfolio. For example, an educational en
dowment fund might decide that it intends to realize ten percent a year from
its funds using income plus realized capital gains, but insist that all of the
funds be invested in common stocks whose year-to-year price volatility is rela
tively high. The years 1969 and 1970 reminded us of the potentially high
cost of such a mismatching of securities with the portfolio’s risk-taking ability.
In a period of rapid inflation, the need for the expected income was greater
than ever, and the forced sale (of what could well have been excellent long
term holdings) of such common stocks at severely depressed prices would
cause permanent damage to the portfolio’s future performance potential.
What is the duty of the portfolio manager when a serious conflict ap
pears in the investor’s reward desires and the account’s risk-taking ability? A
related and highly topical question is: What does the portfolio manager do
when the investor requests highly improbable levels of short-term perform
ance (and on a consistent basis), with the account to go to a competitor if the
desired results are not produced or at least promised?
The following comments are suggestions as to where one might begin to
look for definitive answers to such questions:

1.

Give the investor (be he client, customer, or employer) the available facts
on historic results of market averages and (to illuminate the odds on out
performing these averages and by how much) on groups of professionally
managed investors. Show the investor the potential cost if excess risk-tak
ing should result in short-term or permanent damage to the portfolio.
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2.

Exert maximum effort to agree in advance on mutually acceptable per
formance standards and risk-taking standards so that a base exists for
reference if subsequently the client or employer seeks departure from
these standards.

3.

Presently there are no professionally agreed-to norms for the appropriate
time span for measuring portfolio results. I find appealing the suggestion
that the FAF sponsor research and eventual determination of suggested
time norms for measuring portfolio performance.

Buying and Selling Securities
The FAF Standards of Professional Conduct speak eloquently to ethical
requirements in this area as regards both the research analyst and the port
folio manager:

The financial analyst shall conduct himself in such manner that
transactions for his customers, clients, or employer have priority over
personal transactions, that personal transactions do not operate ad
versely to their interests, and that he act with impartiality. Thus, if
an analyst has decided to make a recommendation as to the pur
chase or sale of a security, he shall give his customers, clients, and
employer adequate opportunity to act on such recommendation be
fore acting on his own behalf.
The financial analyst shall, in addition to the requirements of
disclosure required by law and rules and regulations of organizations
governing his activities, when making recommendations, disclose to
his customers, clients, and employer any material conflict of interest
relating to him and any material beneficial ownership of the securities
involved which could reasonably be expected to impair his ability to
render unbiased and objective advice.

A potential source of ethical conflict is the amount and kind of time a
financial analyst spends managing his personal portfolio. Surely, there must
be some limit to the total number of waking hours on which the employer or
clients have a claim. But, the question could eventually arise as to whether
the analyst is or can be appropriately serving his client or employer if he in
vests largely in types of securities that require day-by-day attention because
of extreme price volatility (examples could be rights, “puts,” “calls,” new is
sues of small companies) or because his securities portfolio is extremely lever
aged with debt.
Another potential ethical conflict in securities transactions is fairness in
transactions among different accounts managed by the same portfolio mana
ger or institution. The advent of computerized record-keeping and incentives
for block transactions from sliding scale (and negotiated) brokerage fees have
gone far in providing a solution to this problem.
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Still another potential source of conflict of interest between the investor
and the financial analyst is the traditional purchase of investment research via
brokerage commissions. In many cases (such as mutual funds, trust accounts,
investment advisory accounts), brokerage fees on securities transactions are
charged directly to the investor, whereas the portfolio-managing institution
pays for its own research efforts from its direct compensation from the inves
tor. Direct brokerage “give-ups” have been outlawed and challenges have
come in the courts against use of brokerage commissions from trust account
transactions for commercial-banking customer development as well as use of
brokerage commissions from mutual fund transactions to favor brokers
engaged in selling mutual fund shares. Further, comment has been made
that part of the reasoning of the SEC in pressing for negotiated brokerage
commissions on large transactions is a desire to reduce or eliminate still other
possible conflicts of interest (such as research for commissions) relating to
brokerage commissions.

Communications With Corporations Whose
Securities Are Being Analyzed

Availability of corporate officials to communicate orally with financial
analysts suggests a quid pro quo on the part of the analyst. It is appropriate
preparation for the “visit” so as to maximize its fruitfulness and to minimize
the time involved and inconvenience of corporate officials. Enlightened selfinterest of the analyst in the fruitfulness of his corporate contacts also strongly
suggests observance of elementary rules of etiquette—punctuality, politeness,
and the like. From comments by corporate officials, it is clear that numbers
of analysts fail to do their homework and, on occasion, do not behave in ac
cord with Emily Post norms.
Fair use of information received is another important aspect of analyst
corporate official relationships. This goes beyond the matter of accuracy and
completeness in reporting facts mentioned above. It involves attention to de
grees of importance. Also, it involves respect for confidences. Here one refers
not to inside information but rather to information that is not of the “bomb
shell” variety but which if published (at all or inappropriately) could injure
the corporation’s competitive position or its relations with its employees, with
its unions, or with government. An example might be a corporate official’s
analysis of the major issues to be faced in upcoming bargaining on a new con
tract with his company’s major labor union. Less than “bombshell” type in
formation—but easily hurtful to company-union relations if mishandled—
could be such opinions as: “The new union chief has considerably less con
trol over his locals than did his predecessor”; or “If we could change such and
such work rules, we could reduce employment in such and such plant by ten
per cent.” The analyst has the opportunity to greatly increase his un
derstanding of the company via frank and complete communication from
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management by proving to management his ability to properly use back
ground information, just as does the news reporter in relating to his key hu
man sources.
As to inside information itself, earlier comments suggest the analyst has
a duty not to seek it and certainly not to exert pressure to obtain it. Corpo
rate officials have a corresponding duty to “blow the whistle” on any analyst
whose behavior is distinctly improper in this area (or in any of the areas dis
cussed above). If the analyst’s misbehavior cannot be corrected by face-toface communication, the corporate official could appropriately turn to the
analyst’s employer. If this route fails or is feared, the good offices of the FAF
should be called upon. The Federation is on record (including publication in
the Financial Executive) as being desirous of offering help in promoting ap
propriate behavior by analysts in their relations with corporate officials. Any
action in such a case would be on a confidential basis and would contemplate
discreet communication between FAF officials and the offending analyst’s em
ployer. In the opinion of the Federation, the stature and position of such fi
nancial analysts as are to be found among the FAF’s executive director, other
officers, and its directors suggest that such a behavior problem could well be
resolved in this way.

Promotion of Adherence to Ethical Standards by Financial Analysts

Enforcement. The FAF first adopted a code of ethics and standards of
conduct in 1962. During 1968, work began on a revision of this code. After
intensive committee work, study, and discussion during several meetings by
the boards of directors of the FAF and of trustees of the Institute of Chartered
Financial Analysts, the new code and standards (see Exhibit I, pp. 48-49)
were adopted unanimously the following year by the FAF delegates and
the ICFA trustees. In related action, the FAF required its member societies to
adopt the new code and standards or ones substantially similar, and to adopt
appropriate enforcement provisions.
For Chartered Financial Analysts, the ICFA has jurisdiction over indi
vidual charter holders as regards ethics code and standards enforcement. The
ICFA has adopted comprehensive grievance procedures. The writer is aware
of one case being processed before the board of trustees.
As the FAF is literally a federation, its members are the local societies
with the societies having jurisdiction over individual members for ethics infrac
tions. The FAF has prepared sample grievance procedure language for use by
local societies where desired. Most of the 42 societies have adopted the new
code and standards (or the equivalent), and many have adopted formal
ized grievance procedures. A number of cases have been processed or are
pending in the local societies. The FAF’s counsel and its ethics committee are
available to advise and to consult with officials of the local societies in ethics
matters.

168

Although grounds for satisfaction exist in developments regarding ethics
enforcement over the past two to three years, there has also been time to per
ceive the nature of common problems. First is the difficulty of proceeding
with an ethics case based on behavior which has already resulted in institu
tion of legal proceedings. For example, FAF society members, including some
CFAs, are parties to some well-publicized cases. Pending settlement of these
cases, the local FAF societies and the Institute of Chartered Financial Ana
lysts have deferred any action. Second, analysts are becoming acquainted
(through experience) with the cost problems (monetary and time) of dealing
with ethics cases, particularly in the development of satisfactory proof of code
or standards infractions. Also, analysts are learning about the human reluc
tance involved in any self-policing activity. Hoary arguments are heard:
“We had better leave this alone, we might get sued. Lots of others have gotten
away with this, why single out this person?”
Genuine hope for progress in ethics enforcement exists, but analysts are
beginning to learn about the inherent limitations in ethics enforcement long
since discovered in such other professions as law and medicine.
Education. With the ultimate goal being adherence to high standards of
conduct, enforcement is naturally only one tool. Both the FAF and ICFA
are committed to improving and intensifying existing educational programs.
Finally, however, perhaps the most powerful force for promoting adherence
to high standards (as one perceives it to be in other professions) is personal
example. FAF volunteer and staff leaders and those in the local societies
have special opportunities in this area. But, in the end, it will be the effort of
each of us in his own work that will decide the issue. This effort must have
a dual focus: (1) developing sensitivity to the obfuscating effects of self-inter
est and past practice so as to perceive ethical issues when one is involved in
them and (2) motivating ourselves to speak out to clients, fellow employees,
and employers on these issues when they arise. Perhaps the term witness (in
its religious sense) is an appropriate description of the behavior goal as re
gards ethical standards of the analyst or any other professional.

Why ethical standards? Perhaps no discussion of ethical standards (for
financial analysts or for members of any other profession) is complete without
suggesting answers to the basic questions: Why should ethical standards be
established, and why should the practitioner live up to them. One of the
standard answers is: So that one may have optimum pride in the quality of
service being provided to clients and employers; the second is: Monetary
self-interest. The monetary self-interest argument was offered earlier in this
paper in discussing the inside information issue and the commonality of inter
est of the public and financial analysts in the fairness of securities markets.
Applied more generally, the argument runs: Given the specialized knowledge
and experience of the professional which puts him in a position of advantage
vis-a-vis his client or employer, unless the members of a profession hold
themselves to high ethical standards, their clients, employers, and ultimately
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the general public will no longer accord the professional the trust and the
freedom of action (absence of regulation) which permits the quality of service
to be as high as it is, the numbers employed in the profession to be as large as
they are, and the level of compensation to be as generous as it is.

EXHIBIT I

Code of Ethics and Standards of
Professional Conduct of
The Financial Analysts Federation

CODE OF ETHICS
WHEREAS, the profession of financial analysis has evolved because of
the increasing public need for competent, objective and trustworthy advice
with regard to investments and financial management; and
WHEREAS, those engaged in this profession have joined together in an
organization known as The Financial Analysts Federation; and
WHEREAS, despite a wide diversity of interest among analysts em
ployed by banks, brokers and security dealers, investment advisory organiza
tions, financial relations counselors, insurance companies, investment com
panies, investment trusts, pension trusts and other institutional investors and
corporate bodies, there are nevertheless certain fundamental standards of con
duct which should be common to all engaged in the profession of financial
analysis and accepted and maintained by them; and
WHEREAS, the members of The Financial Analysts Federation adopted
a Code of Ethics and Standards on May 20, 1962, and it is now deemed ap
propriate to make certain amendments to this Code.
NOW, THEREFORE, the members of The Financial Analysts Federa
tion hereby adopt on October 19, 1969, the following Code of Ethics, and
Standards of Professional Conduct:
A financial analyst should conduct himself with integrity and dignity and
encourage such conduct by others in the profession.
A financial analyst should act with competence and strive to maintain
and improve his competence and that of others in the profession.
A financial analyst should use proper care and exercise independent pro
fessional judgment.
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STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
1. The financial analyst shall conduct himself and encourage the prac
tice of financial analysis in a manner that shall reflect credit on himself and
on the profession. The financial analyst shall have and maintain knowledge
of and shall comply strictly with all federal, state and provincial laws as well
as with all rules and regulations of any governmental agency governing his ac
tivities. The financial analyst also shall comply strictly with the rules and reg
ulations of the stock exchanges and of the National Association of Securities
Dealers if he, or his employer, is a member of these organizations.
2. The financial analyst shall ascertain that his employer is aware of the
existence and content of the Code of Ethics and of these Standards of Pro
fessional Conduct.
3. The financial analyst shall conduct himself in such manner that trans
actions for his customers, clients, or employer have priority over personal
transactions, that personal transactions do not operate adversely to their in
terests, and that he act with impartiality. Thus, if an analyst has decided to
make a recommendation as to the purchase or sale of a security, he shall give
his customers, clients, and employer adequate opportunity to act on such re
commendation before acting on his own behalf.
4. The financial analyst shall, in addition to the requirements of dis
closure required by law and rules and regulations of organizations governing
his activities, when making recommendations, disclose to his customers,
clients, and employer any material conflict of interest relating to him and any
material beneficial ownership of the securities involved which could reason
ably be expected to impair his ability to render unbiased and objective ad
vice.
5. The financial analyst shall be objective in his opinions in advising his
customers, clients, and employer, and when making a recommendation must
have a basis which can be substantiated as reasonable. He must be accurate
and complete when reporting facts.
6. The financial analyst shall inform his customers, clients, and em
ployer of compensation arrangements in connection with his services to them
which are in addition to compensation from his employer or from the custom
er or client for such services.
7. The financial analyst shall not pay any consideration to others for
recommending his services unless such arrangement has been appropriately
disclosed.
8. The financial analyst shall not undertake independent practice for
compensation in competition with his employer unless he has received written
consent from both his employer and the person for whom he undertakes in
dependent employment.
9. The financial analyst shall not, in the preparation of material for dis
tribution to customers, clients, or the general public, copy or use in sub
stantially the same form material prepared by other persons without acknow
ledging its use and identifying the name of the author or publisher of such
material.

171

Ethics of Corporate Reporting
And the Corporate
Financial Officer
By Paul C. Nagel, Jr., Executive Vice-President—Finance, Household Fi
nance Corporation; Vice-President, Financial Executives Research Founda
tion, representing the Financial Executives Institute
The subject of ethics is one which has been studied over the centuries by
philosophers and others in the broad context of interrelationships between
people. The use of the term in relation to a highly specific subject such as
corporate financial reporting can be misleading because it suggests that there
may be a predetermined set of philosophical standards which should apply.
In fact, there is no such specialized set of standards, nor can there be. Rather,
ethics in corporate reporting must be expressed in such fundamental terms as
honesty and consideration of others’ needs. Because there is almost always
more than one right alternative, there is an element of subjectiveness to hon
esty as applied to reporting. Certainly there are conflicts between the inter
ests of users, but a course must be selected, a course which is as equitable as
possible among the variety of interests in the corporation. Therefore, consid
eration of what others’ needs and rights really are in financial reports involves
subjectivity as well.
There is an ethics problem for corporate financial officers, just as there
is for other people in a complex world, but, in many respects, it is no different
from the ethics question faced by other members of the corporate team. The
unique ethics question for the corporate financial officer arises because he par
ticipates in the corporate decision-making process and also directs the prepa
ration of the financial statements which, in effect, report on the results of
those corporate decisions.
The fundamental purpose of published financial reports for the corpora
tion is to inform the investor. The term “investor” as used herein will be de
fined and further discussed later. Whatever others may think, the interests of
the general public, customers, labor, and others in financial reports must be
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regarded as definitely secondary to those of the investor or owner of
the enterprise.
The corporate financial officer can and must assume the financial report
ing responsibility as his special obligation to the stockholders of the company
parallel with that of the chief executive; it is also part of his assigned organi
zational responsibilities. In the exercise of these separate responsibilities, ethi
cal considerations are most certainly involved, especially honesty and con
sideration of others’ rights and needs, which is represented in the context of
this paper through financial disclosure. As stated, the financial officer reports
to investors the results, in financial terms, of the corporation’s activities.
Although the financial officer must report to a variety of financial statement
users, this paper does not deal with reporting to persons or institutions other
than investors.
The ethics of corporate reporting and of the other activities of the corpo
rate financial officer will be discussed in three parts: (1) the obligations of the
corporate financial officer to the chief executive officer of the corporation and
his interrelationships with other members of the senior management group,
(2) the interpretive differences resulting from conflicting objectives on the part
of various types of investors, and (3) the professional responsibilities of the
corporate financial officer.
Obligations of the Financial Officer Within the Firm
The key relationship between the management of a corporation and its
shareholders focuses on the chief executive officer, who reports to the board of
directors, who, in turn, are elected by the shareholders. It is the chief execu
tive who has the responsibility of shareholder relationships and thus for the
annual report and the financial statements of the corporation. The corporate
financial officer reports to the chief executive officer and through this relation
ship he provides the financial and statistical data which the chief executive
publicizes.
The management organization of a corporation is established by the
chief executive officer to deal most effectively with the business or businesses
of the company. As the corporation grows or changes, its management or
ganization must be modified to meet changing needs. The organization of the
financial function also changes to be responsive to the needs of the
corporation.
Preparation of financial reports can be done in a number of different
areas of that financial organization, although generally it is assigned to the
controller’s department; the issuance of financial reports to the public also
can be accomplished through different departments. However, development
of the financial statements for the published reports is the responsibility of
the corporate financial officer, and it is incumbent upon him to be sufficiently
familiar with the goings-on in his organization to make soundly based deci
sions regarding the application of underlying accounting principles to the bus-
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iness judgments and transactions, both completed and in process, in order to
provide adequate information in the published financial reports. The remain
der of the report—that is, any material outside the financial statements—repre
sents the report of the chief executive to his shareholders. Of course, the fi
nancial statements, too, are part of the chief executive’s responsibility, but the
financial officer has a parallel and special responsibility in these reports,
whereas he has a lesser responsibility for the so-called nonfinancial sections
of the report.
The financial department is a part of the overall management team, and
its members participate in the conduct of the business in a way designed to
make the other departments most effective in meeting their objectives. An
other special function of the financial department is to obtain the funds with
which the corporation operates, assuring adequate liquidity without excessive
idle funds. Keeping abreast of credit conditions and interest rates and main
taining adequate sources of funds requires constant attention and expertise.
Literally, no significant corporate decision is made without financial consid
eration, and the corporate financial officer is expected to represent this view
in all corporate councils.
Knowledge of the ultimate outcome of a given course of management ac
tion cannot be known until the action is complete or nearly so. If a financial
report is to be published while a major program or product or new invention
is in the developmental stage, the management team will take the view that
the program will be successful, unless there is strong evidence to the contrary,
because that is the focus of their effort. This view unavoidably affects the fi
nancial statements. In most dynamic businesses new programs, products, or
ventures are constantly being developed, and at any reporting point some
thing will be in process. There are risks in every program; no management
team always can be expected to be successful in every project. Hence, some
projects reported optimistically in one set of financial statements may require
later adjustment.
The financial officer, as a part of this team, is as dedicated to the success
of the corporation’s programs as any other officer; however, he must take a
critical viewpoint of the overall potential impact of programs, new and old
alike, on the financial affairs of the business. He must bring to the attention
of the chief executive officer his thinking in this regard, particularly as it may
influence the contents of any financial reports to be issued to shareholders.

Disclosure Obligations
The disclosure obligations of the corporate financial officer are different
for financial statement content than for nonfinancial statement material. The
body of the annual report, press releases, and interviews are primarily the re
sponsibility of the chief executive, although the financial executive may con
tribute to or even prepare them in certain cases. With regard to these nonfi-
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nancial statement disclosures, the corporate financial officer is only one of the
corporate executives providing information to the chief executive to help to
determine the nature of what should be said publicly. Generally the corpo
rate financial officer would be in the best position to assist in deciding on ap
propriate emphasis so as to avoid publicizing a subject out of proportion to its
financial import to the company. Likewise, he is in the best position to argue
for adequate disclosure of adverse circumstances and developments.
When financial reporting must deal with the status of a development or
the potential impact on the business of a project in process, the outcome of
projects in process is unavoidably subject to judgment. At some point in
time the outcome becomes crystal clear; but during the interim, there are sub
jective evaluations which must be made by various people such as engineers,
production specialists, and marketing men within an organization, and the
chief executive officer must balance all opinions—including that of the chief
financial officer—in reaching his conclusions. By establishing accounting pol
icies such as asset life for depreciation purposes, capitalization policies, etc.,
the corporate financial officer can provide direction that will maintain the in
tegrity of the statements as well as provide guidelines to the management
group in their operations. His first responsibility is to see that management
does not mislead itself to the ultimate detriment of shareholders.
There always will be differences in judgment between members of the
management teams on matters of this kind. A variety of questions will arise,
such as: Can inventory which has been on hand longer than is normal be
sold to realize its cost, or must a writeoff be taken? Is a new product going
to be successful, or should certain production and material costs be charged
off? The answers to these questions involve not only judgment, but the appli
cation of accounting principles and practices as well. In questions such as
these, the corporate financial officer must exercise a greater degree of authority
than is the case with the questions which merely deal with accounting policy.
In summary, it must be understood that the corporate financial officer is
first an active member of the management team and is every bit as much in
volved in the conduct of the business as the other principal members of that
team. His loyalties are to the chief executive officer and are directed to mak
ing the efforts of the corporation successful. Where projects or developments
in process are involved, the responsibility for reporting publicly on those sub
jects must lie with the chief executive, and, therefore, should be differentiated
in the normal quarterly and annual reports from the financial statements also
contained therein.
The corporate management team works long and hard to establish its
priorities and keeps its effort in focus with those priorities. The outsider can
never be completely familiar with the priorities of the management team; he
is limited to information in corporate reports. The amount of disclosure con
cerning individual corporate undertakings must then reflect management’s
best judgment. The corporate financial officer, as a member of the manage
ment team, must represent not only the corporation, but also the interests of
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the investor in such disclosure, and he should encourage the publication of
information concerning events which are sufficiently significant to be of real
importance to the investor. Where matters involve accounting principles and
practices and affect financial statements, the corporate financial officer must
see to it that treatment is accorded the subject which is in keeping with the
posture of the company as well as the interests of the investor.
Financial analysts tend to view corporations as having accounting per
sonalities based on the adequacy of financial disclosure, the use of reports to
influence or inform, conservatism in depreciation and inventory accounting
policy, and the like. To a considerable extent, the corporate financial officer
is responsible for that personality. He must see that the corporation’s account
ing to the public helps maintain rather than reduce its sources of funds.

Conflicting Objectives of Various Types of Investors
At the beginning of this paper it was stated that the responsibility of
corporate reporting was to inform the investor. That would be simple if there
were only one investor with a single interest. However, the “investor” is a
heterogeneous group that has a wide range of interests: from the widow with
her shares in the safe deposit box, forgotten, to the professional speculator,
who deals in daily market price fluctuations. There is another whole class of
investors who lend money, either long-term or short-term, as individuals or as
institutions.
The preponderance of investors have as a primary interest growth in the
market price of their stock, and therefore, in continued increases in corporate
earnings. Their interests may range widely in terms of the length of the
holding period, but by and large, that period is for more than a year at a
minimum and open-ended at a maximum.
The professional speculator and that segment of the general public who
choose to speculate for a very short-term period—in some cases as short as a
day or two—have little concern, if any, for the long-term growth of the com
pany. Their interest is in those factors which affect the market price of the
company’s stock on a day-to-day basis.
Lenders as a class are more interested in the financial position of the
corporation than they are in its earnings. The potential buyer of a debenture
offering has as his primary concern the solvency of the company, the liquid
ity of the company’s assets, and the conservatism indicated by the corpora
tion’s balance sheet. Any long-term lender most certainly has a long-term
concern for the company’s growth as he is dealing with a long-term obliga
tion. The short-term lender places emphasis on liquidity, on the conservative
statement of assets, and on continuing profitability—probably in that order.
The divergence between the interests of lenders, speculators, and inves
tors in equity securities is sufficiently great that decisions affecting the finan
cial reporting of a corporation could be made in quite different ways
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depending upon which category of interest is involved. For instance, if pri
mary attention is given to a long-term lender’s interests, that lender would as
soon see all possible costs written off, depreciation taken at the most rapid
allowable rate, slow-moving inventories written down at an early date, and
bad debt reserves maintained at the highest possible level. In this way he
would be presented with what he would refer to as a conservatively stated
balance sheet on which to make his loan decision. On the other hand, such
treatment might not be desirable from the standpoint of the ongoing interests
of the longer-term investor in the common stock of the corporation whose in
terests are best served by stability of earnings and a consistent growth trend
over a long period of time, rather than the sharp up and down fluctuations
which would result from the writeoff of a project one year and its reinstate
ment in the following year.
Clearly, the problem of the financial executive becomes one of preparing
financial statements with a balanced viewpoint. The interests of all classes
of investors must be kept in mind and be given equitable treatment, but if
one class of investor is to be considered by the corporation to be more impor
tant than other classes, it probably would be the investor with the longerterm interests who wants to see continuing growth in earnings so that over a
period of time the market value of his equity in the corporation would grow.
The viewpoint favoring the long-term investor also requires adequate reserves,
proper writeoff policies in keeping with the corporation’s experience, realistic
depreciation policies, and other policies sufficiently conservative to create an
acceptable reaction among lenders so as to insure adequate sources of bor
rowed money.
From the viewpoint of the chief financial officer, the question of amount
of disclosure may be a difficult one. It constitutes a balancing of the desires
of investors for detailed information, from which they can pick and choose
what they think they will find useful, with the financial officer’s desire to re
port only in terms of total profit performance in order to avoid disclosing in
formation helpful to adverse interests.
While ethical considerations are not the primary determinant of a corpo
ration’s disclosure policy, they are nevertheless important. Certainly such
matters as widespread and equal disclosure of significant information to all
parties and prompt timing of disclosure bear importantly on investor regard
for a company.
There are also ethical considerations which relate to the financial stance
of a company, i.e., conservative or nonconservative. In what way should the
company convey to the investor the fact that it is conservative, other than by
performance?
In summary, the corporation must, to an extent, identify with a class of
investor and must adopt financial policies consistent with that identification.
The financial executive must keep a balanced posture with regard to the in
formational needs of all classes of investors and encourage the adoption of
disclosure policies which are proper to the circumstances.
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The Professional Responsibilities of the
Corporate Financial Officer

It is in the area of professional responsibility that the matter of ethics
comes into play most extensively, particularly because in this area there is the
semi-common law of accounting principles and practices and very real gov
ernment law and regulation. Within the framework as set down by the SEC,
the stock exchanges, and the Accounting Principles Board, the corporate fi
nancial officer must exercise his professional judgment.
The SEC requires that the chief financial and accounting officers of the
corporation, as well as the members of the board of directors, sign a registra
tion statement filed with the Commission under the Securities Act of 1933.
All signers are responsible for the contents of the registration statement. By
this means, the board, the chief executive, and the chief financial officer have
a legal obligation to see that all significant information has been disclosed
and that the financial statements are fairly presented.
In keeping with the foregoing, professionalism seems to relate primarily
to accounting. By no means are all corporate financial officers accountants.
In fact, a majority probably are not. Those who are not must rely on their
chief accounting officer for much of the professional understanding of account
ing. However, even the corporate financial officer without accounting training
must accept the responsibility for adequate disclosure, for honest reporting,
and for accurate financial statements. Certainly these three elements consti
tute a basis for the use of the term ethics in referring to the work of the corpo
rate financial officer.
As a part of the management team participating in the decision-making
process, the corporate financial officer does have a stake in the evaluation
placed on the company by outsiders. In that sense, it is to his advantage to
portray the company in a favorable light. In fact, he may have a financial
interest through stock ownership, in which case it is directly to his financial
advantage to see the price of the company stock move upward. Again, how
ever, the requirements of accounting professionalism, of adequate disclosure,
honest reporting, and accuracy are the legal and personal constraints placed
on him. However, over and above these legal and personal constraints on
the financial officer, public accountants, independent from internal company
pressures, perform an audit in accordance with requirements of their profes
sional society and through a certification join in taking responsibility for the
fairness of presentation of the financial statements.
The key questions for the financial officer concern adequacy of disclo
sure and the quality of the subjective judgments made about the condition of
programs currently going on within the corporation’s activities. In a few cases
the answers are clear, and when they are, the only ethical question facing the
corporate financial officer is one of honesty. However, so much more often
an answer is not clear and a quality judgment must be made to determine
how the matter should be treated in the financial statements of the corpora

178

tion. As a professional, the corporate financial officer knows the current
standards of disclosure; he must make the best subjective judgments he can,
and accept responsibility for them along with his fellow executives.
Over the longer term, the quality and accuracy of these subjective judg
ments is eminently clear to investors and outsiders through the company’s rec
ord. It is only in the short run that the accuracy of these judgments is sub
ject to any question.
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Constructive Use of Financial
Information by Commercial
Bank Lending Officers
By Thomas F. Creamer, Executive Vice-President, First National City
Bank, representing the Robert Morris Associates

Commercial bank officers assume multiple responsibilities in the proper
and constructive use of financial information. In carrying out their functions,
a bank officer encounters many possible conflicts which do not have simple,
clear-cut answers.
To begin with, a bank officer’s first responsibility, after his community,
is to his stockholders. To this end, he is dedicated to the preservation of the
quality and liquidity of the bank’s assets. This is particularly true of loans.
To maximize income, a bank officer must continually appraise the yield ver
sus risk tradeoff in his credit decisions. Essential to this process is a solid
grasp of accounting practice and statement analysis common to a client’s in
dustry. A bank officer has to understand the businesses of his borrowers as
well as the principals’ philosophies of management, which are the underlying
forces creating the figures in the financial statements. In today’s highly com
petitive atmosphere, the loan officer is required to be a constructive consul
tant—not merely a yes or no reactor. He has to call on his experience and
training to help get the best job done for his customer’s business. The opti
mum performance of these requisites contributes to the health of his bank,
maintains investors’ confidence, and attracts the essential raw material of
deposits.

Confidential Information

Woven into this performance mix is the proper use of confidential infor
mation to which he is privy. He must be sure that he obtains good and reli
able financial information on his customers and interprets that information
properly. This applies when he extends credit to a borrower or, where appro
180

priate, when he passes this information and his interpretation to others for
their use. Without proper use and interpretation of these figures, the bank
might end up either with a bad loan which would affect stockholders, or
might give poor or even improper guidance to others.
When an officer asks for sufficient information on which to base his
judgment, he also assumes the responsibility to use that information properly
from the borrower’s standpoint. In other words, he must not divulge any con
fidential information which might directly or indirectly affect the reputation
and standing of the borrower. Another responsibility is in the use of these
figures with respect to other creditors of the bank’s customers including other
banks which may be either competitors or participants in the extension of
credit to the common borrower.
Obviously, in the use of this information the bank officer could mislead,
one way or another, other creditors. He should use the information where
necessary, but only to the extent necessary, and not divulge information
which is not relevant or required. On many occasions the information given
to a bank officer, unless published in an annual report, is of a strictly confi
dential nature and, therefore, not made available to the public at large. This
must be confidentially respected. Occasionally the government, for one rea
son or another, may inquire of a bank regarding the financial position of one
of its depositors or borrowers. This also requires judgment on the part of the
officer, depending, of course, on issues of national security.
Illustrations

For purposes of illustration let us consider the loan officer’s posture in
some typical situations:
Case I—Privately Held Corporation X. Bank A receives an interim unau
dited financial statement from X that indicates a $2 million loss for the recent
quarter’s operations, which comes as a shock to the banker. He has an unse
cured $5,000,000 loan that comes up for renewal in 30 days. Bank A inves
tigates further and discovers inventory has been written down to reflect price
reductions, and sales are down 20 per cent due to the loss of several large or
ders. The outlook is not good, and continued unsecured credit is hard to
justify.

1.
2.

3.

Query:
What should the loan officer say in response to trade creditor inquiries?
Bank A has participated $1 million on an overline basis to its city bank
correspondent because of legal limit problems. What should A say to
the city bank? Does the city bank receive the same story as trade credi
tors?
Bank B has had preliminary discussions with X for unsecured credit.
Bank B asks Bank A about its experience. What should Bank A say if
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there is a possibility of a “take-out” by unknowing Bank B? Should it “let the
buyer beware”?

Case II—Public Corporation. Bank A is Agent Bank in a $15 million
revolving credit with six other participants for Borrower Y. Bank A learns
that Y may lose an important contract (source of information is Y’s financial
officer, or it could very easily be some outside source, such as a competitor).
This has not been disclosed publicly. Corporation Y may also face a large
writedown of deferred R & D on the lost contract.

1.
2.
3.

Query:
Should Banker A notify the six other bank participants prior to public
disclosure by Y?
What does he say to trade inquiries?
Should Banker A be entitled to talk directly with the auditors regarding
the writedown?

Case III—Finance Company. Bank A is one of several line banks which
provide short term loans to the X Finance Company. Tomorrow, Bank A is
scheduled to be given a cleanup of the $5 million loan by rotation to Bank
B. Banker A, this morning, learns that X Finance Company suffered a severe
fraud loss that could cause all creditors to reevaluate their positions. This
afternoon, Bank B calls to make a routine revision.

Query: What does Bank A tell Bank B?
In each case mentioned above there are potential conflicts of ethics and
possibly of interest.
Within the bank’s organization there usually is an investment manage
ment group which is handling investment accounts for others on discretionary
or nondiscretionary bases. In our own institution, as an example, these two
groups, the lending officers and the investment officers, are kept completely
apart and the information made available to the lending officer is not made
available to the investment officer to avoid interest conflicts. The internal
“whipsaw” could be considerably more troubling, however, in a medium
sized bank where the chief loan officer might possibly, because of his financial
expertise, be involved to some degree in the investment management process
and thus must decide which of his two hats to wear. In this frame of refer
ence let us take the first two cases a step further.

Case I—Privately Held Corporation X. Bank A is named as trustee un
der the will of the deceased owner of Borrower X to hold the stock of the bus
iness with the aim of preserving it for the benefit of the deceased’s widow and
five children. Does a conflict of interest loom on the horizon? Where is the
Bank’s first responsibility—to its stockholders as lender to Borrower X, to
the deceased owner and his wishes, or to its fiduciary relationship to the wid
ow and five children?
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Case II—Public Corporation Y. Bank A holds in its various discretion
ary investment management accounts 300,000 shares, or two per cent, of
Borrower Y’s outstanding shares; Banker A learns that the investment man
agement officer happened to hear of Y’s loss of the contract at lunch from one
of A’s junior associates who was unaware of the investment management of
ficer’s interest.
1.
2.

Query:
Should the investment officer be stopped from selling some of Y’s stock?
Suppose either or both bankers or their families own some of Y stock.
How do they react?

Again, within a bank, the loan officer sometimes is faced with the ques
tion of conflicts that may stem from the acceptance of corporate appointments
by borrowing or prospective borrowing corporations, especially in the case
of trusteeships. His quest for earnings has to be tempered by strenuous efforts
to prevent his bank from entering a potential compromising or conflicting po
sition should legal action eventually evolve from future financial problems
of the borrower.

Necessity for Accurate Interpretation
The loan officer’s basic rules of character, capacity, and capital involve
seeking out the facts on which to appraise the honesty, judgment, and ability
of the borrower’s management. The initial information he sees is generally
the borrower’s financial statements. Where necessary, the banker invariably
will try to impress his customers with the values provided by the services of
a good CPA to help him track his business. Statements prepared by the CPA
provide the banker’s customer with credibility and consistency for manage
ment decisions, tax information, and to secure credit. There is no question
that creditors take considerably greater comfort from a CPA’s audit, espe
cially when its scope is unlimited and opinion unqualified, than from finan
cial statements prepared by others of uncertain independence or profession
al ability.
The lending officer’s interpretation and use of all these data obviously
is an art and not a science. This suggests the importance of a close relation
ship with the CPA fraternity which, in practice, seems to vary with the type
of industry and size of the companies involved. In the garment industry, par
ticularly, many of the firms look on the CPA as an important financial con
sultant and, often, as virtually the principal financial officer of the company,
with the result that credit arrangements, including negotiations, are often set
up with the company on a joint basis with the CPA firm. Therefore, in such
cases the lending officer works very closely and intimately with the account
ing firm in the review, understanding the interpretation of the financial fig
ures. I, for one, think this is most desirable.
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On the other hand, there are many large corporate relationships where
the lending institution is not given free access to the borrower’s auditors. The
relationship is restricted to the borrowing customer and the bank is not in
vited or encouraged and, in fact, is often not permitted, to discuss the figures
with the customer’s auditors. As a matter of fact, in such cases the outside
auditors might not discuss their client’s figures with the bank without their
client’s permission. I think this is wrong in many cases, and I believe a closer
relationship between the bank and the auditors makes for much more con
structive, intelligent use of the financial figures by the lending officer. In ad
dition, it makes for a stronger relationship with the customer. This, then,
suggests perhaps a responsibility of the accounting firm as to how it relates
with its client and discusses its client’s affairs with the bank or banks.
The foregoing are only some of the many ethical responsibilities to others
confronting the loan officer in his handling of the ebb and flow of financial
information he gives and receives. But there is no prescribed pattern in the
way he must fulfill these obligations to all parties. The Robert Morris Asso
ciates’ Code of Ethics probably best approximates any guidelines for deter
mining his prospective posture in discharging these responsibilities, and his
optimum understanding of the Code should be a prominent part of his pro
fessional education.
The inside use of privileged information also seems to be a subject of
much current interest, according to the frequent articles in the press. Would
spinning off trust or investment departments into subsidiary or affiliate rela
tionships, as some would recommend, insure the desired separation of privi
leged financial data? I submit that interested bank officers would still be
faced with similar ethical conflicts regardless of the corporate facade under
which they operate and would still have to handle the information they are
privy to with a scrupulous sense of moral responsibility to their total
environment.

Discussion With the CPA Firm

With respect to dialogue with the CPA fraternity, why shouldn’t the
banker, who in some cases is lending more to a company than the stockhold
er’s investment, be encouraged by his client to discuss the financial reporting
he sees with the company’s accounting firm regardless of the size of the bor
rower? Size or public ownership does not make a company invulnerable to
fiscal problems.
I believe that the customer should attend meetings between the banker
and the CPA during which the CPA can discuss the “facts” presented in the
financial statements and can explain footnotes and accounting policies, while
the customer can interpret the financial statements and give opinions. In the
matter of inventories, for example, the CPA can discuss inventory control,
pricing policies, audit procedures, and approach to obsolescence. The
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customer must give his opinion about the salability of the items in inventory;
but, in the final analysis, the banker must draw his own conclusions after
meeting with the customer and the CPA.
The continuous education of the lending officer should include familiar
ity with and frequent updating of his exposure to the evolving generally ac
cepted accounting principles adopted by the American Institute of CPAs to
enable him to discuss intelligently with the accountant the bases on which
values are expressed in audits. Bankers are continuously taking courses
given by schools such as the Rutgers Graduate School of Banking, as well
as specially designed courses within their banks.

Conclusion
I am reminded of a two-week seminar sponsored by the Danforth Foun
dation which I attended several years ago at the Harvard Business School, in
which the subject of the session was “Morals and Ethics in the Busi
ness World.” While the subject matter or case studies at the seminars were
primarily concerned with personnel problems, we encountered exactly the
same type of question which is dealt with in this paper. The seminar was at
tended by representatives from theological seminaries, educational institu
tions, and the business world. We in the business world appreciate that many
of the questions raised at the seminar, like the questions raised in this paper,
are not always easy to answer with a flat yes or no. Therefore, the business
man comes to the answer to any question intuitively and comes up with what
he feels is the best, if oftentimes not the perfect, answer. This was quite a
revelation to many of the theologians and the professors who thought most
business questions were of a black or white nature and did not assume vary
ing shades of gray. So, in turn, the same thing applies to the proper use by
bank lending officers of financial information. It is a matter of judgment on
the part of the bank officer and he must come up with the best answer, which
may not necessarily be the perfect one. He must, however, make certain, to
the best of his ability, that the effect is constructive and not destructive to all
concerned.
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Critique
Of the Olson, Parker, Nagel, and Creamer papers

By Ivan O. Bull, Partner, McGladrey, Hansen, Dunn & Company; member,
Committee on Professional Ethics, American Institute of Certified Public Ac
countants, representing the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
As evidenced by the previous papers, the responsibilities for a financial
report which is to be used by a third party are clearly shared by a number
of people. However, each individual tends to view his responsibility for a fi
nancial report as if he were functioning in a vacuum. This is true regardless
of whether the individual deals with collection, preparation, or review of the
financial report. However, the aggregation of these myopic views apparently
does provide for a total package of responsibilities which should prove satis
factory to third-party users.
Dissemination of financial data about a business enterprise, at the level
we are discussing, clearly requires the transmittal of information through a
chain of individuals prior to its receipt by the ultimate user. If the chain is
to operate effectively, each individual in it must adhere to a high level of ethi
cal conduct to fulfill his responsibility to the system. Therefore, each individ
ual should understand the total environment for communication of financial
information and, further, he should relate his own segmented responsibilities
to the total package.
In this paper I shall discuss the interrelationship between individual par
ties in the preparation, presentation, and use of the financial reports. Within
this context, the importance of the chief executive officer in determining the
level of corporate disclosure is highlighted. The nature of the problem in
volved in preparing financial reports for third-party users will be identified
by examining the comments of the four writers. Together, these comments
form a composite based upon honesty, competence, independence, and pro
fessionalism; individually, the presentations offer certain unique or unusual
views relating to the particular professions represented at this symposium.
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Absence of a Critical Element
In attempting to formulate the total package of responsibility for prepa
ration of a financial report, it became apparent that one critical element to
this process had been excluded. The critical exclusion to which I refer is the
failure to have comments proffered by the chief executive officer of a corpora
tion.
The chief executive officer exerts great influence over corporate financial
reports prepared for third-party use. More than any other individual, he ef
fectively determines the highest, I repeat, highest level of reporting.
The chief financial officer (treasurer or controller) and the independent
auditor effectively determine the minimum level of financial reporting. To
perform below this level subjects both the financial officer and the auditor to
personal exposure to possible censure and criticism. But, above this minimum
level of reporting, the extent of disclosure, understandability of the communi
cation, and the degree of objectivity and consistency in interpreting inconclu
sive evidence are determined, in large part, by the chief executive officer. The
chief financial officer and the independent auditor may exert their influence
toward obtaining a higher level of reporting; but, if he chooses, the chief exec
utive officer will determine the ultimate disposition of most questionable items
of significance.
One might question how ethical conduct for a chief executive is to be
determined. Financial reporting is but one of his responsibilities; however, fi
nancial reporting to owners and creditors is an inescapable and important re
sponsibility of the chief executive. Shouldn’t his views have been presented at
this symposium? Can the total package of financial reporting be effectively
examined when such a critical element is missing?

Enforcement of Ethical Standards
In the development of this critique, it was necessary to consider the pur
pose and problems of enforcing ethical standards. Rather than discussing
enforcement as it related to each of the papers, it seemed more appropriate to
discuss the topic separately. Since enforcement is the subject of a separate
session of this symposium, my observation will be very brief.
Enforcement of the minimum standards of ethical conduct should be
mandatory for all links in the chain of financial reporting. Ethical standards
are ineffective without active enforcement. Third-party users of reports prob
ably want disciplinary action to be swift, well-publicized, and sufficiently se
vere to thwart future ethical departures. Unfortunately, there is some evi
dence that enforcement is inadequate. Confidence in the reliability of finan
cial statements may be directly related to the confidence of statement users
that unethical practitioners will be decisively disciplined. Enforcement must
cease to be delinquent and timid.
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The Nature of the Reporting Problem

The purpose, and therefore the problem, of financial reporting might
be stated as follows: A financial report should communicate relevant finan
cial information about an entity to a third-party user. This requires those
involved in the preparation of a financial report to undertake a diligent search
for related evidence, and an objective interpretation of all known factors,
which can be made intelligible for the intended user, without omission of a
fact which is significant. Further, this communication must meet the exigen
cy of timeliness without disclosing vital information which would impair the
competitive position of the corporation.
This critique assumes there is agreement that this stated purpose reason
ably reflects the objective of financial reporting for third-party use. A com
parison of the ethical conditions of the four disciplines described by the four
papers falls within the definition framework.

Agreement on Ethical Topics
An overview of the papers presented seems to indicate the following eth
ical components of corporate financial reporting: honesty, competency, inde
pendence, and professionalism. Generalizing on each of these elements
from the specific or special treatment presented by the four represented dis
ciplines, their written or unwritten codes seem to say:

1.

Honesty. Be honest with yourself, with your employer, with the entity
being reported on, and with the user of your information.

2.

Competency. Develop and maintain competence at a level which will
meet or excel the recognized standards of performance.

3.

Independence. Conflicts of interest between each of the four disci
plines and the user of financial reports can easily arise. At the very mini
mum, the preparer should subordinate his personal interest to the inter
est of the statement user.

4.

Professionalism. Maintain the dignity and respect of the profession by
complying with the three previous ethical standards; encourage and de
mand that peers also comply; increase the value of the profession to so
ciety by improving professional techniques.

Each of these points could be amplified; however, in one way or an
other, each representative of his profession examined these topics from his
unique viewpoint. Some expanded one or more of the topics while others
were silent about these same concepts. A comparison of the relative treat
ments is informative and leads to some interesting observations. However, I
would prefer to highlight those items on which there was not a common un
derstanding.
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Creamer
I addressed myself to Mr. Creamer’s paper first because I can under
stand the difficulty he had in developing a paper concerning ethical conduct
in preparation of a financial report. He was asked to comment on ethical
conduct in preparing, presenting, and dealing with the reporting entity while
he, in fact, represented a user of financial information—for whose benefit this
seminar is being conducted. The Code of Ethics of Robert Morris Associates
does not deal with corporate reporting problems because it is not relevant to
their concerns. I do observe, however, that only the first and fourth state
ments of the RMA Code (see p. 220) seem to recognize the need to protect
the public. The other ten statements appear to me to protect those who are
exchanging information, presumably against unethical acts of other members.

Parker

With respect to Mr. Parker’s presentation, I would raise the following
questions:
1.

Aren’t different ethical standards needed for an individual analyst doing
investment research for third-party use than for the analyst serving as a
manager of an investment portfolio?

2.

Don’t analysts, either individually or collectively, do more to influence
the results they predict than do other financial information preparers,
whether they work individually or collectively?

3.

The analyst’s view of independence or conflict of interest is unique. It
appears that it is possible to establish independence by waiting a “suf
ficient” time after making a recommendation. Further, disclosure of ma
terial beneficial ownership of recommended securities appears to be suffi
cient to reestablish independence with respect to a recommendation re
garding that security. As an investor, I find that disclosure of a conflict
of interest does nothing for me. An analyst discloses that a fund affil
iate owns $X worth of the recommended investment. Does this mean that
he wants to artificially raise the price by increasing demand so he can liq
uidate at a profit? Shouldn’t the analyst, his employer, and fund affil
iates be precluded from making transactions in that security for some
weeks before and after publishing a recommendation?

Nagel
I take issue with Mr. Nagel’s original assumption that ethical standards
cannot be established for financial reporting. He has presented a view which
requires total knowledge and a coherent set of principles. Why not rely prag
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matically on standards based upon their correspondence to known facts? Why
not rely on standards because they work?
I raise two other questions concerning his excellent paper. The first con
cerns the question of coexistent allegiance to the chief executive and to the
statement user. The statement user might attach more credibility to financial
statements if the chief executive subscribed to a code of ethics. The second
question relates to his relationship to the auditor. Can the third-party user be
well served if full disclosure of facts, assumptions, evidence, etc., is not made
to the auditor? Is it the sole responsibility of the auditor to search for relevant
evidence on which he gives his opinion? Doesn’t the financial officer have eth
ical obligations to the auditor?
Mr. Nagel’s observation that the financial officer’s first responsibility is
to see that management does not mislead itself to the ultimate detriment of
shareholders is a perceptive one. When that responsibility is fulfilled, ethical
problems involving honesty do not arise.

Olson
Since I have been intimately involved in the development of the
AICPA’s Proposed Restatement of the Code of Professional Ethics, my ob
jectivity has inevitably been compromised. My biased view of my committee
chairman’s presentation is that he has done an excellent job. I share his con
cern about the obstacles for effective enforcement of technical standards.

The effort to view ethics in corporate financial reporting as a total proc
ess can perhaps identify significant opportunities for improvement. We must
remember that the value of the reports we prepare and analyze is dependent
on the degree of user confidence we have earned. We are continuously con
fronted with opportunities to either increase or erode that confidence. Let’s
hope that, individually and as a group, we may exploit these opportunities
to better serve the consumer of our product.
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Critique
Of the Olson, Parker, Nagel, and Creamer papers

By Walter P. Stem, Senior Vice-President and Director, Burnham & Com
pany; President, Financial Analysts Federation, representing the Financial
Analysts Federation, and
Marilyn V. Brown, Assistant Vice-President, Burnham & Company; Mem
ber, Financial Accounting Policy Committee of the Financial Analysts Fed
eration, representing the Financial Analysts Federation

The papers presented here have given statements of ethical considera
tions in four different professional areas. While each author states that, in gen
eral, more progress is needed in the ethical standards in each of these areas,
we believe each author would also agree that what is considered acceptable
ethics today is somewhat changed from the acceptable standards of thirty,
twenty, or even ten years ago. And if some imagination were applied, it would
seem likely that what will be acceptable ten, twenty, or forty years in the fu
ture may well be quite different from the standards of today; for, ethical
codes of behavior have been changing over time, and this trend may well con
tinue.
Each of the papers has presented an excellent view of some of the pres
ent ethical questions and the means by which present standards are deter
mined and in some cases enforced. I would like to highlight and interrelate
some of these ethical questions and then go a step beyond, discussing some
areas of future change that I foresee.

Ethics and the Financial Analyst
Turning first to my own profession, that of the financial analyst, I will
note that it is a profession that is itself new, emerging as a significant entity
only with the end of World War II and the beginning of the postwar market
in equities. Thus, the ethical standards of the financial analyst have had only
a short period of time in which to gain an element of maturity. However, be
cause the analyst works within the framework of a highly regulated industry,
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the changes in ethical standards have in part been guided and directed by the
changing positions and regulations of the Securities and Exchange Commis
sion. In fact, in recent years the SEC has taken great leaps forward in de
termining proper ethical standards beyond what most of us in the industry
would have imagined. I am referring here, obviously, to the McDonnellDouglas case where the SEC took a quite different stance regarding fiduciary
responsibility than most of us would have anticipated, stating, in essence,
that the responsibility of the “tippee” was to the community at large rather
than, more narrowly, to the investors in his charge. Interestingly, the SEC po
sition places federal regulations regarding fiduciary responsibility in conflict
with most state laws.
Outside of the particular ramifications of the McDonnell-Douglas case,
the SEC has been moving rapidly in the area of defining inside information.
In times past many so-called security analysts and money managers existed on
advance and inside information from corporate officers and friends in busi
ness. While I would hesitate to even suggest this was considered ethical be
havior, it was in many cases standard operating behavior. Today the situation
is quite different. Not only has the giving and receiving of inside information
been proscribed, the analyst has been told by the SEC that should he be given
by management, information he believes has not been made public, and which
is significant, that information must be publicly disseminated by management
before he can utilize it. As Reed Parker points out in his paper, the significant
criteria here is the impact such information would have on the price of a
stock.
While the purpose of the SEC position has been to increase the flow of
information to the public in general and to eliminate a flow of inside informa
tion to just a few select analysts, the net result has been a great deal of con
fusion and, in my view, has in some cases also reduced analysts’ access to
some companies. Due to the possibility that inside information might be re
vealed to a single analyst, many companies have chosen as an alternative
meeting with analysts in large groups only. There has even been the question
of whether members of the press should be allowed to attend such mass meet
ings.
Historically, many a good analyst has, in company interviews, placed
great importance on his ability to “psych out” or to “read” management, when
leading them through an interview on a one-to-one basis. Often as a conse
quence of his interviewing technique he can find out more about the company,
and particularly, about areas of problems or potential problems than a com
pany may wish to reveal. In a mass audience this technique is lost, and, ulti
mately, management ends up running the session, likely revealing only those
things it chooses to reveal, and thereby possibly reducing the amount of infor
mation ultimately available to the public. I shall discuss the relationship be
tween the company and the analyst at some length later.
The ethical considerations displayed in terms of the quality of analytical
work and concern with the consuming public have come a long way in the
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last twenty years, although at times such as the superheated speculative mar
ket of 1968-69, one wonders. By and large, analysts no longer buy stocks in
advance of their own purchase recommendations; in many instances they will
have no ownership positions in the industries or companies they follow. In
time, analysts may be prohibited from owning the stocks of companies they
follow. There is a growing use of primary sources for inputs rather than reli
ance on someone else’s printed material, although there still appears to be a
degree of plagiarism, unfortunately. In my view, the institutionalization of the
market with higher quality research demands resulting, has made a significant
difference. By and large, institutions simply demand more and better
detail on recommendations. In addition, as professionals they have a level of
understanding of securities analysis far beyond that of the retail customer.
And if the brokerage community is to gain access through research to the
commission dollars available from institutions, it must meet their quality re
quirements. However, again recalling the “hot stock” market of 1968-69,
one sometimes wonders how much progress has actually been made as a result
of the institutionalization of the market. In any event, many ethical problems
remain.

Ethical Conflicts and Questions
Often discussed is the potential conflict that arises when a firm acts as in
vestment banker for a company. Problems here include the availability of in
side information and the difficulty of preparing objective research reports. At
Burnham, our solution to the investment banking relationship problem is to
draw a curtain between the investment banking and research departments.
Companies are covered separately by the two departments. Furthermore, we
do not issue research recommendations on companies where we have an in
vestment banking relationship; we merely issue information reports. However,
even when these two functions are separated within firms, the difficulty is not
completely resolved. If, for example, an analyst truly believes a stock is over
priced, is he free to say so if that company is an investment banking client?
As a compromise he can remain silent as to his views on the stock, but is this
appropriate if the firm’s customers own the stock?
An area which will be subject, in my opinion, to growing discussion also
involves the underwriting function. First there is the question of whether a
brokerage firm applies the same standards when recommending stocks in
which a firm has an underwriting position as are used when the firm develops
a recommendation independently within the research department. Second is
the variation in the kinds of information that are available in conjunction with
an underwriting. In a public offering, a prospectus is filed with the SEC, but
certain important comanagers of the offering may also have the advantage of
an underwriting memo containing information which the SEC will not allow
included in the prospectus. Doesn’t this put these comanagers in the position
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of having more information than those investors seeing the prospectus? If a
European prospectus is written, those having access to this particular document
may also have an advantage over the domestic investor without access to this
information. When a company is in the process of making a private place
ment, it may compile for these potential private investors a great deal of in
formation on the company, including earnings projections, that it does not
ordinarily make available to the public. If, while such a private placement is
in process, a company changes its earnings projections, this change can have
important impact on the price of their stock, with the individual investor un
aware of the reason.
Subject to much present discussion is the position of the mutual fund or
investment management accounts managed by the brokerage firm. How
arm’s-length can the relationship be? Who receives adverse information first,
the in-house client or those outside? In my view the importance of this issue
has been exaggerated, for the greatest motivation of any money manager is the
performance he achieves. At Burnham we have no particular problem with
the question of who receives information first; it is easily handled by our own
internal rules.
Another question which has been raised, but which I think is unlikely to
become an ethical problem of importance is that of block positioning and
crossing of stocks when the firm’s research department has a negative or posi
tive attitude toward the stock. I believe that the trading function is sufficiently
separate from the research function to prevent any real ethical conflict here.
Some other questions which I believe are of interest are these:

1. What are reasonable ethical standards to be applied when a brokerage firm
makes a market in an over-the-counter stock and feels, legitimately, that
the stock is a sound research recommendation?

2. On the institutional side, how many expensive dinners, baseball or foot
ball tickets, and Broadway shows constitute special compensation or a giveup for brokerage commission business?
3. Does a company sponsored and paid analysts’ junket to visit their ski resort
complex or their Florida land development company jeopardize the objec
tivity of analysts in working on that company?

4. What is the analyst’s responsibility when he believes strongly, on the basis
of his analysis, that a company is in serious difficulty, but can’t prove it
decisively? To publish his views could drive the price of the stock down
sharply and could, in fact, totally undermine whatever is left of the viability
of the company, indeed put the company out of business. Not only does
the analyst put in jeopardy his future relationships with that company, he
can perhaps be a causal factor of the very thing he was anticipating.
5. How far should an analyst go in analyzing a company’s social responsibility
posture? To date, this is still a very subjective matter, yet ultimately it may
weigh heavily on a company’s costs and its competitive position.
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These are, in my view, some of the many areas of ethical consideration
which are presently undergoing change regarding the financial analysts. With
in five years, some of the actions currently regarded as acceptable ethical be
havior may be so no longer.

The Analyst and the Company

The analyst does not work in an intellectual vacuum. Changes in ethical
standards in the world around him will very much impact upon his own posi
tion. Perhaps the area with which the analyst is most closely tied is that of the
corporation, ultimately the source of much of his information in company
analysis.
The analyst has two primary responsibilities—to his company and to his
customers or those for whom he has fiduciary responsibility. But because in
part an analyst’s capabilities are judged in terms of his digging out and dis
seminating sound information (in a brokerage firm environment) he is under
much more pressure to reveal than to conceal. This, I think you will agree, is
not necessarily true for the corporation executive. He also has two masters to
serve, his management group and his stockholders; but stockholders are, to
date at least, a relatively ineffective pressure group, so that by default the
corporate manager’s primary allegiance and responsibility is to the manage
ment group and the maintenance of its viability. Consequently, there is a
natural tendency to show himself in the best possible light and to avoid, if
possible, any indication that the management group is not functioning proper
ly.
For many years in the history of the publicly owned corporation in the
United States, any stockholder other than one in a position to dethrone man
agement was treated as a nuisance and know-nothing. And, by and large,
stockholders have accepted this subservient classification. Most of the SEC
positions dealing with inside information, requirements for expanded reporting
in prospectuses, proxies, annual reports, quarterly reports, 10-Ks, and press
releases have been designed to require companies to reveal more about their
operations. Much of the debate within the public accounting profession with
in recent years has been concerned with the same subject—providing account
ants with guidelines so that management is made to reveal more information
about the true details of their operations.
Corporation ethics have come a long way since the entrepreneurial days
of watered assets, outright stock manipulation and sparse, at best, financial re
porting. But there is still, I believe, a long way to go. Here also I think that
the growing institutionalization of the market has been a major factor in pres
suring companies to reveal more of their operations. Granted that at times
it has been an adverse factor when institutional investors have sought short
term performance and have pressured managements to achieve short-term
gains in earnings at the expense of the longer-term health of the company. But
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on balance, I believe that the institutions’ drive for more and more information
and their great ability to provide needed bond and equity financing to com
panies has been beneficial in terms of pressure they have applied on com
panies directly, and indirectly through the SEC.
In earlier days management and ownership of the company were by and
large the same. Today management is usually a group of hired professionals
with only limited direct ownership of the company. Yet the shift is incom
plete. The board of directors, having overall responsibility for the direction of
the company, is only in theory elected by shareholders as the limited numbers
of proxy fights would indicate. Individual stockholders have rarely had either
the strength or the will to introduce a second slate of candidates for the board
of directors, and thereby gain anything. Professional investment groups have
usually taken the view that unless they agreed with management they should
not own the stock, and thus, have chosen to sell stock holdings rather than
attempt to change management. Thus, in reality the board of directors and
the management of the company have become largely self-perpetuating. It is
only in very recent years that the Lewis Gilberts, Wilma Sosses, and Ralph
Naders have begun to vocalize about management policies, and they have
done little more than nudge management. The Financial Analysts Federa
tion has, through the work of its corporate information committee, attempted
to upgrade the quality of corporate reporting through granting awards for ex
cellence each year. But I am afraid that even here the results, in terms of get
ting managements to do a better job of corporate reporting, have been rela
tively meager. We have awarded the excellent, but, beyond reporting
problem areas to the SEC, have done little in terms of punishing the difficult.

The Financial Officer

Mr. Nagel writes at some length about the various audiences for com
pany reports and the difficulties of satisfying all of them. While there are
many different groups having claims upon the financial information a com
pany can provide, I would think the company’s primary responsibility is to the
owners of the company, the shareholders. Inmost instances these will be
long-term investors, seeking, as Mr. Nagel says, steady long-term growth gen
erally coinciding with the goals for the company established by management.
However, to take the subject to its absurd limits, what if a major portion of
the stock were owned by two-day or six-week traders, would not the com
pany’s responsibility at that time be to their needs (recognizing that in both
instances the position of the SEC becomes an intervening factor)?
Certainly the requirements of the company’s creditors cannot be ignored.
But they are not owners, merely lenders. The apparent strengths of the banks
and other lending institutions vis-a-vis company managements have, in my
view, developed as a consequence of the relatively weak positions of the com
pany owners; the lenders have, in the past, exercised much more muscle.
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But, one can certainly raise the question of whether they have an inherent
right to obtain more information about a company than its owners.
Companies have long claimed that the need for secrecy is a function of
competitive position. Yet my experience has been that a company is often
more willing to discuss new developments which reflect well on their man
agements. This even occurs when one might assume that such announcements
might enable competition to react more quickly. I am thinking here of such
things as new products only in the prototype stage and new store locations. It
is human nature to be more reticent to disclose adverse developments or to
postpone recognizing and announcing a difficult decision until the last possible
moment. Analysts frequently complain that information which is already
known to competitors or is readily discernible to someone within the business
such as market share, or profit margins by product line, has been very diffi
cult to obtain.
Logically there are, as Reed Parker points out, always some areas which
a corporate officer may be willing to discuss with an analyst but which if at
tributed or even emphasized in a report would be damaging to a company. In
my view this is not really a question of ethics but of good manners. Just as
one would hardly reveal a personal confidence such as a report of a friend
having marital difficulties, a management statement that weak union leader
ship would allow for an easy labor settlement should come within the same
category of confidence.

The Accountant Enters the Picture

The relationships between the corporate financial executive, the public
accountant and the securities analyst are becoming increasingly intertwined.
The securities analyst seeks to develop a knowledge of the true results of a
company’s operations; the corporate financial executive usually desires to
show his company in a good light; and the public accountant must certify
that the reported financial results are proper. As new industries develop in
the United States economy and as corporate managements become increas
ingly sophisticated in the management of capital, the job of the certified pub
lic accountant has become increasingly complex. In recent years the
AICPA has had to come to grips with the growing use of quasi-equity instru
ments such as convertible debentures and warrants, the mushrooming acqui
sition movement, and franchise accounting, among others. Currently under
discussion are land development accounting, leasing, marketable securities,
overstated sales prices, and many other measurement problems. One of the
great difficulties faced by accountants is that they are invariably working
after the fact, dealing with abuses of present accounting regulations.
The position of the public accountant is today undergoing rapid change
in my opinion. Whereas formerly he was held responsible merely for attesting
that corporate reports were made in accordance with generally accepted ac
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counting principles, increasingly he is being required to point out that while
accounting treatment may be in accord with generally accepted accounting
principles, the financial results are not all what they seem to be. The most ob
vious example is the Penn Central case where the accounting firm of Peat,
Marwick, Mitchell & Co. is being sued for failing to indicate that the Penn
Central was in serious financial jeopardy. Recently we have seen, in a few
instances, accountants noting in their statements that a firm was, on the basis
of present capital structure, in serious financial jeopardy—an important step
forward in my opinion. And I find increasingly that analysts are, in fact, read
ing the auditors’ certifications to determine if there are any exceptions.
One of the serious strains upon the ethical position of the certified public
accountant is, as Wallace Olson indicates, the relationship of the CPA firm
to the corporation. Theoretically hired by stockholders, the CPA firm is, in
fact, paid by the corporation which, realistically, wields the power to hire or
fire the auditing firm. Just as few stockholders have seriously challenged a
slate of directors proposed by management, I know of no instance where they
have suggested, much less successfully elected, a different accounting firm
than the one proposed by management. Thus, if an accounting firm chooses to
take a tough stand vis-a-vis a reporting method desired by management, it
faces the very real possibility of being replaced as the firm’s accountant. In
realistic terms this places too great a burden upon the accountant. Prior to
the new SEC regulations which will require companies to notify the SEC
whenever they change accounting firms and also require a letter from the re
signed firm stating the reasons for the change, the debate between company
and accounting firm was very much one sided. The company had nothing to
lose, the accounting firm everything—the account. I would not want even to
suggest that the accountant invariably knuckles under to the company posi
tion. I am suggesting, however, that there are inevitably a great many compro
mises along the way. Even though none of these compromise decisions in and
of themselves would be regarded as material, in fact none of them may be in
the best interests of the shareholders.
In negotiating sessions with company managements, the accountants
work under another handicap. While they are expert accountants they often
have relatively little awareness of the impact that the final financial statements
have upon the investing public. Company managements which deal almost
constantly with the securities analyst are well aware of this impact and thus
are in a position of strength of knowledge in terms of framing the financial
statement to maximize their image with the analytical profession. Hopefully,
as the FAF and the American Institute of CPAs work more closely together,
this knowledge deficiency will be ameliorated.
As consumerism moves into the area of corporate reporting the threat
and fact of sizeable lawsuits against accounting firms will definitely help to
strengthen the backbone of the accounting firm in its dealings with corporate
management. If the costs of a potential lawsuit will be more burdensome than
the possible loss of income from a corporate account, the choice is much simp-
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lifted. This threat is very real. Since accounting firms are partnerships, any
financial liability of the firm becomes a personal liability of the partners. While
liability insurance has been sufficient to date to meet most or all such settle
ments, premiums for such insurance are on the increase. Although higher
premium costs can be incorporated into the fee structure paid by company
managements, any accounting firm whose premium costs got out of line
would be pressured to eliminate the causes of those higher costs. Being held
truly accountable to the shareholder will help considerably in establishing the
fact of independence for the public accountant.
I find that I must take serious issue with Mr. Olson’s statement that “the
auditor’s opinions on financial statements do not relate to the quality of man
agement but rather to the fairness of presentation of financial position and
operating results .... It is difficult to demonstrate how the auditor can cover
up bad business decisions simply through application of accounting or report
ing techniques.” So long as auditors are stuck with a “Napoleonic Code” of
specific generally accepted accounting standards rather than a “common law”
standard, they will probably accept too many judgments from management
as to how results are to be determined and presented—judgments which
are in too many instances designed merely to obscure bad management.
I am not suggesting that there is any altering of accounting records by col
lusion. Rather, there is frequently the need for an application of judgment as
to whether the financial statements do truly present fairly the results for the
period. Some obvious past examples come to mind.

1. Franchise accounting where sales of franchises were not segregated from
results of ongoing operations.

2. Allowing deferred expenditures to reach major proportions. Here, I am
thinking specifically in terms of one company in which deferred lease ac
quisition, marketing, and research and development expenses totaled $32.6
million at the end of 1970, compared to the company’s total net worth of
$39.1 million. This particular company has had some areas of major dis
agreement with its auditing firm, and the auditors have prevailed in forcing
sizeable changes. They have not, however, gotten around to this, in my
opinion, very questionable deferred expense item.
3. Treating marketable securities held as either current or long-term assets,
apparently at the whim of management, depending on whether it was more
favorable to carry them at cost or market. This abuse will, hopefully, be
dealt with in the forthcoming APB Opinion on marketable securities.

4. Questions of materiality. A company management can scrape together a
good-looking annual statement merely by making a number of changes in
accounting procedures or estimates. No individual change is of sufficient
significance to require disclosure, yet together they can add up to be quite
favorable.
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One of the great challenges to patience and endurance faced by an analyst
occurs when he believes a company’s earnings are being significantly over
stated and that, sooner or later, the accounting profession will catch up with
this overstatement. In the meantime, however, the stock may perform very
strongly on the appearance of a very good earnings record. In such situations
a kind of Gresham’s law of securities analysis comes into play—bad analysis
drives out good. This is one of the reasons why analysts are so concerned with
the elements of accounting.
Fortunately, the accounting profession is moving very rapidly and with
great dedication to resolve many of these difficulties. Anyone who is aware
of the great amounts of time and money being expended by the accounting
firms, not only in terms of their membership and support of study groups and
the APB, but also in terms of the intracompany decisions required almost
daily, recognizes the multitude of changes going on within the profession. An
excellent indication of the profession’s own concern is the two study groups
currently in process on (1) determining the objectives of financial statements
and (2) a review of the very means by which accounting principles are estab
lished. Because both groups are heavily weighted by individuals outside the
accounting profession, it is possible that some important new concepts will
come out of these two groups. It is obvious that the accounting profession is
rapidly coming of age.

The Banker

I have left the discussion of Mr. Creamer’s paper on banking ethics last
for two reasons. First, because the ethical considerations are somewhat outside
the very closely intertwined relationships between the securities analyst, cor
porate financial officer, and accountant and second, because it is the area in
which I have the least personal knowledge.
Mr. Creamer raises some very interesting questions regarding the respon
sibilities of the banker to his banking clients, his banking associates, and his
principals. The ethical questions here are probably the most difficult to tackle
because in each case he has a great responsibility, with no one area demanding
prior consideration. Clearly he has a responsibility not to divulge confidential
and nonpublic information provided him as a lender, yet at the same time he
is serving as a credit reference on companies where he is a lender. The bank
that serves as a lending institution, with access to privileged information in
support of that function, may also manage hundreds of millions of dollars in
portfolios invested in bonds and equities. Any seepage of this privileged infor
mation between the lending operations and the portfolio operation grants the
portfolio managers an advantage through the use of inside information. While
in the past this was merely an ethical question, with the recent McDonnellDouglas decision, it is now patently illegal.
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However, of even greater concern to many is the question of how much
is too much. I am speaking here of the more than $300 billion in investments
managed by banks, the largest single pool of investments in the world. With
that kind of power, the banks are obviously in the very difficult position of
bearing the responsibility for acting in the best interests of their principals
without at the same time, because of their power, acting very much in their
own interest. The ethical challenges are enormous.
In the recent APB Opinion on accounting for equity interests it was de
termined that, in the case of corporate ownership, a 20 per cent stock interest
in another company was sufficient to be deemed control. While banks have as
yet been reluctant to publish their fiduciary holdings in corporations, so that
facts cannot be ascertained, I would venture that there are instances where a
bank may have control over the voting authority of 20 per cent or more of the
stock of a company.
There are the very real questions raised: Can a bank act in a dual capac
ity, as both a fiduciary and lender? And, even if in its own view the bank can
fill both of these roles independently, will it be so regarded by a third party—
the company? In other words, the appearance of the ability to exercise power
may be more important than the decision to exercise that power.
In my judgment, many of the ethical questions being raised in regard to
banks will, before long, be answered either through new legislation or judicial
interpretation. And we may find that when ethics are regulated the changes
required can be much greater than might have been expected.

Conclusion
As a securities analyst I can safely say that whatever regulation has been
imposed in regard to ethics has been in the long-term interests of the invest
ment world, certainly for the consumer and ultimately for the firms them
selves. Raising the level of ethical standards cannot hurt the responsible firm
or individual; it can only sanction and strengthen the positions that they have
already taken in the past. Higher ethical standards will, however, drive out of
the business those unsavory unethical elements in its ranks. Therefore, I feel
very strongly that whatever we can do to bring about improved ethical stan
dards for the business we represent will be of benefit to all of us.
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Critique
Of the Olson, Parker, Nagel, and Creamer papers

By Donald P. Jones, Senior Vice-President—Finance, Sun Oil Company
(retired), representing the Financial Executives Institute

The topic of the symposium is a broad, almost nebulous one, and it will
be difficult to effect a reconciliation of the four viewpoints in this paper. How
ever, I will approach the assignment by showing that the requirement for
more emphasis on ethics in financial reporting, an area of commonality in the
four papers, can be resolved through better disclosure, honesty, and integrity
on the part of financial statement preparers, and a better understanding of
financial reporting objectives and problems on the part of the financial state
ment users.
First of all I would like to address myself to some specific points made in
the papers. There seems to be no controversy among the four authors over
the assumption that the responsibility for the preparation of reliable financial
reports rests with corporate management. However, some differences in think
ing are evident regarding the question: To whom is management primarily re
sponsible for honest and reliable financial reports?

Whose Interests Take Precedence?

Mr. Nagel starts out in his paper with the statement that the interests of
the general public, customers, labor, and others in financial reports are defi
nitely secondary to those of the investor or owner of the enterprise. Mr.
Creamer takes a different position by placing the bank officers’ responsibility
to their stockholders in a secondary role to that of the community. Mr. Olson
indicates that the auditors have an obligation to be completely fair both with
their clients and in meeting their responsibilities to the public. He goes on to
say, however, that where conflicts exist, the public interest must take prece
dence.
I agree that management’s responsibility for financial reporting runs first
and foremost to its stockholders, but at the same time we must recognize man
agement’s obligation to the public for honest and reliable reporting. The ques
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tion then is how we can meet this dual responsibility. First of all, we, as cor
porate management, must be willing to take a hard look at ourselves to make
certain our reporting practices are honest, reliable, fully informative, and in
tune with today’s requirements. Then, each of the disciplines represented at
this symposium must reach a better understanding of its individual responsi
bilities relative to financial reporting.
Mr. Parker states that the analyst’s relevant information base rests in an
unusually large number of disciplines beyond financial analysis itself. Ac
counting, he says, is crucial. I agree that it is an absolute necessity for analysts
to have a complete understanding of accounting, financial reporting practices,
and the related responsibilities of corporate managements. Such an under
standing would support the analysts’ responsibilities of properly interpreting
financial information for their clients and would quiet much of the criticism
made by analysts themselves. The same advice applies to bankers and is borne
out by Mr. Creamer’s admission that a bank officer has to understand the
businesses of his borrowers as well as the principal philosophies of manage
ment which are the underlying forces creating the numbers in the financial
statements.

The Need for Adequate Guidelines
The auditor’s responsibilities, according to Mr. Olson, are based on his
obligation to express his professional opinion as to whether or not his client’s
financial statements are fairly presented and not misleading. He points out,
however, that the present auditor’s report does not indicate whether, in the
opinion of the auditor, the best accounting standard was applied in those
areas where there are acceptable alternatives. I believe that this is a weakness
and when corrected will firm up the auditor’s responsibilities and help settle the
argument over alternative accounting principles.
Mr. Olson goes on to state that no matter how extensive and how refined
the accounting and reporting standards of the profession may become, they
will never be wholly appropriate under all circumstances. I say amen. Also,
I am thoroughly convinced that the members of the Accounting Principles
Board could not be more aware of this. However, in their overreaction to ad
verse criticism, they have chosen to disregard this philosophy and concentrate
their efforts on the development of rigid, inflexible, and highly detailed rules
which would seem to virtually assure their inappropriateness to specific situations.
I strongly urge that the APB stop reacting drastically to outside pressure,
breathe life back into flexibility, and commence developing broad, general
accounting guidelines (standards). This will enable companies to apply the
accounting principles which are most appropriate to their situations. In order
to prevent unethical application of accounting principles, companies should
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be required to fully disclose the justification for any departures from those
standards which are most appropriate for their circumstances.1
Mr. Nagel states that the divergence between the interests of lenders,
speculators, and investors in equity securities is sufficiently great that decisions
affecting the financial reporting of a corporation could be made in quite
different ways depending upon which category of interest is involved. I agree
with Mr. Nagel when he goes on to say that the problem of the financial exec
utive becomes one of preparing financial statements with a balanced view
point. Full and fair disclosure meets the criterion for a balanced viewpoint
and clearly takes care of the needs of all interested parties.

Insider Information
Admittedly, cases will arise where additional information will be required
by various classes of statement users. While there is no requirement that the
financial executive, as the source of information, do the work for them, it is
part of his responsibility to make available to the certified public accountant,
the financial analyst, the commercial bank lending officers, and others suffi
cient information to permit them to properly discharge their responsibilities.
This information can be divulged at group meetings, at individual conferences
or otherwise, but always with the purpose of satisfying the real needs of the
user while conserving to the greatest extent possible the time and energy of
all parties. If these disclosures include anything new or startling, they must
be made available simultaneously to the general public.
There is, of course, the problem of insider information and whether cer
tain types of information having to do with the change in status of a company
should be revealed upon request or otherwise, but these deal with basic matters
of personal honesty and integrity. It seems to me that it is not the responsibility
of the financial executive to paint a picture which portrays his corporation in
the most favorable light but rather, it is his responsibility to give full and ac
curate knowledge of the precise situation in which his corporation finds itself
to those who are interested in it. While it is appropriate for him to maintain the
highest possible credit rating in the event of the need for outside sources of
funds, it is his responsibility to achieve this objective by seeing to it that his
corporation conducts itself in such a manner as to deserve the rating and that
the existence of this condition is duly impressed upon the financial community.
It is not his responsibility simply to live within the letter of the law or by any
specific rules of professional conduct or generally accepted accounting prin
ciples. These should be guidelines and should not be ignored, but his primary*

1

In this regard I should like to refer to the excellent approach set forth by A. Carl Tietjen,
“Financial Reporting Responsibilities,” The Journal of Accountancy, January 1971.
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responsibility is to portray a true and accurate picture even though the means
are new and revolutionary. Such conduct on his part will not only achieve the
results desired but, in the process, will contribute toward the development of
superior financial reporting.

Agreement Among the Professions
A review of the papers presented by Messrs. Creamer, Nagel, Olson, and
Parker clearly indicates that these gentlemen have restricted themselves to
their own particular field and, happily, have not added in any degree to the
disagreement and, indeed, acrimony which has sometimes characterized the
relations between the disciplines which each represents. While I would not
expect to agree with all points made in the papers, I do think that the various
ethical problems are clearly delineated and provide much food for thought.
Each supports the thesis that the practitioners in his area are generally of
high moral character and need little detailed surveillance. With this I concur
and, moreover, I believe the same concept is applicable to people generally
once they recognize the general rules of the game. However, I commend the
AICPA, the FAF, and the Robert Morris Associates for their real efforts at
self-regulation, including the adoption of standards of ethical conduct, even
though those manifestations of the aim for perfection are helpful chiefly in
providing the appearance of adherence to high ethical standards which, in this
cosmetic age, sometimes seems more important than adherence itself.
In general, it is my thesis that practically all of the problems expressed
by these gentlemen as they concern interdisciplinary matters are related to the
assumption of inevitable conflict whereas, in my opinion, this assumption is
invalid and inappropriate. If this critique is to have one simple theme, it is
that no basic conflict exists between financial executives, certified public ac
countants, financial analysts, or credit grantors and that the purpose of all is
to provide full and adequate disclosure to their various publics so that those
publics are fully informed and in a position to make appropriate judgments
for themselves.
We would do well to recognize, however, that there are two situations
which make the achievement of these objectives extremely difficult. One of
these is the fact that the language of accounting deals specifically with dollarand-cents figures with which the layman considers himself fully familiar and
completely competent to analyze. It is common belief that the income state
ment should reflect the “true" income of the company for the period indicated
and that the balance sheet should truly set forth the value of each of the assets
enumerated. Since there is little recognition of the fact that each individual
has a different idea of what constitutes “true” income or the proper valuation
of assets, even the most meticulous and ethical practitioner will necessarily
fail to produce results which fully satisfy the preconceived, but largely unex
pressed, views of the public generally or even of his particular clientele. Were
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we able to express our financial statements by the extensive use of algebraic
symbols or other means less familiar to the public, there would be a greater
willingness to admit the need for definition, intelligent interpretation and anal
ysis, and much of the communication gap now present would disappear.
The second problem has to do with what I would describe as the general
moral decline which has been especially noticeable during the past thirty or
forty years. This is particularly evident over the entire span of this period
through the increasing acceptance of the philosophy that an individual is en
titled to get all he can regardless of the merits of the case when he is dealing
with the government and with large companies, particularly insurance com
panies. I believe this same moral decline has been evidenced even more
noticeably in recent years by the irresponsible attacks on institutions of all
kinds without relation to the facts and apparently chiefly for the purpose of
obtaining notoriety or personal gain for the individual attacker. While these
somewhat extraneous situations may have little impact on the ethics of cor
porate financial reporting as such, they do severely influence what can be ac
complished in the area of improving the credibility of financial reporting.
From my point of view, corporate financial reporting is the sole responsi
bility of corporate management. The responsibility of the certifying public
accountant is basically limited to the attest function, indicating that, in his
professional judgment, the financial reports certified are correct and do ac
curately portray the financial results of operations during the reporting period.
Insofar as financial reporting is concerned, it is then the responsibility of the
financial analysts and the credit grantors to properly interpret these statements
for their individual publics and to assist those publics in making appropriate
judgments based upon the financial results of operations in whatever areas
their clients may have interests. Since we all seem to agree that no one type
of reporting and no single form of financial reporting will satisfy all interests,
management must decide how best to acquaint its stockholders with the true
nature, status, and prospects of its affairs and pattern its financial reporting
to achieve that end. It then has the responsibility to make available whatever
additional information is necessary to satisfy all other legitimate interests as
previously discussed in this paper.

Toward the Goal of Professionalism

While it is the prime responsibility of management to provide the means
by which these various ends may be accomplished, it needs to, and should, en
courage suggestions and assistance in accomplishing its objectives from many
other sources, specifically including the other participants in this symposium.
It should be clearly indicated, however, that this goal of achieving a complete
understanding on the part of all concerned is quite different from the impos
sible dream of providing a foolproof system to catch or call to account all ne
farious activities. This means that all elements in this symposium should per
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form their functions in a highly professional manner, welcoming further sug
gestions as to improvement rather than attempting to prove their expertise by
devising specific, detailed, and rigid rules by which our less talented or less
highly motivated associates should be held in line. It should be recognized that
rules which are too strict and confining breed the desire to beat the system and
that human ingenuity, in time, will in fact achieve that aim regardless of the
quality of the restrictive edicts. In such cases, it would be far superior to as
sist the constituted legal authorities in prosecuting those who conduct them
selves improperly. It perhaps follows that it is impossible and probably even
undesirable to protect people from their own folly, but it is most desirable and
possible to provide the tools whereby they will be able to make competent
judgments in what they consider to be their own interests.
As a final philosophical comment, let me add that the search for perfec
tion is commendable, but our enthusiasm for attaining this end should not
blind us to our individual inabilities to achieve it, and we should be ever mind
ful of the absolute necessity of maintaining a healthy climate in which progress
may continue toward that ultimate goal.
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Critique
Of the Olson, Parker, Nagel, and Creamer papers

By Norman J. Collins, Senior Vice-President, The South Carolina National
Bank; 2nd Vice-President of the Robert Morris Associates, representing the
Robert Morris Associates

This was a highly interesting although rather disparate group of papers
to critique. My reactions ranged from agreement, through shared perplexity,
on to disagreement, and back. In general, let me commend these four writers
for the depth and perceptiveness of their convictions and the persuasive man
ner in which they set them forth. Because of the varied content of the papers,
my comments are directed primarily to the papers individually.

Olson
Mr. Olson’s is an exceptionally well-reasoned paper. The accountant
does, indeed, have many conflicting demands which tug at him—perhaps a
greater number in an absolute sense than most of the other professions repre
sented—and Mr. Olson and his profession are to be commended for express
ing them so openly. Change has not always been as rapid as we (and they)
would like, but progress has been made and determination for further improve
ment comes through strongly.
Despite this progress, and after noting the many opportunities, which
Mr. Olson identifies, for an accountant to behave unethically or unwisely one
could conclude that attacking these opportunities as individual problems
would be almost impossible. A solution would seem to call for a restructuring
of the whole environment. While Mr. Olson never did pose this possibility as
such, he seems almost to have anticipated it in that in a number of critical
areas he does pose radical alternatives to the present way of doing things. But,
without exception, he provides logical reasons why these are even less de
sirable, on balance, than present practices.
Nowhere is this undesirability more striking than in those several areas
where, if the present system continues unimproved, government intervention
may be the next step. This alternative more than any other should provide
strong incentive to all parties represented at this symposium to work for im
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provement. There is no reason whatsoever to believe that bureaucratic inter
vention in this area would be any less rife with inefficiencies and conflicting
demands than in other areas where control has already shifted.
Ethics is a concept highly oriented toward the individual, and most exam
ples of ethical conflicts ultimately get down to a choice between some action
which is proper or “noble” in the eyes of almost everybody else, but which
runs counter to the responsibility which every individual has to himself and
to his own materialistic well-being. A good example of this is pointed out by
Mr. Olson in his discussion of “independence, integrity, and objectivity” where
he discusses instances in which completely ethical behavior on the part of the
accountant would undoubtedly result in the loss of both the client and a sub
stantial fee. Olson was both wise and practical in introducing this point; it in
dicates how quickly a discussion of ethics in any profession can switch from a
comfortable setting of hypotheses and generalities to areas which can be truly
“gut-wrenching.”
At any rate, we can wonder whether there is some way to spare the ac
countant this awful “either-or” dilemma. Perhaps the problem could be par
tially solved through greater insistence that the auditor report only to an audit
committee composed of outside members of the board of directors, particular
ly in areas as sensitive as this one. Another approach might be to require that
accountants make public statements when they choose to drop an engagement.
(Of course, such an action would itself raise ancillary problems which would
require a careful balance between frank disclosure and the laws of libel and
defamation.) The question here is basic: If loss of income is at times a deter
rent to wholly ethical conduct, could we not find some way to mitigate such
losses?
Elsewhere in that same section, Mr. Olson discusses contingency fees.
There can scarcely be disagreement that such arrangements should be pro
hibited in connection with the expression of opinions on financial statements.
Consider, for instance, an accountant preparing a statement on a contingency
basis whereupon a loan is to be obtained or a new equity issue is to be sub
scribed completely. Such a situation would have heavy potential for profes
sional compromise. Yet, admittedly, there are gray areas. The author men
tions one—tax matters. Others which come to mind are finders’ fees for mon
ey, property, or personnel. But, in general, if the accountant does not receive,
on the basis of his usual fee schedule, adequate compensation for work done,
then bankers, among others, should be willing to support a legitimate increase.
Olson next discusses competence and technical standards. A discussion
of the competence of accountants is difficult for at least two reasons. First,
the degree of competence of any professional person is almost always a matter
of judgment rather than of fact. Second, competency—or incompetency—re
fers to individuals and not to a profession as a whole. Most accountants are
thoroughly competent professionals. However, perhaps he should not go so far
as to state that there is no “serious public concern about the profession’s com
petence.” The number of recent law suits against major accounting firms

209

alone—and we must assume they have some reasonable basis in fact—would
seem to contradict this assertion.
Competence, of course, involves far more than judicious adherence to a
code of ethics and the possession of unassailable honesty. It even goes beyond
the consistent application of those accounting and reporting standards which
are most appropriate in each case. It is so broad, in fact, as Mr. Olson states,
as to require a complete understanding of all the peculiarities of the client’s
business. With this in mind, we can only wonder whether there are instances
where accountants have accepted an audit assignment which by most reason
able standards is “over their heads.” An editorial in the July 24 issue of Busi
ness Week treats rather directly of this subject; to quote in part:

Members of the New York Stock Exchange, understandably an
noyed at having to ante up $100,000,000 to pay off debts of busted
members, have filed suit for $5,000,000 against the partners of Orvis
Brothers & Co., one of the fifteen Wall Street firms that failed last
year. By including the Orvis firm’s auditors, Haskins & Sells, in the
suit, the Exchange has given the public a glimpse of one of the mes
siest problems in the securities industry: The audited statements on
which everyone depends for information about member firms some
times conceal weakness rather than reveal it.
Auditing a brokerage firm is a very complex and difficult job.
But that is no reason to let the auditor off the hook. No law compels
the accountant to take on a job he cannot handle. If the accounting
profession has bitten off more than it can chew, it has done so eager
ly. It has oversold the capability of the independent auditor. It has
represented that accounting is a matter of fact when clearly it is a
matter of opinion. And, by carrying balance sheet figures to pennies,
it has implied an exactness that never exists.

It is not a purpose of this critique to agree with or rebut these harsh
words. Rather, the point to be made is that it is the accountant himself, and
not a client or third party, who is in the best position to judge his own com
petence, and that one of the most highly ethical practices in which an account
ant or any other professional can indulge is this very type of self-examination
prior to accepting an engagement. It is better to prevent a suit than to win
one.
In discussing technical standards, Mr. Olson and his profession are to be
commended for the efforts which they are making, including two highly im
portant study groups, to eliminate alternatives and establish principles in areas
where they may be lacking. Particularly noteworthy was his statement that
“the degree of sophistication and the needs of users vary so widely that it
seems inevitable that multiple types of financial statements must be designed to
meet the specific needs of each user group.” This is based on the premise that
the same form of financial statements cannot be all things to all people, and we
bankers would agree with that.
How rapidly such special types of financial statements will come into
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being is, of course, not known at this time. Meanwhile, we bankers would
continue to press for sufficient detail and comment in the traditional format
to give us a complete picture of a borrower’s operations. We encourage the
CPA to be as detailed and meaningful in his reports as his fee arrangement
with the client permits.
In his discussion of how and by whom accounting and reporting principles
should be established, Olson summarizes the significance of the wording of the
short-form report in a succinct and laudable manner. If the profession can ever
get to the point where users of short-form reports can consistently assume that
the type of considered judgments and sorting of alternatives which he describes
have indeed been applied, a giant step will have been taken.
In this same area, and also commendable, is Olson’s forthright stand on
the auditor’s accepting responsibility to choose the best accounting standard
when alternatives are available. In the face of client pressures and competitive
forces, it is sometimes all too easy to permit a sort of Gresham’s law to prevail,
resulting in the adoption of auditing standards and generally accepted account
ing principles which, by more objective standards, are far from optimal.
His acknowledgement of the profession’s ethical responsibility to develop
accounting and reporting standards for new and complex forms of transactions
—many of which are subject to abuse—is critical. Examples readily come to
mind: computer leasing, franchising, land development businesses and, as al
luded to earlier, securities dealers. But with this responsibility goes the con
comitant one of avoiding rules which are entirely too complex, confusing, am
biguous, and even conflicting. What have we gained, if, in an effort to resolve
one problem by setting out rules and guidelines, interpretive problems are
created in other areas not foreseen or anticipated?
Olson concludes by observing that to the extent that education and vol
untary compliance with the ethical standards of the profession fail, to that
same extent recourse should be had to enforcement through disciplinary pro
ceedings. This is certainly the proper relationship of the cart and the horse:
voluntary compliance, as he pointed out, is generally better than forced com
pliance. And in the special area of voluntary compliance through education,
perhaps we bankers have our own special ethical obligation to the accounting
profession—that being to work with the profession in discovering and elimina
ting, through various professional review mechanisms, allegedly substandard
audit reports. We bankers haven’t done too good a job in this area for a num
ber of reasons, including inertia. We seem, rather, to be all too content to cat
egorize the work of a given accountant as something less than desirable, and,
therefore, sort of “work around him” in any future dealing, and/or to rely
upon our ability to cope with each instance of incomplete or unsatisfactory
audit information on a case-by-case basis, ferreting out on our own whatever
additional information or background circumstances we have a hunch we
need. This works or does not work in direct proportion to the analytic skill of
the banker, but it is at best a short-run, symptomatic approach and does not
work toward the betterment of both professions in the long run.
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Nagel
Mr. Nagel states right at the beginning of his paper that “there is almost
always more than one right alternative” in corporate financial reporting. While
one might question the “almost always” condition, it is true that options are
offered in a number of areas. Evaluation of inventory and depreciation prac
tices are prime examples of this, as they afford numerous alternatives perfectly
acceptable in accounting. But it also appears to be true that in some areas,
even though options are available, one appears to be more proper than others
for the best financial reporting, and an ethical responsibility exists to find and
apply it.
The presence of alternatives also points up rather forceably the need for
more explanation as to the methods used in, and the rationale behind, the prep
aration of reports to be used by many different classes of people. Documen
tation as to what method was used as well as why it was used would be highly
desirable.
A bit later Nagel states that, “whatever others may think, the interests of
the general public, customers, labor, and others in financial reports are defin
itely secondary to those of the investor or owner of the enterprise.” The prob
lem with this statement is that he never does define “investor” in a consistent
manner. The general tone of the paper is that he is speaking of investors in
the sense of equity purchasers. Later, however, he does indicate that an in
vestor can also be one who lends money—but even here he appears to be think
ing less of the commercial bank lender and more of the purchasers of deben
tures or bonds. The obvious point to consider, of course, is that whenever
creditors have more money in the firm than the equity interest, they certainly
should not take a back seat to the investor or owner in the area of getting full
information.
Although there is a passing mention of lenders needing his reports, the
general thrust of Nagel’s paper is emphasized where he says that “this paper
does not deal with reporting to persons or institutions other than investors.”
Who is, then, responsible for reporting to creditors? Why does he believe his
reports are not ever for the use of creditors? What about interim reports under
term loan or revolving credit agreements prepared by management? Does this
indicate that the comptroller or accounting function reports to someone other
than the financial officer?
Through his paper, Nagel treats of a number of points in the relation
ship as he sees it between the corporate financial officer and his chief executive.
Two of these areas are worthy of comment. At one point the author says that
“interviews are primarily the responsibility of the chief executive....” Has this
been his experience as a practical matter? Interviews with bankers, for in
stance, are more often handled by somebody in the financial area than by the
chief executive himself. In another area, Mr. Nagel remarks that the corporate
financial officer supplies the chief executive with all of the information and the
latter assumes full responsibility for its publication. Perhaps—but if somewhere

212

the financial officer’s name is connected with the report, then he must also
assume personal responsibility for what is disclosed.
Particularly in the first third of this paper, the chief financial officer
comes through again and again as a “company man”—so strongly that one
hesitates to envision a conflict between that posture and ethical decisions which
may have other good effects on the company. (We might go on to wonder in
the same situation what the financial officer’s ethical posture might be vis-a-vis
the outside auditor.)
Throughout much of the paper Nagel puts much stress on the financial
executive’s role in reporting on the status of projects in process, and rightly
so. For instance, several years ago a large computer manufacturer got a tem
porary black eye in the financial community because, in the interest of beating
one or more of its competitors to the punch, it announced a broad new series
of third generation computers before they were truly ready for sale and while
there were still bugs to be worked out. Was this unethical behavior? By way
of another example, consider the business in which there is some honest doubt
about the ultimate outcome of a major undertaking—there is a hint of dark
clouds on the horizon. Hypothesize further that the business is being audited,
and though the auditors review the circumstances, they fail to pick up the po
tential problem. Suppose further that even though management is of the opin
ion that things will work out ultimately, they know that if the matter
is brought to the attention of the auditor it could materially affect the out
come of the engagement. What ethical obligations, if any, does management
have in this situation to share its concern with the auditors?
In discussing the responsibilities of the corporate financial officer, Nagel
says: “He must see that the corporation’s accounting to the public helps
maintain rather than reduce its source of funds.” In this statement, he has
highlighted a very serious potential conflict of interest, and one which may be
contradictory to part of what else he has said. Such reporting must above all
be honest, regardless of what affect it has on the source of funds for the com
pany. There are multitudinous opportunities for the corporate financial officer
to play up one aspect of the company’s potential or play down another in or
der to keep creditors or the investing public or financial analysts or the govern
ment in a certain frame of mind. Perhaps that’s his job. But if it is, and if he
subscribes to the statement made, he is admitting a very serious potential con
flict of interest as soon as the company’s fortunes begin to wane even on a
temporary basis.
There is a situation which is related to both the preceding points (re
porting on projects in process and reporting so as to maintain a source of
funds), and that has to do with the decision to maintain or drop a product line
which has seen only limited profitability. Are there ethical overtones in facing
this decision, in costing the product, in assessing its past versus its potential, or
in considering the impact on the company’s total posture and reputation? Scott
Paper Company, for instance, has recently, and quite abruptly, gotten out of
the disposable diaper business, with a significant writeoff in the April-June
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1971 quarter. A large bank, with equal suddenness and finality, recently with
drew from the credit card business. Can we say with certainty that the fact sit
uations in both cases were so incontrovertible as to leave management with no
choice but abandonment? Did Scott, for instance, have any ethical responsi
bility to its stockholders and to certain of its management “diaper-devotees”
to slug it out with Proctor and Gamble, its major diaper competitor? Did the
bank have any similar obligation to stick with the credit card and determine
to turn it around? These are rhetorical questions only in the context of the
two specific fact situations. In a general sense, they are far from rhetorical:
ethical considerations can well be present in product-line decisions, and man
agement, including the financial executive, must recognize and reconcile them.
Another related area is what might be called “managed earnings.” In an
effort to continually show better per-share results, many publicly held corpo
rations are inclined to include next year’s expenses in this year’s earnings re
port if business is going extremely well, and vice versa if profits are under
pressure. There is a related problem in some closely held corporations whose
managements want to understate earnings on a regular basis. The question
becomes whether such shifting is adequately constrained by current account
ing and reporting standards. And if so, is there a gap between theory and
practice? Is not the size of this gap a good measure of the ethical considera
tions involved—both for the financial officer and the accountant?
(Incidentally—and getting back to Mr. Olson for a moment—does the
auditor have at least an ethical responsibility of, if nothing else, discussing
with management the adverse implications of its decisions? Law suits filed by
the public indicate that the auditor should probably take on more responsi
bility in weighing corporate judgment and, in effect, corporate management.
Or does this go too far beyond the auditor’s prerogatives and the scope of his
engagement relative to his fee?)
To continue, Mr. Nagel says that “lenders as a class are more interested
in the financial position of the corporation than they are in its earnings.”
Sometimes, yes. But the pendulum has swung considerably in the other direc
tion, and long-term lenders today are more concerned with cash flow and
long-term profitability than with historical financial information. Granted,
they want a reasonably sound position, but their primary stress is on earnings,
because to do otherwise would be to encourage the company to siphon off
some liquid assets which are needed in the working capital cycle in order to
meet the current portion of term debts. (Of course, the Penn Central situation
might be another matter. It perhaps would tend to move the pendulum away
from emphasis on the earnings statement because, obviously, a truly illiquid
or undercapitalized situation can prove to be disastrous in cases where the
cash generation capacity of the borrower, while substantial under normal cir
cumstances, simply cannot keep pace with the rate of deterioration.)
Nagel sums up the posture of the financial officer by stating: “The key
questions for the financial officer are adequacy of disclosure and the quality
of the subjective judgments made about the condition of programs currently
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going on within the corporation’s activities.” Unfortunately, there seems to be
a dilemma here because, being a company man, the financial officer doesn’t
necessarily have full authority over the first of these two questions, and by
his own admission, very little authority over the second one. In other words,
even though he himself may be very ethical, he may be overridden by the
chief executive officer of his company. And in this respect he is a bit unique
in that, while the accounting firm can drop its engagement, the banker can
refuse the loan, and the financial analyst can “call ’em as he sees ’em,” the
financial officer seems to have little choice but to, shall we say, persevere.
The question of the desirability of the development of specialized report
ing forms for specialized users could perhaps have been given more attention
by Nagel. He apparently doesn’t see the need for this to the same degree that,
say, Olson does. Yet he does suggest that lenders’ needs are markedly different
from investors’ needs. In many cases this is so, and perhaps specialized reports
for each would be desirable. But we must again observe that in some of our
truly long-term credits, we bankers, like investors, are very interested in cash
flow and long-term profitability. Our loans to many companies—public utili
ties, for instance—are based almost completely on the borrowers’ ability to
refinance our loans in the capital market. The result is that our analytical ap
proach in this instance is identical to the “Wall Street” approach.
If one backs off from the detail of Nagel’s paper and ponders it as a
whole, one could get the impression that everything is essentially well under
control. The ethical problems of the financial officer don’t appear to be too
great in number relative to those facing some of the other professions, and
furthermore, they seem to be reasonably clear-cut. He seems to suggest that
the only class of financial statement user who is concerned about the short
term is the speculator, and that he can be ignored, and that everybody else
“with long-term needs” will be properly taken care of. Perhaps, but how much
solace would this be to the lenders and investors in companies like Penn Cen
tral, A. S. Beck, Mill Factors, Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., and so on?

Parker

Mr. Parker gives quite a lesson in what the financial analyst does. We
bankers can have a certain empathy because we too are “users.” Certainly an
analyst, being in a position of trust in connection with important financial in
formation regarding a firm and its anticipated performance, should treat this
information discreetly and report it to others on a factual and impersonal
basis. In making judgments concerning recommendations for investments in
one specific security, the analyst should present the facts and allow those in
control of the funds to make their decision. In general, if an analyst is a
“recommender,” then he is charged with the responsibility of developing facts
and communicating those facts to the decision-makers. If the analyst followed
his professional code of ethics—for which, incidentally, the Financial Ana
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lysts Federation is to be commended—he would apparently be in good stead
with his employer as well as with those firms from which he gathers informa
tion to help make decisions.
Turning to some specific items, it was good to see Parker treat with the
development of the inside information doctrine; this cannot be emphasized
too highly. However, he said that this doctrine is taking shape entirely in the
judicial section rather than in the legislative area. Largely, perhaps, but not
entirely. Witness, for one thing, Congressman Wright Patman’s Banking Re
form Act of 1971 which, among other things, does indeed try to legislate out
of existence certain areas of potential insider conflicts in banks. We bankers
are feeling this now. We are convinced that the violations and lapses involve
only a very few, isolated banks, and that the industry as a whole is aware of
the potential conflicts and avoids them assiduously. Congress, we hope, will
be as convinced of this as we are. The point is not to anticipate this particular
outcome so much as to warn of the threat itself. Don’t ever take lightly the pos
sibility of legislative intervention.
There are still other elements of similarity between bankers and analysts
in this same general area. For instance, a statement is made by Parker which
indicates that there is a great cry for “divorce” between areas of financial in
stitutions which might have conflicting uses for the same information. In com
mercial banks there is a great interest on the part of the customer in knowing
about the uses to which his information is put. He wants to know who rou
tinely sees it, who has access to the credit files, what individuals are on any
approving committee for loans (particularly outside directors), what protec
tive measures are taken to guard the storage of that information, and how
long this material stays in the file before it is disposed of, as well as the meth
od of disposal. Commercial bankers will, if anything, be receiving more and
more of these types of questions, and we should be prepared to give those
people who trust us with their private financial data proper answers. If your
client asks you these questions, can you answer them in such a manner that
he is assured your skirts are clean?
The point is raised that the financial analyst would instinctively shy away
from insider information because it would make his job too easy, so to speak:
it would be a sort of insult to his professional competence if he were to use
insider information to arrive at conclusions which he could instead have de
veloped “the hard way.” This observation runs counter to human nature. The
analyst, in the final analysis, is interested most of all in giving opinions and
making recommendations which are sound. Furthermore, if he’s at all effi
cient, he’s not going to instinctively try to do things the hard way. Or to put
it another way, he’s certainly going to be tempted by the promise or possession
of insider information. That’s why a question of ethics arises here in the first
place.
Mr. Parker goes on to speak of the “conflict between the investor’s re
ward desires and the risk-taking ability of the portfolio.” Certainly a balance
must be struck in this area, but this appears to be a question of executive
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competence and judgment, not of ethics. Nor is it unique: the commercial
loan officer faces a similar situation every day where he’s balancing his inter
pretation of the bank’s loan policy on the one hand versus the risks inherent
in the loans under consideration on the other.
A neat question of ethics is posed, however, with Parker’s later observa
tion that “a related and highly topical question is: What does the portfolio
manager do when the investor requires highly improbable levels of short-term
performance . . . with the account to go to a competitor if desired results are
not produced. . .?” He then proceeds to give three areas where one might
start to look for definitive answers to that sort of question. The word start
implies that there may be more to it than even these three areas can cope
with. This in turn means the question is still going begging: there indeed ex
ists no way of determining whether the analyst’s performance was incom
petent or the client’s demands unrealistic. This unsettled climate, with its
unethical temptations, is nurtured by the same vital loss of income threat
which Mr. Olson raised. Further work, including a mutually determined time
span standard, does seem called for to provide relief.
As noted earlier, the wording and intent of that portion of the FAF
ethical standards quoted by Parker is to be commended. It is easy, also, to
appreciate and sympathize with the problems he airs in discussing the diffi
culty of enforcing the FAF’s ethical standards, especially during the process
of litigation. (Understandably, Olson made the same points with respect to ac
countants. )

Creamer

One could gather from Mr. Creamer that bankers are less canonized,
less coded, more free to react to individual circumstances than perhaps mem
bers of the other three professions. He states it in his summary thus: “There
is no prescribed pattern in the way [the banker] must fulfill these obligations
to all parties.”
The other three writers all took a broader view of the subject than
Creamer did. He limited himself largely to the ethical problems related to the
acquisition and treatment of “information” per se. He indulged less in defense
and justification of his industry’s purity than did the others. He posed more
open-ended questions and situations—including an interesting albeit perhaps
too brief series of mini-case studies.
The statement at the beginning of the paper that the bank officer’s alle
giance is due first to his community, and only then to his stockholders, is ar
guable. The community is an important part of the very being of a bank, but
is a bank not first of all an economic entity responsible to its investors and
only secondly a participant in the market place at large on their behalf?
Perhaps the single biggest ethical responsibility of a commercial bank
er—and one which, unfortunately, Creamer didn’t treat with to any extent—
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stems from the banker’s role as allocator of funds. The banking industry as
a whole is a rather efficient gatherer of funds and has an awesome and unique
ability to disperse these funds through reallocation as well as the creation of
credit. This process is under way at all times, and particularly heightened
during periods of tight money. This money is dispersed within the parameters
established by the bank’s loan policy, which in turn is a function of many
variables and considerations such as safety, liquidity, profitability, social con
sciousness, community needs, and so on. Unfortunately, these parameters are
relatives and not absolutes—which is to say that many, many times in the
weighing of them in the face of a particular loan request, decisions must be
made which, in large measure, can turn as much on subjective—yes, ethical—
considerations as on objective analyses. A recent, but already classic, case in
point stems from lending to new minority enterprises. How best can the bank
er balance the greater risks which run to most of these loans against his long
term obligations to his community and against the profit goals of his depart
ment and his bank?
We might note also, of course, that this problem spills over into the areas
of the preparers of statements: if the financial statements supporting the re
quested credit are misleading in any respect, this could also lead to poor judg
ment in the allocation process.
The ethical considerations involved in the allocation of funds by banks
are accentuated by the changes in the industry itself, which has grown from
an unimaginative, unaggressive entity which got its money at a very low cost
to a highly competitive, profit-motivated industry. Certainly the banker who
is hip-deep in the profit center concept is faced with a different atmosphere in
which to make all sorts of decisions, including ethical ones, than his counter
part of, say, two or three decades ago. (This is not to say that today’s banker
is any less ethical, but just that the milieu in which he operates is different.)
A potential conflict of interest is probably the most classic business situa
tion involving ethics, and as Creamer points out, bankers should always bend
over backwards to avoid such conflicts, particularly in the trust versus com
mercial areas. No one would disagree with this statement. It can, however,
get muddied by details and by sobering consideration of some of the possible
end results of a literal separation of the trust and commercial departments.
Perhaps the primary difficulty stems from the valid assumption that a person
employing a fiduciary is entitled to the best it has to offer. Is it possible, then,
that spinning off the trust department, while giving the appearance of good
intentions, might not really accomplish too much and even prove detrimental
by depriving it of perfectly legitimate management expertise and business in
formation existing on the commercial side? As a case in point, consider the
instance in which the owner of a business, borrowing from a given bank,
places with that bank his personal trust, the principal assets of which are the
majority ownership in his closely held, family corporation. Further assume
that the reason he gave this bank his trust business is his assumption that the
bank has the best financial contacts in town and thus might be able to do a
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better job of selling this business, thus increasing the value of his estate, than
any other available bank. Would this bank be giving this customer the best
service it can if it absolutely closes off communications between the trust de
partment and its probable best source of ultimate purchasers, namely, the
commercial department? Should not this customer and thousands like him be
able to assume that his bank, in order to do its job best, must have access to
the widest possible range of bidders for the trust assets which will be available
for sale upon his death? The general question becomes, of course, whether
complete “insulation” (the trend since the Merrill Lynch decision and since
accentuated by Representative Patman) does indeed serve the bank and its
public in the best possible manner. Would it be possible to have one (and only
one) authorized information conduit between these departments which would
at least let both sides know of possible opportunities available?
The paper writers from the other three professions all mentioned or
alluded to the canons or standards or codes of ethics which govern their ethical
conduct. For a number of obvious reasons the banking industry as a whole
does not have one single code or set of standards. The several functional
areas of banking do, however, and in the very important area of commercial
lending and the exchange of credit information, a code of ethics set up over
a half century ago by Robert Morris Associates does clearly set criteria for
bankers to follow in this area. (A related, highly similar document deals with
the exchange of information between bankers and nonbank business entities.)
This brief but comprehensive code has survived almost unchanged over time,
and without exaggeration it has done a great deal to foster economic progress
and growth through the realistic and confidential flow of information. Since it
is so brief, a copy of it appears on page 221.

Conclusion

Even given codes of ethics—even given the whole body of legislative,
regulatory, and judicial constraints under which we must all operate—so
much of the matter of handling business information and the ethics therein
evolved to the common sense concept of what else but common sense. Since
all business entities are different, the question of ethical handling of the in
formation will be different in all circumstances. How much information we
divulge must be considered in the light of each specific situation. Clearly
what would be prudent practice for the handling of information concerning a
large national corporation might not be prudent for the handling of informa
tion concerning a small, local, closely held company. It is common sense, al
so, which helps one achieve an optimal tradeoff between the amount of infor
mation requested from a present or prospective borrower versus the amount of
information actually needed to arrive at the proper decision. Obviously, we
are not doing our job if we make a decision based on insufficient information,
whether the motivation is reluctance on the part of the borrower, competitive
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forces, or our own laziness. The reverse, while perhaps less harmful, is also
true in that it might be considered unethical to require the borrower and his
accountants to provide excessive information.
Now, add to the concept of common sense the essentiality of education,
and we go still further along the road to a full understanding and appreciation
and perhaps even solution of the problem. Each of the writers has mentioned
this, often in general, and often in a specific sense such as an ethical responsi
bility to fully understand the business of one’s client or borrower. Similarly,
the writers all mentioned what respective professions are doing to improve the
educational competence of their members. Banking has recognized and is at
tempting to meet this also, of course. Specialization abounds; continuing edu
cation programs are in effect all over the country, sponsored by many different
entities. RMA itself has a loan management seminar at Indiana University,
several regional schools, and dozens of smaller meetings throughout the coun
try each year, all of which in general stress the importance of current know
ledge in banking and business.
Common sense plus continuing education, operating in tandem with
whatever objective guidelines and criteria are available, particular avoidance
of conflicts of interest, self dealing, and insider trading, constant mindfulness
of the high roles and responsibilities which are ours in the financial communi
ty, determination never to be a party to aiding those who want to violate these
high standards—do all these things, remember all these things, and you’re not
only on the right course, but the only course for ultimate improvement and,
hopefully, resolution.
As a concluding thought, remember that good ethical practices are con
tagious. But, so, unfortunately, are bad ethical practices. Perhaps this is one
of the “great truths” which can emerge from this symposium. The only way
to improve the ethical conduct of our four professions in their interactions with
each other is if everybody is resolved toward that common goal: the golden
rule principle. Similarly, nothing is more conducive to sharp practices on one’s
own part than knowing that he is dealing with someone who is unethical or
quasi-ethical. In the successful interaction between groups with goals which
are at times disparate, ethical improvement becomes possible only to the de
gree to which each of the parties is willing to see the other fellow’s point of
view, and, most likely, subordinate a portion of his own interests and inde
pendence as a contribution to the commonweal.

220

The RMA Code of Ethics
For the Exchange of Credit Information
Preamble
The Robert Morris Associates, recognizing the importance and value of
the interchange of credit information in the conduct of business, adopted
(1916) the following Code of credit ethics and, subject to the requirements
of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (Public Law 91-508) and/or other applica
ble Federal or state law, urges adherence to the Code in order to maintain
the exchange of credit information on the confidential and ethical basis that
this phase of credit activity warrants and requires.

The Code
1. The first and cardinal principle in credit investigation is to respect the
confidential nature of the information received.
2. The name of the inquirer, in whose behalf the inquiry is made, should
not be disclosed without permission.
3. In answering inquiries, the source of the information should not be dis
closed without permission.
4. Any betrayal of confidence stamps the offender unworthy of future con
sideration.
5. Each letter of inquiry should indicate specifically the object and scope
of the inquiry.
6. When more than one inquiry on the same subject is sent simultaneously
to banks it should be indicated that information from their own files is
sufficient as other checkings are being made.
7. All letters, including form letters, should bear the manual signature of
the inquirer to establish responsibility.
8. The recipient of a credit inquiry is negligent in his duty if he does not
read carefully each letter of inquiry and answer frankly, to the best of his
ability, its specific questions.
9. In answering inquiries, it is advisable to disclose all material facts bear
ing on the credit standing of the subject, including the basis upon which
credit is extended.
10. Indiscriminate revision of files, when there is no real need for informa
tion, is wasteful and undesirable.
11. Where periodic revision of file information is made, it may be desirable
to give your own experience in the letter of inquiry, in order that dupli
cation and unnecessary correspondence may be kept to a minimum.
12. In soliciting accounts, it is not permissible nor the part of good faith for
the soliciting bank to make inquiries from a competitor without frankly
disclosing the nature and object of the inquiry.
This code was originally adopted in 1916; revised in 1921, 1948, 1954 and
1971 (Preamble only).
Copyrighted by the Robert Morris Associates.
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Forecasting: Ethical
And Other Problems

Ethical and Other Problems
In Publishing
Financial Forecasts1
By R. Gene Brown, Vice-President of Corporate Development, Syntex Cor
poration

I could give you facts and figures—I could give you
plans and forecasts
Even tell you where I’m going ...
But why should you want to know? . . .
If you knew the path we’re riding you’d
understand it less than I.
“JESUS CHRIST TO THE APOSTLES”

from the rock opera, Jesus Christ,

Superstar

Uncertainty about future events, whether it is associated with our per
sonal lives, professional careers, or business investments, is something we must
all live with. In business management, the recognition that any statement
about future transactions or events contains some element of risk has led to
the relatively recent development of some interesting management science
and economic tools for recognizing, measuring, and analyzing uncertainty.
Why this interest in uncertainty? Many answers might be suggested, but
as a more sophisticated breed of managers has developed, formally educated
in their discipline, and as the investor and his professionally trained counselor
have increased economic and other pressure for financial performance, inter
est in analyzing the future has intensified. Managers and investors increasing

1

The controversial content of this paper, together with a strong desire to remain gainfully
employed, encourages me to make the usual disclaimer, associating the thoughts herein
solely to the writer, personally. I would also like to acknowledge the help of Mr. Roger
Salquist, who assisted in researching the literature as background for this paper.
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ly recognize that expected future performance is what is relevant, that not a
single historical transaction or event is relevant to decision-making except
insofar as it might directly influence a future cost or revenue, or provide a
direct predictive base for estimating a future cost or revenue.
Financial executives and CPAs are beginning to recognize the irrele
vance of past transactions in financial statements through attempts to report
current costs (such as market values for marketable securities) as a closer
approximation of present-day values or as opportunity costs of asset reten
tion. Many accountants and members of the investment community are push
ing for further progress in financial reporting, some advocating the extension
of current cost (in the sense of replacement cost or net realizable value) meas
urements to other assets, some advocating reporting future costs or revenues
through a discounted cash-flow vehicle, and some suggesting the publishing
of budgets or other forms of financial forecasts.

Disclosure of Future Plans Proposed
In the summary report of the last Seaview Symposium in 1968, Profes
sor John Burton reported that the most significant new idea discussed for
corporate reporting was the suggestion that corporations disclose future plans
and expectations.2 At that conference a number of financial analysts argued
that investors are interested in the future; that management allocates signifi
cant resources to preparing financial forecasts; and that the benefits of dis
closing these forecasts would far outweigh the legal and practical problems
which would arise. As one might imagine, the conference participants repre
senting the internal financial officers and the CPA profession were not alto
gether enthusiastic about such proposals. Because of the interest in (and
controversy surrounding) financial forecasting, it was felt important to include
the topic as one of the principal papers of this second Seaview Symposium.
I was intrigued by the invitation to consider the subject from an ethical
and, to a lesser extent, a behavioral viewpoint. A fairly extensive review of
the literature reveals a fair number of published works dealing with the ad
vantages and disadvantages of publishing financial forecasts, but the prepon
derance of printed material addresses the legal and auditing aspects of such
public pronouncements, interspersed with a smattering of appeals for such
information from the investment community.3 No published works were
found which more than peripherally dealt with the ethical or behavioral as
pects of publishing financial forecasts.
An intriguing, but hazardous, inclination facing anyone addressing ethi
cal aspects of certain business behavior is to devote a considerable amount of

John C. Burton, “The Seaview Conference on Financial Reporting,” The Journal of Ac
countancy, January 1969, p. 37.
3 A selective bibliography is provided at the end of this paper.
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time and words to attempting to define ethics, ethical standards, ethical be
havior, business morals, or other pertinent terms. The difficulty is that one
can devote unlimited time to reading not just from the business and quasi
business literature, but from varied other disciplines and writers varying from
Margaret Mead to Descartes. Although I must confess to having committed
some time to this, I shall avoid burdening you with any esoteric thoughts de
veloped on the subject. I should like to define ethics as those standards of
conduct which are generally accepted at a given time by a given population.

Financial Forecasting Defined
Although the ethical and behavioral problems associated with publish
ing financial forecasts are the main thrust of this paper, it is impossible to
ignore certain more formal legal and accounting (American Institute of Cer
tified Public Accountants and Securities and Exchange Commission) con
straints. Prior to addressing any of these problems, it would be worthwhile to
zero in on exactly what is meant by a “financial forecast.”
Financial forecasts can take many forms, ranging from simple comments
such as “the company expects to maintain its historical growth rate” to
detailed financial projections in the form of income and funds statements as
well as balance sheets. For purposes of this paper and our discussion, I should
like to define a financial forecast as any published quantitative or nonquantitative statement which provides direct information about the entity’s expected
future performance or data complementary to historical financial statements
in such sufficient detail as to permit interested parties external to the firm to
make their own reasonably reliable financial projections.
In one sense, it is surprising that there should be so much controversy
over publishing financial forecasts, since certain forms of forecasts are now
commonly published, available in the form of “public information,” or sup
plied to special interest groups. Examples of forecasts now commonly made
are:

1.

Corporate pronouncements of an expected or “goal” income growth
rate.

2.

Forecasts of expected earnings per share for the next ending accounting
period.

3.

Projections of cash flows, income flows, and return on investment in
proposals for initial offerings in certain real estate ventures.

4.

Proforma financial statements or forecasts issued to illustrate the effects
of a desirable (friendly) merger or to combat an unfriendly proxy battle
or tender offer.

5.

Estimates of physical quantities expected to be realized from reserves
in reports issued by the extractive industries.
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6.
7.

8.

9.

10.

Publication of sales forecasts, including an occasional attempt to pro
vide various possible sales levels.4
The submission of proforma cash flows and supplementary information
to banks and other creditors. (This falls into the “restricted informa
tion” category of forecasts.)
Preparation and presentation of projected financial performance for
certain new venture activities seeking capital.
Forecasts provided by companies hoping to qualify as a government
contractor for a particular project. (This occurs when the company is
subject to a contractor’s financial capability evaluation and/or is seek
ing larger or earlier than normal progress payments.)
Proforma financial statements required by certain large prime defense
contractors from companies hoping to land subcontracts. (As one might
expect, such forecasts are given reluctantly, or not at all by the larger
subs; it is the smaller company which complies for fear of being cut
out of the competition.)

A less obvious, but nonetheless common form of publishing financial
forecasts occurs each time we prepare the usual corporate financial state
ments based on so-called historical transactions. The whole process of match
ing costs and revenues and assigning those measurements to accounting
periods is based on estimates or assumptions as to future transactions. Certain
obvious examples come to mind, such as inventory measurements based on
cost or market, whichever is lower; the newly established current market
reporting for marketable securities; deferred federal income tax; all cases
where asset, liability, or equity reserves are created; and long-term asset
measurements which are based on assumptions as to the timing and amount
of expected future economic benefits. In fact, one could assert that virtually
every measurement (with the possible exception of cash) on a balance sheet
and income statement makes some assumption as to a future value or as to
future transactions; even cash in a large multinational corporation is an es
timate relying on assumptions as to currency revaluations, exchange restric
tions, dividend policies, and future tax rates.

Problems With Existing Forecasting Practice

That financial forecasts are now frequently made available outside of
the firm cannot be denied. The degree to which such forecasts are public (by
design), semipublic (by design or leak), or highly restricted varies significant
4

John J. Willingham, Charles H. Smith, and Martin E. Taylor, “Should the CPA’s Opinion
Be Extended to Include Forecasts?” Financial Executive, September 1970, illustrates an
annual report of the Micro Engineering Corporation which included a three-year sales fore
cast by major product category with optimistic, median, and pessimistic expected sales for
each category.
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ly. It is also fairly obvious, at least to me, that there is no consistency in prac
tice. About the only reasonable conclusion that one can reach is that at
present it is not accepted practice to publish detailed budgets or proforma
financial statements, even though the single most important financial measure
of performance, projected earnings per share, is frequently made public.5
The inconsistency in practice, the fact that forecasts are being made
without SEC or stock exchange blessing, and the total lack of any external
control or attestation as to the forecasting process should give rise to dis
comfort in the financial community. Indeed, in discussing the problems in
herent in corporate disclosure, George Bissell, the former president of the
Financial Analysts Federation, asks, “Have previous moral, ethical, and legal
standards in disseminating corporate information changed, and if so, by what
rules am I now to be guided?”6
In view of the current situation with respect to financial forecasts, it
seems more appropriate to ask whether such forecasts should be formally
recognized as acceptable current practice (hence, made ethical) and what
form the projections should take, rather than ask if financial projections
should be accepted or permitted.
A number of major questions should be considered prior to reaching
any judgment as to the advisability of encouraging publication of forecasts:
What constraints now exist which discourage publication of financial fore
casts? What are some of the ethical and behavioral advantages and disad
vantages of publishing financial projections? What form should the financial
forecasts take if they are deemed advisable? The balance of this paper will
consider these questions.

Legal Implications of Forecasting
Three of the major constraints delimiting publication of financial fore
casts are legal, ethical, and behavioral considerations. I shall not dwell on
the legal aspects, since that is outside the scope of this paper. However, it
should be pointed out that there appear to be at least two legal aspects worth
mentioning. The first relates to the Securities and Exchange Commission’s
expressed strong policy not to permit projections in prospectuses filed with
it.7 The second deals with the potential civil liability of management to out

5

6
7

1 do not wish to be drawn into the argument as to whether or not net income or earnings
per share are overemphasized; I would simply observe that from a behavioral standpoint,
we seem to be stuck with “earnings per share” as a simplistic, shorthand performance
measure.
George S. Bissell, “Corporate Disclosure and Inside Information,” Financial Analysts
Journal, November-December 1968, p. 9.
An excellent discussion and critique of the SEC position on this subject appears in an
article by Kenneth I. Solomon, “Proforma Statements, Projections and the SEC,” The
Business Lawyer, January 1969.
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side parties, together with a similar potential liability of CPAs should the
attest function be extended in any fashion to cover forecasts, and/or assump
tions or processes underlying the preparation of forecasts.
With respect to the SEC position, it has been pointed out that “if pro
jections were not required but only permitted. . . problems of civil liability
would be insurmountable unless projections in prospectuses were expressly
granted immunity from Sections 11 and 12 of the Act.”8 When one con
siders (1) that the SEC position on forecasts is inconsistent since financial
projections are now required or permitted by the SEC in certain initial offer
ings (real estate), extractive industry reports, and in the so-called “giving
effect” balance sheets (to reflect the impact of proposed capital transactions),
and (2) that the civil liability alluded to above relates to permitted but not
required financial projections, it appears that a legislative change in SEC
regulations would wipe out the “legal” complications insofar as the SEC is
concerned.
The questions of potential management and audit liability remain. With
respect to individual liability of management and CPAs, it is worth emphasiz
ing that, should financial forecasting be expanded, such financial forecasts
must certainly be representations of management just as are today’s histori
cal financial statements. It is also worth noting that proposals to extend the
auditor’s role to cover projections usually are limited in such a way as to
preclude a direct expression of opinion as to the reasonableness of the fore
casts themselves.9 The wording of the Council of The Institute of Chartered
Accountants in England and Wales on this matter states:

It should be clearly established that the reporting accountants’ in
structions and responsibility for reporting under the Code are con
fined to the accounting bases and calculations for the profit forecasts,
as distinct from the assumptions, including the commercial assump
tions, upon which the directors have based their forecasts.10
The Council points out in the above cited document that when profit
forecasts are published, it is also required that the economic, commercial,
marketing, and financial assumptions underlying the forecasts be also pub
lished and that the reporting accountants should report whether or not the
forecasts are consistent with the assumptions.
The Wheat Report, “Disclosure to Investors—A Reappraisal of Federal Administrative
Policies Under the ’33 and ’34 Acts,” ICH Federal Securities Law Reports, p. 95.
9 A notable exception is Yuji Ijiri, “On Budgeting Principles and Budget—Auditing Stand
ards,” Accounting Review, October 1968, pp. 662-7, who argues that auditors should ex
press an opinion on the budget estimates as well as the inferences made in preparing the
budgets.
10 Council of The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales, “Accountants’ Re
ports on Profit Forecasts,” The Accountant, May 3, 1969, p. 629.
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If the auditor’s role is limited to attesting that forecasts are prepared in
accordance with the assumptions underlying the calculations, and detailed
with the published forecasts, and if the auditor takes no responsibility for the
assumptions themselves, it is difficult to see any greater legal exposure than
now exists. In fact, one might speculate that the legal liability associated with
attesting as to the reasonableness of calculations made in accordance with
specified assumptions is less than that which now accompanies an expression
of opinion following a standard so-called “balance sheet audit.” This, how
ever, would be for the courts to decide.
With regard to the legal liabilities of management and boards of direc
tors, the publication of formal projected financial statements cannot help
but increase legal exposure. Financial performance significantly better orworse than that projected seems clearly to be a source of action for damages.
In any situation where a deliberate intent to mislead were established, the
same avenues for redress as now exist would be available to third parties.
The murky area is when performance differs significantly from plan and
there has been an honest attempt to (1) plan properly, (2) make full dis
closure, and (3) manage the company as efficiently as possible in a dynamic
environment. The recognition of this potential new source of legal complica
tion is one of the reasons why management is not particularly enthusiastic
about publishing detailed forecasts in the form of projected financial state
ments.11

Ethical Aspects of Publication

The two other constraints on publishing financial forecasts, ethical and
behavioral questions, are interrelated. Earlier in the paper, I defined ethics
as those standards of conduct which are generally accepted at a given time
by a given population. At present, we face a somewhat strange situation, for
it is not unusual for some form of financial forecast to be published by man
agement or made available to special interest groups, yet the SEC and the
AICPA want no part of it. The oft quoted Rule 2.04 of the AICPA Code
of Professional Ethics states that, “a member or associate shall not permit
his name to be used in conjunction with any forecast of the results of future
transactions in a manner which may lead to the belief that the member or
associate vouches for the accuracy of the forecast.”
It is important to recognize the fact that although it is unethical, by code,
for any AICPA member to in any way associate himself with a financial fore
cast, and although forecasts are specifically discouraged by SEC regulations,
management does not seem to feel similarly bound by any such restric
11 An informal discussion of this point with Robert Ward, former president of ULTEK, now
a division of Perkin-Elmer, prompted the following response: “Man plans; God decides!”
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tions in their public pronouncements. There are no ethical barriers, in terms
of accepted practice, preventing management from making public certain
forecasts; the SEC and AICPA constraints are quasi-legal and ethical by
decree, and any change in SEC regulations and the AICPA professional
code would simply recognize a de facto situation and permit CPAs to parti
cipate as deemed necessary or desirable. Indeed, one might argue that from
a macro-social standpoint, the users of financial statements would be better
off if current practice were recognized and controlled, and the forecasting
methods were subjected to independent review.
Presumably, the AICPA and SEC are concerned over the legal expo
sure arguments and the assumed lack of verifiability of forecasts. However,
this does not in any way relate to the ethical considerations of publishing
forecasts. In fact, if adequate disclosure of the assumptions underlying fore
casts and forecasting techniques are made, Verification that the forecasts were
prepared in accordance with the disclosed assumptions and techniques can
occur. It would be difficult to see that the public interest would be improp
erly served by such a move.
To summarize then, I fail to see any major ethical considerations which
would be so sufficiently severe as to preclude a recommendation to recognize
and extend current practice in publishing financial forecasts.

Behavioral Difficulties of Publication

It is in the area of behavioral constraints that I find the greatest concern,
and behavioral implications exist not only for management, but also for the
accounting profession, the professional financial advisor, and other qualified
users of financial statements. To cite the major ones of concern, as well as
some of the related advantages and disadvantages:
1. Managers will tend to play the so-called “budget game” and under
estimate real projected performance, since the costs of underestimating are
significantly lower than of overestimating.
2. Managers will tend to reveal the absolute minimum summary in
formation required, for the greater the detail in projections, the more areas
of exposure to criticism exist. In addition, the self-canceling effect of plus and
minus fluctuations in individual components of a summary will obscure poor
performance in certain specific areas.
3. Financial analysts who now have to guess as to earnings, will have
to second-guess management. This cannot improve relations between the two.
4. Management will tend to manage resources and take certain dis
cretionary actions which influence costs and revenues in order to legitimatize
previously announced earnings.
5. In situations of uncertainty where actual performance toward the
end of the year would be materially above projections, there could be the
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tendency to suppress earnings for the current year and transfer them to the
following year.
6. Management could easily be tempted to act contrary to the best
interest of the company and shareholders by suppressing desirable expendi
tures in order to meet the forecast.
7. When facing a near term problem such as economic and federal
pressure to hold or reduce prices, or a major labor contract negotiation, a
tendency might exist for management to paint a different picture than ac
tually expected.
8. Audit/management relations could be strained in the event that
financial projections were in fact prepared in accordance with the stated as
sumptions and acceptable forecasting techniques, but the auditor found him
self faced with one or more poor or unacceptable assumptions.
9. It has been argued that if CPAs express opinions on forecasts (pre
sumably this also means any of the back-up work necessary to prepare a
forecast) and actual performance is significantly different than planned,
third parties might tend to question the credibility of CPA opinions, not only
on forecasts, but on more factual statements as well.12 The behavior of the
user group toward CPAs would thus be affected.
10. Publication of an unsatisfactory expected level of achievement,
when management action is under way on a number of fronts to preclude the
projected from happening, might prejudice the alternatives open to manage
ment or preclude them from behaving or conducting business in such a fash
ion as to take preventative action. In this not unlikely case, no one benefits
from the forecast; in fact, management and investors will suffer. It is easier to
project the future based on an assumption of operations continued roughly as
they are now conducted than to attempt to build in unknown events which
might relate to product or company acquisitions, spin-offs, changes in product
pricing or mix, and so on. In fact, to reveal such plans in advance of very
high success probabilities can be disastrous to employee morale, contrary to
the maintenance of a stable marketplace, and prejudicial to a firm’s competi
tive position.

Behavioral Advantages of Publication
There are some favorable behavioral arguments:
1. Relations between management, investors13, and the financial com
munity should improve since the information deemed most useful in invest
ment decisions would be provided.
12 Howard F. Stettler, “CPAs/Auditing/2000±,” The Journal of Accountancy, May 1968,
p. 58.
13 In this paper, the term “investors” includes those making equity and debt investment deci
sions.
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2. Given an opportunity to compare actual to planned performance,
management could more easily isolate the controllable from the noncontrollable influences on results and do a clearer job of explaining “what went well
or poorly this year.”
3. It is possible that total management would improve, for it might be
presumed that a more careful job of planning would be performed (indeed
formal planning might be induced where it is now nonexistent) in view of the
public nature of the forecast.
4. Advice to investors would be improved, since the professional
analysts would have added valuable information on which to base their rec
ommendations; it might also be argued that advice will be improved since
the large amount of time now spent trying to guess as to near-term earnings
could be devoted to other analytical tasks.
5. Because of the emphasis on forecasts, there will be an enhanced
interest in improving existing financial reporting practice, including further
departures from historical cost measurements.14
The list of ethical and behavioral implications as well as the related
advantages and disadvantages could be larger, but the listed ones above are
representative of the longer list. Two criticisms of the disadvantages above
could be expected. First, with adequate professional auditing, the managerial
freedom for discretionary acts to shift the timing and amount of income should
be reduced. Second, if it were possible to publish some form of flexible or
variable forecast, the unfavorable managerial behavioral aspects tied to the
public dissemination of only one set of numbers would diminish. Both of
these criticisms are partially valid, but the problems remain.
On balance, I would conclude that if there were ways to minimize some
of the legal, ethical, and behavioral difficulties inherent in publishing fore
casts, such publication is a highly desirable step forward. It should enhance
communication between management and external users of financial state
ments, improve investor decisions, and conceivably strengthen the manage
ment process itself. The question is, Is there some form or method of pub
lishing financial forecasts which can achieve these objectives? I think there
are several possibilities of which one approach is superior.

Financial Forecasts: Content
It should be recognized that any given approach to forecasting has dis
advantages, including the theoretically superior technique of simulation built
on a foundation of subjective probabilities (which would undoubtedly over
14 W. W. Cooper, N. Dopuch, and T. F. Keller, “Budgetary Disclosure and Other Sugges
tions for Improving Accounting Reports,” Accounting Review, October 1968, pp. 640-648.
An interesting related argument presented in this article is that publishing budgets will
draw greater attention to the opportunity costs of retaining assets, thus improving the man
agement process as well as the information made available to outsiders.
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whelm the financial statement users). At the other extreme, the worst form
of forecast is the single value/point estimate prediction. Some of the common
concerns of those responsible for internal planning for companies are:
1. Timing. How many periods should one include in the forecast?
2. Reported values. How much information should be provided about
possible fluctuations about a given case or how many cases should be pre
sented?
3. Probabilities. Should the forecasts build in or include probability
statements about the likelihood of a certain event occurring and/or should
probabilistic values be computed (expected monetary values, etc.)?
4. Uncertainty. Should specific reference or treatment be given to risk
(uncertainty) independent of probability statements?
5. Discount factors. Should forecasts include discounted value compu
tations or a range of calculations based on alternative discount rates as an aid
to examining opportunity costs and evaluating investment alternatives?
6. Presentation. How should the results of the forecasting process be
displayed, given a varied user or reader group?

Financial Forecasts: Suggestions and Examples
Most of the same questions are directly applicable to preparing and pub
lishing financial forecasts to external users. To answer these questions and to
attempt to minimize some of the disadvantages which exist in publishing finan
cial forecasts which do not exist when internal use alone is made, I would
suggest that companies publish with each annual report a schedule of events
and/or transactions which are reasonably expected to occur in the near fu
ture, and which, if experienced, would individually have the potential for
changing the reported earnings base by an amount in excess of plus or minus
ten per cent.15 Some of the implementation suggestions would be that:
1. Each event or transaction be accompanied with an expected high
and low financial impact indication.
2. Probabilities of occurence of the events or transactions not be pro
vided.
3. The possible earliest and latest occurrence date be provided.
4. The time horizon be flexible; no short-term, one-year constraint
should be imposed, nor should a long-term cutoff, such as five years, be ar
bitrarily established.
5. The events or transactions should usually be limited to those factors
which directly arise from and influence normal operations—factors such as
acquisition plans, major corporate personnel reorganization, divestitures, etc.,

15 An interesting alternative strategy would be to report events and transactions expected to
influence reported income in the next succeeding year by ±5 per cent, and use ±10 per
cent for projected years beyond the next succeeding year.
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should be omitted unless the probability of occurrence is extremely high and
disclosure costs are minimal.
It would be helpful to give some examples of the kind of events and
transactions I have in mind.
Example 1. Your company expects to embark on a major expansion of
its physical plant sometime during 1973. Preliminary engineering estimates
place the costs (adjusted to reflect expected 1973 prices) at $40 million, of
which $5 million is for land. The building is being planned to accommodate
our normal growth of sales of existing products and modifications thereof,
and should have an expected useful economic life of 20 years. Straight-line
depreciation will be used for financial reporting; accelerated depreciation for
tax purposes.
Example 2. Our labor contract with the UAW expires in June of next
year. We expect to enter into negotiations prior to its expiration. In our opin
ion, if the tentative demands of the Union are met, our cost of sales is ex
pected to increase by 4 per cent in 1972 (one-half year) and between 10 per
cent and 12 per cent in the years following. We do not expect to be able to
raise prices.
Example 3. Our product patents on the Metali-X-ray-opto-gyroscope
expires in 1974. Due to our predominant market position, it should be some
time before domestic competition becomes a factor; however, immediate for
eign competition is expected which could cut sales by 5 per cent to 15 per
cent. This product now accounts for 20 per cent of our sales dollar.
Example 4. Continued sales growth of our existing UL approved water
bed heaters (thermostatically controlled) should occur at 20 per cent per
year for at least two years. Beyond that we cannot speculate as to product
growth because of the unusual nature of the product and the market. Last
year we sold 5,000 units and realized a net profit after all related costs of
about $6 per unit. We expect prices to hold and profits to increase at the
approximate rate of sales increase due to the efficiencies of greater volume.

Advantages and Disadvantages of the
Suggested Program
The purpose of the above suggestions is simply to provide the sophis
ticated analyst and user of financial statements with the information neces
sary to make financial forecasts should they desire. In addition, sufficient
information is available to permit calculation of a number of possible levels
of future performance; indeed, some more sophisticated simulation might
be feasible and desirable in some situations.
Such a program should satisfy the demands for financial forecasts by
investors, analysts, and special-interest financial statement users: it should
reduce any potential legal liabilities by management and avoid many of the
behavioral disadvantages earlier cited. The question of audit participation is
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open. In my opinion, it would not be necessary to extend the attest function
to cover the schedule of expected future events and transactions: however, it
could be so extended if a useful purpose were served.
I see two major difficulties in the proposal presented. First, the latitude
for managerial manipulation still exists; items can be omitted from the sched
ule and discretionary changes can be made in the timing of certain transac
tions. Furthermore I hold little faith in the so-called “self-policing” nature
of the information marketplace.
It seems that any proposal for publication of projected financial data
will be burdened with some disadvantages; in evaluating any proposal the
investment community, managers and directors, the SEC, and the AICPA
must compare the expected costs of the disadvantages with the real social
benefits to be derived from more relevant information for decision-making.
The second major difficulty relates to the investor’s decision process and
the inputs to that decision. There is usually the presupposition that if the
investor knew future income and dividend flows, he would be fully informed.
However, it must be remembered that the investor is interested in financial
forecasts and future income and dividend flows only insofar as it permits him
to make estimates of future stock price. The moment that one departs from
a theoretical model based on perfect information and confronts the real
world, the more one must accept the fact that present and future income
and dividend flow information is surrogate to the projected information that
is really desired, i.e., future stock price. Nonetheless, since future market
prices for stock are partly a function of income and dividend flows (or at least
the investor’s expectations as to future flows), it certainly makes sense to pro
vide the users of financial statements with information permitting them to
make reasonable forecasts. To deny access to relevant information because of
quasi-legal, doubtful ethical problems and behavioral difficulties that can be
minimized is a questionable financial reporting policy from the social view
point. Hopefully, meetings such as this, papers published on the subject, and
individual and professional society pressure will continue to result in im
proved financial reporting.
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Critique
Of the Brown paper
By George S. Bissell, Senior Vice-President, Massachusetts Financial Serv
ices, Inc.; past President of the Financial Analysts Federation; Chairman,
Government Relations Committee of the Financial Analysts Federation,
representing the Financial Analysts Federation

Mr. Brown, a preparer of financial statements, presents a refreshing
point of view in this statement from his paper:

It is important to recognize the fact that although it is unethical,
by code, for an AICPA member to in any way associate himself with
a financial forecast, and although forecasts are specifically discour
aged by SEC regulations, management does not seem to feel
similarly bound by any such restrictions in their public pronounce
ments. There are no ethical barriers in terms of accepted practice
preventing management from making public certain forecasts; the
SEC and the AICPA constraints are quasi-legal and ethical by de
cree, and any change in SEC regulations and the AICPA profession
al code would simply recognize a de facto situation and permit CPAs
to participate as deemed necessary or desirable. Indeed, one might
argue that from a macrosocial standpoint, the users of financial state
ments would be better off if current practice were recognized, con
trolled, and the forecasting methods were subject to independent re
view.
Those preparers of financial statements who are reluctant to reveal to the
investment community a sense of future expectation should be urged to do so.
It is high time that the SEC should deal with the inconsistency in its registra
tion requirements of dwelling on historical fact while the investment realities
of life relate to future expectation. Independent bodies such as the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants should be given the responsibility
of commenting on preparers’ material to add a further sense of reliability and
objectivity to the corporate reporting process. And finally, the professional
financial analyst should de-emphasize his role as a reporter (What are you
going to earn this year?) and concentrate more on the critical evaluation as
pects of his responsibilities in the investment process.
I do not believe that it is necessary to dwell at length here on the advan
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tages of financial forecasting. I consider the process an extension of the broad
er responsibility of corporate disclosure. I further assume that it is a widely
accepted assumption that buyers and sellers of securities today depend to a
substantial degree on future expectation as a major aspect of the investment
decision-making process. Therefore, it seems obvious to me that the more reli
able information that can be disseminated broadly throughout the investment
community, the greater the tendency of security prices to remain at or near a
level of “true or investment value” and to contribute to a more stable price
pattern. Thus, I concur with Brown that the issue today should be not
whether but how to undertake appropriate financial forecasting, and I would
add, to whom and by what means. This is the challenge.

Challenges for the Symposium

The challenges of financial forecasting are substantial, and the seminar
discussion should be most productive. Each individual can bring to bear his
own experiences on the problems and possibilities of forecasting which by the
very nature of the seminar (talking and listening) should produce some areas
of consensus.
To the issuer, the challenges may include those outlined by Mr. Brown
such as appropriate time frames for financial forecasting, the amount of detail
that should be divulged, the degree of probability of the forecast, and the re
liability of the assumptions that are behind it. Further, what are the costs of
preparation? What aspects might hurt a competitive position and to what de
gree are there increased legal liabilities?
Each corporation undoubtedly has its own internal forecast yardsticks
and appropriately so, for each corporation’s business differs, and the sophis
tication and reliability of its internal forecasting mechanism must vary widely.
To the user of financial forecasts the challenge is even greater, for in my
view little thinking has been done as to how much information is actually
needed to make an appropriate investment evaluation. For years analysts have
sought increased disclosure under the (superficial) assumption that anything
more is better. Thus it would appear to me that formal internal budget dis
closure is probably substantially more than is necessary. Indeed I suspect that
general discussion, through one media or another, of the elements involved
in future revenue and cost assumptions underlying these forecasts and the
probabilities that are involved in such assumptions may well be sufficient for
investment evaluation.
Perhaps the representatives of Robert Morris Associates could shed light
on this matter by their experiences. For instance, how much information in
this area is generally disclosed for approval of corporate loans; and how much
information is actually used by RMA representatives in initial decisions and
in ongoing surveillance of the safety of the loans made.
It would appear to me that the auditors could well discuss the degree of
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certification which can be economically undertaken and responsibility appro
priately assumed at each level and degree of financial forecasting and disclo
sure.
Rather than discuss in detail the pros and cons of Brown’s suggestions
as to how financial forecasting might be undertaken, I think it would be more
productive perhaps if I describe my views as a user of financial statements
and leave the final argument and judgments on these issues to the seminar
participants.

The User Market

Before discussing how to undertake financial forecasting, one should
understand the user market and its needs. In terms of numbers and sophistica
tion, the user market in my view resembles a triangle. At the top of the tri
angle are a few sophisticated securities analysts who have devoted a substan
tial part of their lives to the understanding and evaluation of a small number of
industries and corporations. Formal education usually includes an advanced
degree (M.B.A.) plus a sufficient number of years of study to thoroughly un
derstand industry characteristics, corporate structure, and management capa
bilities. This level of professionalism in my view can be compared to a man
agement consultant. The major value of this individual is not only his com
prehension, but more importantly his interpretation and judgment of the in
formation available which leads to a meaningful decision. Indeed, he should
be aware of and be able to identify all of the possible unfavorable manage
ment behavioral patterns which Mr. Brown lists.
This specialist serves institutions of course, and their market force is over
whelming. The New York Stock Exchange’s study of public transactions of
1969 reveals that there has been a substantial increase in institutional trad
ing activity on the Exchange. This group, which in 1960 contributed only 40
per cent of all transactions on the Exchange, jumped to 62 per cent in 1969,
and it is my understanding that a current estimate of 70 per cent would not
be out of line.
At the bottom of the triangle are millions of individual investors (in
cluding former SEC Chairman Cohen’s favorite, “Aunt Minnie”). Perhaps
less obvious, however, is the fact that this broad investing public also has the
professional analyst available via the broker-dealer community. In recent
years this community has increased its research effort in terms of both quality
and quantity. Thus, while it is important to direct attention to Mr. and Mrs.
John Q. Shareholder (and I agree with the SEC thrust of equal opportunity to
participate), it is nevertheless true that the desired results of appropriate eval
uation and stability of securities price movements in the marketplace will be
achieved most efficiently through communication with professionals in the in
vestment community.
The conclusion I draw about the user market is that corporate disclosure,
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including financial forecasts, should be made at all levels of sophistication in
the marketplace on a continuing and regular basis at an appropriate level of
comprehension. This would suggest the need for in-depth financial forecast
ing for the professional investor and disclosure of the potentially dangerous
and oversimplified earnings-per-share expectations for the investing public.

Forecasting for Securities in Registration
I shall divide the forecasting responsibility into two categories: (1) ma
terial desired in conjunction with the issue of public securities and (2) sug
gested procedures for normal ongoing financial forecasting.
The material required for registration of new securities should include
aspects of the future. Since investment decisions include to a large degree an
evaluation of future expectations, it seems difficult to understand why fore
casting is not permitted and indeed encouraged by the SEC at all times, even
during a public offering. I fail to see any difference between day-to-day and
new issue investment decision-making on the part of the investor. Indeed, it
is ironical that a blackout period exists at the most crucial moment of a public
offering in order to avoid “conditioning the public mind or arousing public
interest in the issuer or its securities.”1 Such a posture, while laudable in the
sense of trying to protect the unsophisticated investor, does not prevent the
hard sell possibilities of the broker-dealer community which might be possible
in light of increased financial incentives of an underwriting. Indeed such a
blackout process actually favors the professional investor who, without help
ful and controlled background information on future expectations, concludes
more reliably the securities’ probable future potential.
If the concept of forecasting for new public issues is accepted, considera
tion should be given to the British system. While by no means foolproof in
protecting the public against Mr. Brown’s management behavioral concerns,
erroneous forecasts or a decline in stock value, nevertheless such disclosure
should add to more appropriate investment decision-making and be of benefit
to the investing public as a whole.
Exhibit I, pp. 246-255, includes relevant material of the Accountant's
Reports on Profit Forecasts, July 1969, of The Institute of Chartered Account
ants in England and Wales. I have also included several samples of forecast
expectation paragraphs extracted from both English and Dutch prospectuses.
Note that there is more detail in the English prospectuses than the Dutch. As
far as the Netherlands is concerned, according to Article 15-1 (f) of the Am
sterdam Stock Exchange, an offering circular should contain “all further data
desired for making a judgment on the state of affairs and the financial situa
1

SEC Release No. 5180, Securities Act of 1933 — Guidelines for Release of Information by
Issuers Whose Securities Are in Registration, August 16, 1971.
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tion of the issuing company in the past, the present as well as the near fu
ture.”
In view of the diversity of corporate operations and variation in reliabili
ty and volatility of revenue and cost trends, it seems essential that manage
ment retain maximum flexibility in determining the degree of financial fore
casting detail. Indeed the Financial Analysts Federation was most gratified
that the Professor Robert Mautz study on divisional reporting sponsored by
the Financial Executives Institute Research Foundation, recognized and em
phasized the importance of this concept. With this flexibility it would seem
appropriate for management to comment in general on expectations of the
economy, markets served, industry conditions, and internal corporate progress
to a maximum degree without injuring corporate competitive advantages.
As in the British system, responsibility for the economic, commercial,
marketing, and financial assumptions underlying the forecasts should remain
the responsibility of management. The accountant’s verification relates to at
testing that forecasts are prepared in accordance with the assumptions under
lying the calculations, rather than the assumptions themselves.
A further aspect worthy of consideration is the development of an inde
pendent opinion as to the reasonableness of management’s commercial as
sumptions. This responsibility might be assumed by a management consultant
division of the auditing firm or some other independent source. A rare exam
ple of this concept (Exhibit II, pp. 255-260) was enclosed in the 1965 Pure
Oil proxy statement for a special meeting called to consider a proposed mer
ger with Union Oil. The firm of Duff, Anderson & Clark, Industrial, Invest
ment and Financial Analysts, certified that in their opinion the proposal of
the merger of Pure into Union was fair and equitable and in the best interests
of Pure shareholders. They further stated that the merger arrangements were
superior and preferable to any other proposals and that the investment quality
of the security to be issued should, in their opinion, command a higher valua
tion than the market of the Pure Oil common.
Ongoing Forecasting

In regard to ongoing financial forecasting, emphasis should be placed on
maximum flexibility in terms of content and timing. To me it seems impossi
ble to establish detailed and inflexible rules regarding financial forecasting.
The diversity and complexity of corporations today are such that appropriate
procedures for one firm may be entirely inappropriate for another. For in
stance, utilities, by their very nature, are involved in three- to five-year finan
cial forecasting because of the long lead-time required for capital expendi
tures.2 Furthermore the stability of revenue and costs of the utility industry are
such that one can attach a high degree of reliability to the long-range forecast.

2

See Exhibit III, pp. 260-263, Public Service Company of Colorado Forecast.
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By contrast, a company which is in the area of high technology may be involv
ed with uncertain costs and unknown revenues so that detailed forecasts may
be either meaningless or misleading.
In this latter sense then, I would certainly agree with those who are con
cerned about revealing budgets which are primarily designed for internal con
sumption. The professional analyst is well aware of these uncertainties and
the low degree of reliability that may be incorporated in certain aspects of in
ternal corporate budgets. Nevertheless, in my mind, this does not relieve the
executive of his responsibility of discussing these factors in a more general
way with the professional analyst so that he can understand the thought proc
ess contributing to management’s expectations.
In view of the diversity of sophistication of the user market it is obvious
that discussion should vary accordingly, i.e., conversation either in private or
large groups of financial analysts should be substantially more detailed than
press releases or shareholder publications. At the same time, however, carry
ing this theory to its logical conclusion, it is important for management to
communicate with the general investing public at a level that is meaningful.
In this respect, rather than being content with the argument that nondisclosure
avoids confusion in the minds of shareholders, management should give some
expectation of earnings per share. Perhaps the means to convey a sense of
forecast uncertainty to the general investing public would be to issue a range
of earnings-per-share expectations with the breadth-and-time frame of the fore
cast reflecting management’s estimates of the degree of reliability.

Forms of Corporate Forecasting
In regard to frequency, I would tend to favor some comment at least on
a quarterly basis. The investment community and shareholders are used to
quarterly reports and, depending on the pace and volatility of the business,
previous forecasts can be either modified or reaffirmed briefly. While there is
no best method of communication, the following would be my suggestion for
a typical program of forecast communication with the financial community.

Annual Reports. While the prime purpose of the annual report is to dis
close to shareholders a review of the operations for the preceding year, of more
importance to me is management’s assessment of the near future. While the
subject matter (materiality) and degree of detail should remain the prerogative
of management, it is my view that most companies could expand on future
expectations in their annual report. As a starter, why not at least discuss the
divisional sales and earnings by category required in the Form 10-K. Further
more, comments on expectations for the economy, as a whole, are appropriate
as well as conditions in the industries served and specific corporate events
which would tend to make corporate results either better or worse than that
of the industry as a whole.
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While it is not necessary to be specific in every detail, to my way of think
ing it would be appropriate to put in an earnings range for the following calen
dar year. The major purpose of this disclosure is not for the professional
analyst, but to establish a reasonable framework throughout the entire in
vestment community of appropriate expectation for the company over the
foreseeable future. Once this framework has become established and well
known, it becomes less likely that private discussions among analysts
throughout the year will lead to the possibility of disclosure of inside informa
tion. While some corporate executives feel that earnings estimates of this na
ture are dangerous in that they may increase legal liability, to my way of
thinking the forecast, if handled with appropriate modifying conditions and
clauses, will reduce the liability of misleading the investing public as well as
disclosure of inside information.
Quarterly Reports. Quarterly reports, while essentially reviewing items
of immediacy and containing a short time span in corporate history, should as
a stabilizing factor address themselves briefly to changing or reaffirming ear
lier long-term forecasts.

Annual Meetings. Annual meetings are the most inefficient corporate
obligation today; yet, with a little planning, annual meetings could be the
cornerstone of communication with the investing public. I believe it is typical
for management to spend hours in preparation for an annual meeting so that
they might not be embarrassed by a question from a shareholder on the floor.
A more positive and fruitful tack would be for management to address itself
to the problems and prospects of the company particularly as they relate to
the financial expectations for that particular fiscal year. General comments
on corporate undertakings affecting future fiscal years are also helpful. While
not discussing financial forecasts, some corporations today have utilized this
time to great advantage (e.g., Polaroid, American Research and Development).
Other corporations have invited analysts to attend not only the annual meet
ing but also special briefing sessions which follow (Gulf Oil, Continental Oil).
The effectiveness of such a program is underscored by the enthusiasm of the
financial community to attend such meetings.
Communications With the Press. While I do not intend to tread on the
expertise of the public relations industry, the PR aspect relating to financial
forecasting of corporations is indeed vital in this discussion. Management,
possibly two or three times per year, may wish to present their views in front
of the investing public by accepting a speaking engagement before one of the
local Societies of the FAF or, if a larger corporation, perhaps a press confer
ence would be more effective as a supplement to the normal flow of corporate
releases. Such occasions may well be necessary to redirect the general area of
expectation of corporate earnings to more appropriate levels than those pre
viously predicted. Under these circumstances, a simple explanation of a new
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range of reasonableness followed by a brief discussion of the factors involved
in the change of the forecast proves most effective. Once this redirection in
forecast is known, corporate contacts with the financial community are then
freer to delve in detail on a day-to-day basis with the professional analyst with
out fear of divulging possible inside information.
Over the last few months I have kept a file of earnings forecasts re
ported in The Wall Street Journal. The file is so jammed full that it became
apparent that there are sufficient examples in the newspaper almost daily for
anyone to judge effective and ineffective examples of this procedure. How
ever, for an illustration of the former, see the shareholder letter of Industrial
Nucleonics (Exhibit IV, pp. 264-266).
A final measure to consider in this respect might be to hold a press con
ference near the end of the calendar year during which management could dis
cuss expectations for the general economy and for specific industries for the
following year (e.g., AT&T and General Motors). Such an undertaking pre
valent in economic circles sets the stage for more detailed discussions in the
annual report and the annual meeting typically three to four months hence.

EXHIBIT I

Excerpts from “Accountants’ Reports on Profit Forecasts”
The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales, July 1969
6. Reporting accountants can, however, within limits which are further
discussed below, properly undertake a critical and objective review of the ac
counting bases and calculations for profit forecasts, and can verify that the
forecasts have been properly computed from the underlying assumptions and
data and are presented on a consistent basis.
Preliminary considerations
7. Reporting accountants are advised to reach agreement with directors
on the following fundamental points before accepting instructions to report
in connection with profit forecasts:
(a) The time within which the accountants’ report is required should
not be so severely restricted that, having regard to the company’s
circumstances, and not withstanding their best endeavours, it
would be plainly impossible for the reporting accountants to ob
tain sufficient information to enable them properly to exercise their
professional judgement for the purposes of reporting (see also
paragraphs 16 and 17).
(b) It should be clearly established that the reporting accountants’ in
structions and responsibility for reporting under the Code are con
fined to the accounting bases and calculations for the profit fore
casts, as distinct from the assumptions including the commercial
assumptions, upon which the directors have based their forecasts.
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(c) Because profit forecasts are subject to increasing uncertainty the
further forward they reach in time, reporting accountants should
not normally undertake to review and report to directors on profit
forecasts for more than the current accounting period, and, pro
vided a sufficiently significant part of the current year has elapsed,
the next following accounting year.
(d) Although reporting accountants can provide the board with some
reassurance on the lines referred to in paragraph 6 above, they
cannot relieve the directors of the responsibility for profit fore
casts which are disclosed to and may be relied on by outsiders.
8. Before accepting instructions from boards of directors to review, and
report the connection with profit forecasts the reporting accountants will also
wish to establish the following main points:
(a) The purpose for which the forecasts have been prepared and the
accountants’ report is required.
(b) That the directors assume full responsibility for the forecasts un
der review (as required by the Code) and that they will signify
such responsibility by formal adoption by the board and a state
ment to that effect in any relevant circular.
(c) The identities of the company’s merchant bankers, advisers or
other independent professional experts reporting in connection
with the forecasts, with whom the reporting accountants will wish
to consult and keep in touch. It will be recalled that in any docu
ment addressed to shareholders in connection with an offer the as
sumptions, including the commercial assumptions, upon which the
directors have based their forecasts must be stated, and must be re
ported on by the company’s merchant bank or other advisers, and
revaluations of assets must be supported by the opinion of inde
pendent professional experts (Code, paragraph 15—see Appendix).
Main points to be considered in reporting accountants’ review
9. In carrying out their review the main matters to which the reporting
accountants will direct their attention are as follows:
(a) The nature and background of the company’s business.
(b) The accounting practices normally followed by the company.
(c) The assumptions on which the forecasts are based.
(d) The procedures followed by the company for preparing forecasts.
10. The nature and background of the company’s business. The reporting
accountants will wish to review the company’s general character and recent
history, with reference to such matters as the general nature of its activities
and its main products, markets, customers, suppliers, divisions, locations, la
bour force and trend of results.
11. The accounting practices normally followed by the company. The re
porting accountants will wish to establish the accounting practices followed
by the company so as to ensure that the principles normally adopted in an
nual financial statements are acceptable and have been consistently applied
in the preparation of interim accounts and profit forecasts. Areas which may
require particular attention include, for example:
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(a) The methods followed, and the nature of overheads included in
determining the amount to be carried forward for stock and work
in progress, and the identification, judgment and accounting treat
ment of obsolete and slow-moving items.
(b) The bases adopted for recognizing profits and providing for losses
on long-term contracts.
(c) Bases for calculating depreciation charges.
(d) The accounting treatment of research and development expendi
ture.
(e) The accounting treatment, and adequacy of disclosure, of excep
tional items.
(f) The accounting treatment of taxation and investment grants.
12. The assumption on which the forecasts are based. If a circular in
cludes profit forecasts, Rule 15 of the Code requires the assumptions, includ
ing the commercial assumptions, upon which the directors have based their
profit forecasts to be stated. As noted in paragraph 3 above, it is not the re
sponsibility of the accountants reporting on the accounting bases and cal
culations for profit forecasts to report on the underlying assumptions but
the task of the company’s merchant bank or other advisers, if any. However,
it is fundamental that the reporting accountants should report whether or not
the forecasts are consistent with the given assumptions, economic, commer
cial, marketing and financial, which underlie them.
13. The procedures followed by the company for preparing forecasts. In
carrying out their review of the accounting bases and calculations for fore
casts, and the procedures followed by the company for preparing them, the
main points which the reporting accountants will wish to consider include
the following:
(a) Whether the profit forecasts under review are based on forecasts
regularly prepared for the purpose of management, or whether
they have been separately and specially prepared for the immedi
ate purpose.
(b) Where profit forecasts are regularly prepared for management
purposes, the degree of accuracy and reliability previously
achieved, and the frequency and thoroughness with which estimates
are revised.
(c) Whether the forecasts under review represent the management’s
best estimate of results which they reasonably believe can and will
be achieved as distinct from targets which the management has set
as desirable.
(d) The extent to which forecast results for expired periods are sup
ported by reliable interim accounts.
(e) The extent to which the forecasts are built up from detailed fore
casts in respect of the main division or lines of activity of the busi
ness, distinguishing where possible between those which may be re
garded as showing a proved and consistent trend and those of a
more irregular, volatile or unproved nature.
(f) How the forecasts take account of any material exceptional items,
their nature, and how they are presented.
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(g) Whether adequate provision is made for foreseeable losses and
contingencies.
(h) Whether working capital appears adequate for requirements as
shown by properly prepared cash flow forecasts; and where short
term finance is to be relied on, whether the necessary arrange
ments have been made and confirmed.
(i) Whether the forecasts have been prepared and presented on ac
ceptable bases consistent with the accounting principles and prac
tices adopted by the company in previous years, and if not, wheth
er the fact and effects of any material change of basis are made
clear.

Main matters to be stated in accountants' report
14. The accountants’ report under the Code will be addressed to the di
rectors and will normally include statements dealing with the following mat
ters, so far as appropriate:
(a) The fact that the reporting accountants have carried out a review
of the accounting bases and calculations on which the profit fore
casts have been based.
(b) Specific identification of the forecasts and documents to which the
report refers.
(c) If, as will usually be the case, the reporting accountants have not
carried out an audit of estimated results for expired periods, a
statement to that effect.
(d) Whether in the opinion of the reporting accountants the forecasts
have been properly compiled on the basis of the assumptions made
by the board of directors, as set out in the circular, and are pre
sented on a basis consistent with the accounting practices normally
adopted by the company.
15. If the reporting accountants have reason for material reservations
about the accounting bases and calculations for the forecasts, or if they have
reason to consider them inconsistent with the stated assumptions, they should
qualify their report accordingly.

Reporting accountants’ reservations caused by
substantial restrictions of time
16. It has been noted (paragraph 7 (a) above) that before accepting in
structions to report on the accounting bases and calculations for profit fore
casts, reporting accountants should be satisfied that the time within which
their report is required should not be so severely restricted that it would be
plainly impossible for them to obtain the information they require to enable
them properly to exercise their professional judgement for the purpose of re
porting.
17. If for any reason, including unduly restrictive time limits, the reporting
accountants have not obtained all the information they consider necessary,
they should qualify their report accordingly. If they consider they have in
sufficient information to enable them properly to exercise their professional
judgement for the purpose of giving a meaningful report, they should say so.
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Specimen report
18. An accountants’ report on the accounting bases and calculations for
profit forecasts might, in appropriate circumstances, where there are no
grounds for qualifications, read as follows:
To the directors of X, Ltd.
We have reviewed the accounting bases and calculations for the profit fore
casts of X, Ltd. (for which the directors are solely responsible) for the peri
ods ... set out on pages ... of this circular. The forecasts include results
shown by unaudited interim accounts for the period .... In our opinion the
forecasts, so far as the accounting bases and calculations are concerned, have
been properly compiled on the footing of the assumptions made by the Board
set out on page ... of this circular [and separately reported on by Messrs . . .
on page . . .] and are presented on a basis consistent with the accounting prac
tices normally adopted by the company.

Letter of consent
19. Rule 15 of the Code requires that accountants’ reports on the account
ing bases and calculations for profit forecasts contained in circulars must be
accompanied by a statement that the accountants have given and not with
drawn their consent to publication.
20. Before giving their consent (which should be in writing) to publication
of their report, the reporting accountants should require to see the whole text
of the circular and should be satisfied that it is appropriate, and not mislead
ing, for their report on the accounting bases and calculations for profit fore
casts to appear in the form and context in which it is included.

EXHIBIT I-A

Prospectus of Secondary Offering of
Bost Kalis Westminster Dredging Group N.V.
(A Dutch Company)
June 4, 1971

Finance and dividend policy
Although the dividend policy will be changed, retained earnings should
continue to be one of the most important sources of finance. Besides, limited
use will be made of loan capital in future.
An ample measure of liquidity will be necessary to enable the Company to
pursue an active policy and to prefinance contracts.
Assuming that results of the current year would equal those of fiscal 1970,
it is the intended to distribute approx. 35% of the net profit to shareholders.

Progress and outlook
The volume of contracts awarded guarantees a satisfactory level of activity
for the remainder of this current fiscal year. A number of important projects
that are due to commence include sandwinning near Reeuwijk, enclosure of
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the East Schelde and improvement of ports and harbours at Boulogne, Tar
ragona, Leixoes, Dublin, Aalborg and Milford Haven.
In 1971 the Company also plans to undertake activities on a modest scale,
in the fields of the disposal of industrial effluents. A chemical tanker M.I.
Transporter No. 1 has been purchased and is being converted for this pur
pose.
Expansion of activities resulting from the acquisition of Grant, Lyon, the
Oosterwijk and Verstoep groups and more recently of Rock Fall afford more
scope for diversification. This will broaden and strengthen the Group’s base.
Special attention will be paid to further internationalisation. More and
more opportunities for carrying out large-scale projects are likely to occur
through the infrastructural improvements particularly in the developing coun
tries. The Group today offers a full comprehensive range of services, sup
ported further by the merger with Verstoep. In view of the anticipated growth
of foreign business it is of vital importance that the scope of the foreign work
ing companies is further enlarged. During 1970 subsidiaries were formed in
France and the Netherlands Antilles, whereas the establishment of a Spanish
subsidiary is in a preparatory stage. Presently, possibilities are being studied
for an enlarged participation in Continental Shelf activities.
Results for the first months of 1971 have been satisfactory. It seems justi
fied to expect that full year results will not differ to any important degree
from those obtained in 1970. However, as profits on a given project are only
accounted for after completion of the contract, it is difficult to make an ac
curate assessment of profits for the full year at this stage.
For additional information reference is made to the financial data included
elsewhere in this prospectus.

Yours faithfully,
Bost Kalis Westminster Dredging Group N.V.

Excerpt from Oce-van der Grinten N.V.
(A Dutch Company)
Offering Prospectus
Dated April 13, 1971

Forecast
It is expected that, during the next five years — acquisitions not taken in
to account—increases of sales of 20% per annum may be realized, which
would mean that in said five-year period the sales of the present Oce com
panies would be trebled. Every effort is being made to step up operating pro
fits. For 1971 a 15% rise of net profits is anticipated. Developments in the
first quarter of the current financial year confirm these expectations. There
is no certainty yet as to whether the equity deriving from the present issue
which is destined for the financing of new acquisitions will contribute to
profits in the current financial year to the same extent, since this will depend
on, among other factors, the times at which these acquisitions can be effected.
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EXHIBIT I-B

Offering of M.F.I. Warehouses, Ltd.
(A U.K. Company)
Profits and Prospects
The growth in the Group’s turnover and profits shown by the Account
ants’ Report may be attributed to four principal factors:
(1) The ability of the Group to develop, in close association with man
ufacturers, specially designed goods at competitive prices and to sell these
goods profitably through the efficient use of advertising in the national press
and magazines.
(2) The continued extension of existing lines which has increased the
return from advertising.
(3) The development of retail trading which has produced a greater re
turn from the mail order advertising.
(4) The increase in turnover which has enabled the Group to buy in
greater quantities at lower prices.
The Group’s turnover and profits before taxation for the year ended
31st May, 1970 amounted to £3,718,000 and £532,182 respectively, and for
the nine months ended 28th February, 1971 amounted to £3,914,000 and
£ 609, 584 respectively. The last six weeks of the latter period were adversely
affected by the postal strike. During those weeks the turnover of the retail
warehouses was approximately in line with the budget made prior to the
strike but mail order turnover was severely reduced. The Directors consider
that stocks at 28th February, 1971 as shown by the Accountants’Report were
abnormally high because of the reduction in mail order turnover. Taking into
account cost savings which were made, including a reduction in advertising
expenditure which it was possible to make because the Group’s advertising is
finalised weekly, it is estimated that the Group earned profits before taxation
of approximately £40,000 during the period of the strike.
The turnover in the three months ending 31st May, 1971 is expected to
amount to approximately £ 1,900,000 (1970—£ 1,300,000) of which £ 1,150,000 will be mail order sales and £ 750,000 will be retail warehouse sales.
The overall net profit margin in this period is expected to be somewhat lower
than for the previous nine months because of a seasonal change in the sales
mix and a reduced level of credit charges receivable caused by the loss of mail
order turnover during the postal strike. The Directors expect that in the ab
sence of unforeseen circumstances the Group’s profits before taxation for the
year ending 31st May, 1971 will be not less than £875,000.
The Company gave evidence to the Crowther Committee on consumer
credit and would welcome the implementation of that Committee’s recom
mendations. The Directors consider that having regard to the Group’s method
of trading it will continue to be fully competitive.
It is the Directors’ policy to continue to develop the business of the
Group by increasing the range of goods sold and by opening further retail
warehouses, both in suburban London and in other growing and densely pop
ulated areas of the country. It is planned to open a total of four further retail
warehouses by 31st May, 1972 including those at Welling and Luton.
The Directors are confident that, with the additional space available in
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the new premises at Wembley and with the further retail warehouses which
it is intended to open, the prospects for both the mail order and retail busi
nesses of the Group are good.

Dividends and Yields
The Directors do not intend to recommend a dividend in respect of the
year ending 31st May, 1971. In respect of the year ending 31st May, 1972
it is their intention to pay an interim dividend in February, 1972 and to re
commend a final dividend for payment in or about October, 1972.
Had the company been a quoted company for the whole of the year end
ing 31st May, 1971 the Directors would have recommended, on the basis of
profits before taxation of £875,000 and corporation tax at the rate of 40 per
cent, dividends totalling 54 per cent of which 20 per cent would have been
paid as an interim dividend and 34 per cent as a final dividend. This may be
shown as follows:
£
Profits before taxation
875,000
Less: Corporation tax at 40 per cent
350,000

Profits available for Ordinary shareholders

525,000

Less: Total dividends of 54 per cent on the
324,000

Ordinary share capital of £600,000

Retained profits
Cover for the Ordinary dividend

£201,000
1.62 times

On this basis and at the Offer price of 135p per share, the Ordinary
shares of the Company are being offered for sale at a price/eamings ratio of
15.4 and on a dividend yield of 4.0 per cent.
Yours faithfully,
Arthur C. Southon,

Chairman

EXHIBIT I-C

Singer & Friedlander Ltd. Offering of
Kwik Save Discount Group Ltd.
November 25, 1970

Profits, prospects and dividends
As will be seen from the Accountants’ Report, the growth in turnover
and profits of the Group since the Group adopted its present methods of
trading in 1965 has been very rapid. The rise in profits has broadly followed
the increase in the number of stores opened by the Group, but it has also
been assisted by an improvement in net margins.
The number of outlets operated by the Group at the end of each of the
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last 6 financial years and the anticipated position at the end of the current
financial year are as follows:
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971

4 conventional supermarkets totalling
9 discount supermarkets totalling
99
99
"
13
99
"
17
99
99
99
18
99
99
99
24
99
99
29

27,000 sq. ft. of floor area
99
51,000 99 99 99 99
99
99
99
99
99
86,000
99
108,000 99 99 99 99
99
121,000 99 99 99 99
99
163,000 99 99 99 99
99
99
99
99
250,000

*Includes the 4 conventional supermarkets converted during the year.

Although only one discount supermarket was opened in the year to 31st
August, 1969 the warehouse was expanded by 28,000 square feet and the
full benefit was felt of the four discount supermarkets opened in the previous
year.
In the year of 31st August, 1967 which was the first full financial year
which reflected the change in the Group’s methods of trading, turnover rose
by some 125% but profits only rose by some 30%. The principal cause of
this relatively small increase in profits was the difficulty experienced in
changing the Group’s methods of trading; inevitably mistakes were made,
particularly in the selection and handling of stocks. In each of the three years
subsequent to 1967 the percentage increase in profits has been in excess of
the percentage increase in turnover, reflecting the steady improvement in net
profit margins.
Two of the six new discount supermarkets opened in the year to 29th
August, 1970 were not opened until the last month of this period and made
little contribution to the profits of the year. As mentioned under “Future
Expansion of Premises” above at least five further stores are scheduled to
open in the current financial period. In addition the Group is expanding the
selling area of two existing stores. Taking into account this current develop
ment programme and the expansion of turnover being experienced in existing
discount supermarkets the Directors expect that profits before corporation tax
for the current financial year ending 28th August, 1971 will show a signifi
cant increase over those for the previous period and in the absence of un
foreseen circumstances will be not less than £900,000.
On the basis of profits before tax for the year ending 28th August, 1971
of not less than £900,000 the Directors expect to pay an interim dividend of
20% in or about April, 1971 and to recommend a final Ordinary dividend of
not less than 271/2% in or about December, 1971.
The Directors believe that present trends in retailing favour the type of
trading carried out by the Group and that the potential for continued growth
of profits in the future is good. For this potential to be realised it will be ne
cessary for the Group to continue to acquire and develop new sites. As in
dicated under “Future Expansion of Premises” above, the Group is being of
fered an increasing number of sites and is capable of opening a new discount
supermarket very rapidly after a suitable site is acquired; new discount super
markets are expected to become profitable immediately after opening. Taking
into account recent motorway development the Group has a substantial po
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tential trading area based on the present warehouse at Prestatyn. The Direc
tors intend at a later stage to expand the Group’s operations in an adjacent
area centred round a second warehouse.
In the financial year ended 29th August, 1970 the Group increased its
net profit margin for the third year in succession, despite two wage increases
to its employees. The average size of the stores that will be opened by the
Group in the future will be larger than the average size of the existing stores;
since labour costs do not rise proportionately with the size of the store this
should result in increased productivity. Many of the Group’s overhead ex
penses do not vary directly with turnover; as turnover rises the Directors
therefore expect that margins will be at least maintained and possibly im
proved.
Taking into account all the above points the Directors are confident of
the Group’s ability to continue to expand its turnover and profits in the fore
seeable future.

Dividend yield, price earnings ratio and cover
The appropriation of the forecast profits before taxation of £900,000
based on corporation tax at 421/2% and on dividends totalling 471/2% is
shown below:
£
Forecast profits before taxation
900,000
Less: corporation tax at 421/2 %
382,500
Profits after taxation
Dividends (gross) of 471/2% on £750,000
Ordinary share capital would absorb
Leaving for retention in the business

517,500
356,250

£161,250

On this basis, at the Offer price of 21s. 6d. per share, the gross dividend
yield would be 4.42%, the dividend would be covered 1.45 times, and the
price earnings ratio would be 15.58.

EXHIBIT II

The Pure Oil Company
Proxy Statement
for
Special Meeting of Shareholders
July 2, 1965
General information
This statement is furnished in connection with the solicitation of proxies
by the management of The Pure Oil Company, an Ohio corporation (“Pure”
or “Company”), to be used at the special meeting of stockholders of Pure to
be held at 10:00 o’clock A.M. (Central Daylight Saving Time) on July 2,
1965, at 620 East Broad Street, Columbus, Ohio, and at any adjournment
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thereof. The special meeting has been called for the purpose of considering
and taking action on a proposal to merge Pure into Union Oil Company of
California, a California corporation (Union), under an Agreement of Merger
(merger agreement), a copy of which (as approved and recommended by the
Board of Directors of Pure) is attached hereto as Exhibit A and made a part
hereof. If the accompanying form of proxy is executed and returned it may
nevertheless be revoked at any time before it is voted by written notice to the
Company or in open meeting.
At the close of business on May 20, 1965, Pure had outstanding 10,024,605 shares of Common Stock entitled to be voted of the par value of
$5.00 each. Each share of the outstanding Common Stock is entitled to one
vote on matters to be considered at the meeting. Only shareholders of record
at the close of business on May 27, 1965, were entitled to notice of the meet
ing and will be entitled to vote at the meeting.
The proposed merger
Under the terms of the merger agreement, and as provided by the appli
cable laws of Ohio and California, Pure will be merged into Union, which
will be the surviving corporation, and the separate existence of Pure will
cease. Union will thereafter continue to be a corporation organized under
California law, will succeed (without other transfer) to all the rights, proper
ties and assets of Pure, and will be subject to and responsible for all debts and
liabilities of Pure.
The merger agreement provides for the amendment of Union’s Articles
of Incorporation to create and authorize 10,275,397 $2.50 Cumulative Con
vertible Preferred Shares, without par value, each of which—
will have share for share voting power, along with the Union Common
Shares,
will be entitled to a $2.50 annual dividend in preference to the Union
Common Shares,
will be convertible into 1.3 Union Common Shares,
will be non-callable for five years. Thereafter, unless the holder exercises
his right of conversion, the Preferred Shares will be redeemable in
whole or in part at Union’s option at $67 in the sixth year, $66 in
the seventh year and $65 in the eighth and subsequent years, and
will be entitled in the event of liquidation, in preference to the Union
Common Shares, to $65 in case the liquidation is voluntary and
$62.50 if it is involuntary.
Upon the merger becoming effective, each outstanding share of Pure
Common Stock will be converted into one Union $2.50 Preferred Share.
Thereafter, until exchanged for Union share certificates, outstanding Pure
Common Stock certificates will represent an equivalent number of the new
Union $2.50 Preferred Shares.
Authorized and outstanding Union Common Shares will not be affected
by the merger.
Upon the merger becoming effective, Union Common Shares theretofore
authorized (whether issued or unissued) shall remain unchanged and all such
shares outstanding on such effective date (including shares held in the treas
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ury of Union) shall remain outstanding. Each certificate of Union evidencing
ownership of any such shares shall continue to evidence ownership of the
same number of Common Shares of Union as the surviving corporation.
The Board of Directors of Pure has approved the Merger Agreement
and, under the laws of Ohio and Pure’s Articles of Incorporation, the affirma
tive vote of at least a majority of the outstanding shares of Pure’s Common
Stock is required for approval of the Merger Agreement. The Board of Di
rectors of Union has also approved the Merger Agreement and the proposed
amendments to Union’s Articles of Incorporation and, under the law of Cali
fornia, an affirmative vote of at least two-thirds of Union’s outstanding com
mon shares is required for the approval of the Merger Agreement. As the amendments to Union’s Articles of Incorporation relate to and are proposed
for the purpose of effecting the merger, Union’s shareholders will vote upon
the Merger Agreement and the amendments as one matter. Accordingly, the
affirmative vote of at least two-thirds of Union’s outstanding common shares
will be required for the adoption and approval of the proposed amendments
to Union’s Articles of Incorporation.
The foregoing summary of certain terms of the Merger Agreement is
qualified in its entirety by reference to that document itself, a copy of which
is attached to this Proxy Statement.
Negotiation of Union Oil merger terms and basis therefor
The principal reasons for the conclusion of the Board of Directors of
Pure that the proposed merger is in the best interests of shareholders have
been set forth in the letter of its President accompanying this Proxy State
ment. Shareholders are urged to read this letter carefully.
The terms of the merger are the result of arm’s length negotiations be
tween representatives of the constituent companies. Among other factors con
sidered were the respective assets, earnings, operations and future prospects of
the companies and the market prices for their common stocks. Under the
circumstances it appeared equitable to provide for the creation of a preferred
stock of Union for issuance to Pure shareholders upon the merger, such pre
ferred stock to carry a stable dividend rate above that previously paid on
Pure Common Stock and to permit holders of this preferred stock to partici
pate in the possible future growth and development of the combined enter
prises through a right to convert into Common Shares of Union. The conver
sion and dividend rates were fixed so as to reflect a comparison of past pro
jected earnings and market prices at the time of negotiations, adjusted, how
ever, to reflect the differences between a preferred security with a right of
conversion and Union’s Common Shares.
In working out the merger arrangements, Union consulted with Dillon,
Read & Co. and Blyth & Co., Incorporated, investment banking firms. Pure
has had the benefit of advice and a report from Duff, Anderson & Clark, in
vestment analysts. Their letter of opinion is reproduced on p. 258.

Developments preceding submission of Union merger to shareholders
After careful study and analysis, Pure’s Board of Directors determined
on February 15, 1965, by a 12 to 1 vote (Mr. Parten dissenting), that the
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Report of Independent Investment Analysts
Duff, Anderson & Clark
Industrial Investment and Financial Analysts
208 South LaSalle Street
Chicago, Illinois 60604
May 19, 1965
Board of Directors
The Pure Oil Company
Palatine, Illinois
Gentlemen:
In accordance with your request, we have reviewed the terms of the
proposed merger of The Pure Oil Company into Union Oil Company of Cali
fornia.
We have also, at your request, reviewed two alternative proposals con
sidered at the time you determined to proceed with negotiations of definitive
details of the Union merger, one of which contemplated the sale of Pure’s
assets and the other a merger of Pure with another oil company; and also a
recent communication from Ashland Oil & Refining Company outlining a
plan for the sale of Pure’s assets. The results of our review and analysis of
the foregoing are set forth in detail in our Report dated April 22, 1965, and
supplementary letters dated May 4, and May 17, 1965.
In our opinion the proposal for the merger of Pure into Union is fair
and equitable; and your decision to proceed with the Union merger was and
is, in our view, in the best interest of Pure’s shareholders. We consider the
Union merger arrangement to be superior and preferable, from the stand
point of a shareholder of Pure, to any of the proposals or possibilities refer
red to in the preceding paragraph. Our belief is that the investment quality of
the Union preferred to be issued on the merger to Pure shareholders is such
that, under normal market conditions, it should command a higher valuation
than the market has been placing on Pure common.
Very truly yours,
Duff, Anderson & Clark

merger of Pure into Union was clearly superior to, and more in the interests
of Pure shareholders than, either of the only other definitive proposals which
your Company’s Board of Directors received between June 1964 and the fol
lowing mid-February.
One of the proposals rejected contemplated a merger of Pure into At
lantic Refining Company (Atlantic), an active competitor of Pure in a multi
state area in the Southeast. Under this proposal, Pure shareholders were to
receive Atlantic preferred stock on a share for share basis. The Atlantic pre
ferred was to be convertible into one-half share of Atlantic common (then
trading at approximately $60 a share); was to be subordinate as to dividends
and on dissolution to $90,000,000 authorized prior Atlantic preferred, of
which $32,500,000 was stated to be outstanding; was to be entitled to a $2.95
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noncumulative annual dividend and $70 in liquidation, in each case in prefer
ence to Atlantic common; was to be callable after ten years at $90 per share;
and was to be entitled to one-half vote per share.
The other rejected proposal was submitted by a group consisting of Carl
M. Loeb, Rhoades & Co., two other investment banking firms and a chemical
corporation. It contemplated purchase by this group of Pure’s production
properties, subject to a $500,000,000 reserved production payment, sale of
Pure’s refining, transportation and marketing properties to a new company
having no interest in the oil and gas properties and liquidation and dissolution
of Pure. The gross consideration to be given for Pure’s assets was stated to
be an amount equal to $62.50 per share of Pure’s common stock, plus an
amount sufficient to retire Pure’s funded debt, and the assumption of certain
of Pure’s liabilities. Title and conveyancing expense, taxes generated by the
sale, and liquidation expense were to be borne by Pure.
Neither of these two proposals is now open, one of them having been
expressly withdrawn and the other having expired by its terms.
On April 29, 1965, Pure’s Board of Directors, by a vote of 11 to 2
(Messrs. Parten and Sandlin dissenting) approved the Merger Agreement,
Union’s Board of Directors having previously approved. Thereafter, in ac
cordance with applicable law, the merger agreement was executed by Pure
and Union on April 29. On May 7, 1965 Pure received a letter from Ash
land Oil & Refining Company dated that day. A later communciation, dated
May 15, was received from Ashland which amended the earlier letter. The
last Ashland letter (copy of which is hereto annexed as Exhibit B) outlines a
proposal by Ashland and its associates for negotiations for the sale by Pure
of its assets upon outlined terms which, it is asserted, would produce $70 a
share on Pure stock. Ashland is an active competitor of Pure in a multi-state
area in the Midwest and Southeast.
At the present time the Union merger agreement constitutes a contractual
commitment by Pure and Union for the merger of the two companies, subject
only to the approval of shareholders of each company and to termination of
the merger agreement in certain limited situations defined by the agreement
itself. Ashland’s proposal to negotiate is, in recognition of this fact, expressly
made subordinate and subject to Pure’s submission, to its shareholders of the
Union merger proposal.
The Ashland submission is not an offer susceptible of acceptance or re
jection in its present form, even if Pure were contractually able to entertain
it, and Ashland and its associates are in no way committed at the present time.
The Ashland plan is, instead, only a proposal to negotiate on a variety of de
tails. Before any clear proposal could be developed and put in definitive form
for Pure’s consideration and necessary action, satisfactory resolution of a
number of contingencies and extensive documentation would be required, all
of which would likely take a number of months. The contingencies which
would have to be resolved include the financing of a new company, not yet
organized, in a very substantial aggregate amount by the public or institutional
investors, at a future date and under economic and market conditions not now
predictable. This financing would be necessary to enable the new company to
undertake assumption of Pure Oil’s liabilities, which include long-term debt in
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excess of $150,000,000, and at the same time to carry on Pure Oil’s present
refining, transportation, and marketing operations.
There is no assurance that any alternative to the Union merger can be
successfully developed. The probability is that substantial time delays would
be involved in the process, in any case, before shareholders could expect to
realize upon their investment under any alternative.
The Union merger proposal is the only definitive offer before the share
holders for acceptance or rejection.
Over a period of ten months, in considering various suggestions, plans or
proposals for merger of Pure into another company, or the sale of its assets,
a major consideration has been the impact on the transaction of federal and
state antitrust laws. Ultimately, the relationship between these laws and a
particular transaction is a matter for judicial determination, but in the first
instance the attitude of enforcement authorities is important.
For several months, the United States Department of Justice has been
studying the proposed Pure-Union merger in the light of federal antitrust laws
and each of the companies has been cooperating in this study by supplying in
formation as requested. To date, there has been no indication by the Depart
ment of Justice as to whether it will oppose the merger.
Counsel have advised Pure that a merger of Pure and Union, in its opin
ion, will not violate antitrust laws. Counsel have further advised that a re
jected merger proposal by Atlantic, a competitive oil company, as well as the
recently publicized idea of Ashland, another competitive oil company (Ex
hibit B), for the purchase of Pure’s assets, would violate the Sherman and
Clayton Acts.

EXHIBIT III
Uniform Forecast
Public Service Company of Colorado and Subsidiaries
1971-1975

Assumptions made in Forecast
(1) Present federal and state income tax laws will prevail throughout the
period.
(2) No rate relief is assumed beyond that associated with the 1970 rate
case.
(3) Interest rates of 7 per cent for long-term debt securities and 6 per
cent for short-term notes payable were assumed throughout the period.
(4) The present dividend payout ratio in common stock will be approxi
mately maintained.

Rate Filing
For the year ended December 31, 1970, Public Service Company of
Colorado did not earn the rate of return that was authorized by The Public
Utilities Commission of the State of Colorado in its January 1970 Rate of
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Return Order. The combination of a high rate of price inflation, higher mon
ey costs and the reduction in electric revenues resulting from the rate re
structuring in March 1970 have resulted in overall earnings that are deficient.
Therefore, on February 19, 1971, the Company filed an application with The
Public Utilities Commission of the State of Colorado for authority to in
crease its gas and electric rates. The application seeks to update the Com
mission’s 1970 order which allowed a 7.5 per cent overall rate of return (7.7
per cent on the gas business alone). No increase will be sought in the 13 per
cent allowance for return to common equity, nor will the Company raise
other controversial matters such as rate base definition or calculation. Of
course, the increase in rate base and in operating revenue deductions will be
taken into account as well as the fact that, since $75 million of new debt
securities have been sold since the 1970 order, a somewhat higher overall
rate of return is being sought.

Increased cost of gas — rate adjustment
On August 14, 1970, Colorado Interstate Gas Company, which sup
plies over 90 per cent of Public Service Company of Colorado and its sub
sidiaries natural gas resale requirements, was authorized by the Federal Pow
er Commission an annual increase of approximately $5 million effective
April 18, 1970. The Company and its subsidiaries were authorized by their
respective regulatory commissions to increase their rates on a consolidated
basis in an amount approximating 97 per cent of the increased cost of gas
effective simultaneously with Colorado Interstate Gas Company’s increased
rates.
On September 30, 1970, El Paso Natural Gas Company, a partial nat
ural gas supplier of Colorado Interstate Gas Company and Western Slope
Gas Company, filed an application with the Federal Power Commission for
increases in its rates. Subsequently, Colorado Interstate Gas Company filed
a tracking increase application. The Federal Power Commission has suspend
ed both proposed increases until March 31, 1971 at which time the propos
ed increases will become effective in part, subject to refund to the level of
rates ultimately determined. The Company and its subsidiaries will file with
their respective regulatory commissions for authority to make coincident
compensating rate increases, also subject to refund. It is estimated that the
amount of the March 31, 1971 increase to the Company and its subsidiaries
will be about $1.25 million.
General comments on:

Air Quality Control Program. The Company announced on April 16,
1970 a new air quality control program which involves two phases and a
three year estimated cost of $ 11 million. The objective of the program is to
reduce particulate emission levels of ten of the Company’s major generating
units to a point substantially lower than that required by state statutes
through the use of gas conditioning equipment and wet scrubbers. The Com
pany’s overall goal is to obtain a clear stack status by mid-1973.
Fort St. Vrain. Construction of Fort St. Vrain Nuclear Generating Plant
is approximately 85 per cent complete as of year-end 1970. Commercial op
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eration is scheduled for not later than March 31, 1972. The total estimated
construction cost to the Company is approximately $63 million, which in
cludes the cost of the site and site preparation. Local reaction to the plant has
been favorable as evidenced by over 15,000 visitors during the first six
months.

Uniform Forecast Form
Public Service Company of Colorado and Subsidiaries
(Revised February 1971)

Actual
1971

1972

1973

1974

1975

7,259
185

7,883
192

8,522
209

9,213
210

10,721
226

11,558
233

1,377

1,558

1,685

1,823

2,075

2,259

362
1,485

362
1,485

362
1,815

362
1,815

362
2,165

362
2,165

52

56

58

60

63

66

1,899

1,903

2,235

2.237

2,590

2,593

$73.7
14.5
4.9

$70.4
14.1
5.5

$64.9
13.8
4.7

$65.9
14.7
4.2

$75.3
15.8
5.1

$93.1
—
0.5

$75.6
17.0
6.4
$99.0
—
0.5

$90.0
—
0.5

$83.4
0.3
0.5

$84.8
—
0.5

$96.2
____
0.5

$93.6

$99.5

$90.5

$84.2

$85.3

$96.7

$22.7
17.1

$23.8
18.8

$26.3
4.3

$28.9
15.5

$31.1
13.5

$33.4
15.7

Subtotal
Outside financing required

$39.8
53.8

$42.6
56.9

$30.6
59.9

$44.4
39.8

$44.6
40.7

$49.1
47.6

Total sources of capital

$93.6

$99.5

$90.5

$84.2

$85.3

$96.7
—

(1) Sales and Load Data
Electric sales (millions of
kwh)
Gas sales (millions of mcf)
Electric max. net firm de
mand (MW)
Electric net capability
(MW)
Peaking generation
Base load generation
Firm purchases and
Colo. power pool
Total

(2) Capital Requirements*
Construction expenditures:
Electric
Gas
Other

Subtotal
Bond maturities
Bond sinking funds
Total capital require
ments
(3) Sources of Capital*
Internal cash:
Depreciation accruals
Other internal sources
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Estimated

1970

Estimated

Actual
1970
Tentative financing program*
Bonds
Preferred stock
Common stock
Short-term loans
Type not determined (a)

Total
(4) Significant Income Items*
Tax reductions from lib
eralized depreciation
and guidelines (flowthrough)
Interest charged to con
struction (Rate — 71/2 per cent)

1971

1972

1973

$35.0 $40.0 $ — $ —
—
—
—
30.0
—
—
—
19.5
(0.2)
(0.7) (13.1) (5.1)
40.0
—
—
65.0

1974

1975

$ —
—
—
5.7
35.0

$ —
—
—•
(2.4)
50.0

$47.6

$53.8

$56.9

$59.9

$39.8

$40.7

$ 5.2

$ 5.4

$ 6.0

$ 6.4

$ 6.7

$ 7.0

2.8

5.4

3.9

4.6

1.6

3.7

*Millions of dollars
(a) Permanent financing — type dependent on market and other conditions
at the time.

Weather Comparison
Denver Airport Temperatures
Degree
%
Colder or
Days
Warmer ( ) Actual
Than Normal 1969

%

Colder or
Warmer ( )
Than 1969

1970

Degree
Days
Normal

January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December

1,139
910
690
974
532
175
30
—
1
268
702
741

1,088
1,076
983
748
433
200
55
3
26
173
509
803

4.7
(15.4)
(29.8)
30.2
22.9
(12.5)
(45.5)
(—)
(96.2)
54.9
37.9
(7.7)

1,065
956
887
819
367
157
122
—
—
187
845
816

6.9
(4.8)
(22.2)
18.9
45.0
11.5
(75.4)
—
—
43.3
(16.9)
(9.2)

Total to Date

6,162

6,097

1.1

6,221

(0.9)

Month Ending
the 7th

Degree Days
Actual

Definition: Degree days for any day is the difference of the mean temperature
(average maximum and minimum) below 65°F. Example: Assume maximum of
60° and minimum of 20°, the mean temperature would be 40°, which subtracted
from 65° equals 25 degree days.
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EXHIBIT IV
Industrial Nucleonics Corporation®/AccuRay®
650 Ackerman Road, Columbus, Ohio 43202 (614) 267-6351
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

September 29, 1971
Dear Stockholder:
We are pleased to present the following progress report covering the year
to date together with our current projection for the full year ended Decem
ber 31, 1971. Our report is based on our detailed midyear review completed
in late August of order projections, equipment shipments, rental and service
revenues, and operating budgets for all departments for the remainder of
1971.
1970
7969
1971

(per audit)

(per audit)

(projected)

Operating revenues

$20,002,000

$27,600,000

Profit before taxes

3,366,000

4,429,000

Profit after taxes

1,916,000

2,402,000

$0.60

$0.74

$38,000,000
41,000,000
5,000,000
5,500,000
2,600,000
2,850,000
$0.80-0.86

Earnings per share

The market for our process automation systems is a combination of di
verse individual markets in each of the various industries we serve. As de
scribed in earlier quarterly reports, we have been engaged during all of 1971
in shipping a series of initial system configurations with the objective of rap
idly expanding our potential for repeat orders for each new application.
These systems have many existing new features such as “automatic grade
change control,” “speed optimization control,” and “dynamic target optimi
zation control” which are being offered to our customers for the first time.
Many of these large sophisticated systems, in retrospect, have taken
longer to install and bring fully operational than anticipated. In a number of
instances, we have also encountered delay in customer programs because of
external conditions beyond our immediate control. The composite effect of
these factors was that the level of new equipment orders which we received
during the summer months was lower than expected. On the positive side, we
have received outstanding initial application results from systems shipped
earlier in 1971. With these excellent customer testimonials, we foresee a high
er level of order activity during the remainder of 1971.
The lower level of orders received during the summer months has af
fected adversely our quarterly profit planning for the year. During each of
our current quarterly periods, we have planned to balance the mix of initial
systems designs having higher manufacturing costs with more standard ship
ments produced at lower manufacturing costs and higher profit. The delay in
receipt of orders has moved several shipments into the fourth quarter which
we had planned to complete in the prior quarter. The third quarter will,
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therefore, be lower in volume and profit, and the fourth quarter will be cor
respondingly higher in volume and profit than we had anticipated earlier.
The following is a summary of current quarterly projections:

Operating
revenues
Profit before
taxes
Profit after
taxes

Earnings per
share

1st Quarter
Ended
Mar. 31
(per interim
report)

2nd Quarter
Ended
June 30
(per interim
report)

3rd Quarter
Ended
Sept. 30
(projected)

4th Quarter
Ended
Dec. 31
(projected)

$7,728,000

$9,954,000

$10,000,000

1,020,000

2,037,000

500,000

530,000

1,058,000

250,000

$10,000,000
13,000,000
1,500,000
2,000,000
800,000
1,000,000
$0.24-0.30

$0.16

$0.32

$0.08

Our final performance for 1971 will be leveraged by our ability to cap
italize on the success of each initial system installation and to produce repeat
business in that industry segment. Included among these new systems recently
shipped were:
• An AccuRay® Process Management 800 system with target optimi
zation control which is now installed on a tire fabric calender in the rubber
industry.
• An AccuRay Process Management 800 system with target optimi
zation control designed for multi-line impregnation processes in the indus
trial laminating field.
• An AccuRay Process Management 800 system for the galvanizing
industry designed with a new X-ray fluorescence system to measure zinc
coatings on steel and provide for automatic control of coating weight on gal
vanizing lines.
• An AccuRay Process Management 832 system with target optimiza
tion control for both basis weight and moisture which is now installed on an
on-machine coating process producing over 300 tons per day of coated
papers.
• An AccuRay Process Management 811 system with complete auto
matic grade change and automatic speed change capabilities which is now
installed on one of the fastest machines in the United States manufacturing
publication grades of paper.
• An AccuRay Process Management 821 system with speed optimi
zation control for both basis weight and moisture which is now installed on
a high production machine producing corrugating medium.
• An AccuRay Process Management 821 system with automatic grade
change, speed optimization control, and target optimization control which is
presently being installed on a machine producing over 1,000 tons per day of
liner-board product.
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• An AccuRay Process Management 811 system with target optimi
zation control for both basis weight and moisture which is now installed on
a machine in the newsprint industry.
• An AccuRay Production Process Diagnostic System 800 designed
for use with the basic AccuRay Process Management system being supplied to
the tobacco industry to provide a practical link from the data base generated
at the process level to higher level management information systems.

We have active marketing programs under way to contact every poten
tial user of these systems and encourage visits to present installations in order
to demonstrate the results being achieved. To better communicate the suc
cess of these systems, we are also accelerating our advertising program. The
attached advertising reprint appears in the September issue of Pulp and Paper
magazine and other trade periodicals.
In our 1970 Annual Report to stockholders, we advised that in order
to aid the introduction of our computer-based AccuRay Process Management
systems, we had adopted the cost accounting technique of associating the
learning costs on initial system applications with anticipated orders for simi
lar future applications. We also noted that this method would aid in the ex
pansion of this basic system development to new applications in 1971. We
have followed this program during the year and expect to include in our in
ventory valuation approximately $1,000,000 and defer this cost into 1972.
Our experience continues to show that subsequent shipments of these sys
tems are produced at much lower costs. During the past 18 months, we have
substantially increased both our professional staff and our physical plant and
facilities to accommodate the higher level of manufacturing operations. We
have made significant headway in our manufacturing standardization pro
grams, and our new personnel are being efficiently utilized. The result is that
we can now offer routine shipment of all major new product lines, and we are
realizing improved profitability on subsequent shipments of new designs. This
will enable us to achieve improved margins in the balance of 1971 and 1972.
In summary, we report major progress in the transition of the Company
to a broader systems supplier of process automation and management infor
mation systems. We believe that the strength of the Company is in our diver
sification by industry, by product line, and by geographical market. We remain
most optimistic for continued success in the period ahead.
Sincerely,

David L. Nelson
President
Attachment
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Ethical Problems in Context

A Montage of Financial
Reporting Problems
By Robert L. Grinaker, Professor of Accounting, University of Houston.

Henry Parsons was trying to clear his desk of a few troublesome details
before taking off with his family for a weekend at their Wisconsin shore home.
Henry is an audit partner with Helman and Minert, CPAs, a regional firm
with its head office in Chicago. His clean-up campaign was interrupted by a
call from his good friend, Allen Petrie, vice-president and controller of
R. Milby, Inc. Henry was pretty sure he knew what the call was about even
before he picked up the phone, and he was right. “Friend Henry,” came a
too soothing voice, “I hope your calendar is clear Monday morning, because
you are invited to a 10:00 am meeting at our shop. Tom and Bill Milby want
to discuss our accounting and financing problems.” Henry did have another
engagement, but thought to himself that he could (or perhaps more accu
rately, he had damn well better) break it to attend the Milby meeting. How
ever, Henry replied that his calendar was clear and that 10:00 am would be
fine. Allen then informed him that Herb Conners and Arnold Kendall would
also be there. With that, Allen wished him a nice weekend, adding the com
ment that he would miss Henry’s money at the Saturday morning golf game.
Henry decided that he’d better put aside other matters and get his
thoughts in order for the Milby meeting. He called for the Milby files and
proceeded to browse through them. Among other things, the following mat
ters were noted in the course of this review.

General Background
R. Milby, Inc., is an operator of feed and hardware stores throughout
the midwestern United States. Until the middle 1950’s, the company served
a primarily rural market. During the fifties, as the suburban movement blos
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somed, a substantial new market developed, largely attributable to a growing
number of suburban horse-owners. It became Milby’s policy to exploit this
expanding suburban market while maintaining those rural markets which
could be served from common facilities.
The company is managed by Tom and Bill Milby, sons of Robert
Milby, the founder. Tom and Bill grew up in the business. Each had served
stints as stockboys, clerks, and store managers. Both had some farming expe
rience and were graduates of agricultural colleges. Bill is president and chief
operating officer of the company. Tom is board chairman and chief financial
officer.

Finance

The company operated in Illinois until 1960, at which time it undertook
an expansion program under the direction of Tom Milby. Expansion was
financed by “going public,” and Milby’s shares are currently traded over-thecounter. Milby’s stock issues have been handled by the brokerage firm of
Kendall Bros. Since the initial issue in 1960, Milby has had one additional
public issue (1962-1963) and, on two occasions (1966-1967 and 19681969), has exchanged stock for established feed and hardware companies.
These exchanges were for long-established businesses, ideally located with
respect to suburban and rural markets. Furthermore, these companies had
substantial amounts of fully depreciated fixed assets. Although the condition
of these facilities made a modernization program imminent, each exchange
provided Milby with immediate earnings in excess of normal. Both acquisi
tions were accounted for as poolings, thus reflecting these excess earnings in
the financial statements. Milby’s earnings since fiscal 1961-1962 are sum
marized in Exhibit I, p. 271. Exhibit II, p. 272, contains comparative bal
ance sheets as of June 30, 1969 and 1970.
All real estate used by R. Milby, Inc., except that obtained in the 19681969 acquisition, is under lease—about half from an affiliated company,
Milby Investments, Inc. The investment company is owned by the Milby
family. With respect to the 1966-1967 acquisition, the real estate was dis
tributed by the former company to its shareholders. In turn, Milby Invest
ments purchased the real estate from these shareholders for cash.
Milby has enjoyed excellent banking relations with Chicago First Fidel
ity. Principal contact has been with Herb Conners, assistant senior loan offi
cer. Milby moves in and out of the bank, reflecting the seasonal aspects of
the feed business. Bank loans outstanding generally are either liquidated or
minimal on June 30, Milby’s fiscal year end. Interim demands for cash are
indicated by schedules of monthly balances in certain working capital ac
counts shown for the years 1969-70 and 1970-71 in Exhibit III, p. 273.
Both Herb Connors and Arnold Kendall served as directors on Milby’s board.
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EXHIBIT 1

R. Milby, Inc.
Summary of Consolidated Earnings (1)

(2)
(3)

(4)
(5)
(6)

Year

Sales

1961-62
1962-63
1963-64
1964-65
1965-66
1966-67
1967-68
1968-69
1969-70

$ 45.0
47.5
50.5
60.0
52.5
80.2
90.0
105.1
111.2

Selling,
Earnings
Cost of Administrative,
Per
Net
Goods and Financial Income
Share
Income
Taxes
Expenses
Sold
(Dollars)
(Millions of Dollars')
$ 26.9
28.6
30.1
35.8
32.5
48.0
54.6
62.9
66.7

$ 16.3
17.1
18.0
21.2
17.4
28.5
31.4
37.4
39.2

$ .9
.9
1.2
1.5
1.3
1.8
2.0
2.4
2.7

$ .9
.9
1.2
1.5
1.3
1.9
2.0
2.4
2.6

$ .90
.70
.92
1.15
1.00
1.06
1.10
1.20
1.30

NOTES:
(1) In the above summary, earnings for years prior to years of pooled acquisitions are
stated as originally reported, although appropriate adjustments were made in the
comparative statements for the year of acquisition.
(2) Issued and outstanding — 1,000,000 shares.
(3) Issued 300,000 shares for cash.
(4) Changed from sum-of-years digits to straight-line depreciation.
(5) Issued 500,000 shares for an acquisition treated as a pooling of interests.
(6) Issued 200,000 shares for an acquisition treated as a pooling of interests.

Auditing and Accounting
Prior to 1960, Milby, Inc. had been audited primarily to support bank
ing relations. The auditing work had been done by Helman & Minert.
H & M did all the accounting work necessary for the initial public issue and
has continued in the capacity of independent auditor. In addition, H & M
provides Milby with tax counsel and management services. The accounting
firm also handles the personal tax work of the Milby brothers. Henry Par
sons has been the partner in charge of the Milby engagement since the public
offering in 1960.
Milby’s accounting is under the direction of Allen Petrie, vice-president
and controller. Over the years, Allen Petrie and Henry Parsons have devel
oped a close personal friendship. Petrie is an excellent accountant. Further
more, he has guided a carefully controlled program of computer utilization.
Developments in computer utilization have included payrolls, purchases, and
billings. Most recently an innovative system of inventory control has been
established. In these latter developments, considerable counsel has been re
ceived from Helman and Minert.
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2.0
29.4
$35.7
20.3
$15.4
$41.9

4.3

$41.6

$16.4

17.9

$343

2.0
28.4

$ 3.9

$ 1.4

.8

$ 1.5

9.2

$23.8

.9

$25.0

9.4

3.1

5.8

6.3

3.2

$ 4.9

$ 5.2

June 30
1970
1969

Stockholders’ Equity:
Common stock, 5,000,000 shares
authorized; par value, $5; issued
and outstanding, 2,000,000 shares
Additional paid-in capital
Retained earnings

Other Liabilities:
Minority interests in subsidiaries
Deferred taxes

Current Liabilities:
Account
Accrued liabilities
Federal, state, and local taxes

Liabilities and Stockholders’ Equity

1.5
.5

7.4

$10.0
8.4
12.6
$31.0
$41.9

.6
.9
$ 1.5

$ 9.4

$

$30 .3
$41.6

11.9

$10.0
8.4

1 .3
$

.5
.8

$10.0

$ 7.7
1.9
.4

June 30
1970
1969

EXHIBIT II

:

Note A Long-term leases. The major portion of the Company’s business is conducted on leased premises. Minimum annual rentals
under leases in effect at June 30, 1970 total $3.6 million of which $1.6 million is payable to affiliates. These leases expire at various
times over the next 20 years.
Note B: Certain accounting policies. Costs of plant and equipment are depreciated on a straight-line basis over estimated useful lives;
leasehold improvements are amortized over the terms of the leases or the useful lives of the assets, whichever is shorter. Deferred fed 
eral income taxes are provided for timing differences between depreciation for financial statement presentation and tax purposes.

Less: accumulated depreciation

Current Assets:
Cash and certificates of deposit
Marketable securities, at lower of cost or
market (cost, 1970-$6.5, market,
1969-$6.0)
Accounts receivable, less allowances for
doubtful accounts — $.1 each year
Merchandise inventory, at lower of firstin, first-out cost or market
Prepaid expenses and supplies
Total Current Assets
Other Assets
Property, Plant, and Equipment, at Cost
Leaseholdimprovements
$
Land, buildings, and equipment
Fixtures and equipment

Assets

R. Milby, Inc.
Comparative Consolidated Balance Sheets
(Millions of Dollars)

EXHIBIT III
R. Milby, Inc.
Current Asset Accounts and Bank Loans
Summary of Monthly Balances

Fiscal Year
1969-70
July 1
July 31
August 31
September 30
October 31
November 30
December 31
January 31
February 28
March 31
April 30
May 31
June 30

Cash and
Marketable
Accounts
Certificates
Securities
of Deposit at Cost (Note) Receivable Inventory
$ 4.9
4.8
1.6
1.4
1.3
1.3
1.2
1.4
3.2
4.1
4.5
4.8
5.2

$ 5.8
5.8
5.8
.9
.8
.8
.8
.8
.8
.8
5.4
6.3
6.5

$ 3.2
3.4
3.6
3.7
3.8
4.5
6.9
9.2
9.7
8.9
4.8
3.7
3.3

$ 9.2
9.8
12.6
19.5
22.4
20.8
19.5
15.1
10.9
9.6
9.5
9.3
9.4

Bank Loans
$ —
—
—
1.5
4.5
4.8
4.8
2.5
.6
—
—
—
—

1970-71
—
July 1
5.2
3.3
9.4
6.5
—
July 31
4.9
10.0
3.5
6.5
—
August 31
13.1
1.7
3.6
6.5
4.3
1.4
20.2
September 30
3.7
3.8
7.3
October 31
1.4
23.6
3.7
3.9
7.3
November 30
1.3
21.2
5.8
3.7
7.3
19.8
December 31
1.5
3.7
7.9
January 31
15.3
5.4
9.7
1.5
3.7
3.3
February 28
11.2
3.3
3.7
10.1
2.6
March 31
9.1
4.0
8.9
3.7
April 30
1.5
4.6
8.9
6.1
4.9
—
9.0
May 31 (estimated) 5.1
3.9
6.6
—
9.0
June 30 (estimated) 5.4
6.6
3.9
Note: Marketable securities comprised a portfolio of dividend-paying com
mon stocks and Treasury Bills. In 1970-71, common stocks in the portfolio
were held to avoid realizing a market loss attributable to a generally depressed
market coupled with rising interest rates and dividend cut-backs.

Current Activities

During fiscal year 1970-1971, R. Milby, Inc., undertook a campaign to
increase sales volume in its present outlets. The decision to undertake the
sales campaign was made in consideration of two factors: a sorely needed
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modernization program for a number of outlets, coupled with an unfavorable
financing environment attributable to a depressed stock market. After careful
review of operating conditions, and in the hope of obtaining better financing,
Bill Milby was convinced that the modernization program could be deferred
for a year. Tom Milby then argued the view that a good year, in spite of a
general economic downturn, would improve the company’s chances of obtain
ing favorable financing. Thus, an ambitious sales goal was set, and marketing
policies were adopted for the purpose of attaining the desired increase in sales.
In December it became apparent that the increased sales goal would be
realized. Several press releases were issued during the next couple of months
indicating that sales for the year would top $130 million and that income
was expected to exceed $3 million, or $1.50 per share.
In consideration of the anticipated new financing, analysts at Kendall
Bros. kept a fairly close watch on Milby’s operations. They were impressed
with the fact that sales dollars for the year were substantially in the till and
became convinced that the earnings goal also would be realized. Excerpts
from Kendall’s published review of prospects for R. Milby, Inc., issued in
mid-February showed the following:

Recent price..............................................................................
Price range.................................................................................
Estimated earnings per share for fiscal year 1970-1971....
Reported earnings per share for fiscal year 1969-1970. . . .
Price-earnings ratio (based on 1969-1970 earnings)...........
Shares outstanding...................................................................
Recommended for purchase because:
(1) Growth pattern — consistent.
(2) Accounting policies — moderate.
(3) Sales — especially strong.
(4) Industry group — attractive.

Per Share
$ 191/2
$ 17-25
$1.50
$1.30
15X
2MM

Some second thoughts arise. Allen Petrie was informed of the goal to
increase sales and of the related modifications in marketing policies after they
had been adopted. The modified marketing policies involved adjustments of
commission rates, extensive promotions, and media advertising. Petrie was
convinced that these increased selling costs could well wipe out any profit
potential in the increased sales. As the anticipated sales volume began to be
realized, he tried his best to tone down the optimism of the brothers Milby.
Petrie became angry with Tom Milby, and let him know it, when he realized
that income estimates released by Milby to the press were based on cost-prof
it-volume relationships developed prior to the changed marketing policies.
By the end of February, the impact of the increased selling costs became
apparent. A number of special promotional commitments came to light. Dur
ing February, a number of advertising bills totaling a substantial amount
were released by local agencies. These advertising bills reflected special
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authority granted to local management to place advertising. The impact on
income of increased selling costs was compounded by concurrent skyrocket
ing of warehousing, delivery, and interest costs.
By the middle of March, Petrie was able to get figures together and
come up with a revised estimate of 1970-71 earnings:
Sales .......................................................................................
Cost of goods sold................................................................

$130.3 MM
78.2 MM

Selling, administrative, and financing expenses..............

$ 52.1 MM
47.6 MM
$

4.5 MM
2.2 MM

$

2.3 MM

Income taxes..........................................................................
Net income............................................................................
Earnings per share...........................................................

$

1.15

When these figures were presented to the Milby brothers, they were finally
forced to recognize that they had been suffering from financial myopia.
While they were somewhat angry with Petrie for failing to develop such pre
cise facts and figures several months earlier, they were forced to admit that
the change in marketing policies had been instituted and administered some
what informally. Hence, any earlier forecast would have been difficult, if not
impossible. The conclusion to their discussion was to seek ways to “tighten
the corporate belt” and salvage a few additional dollars of income.

An additional dark cloud appears. In early May, Ron Hunt, H & M
senior accountant in charge of the Milby audit, had undertaken interim work.
Through discussions with Petrie, Henry Parsons was aware of Milby’s earn
ings problems. He was particularly concerned that solutions might be sought
in “accounting” or in “extraordinary transactions.” He thus instructed Hunt
to include in his work a review of the current status of financial projections.
In the course of his review, Hunt was convinced that Petrie’s income
projection seemed fairly well on target, except for marketable securities. Mil
by’s current accounting policy called for marketable securities to be valued
at the lower of cost or market. This policy was not taken into account in
Petrie’s income projection, which ignored a possible market loss of some $1
million. Recognizing the market loss, the projected income for fiscal 19701971 might well be $1.3 million, or $.65 per share, as compared to 19691970 earnings of $2.6 million, or $1.30 per share. Proforma, the marketable
securities section of the balance sheet would appear as follows:
June 30
1971
1970

Marketable securities, at lower of cost or
market (cost, $6.6 million and $6.5
million, respectively)

$5.6MM

$6.3MM
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Hunt called this matter to the attention of Allen Petrie and Henry Par
sons on Friday afternoon, May 21. Petrie, in turn, screwed up his courage
and laid the matter on the line to Tom and Bill Milby. As was to be ex
pected, the Milby brothers called a meeting to discuss the financing and ac
counting problems facing the company. The meeting (to include the Milby
brothers, Petrie, Henry Parsons, Herb Conners, and Arnold Kendall) was set
for the following Monday morning. Allen Petrie was instructed to call Henry
Parsons.
Several hours had now passed since Henry had received the call from
Allen. After his extensive review of the Milby files, he felt up-to-date and
ready for the Monday meeting. He decided he could take his leave for the
weekend.

A Meeting Was Held

Bill Milby opened the meeting by laying out details of the planned
modernization program. He attempted to demonstrate that the program was
essential to the survival of a number of the more recently acquired outlets.
Tom Milby then made the point that new financing in the next fiscal year
was imperative to carry out the modernization program. Next, Allen Petrie
was called upon to present the earnings forecast.
Tom then posed the following question to Arnold Kendall: “If we report
earnings of $.65, what will happen to the price of our stock?” Kendall re
plied that the price could well drop 5 to 10 points, depending on the extent
to which the market discounted the special securities loss. He further pointed
out that a fall-off of earnings coupled with a generally weak market tends to
reinforce a pessimistic attitude toward the stock of any company.
Tom then queried Herb Conners concerning the possibility of financing
the modernization program with a bank loan. Herb indicated that a 60month loan was indeed a possibility. He was quick to point out, however,
that the interest rate would be fairly high. He also noted that the bank
would probably require more details with respect to accounting and auditing.
It was Tom Milby’s view that the financing picture looked bleak under
either alternative. A stock issue in an unfavorable market would result in a
considerable dilution of equity; on the other hand, a long-term bank loan
with fixed interest payments and maturities hampered flexibility of action to
a considerable extent.
Then came the inevitable turn in the conversation. Tom Milby put it to
Henry Parsons this way: “Is $.65 a share really a fair picture of R. Milby’s
earnings?” Tom pursued his point, “This securities loss is only a possibility at
this time and, in fact, may never be realized. Is it right for $1 million of pos
sible securities losses to tip the per-share price of two million shares $10 or
even $5? Regardless of how we try to explain it away—showing the loss as a
special item and giving an explanation in the president’s letter—there’s a good
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chance that we will fail to communicate to the investing public the fact that
the securities loss is totally unrelated to regular operations.” Arnold Kendall
nodded his agreement with Tom’s last point. Tom pressed on, “There must
be some provision in your accounting rules to avoid this kind of lick.”
Before Parsons could answer, Allen Petrie suggested that accounting for
securities transactions be switched this year from lower of cost or market to
cost. Parsons recognized the possibility, but pointed out that the financial
statements would require a footnote to explain the change and that the audi
tor’s report would require a consistency qualification.
Clearly, Allen Petrie and the Milby brothers had given the matter some
prior thought. Parsons was asked to give his immediate blessing to the pro
posed accounting change, subject to appropriate disclosures. He demurred,
however, requesting time to research the accounting rules involved and to
discuss the auditing and accounting implications with his partners. He has
tened to assure the group that he was not being negative, but merely cautious.
With that point covered, Tom Milby (at no surprise to Henry Parsons)
was still not satisfied. He suggested that, although the increased selling costs
were real enough, a substantial portion of these costs—some $1.8 million—
was more in the nature of development costs which would benefit at least
two, and probably more, future years. Allen Petrie presented a schedule of
“special development costs” which listed the following items:
Contributions to 20 selected communities to support an
nual horse shows. Under the terms of the contribution, R.
Milby, Inc., is to be listed as a major sponsor for a five-year
period .......................................................................................
Contributions to ten agricultural schools for establishment
of R. Milby, Inc., Scholarships in Agriculture. The con
tributions have been set up in permanent endowment funds,
with the income to be used for scholarships........................
Development and publication of educational pamphlets for
distribution to the agricultural and equestrian community. .

$ 900,000

700,000
200,000
$1,800,000

In the course of explaining the nature of these costs, Petrie pointed out
that Milby, Inc., had never before incurred such costs as part of its marketing
program, at least in any significant amounts. He then suggested that these
special costs be set up in the balance sheet as “Deferred development costs”
with an appropriate explanation. “I also suggest,” he said, “that the costs be
amortized over a conservative three-year period, including the current period.
The proposed accounting for marketable securities and special development
costs will reveal an income of $2.9 million, or $1.45 per share, a figure which
reflects more fairly Milby’s actual operations for the year.”
Henry Parson’s initial reaction was an unexpressed thought, “Thanks a

277

lot, friend Allen.” Aloud, however, he recognized the accounting possibilities
but asked for time to research the accounting rules and to discuss the issues
involved with his partners.
Parsons promised an answer on the accounting matters within a week.
The meeting broke up, and the visitors went their separate ways.

Some Not So Amusing Musings
A banker. Herb Conners puzzled over his customer’s accounting and
financing problems, but without too great concern over the bank’s interests.
He was confident that the bank could continue to finance Milby’s seasonal
working capital requirements against inventories and receivables. He was
also convinced that a modernization loan would be sound, although he felt
certain that Milby would exhaust all other financing possibilities before going
into the banks. However, he had other matters pressing for his immediate at
tention, and he could cross the Milby bridge if and when he came to it.
Despite a rather tension-filled meeting, Herb felt a sense of relief, primar
ily because he could put the Milby matter aside for awhile. He noted that he
just had time to make his luncheon date with Larry Hopkins, his counterpart
in the bank’s trust department. Over lunch Herb was quite relaxed, told
some jokes, and even allowed himself a rare lunchtime martini.
However, the Milby matter was destined to be a continued annoyance
due to Larry Hopkin’s parting remark, “Incidentally, Herb, you might be
pleased at how well R. Milby, Inc., is thought of in our shop. We’ve put 100
shares each in a number of portfolios that could stand some growth possibili
ties. Milby’s recent market performance hasn’t disappointed us a bit.” Herb
forced a smile and took his leave.

An underwriter. After the meeting, Arnold Kendall was in a disturbed
state of mind. He knew he should eat lunch, but he didn’t. He knew he
shouldn’t have a drink, but he did. He was glad that he hadn’t been asked
for a direct opinion on the accounting questions. He simply wasn’t sure how
he felt. Kendall Bros. had pushed Milby’s shares pretty hard since issuing
their “tout sheet” last February. In fact, the market had been anticipating in
creased earnings, and the stock price was pushing $22.
Kendall was particularly concerned over what immediate position his
firm should take toward promoting Milby, Inc.: continue pushing, go neutral,
or go negative. He also was concerned about the longer run. If earnings held
up, or accounting for earnings were corrected, Milby would want to go to the
market with 300,000 shares as soon as possible, and Kendall Bros. would be
expected to handle the underwriting. A question kept coming to Arnold
Kendall’s mind, “Is R. Milby, Inc., a $.65 company, a $1.45 company, or
something in between?” He wished he knew, or he wished the auditors could
tell him for sure.
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A CPA. Henry Parsons wished he knew the answer to Arnold Kendall’s
question. He was never more concerned with the phrase “present fairly,” and
just what it meant. Surely, if there were a possible swing in per-share income
of between $.65 and $1.45, some amount had to be more nearly “fair” than
any other. It was Parson’s general belief that fair presentation meant con
formity with generally accepted accounting principles, insofar as these could
be determined. Then he recalled a comment from the 1968 Seaview sympo
sium on communication and innovation in financial reporting: “I would like
to think that the certificate means that the auditor, in reviewing the financial
statements, has exercised his professional influence to have these presented in
the best way he can—not that he has searched through accounting literature
to find a means of supporting the way management may have elected to pre
sent something that he doesn’t completely agree with himself.”
In any event, he promised Milby an answer to the accounting questions
within a week. Furthermore, even if he agreed with the quotation, he was
quite certain that a literature search was essential. Some pertinent thoughts
developed from this search are summarized as follows:
Accounting matters involving marketable securities
APB Opinion No. 20, “Accounting Changes”:
The Board concludes that in the preparation of financial state
ments there is a presumption that an accounting principle, once
adopted, should not be changed in accounting for events and transac
tions of a similar type. Consistent use of accounting principles from
one accounting period to another enhances the utility of financial
statements to users by facilitating analysis and understanding of com
parative accounting data.
The presumption that an entity should not change an accounting
principle may be overcome only if the enterprise justifies the use of
an alternative accounting principle on the basis that it is preferable.1

ARB No. 43:
However, practice varies with respect to the carrying basis for cur
rent assets such as marketable securities and inventories. In the case
of marketable securities where market value is less than cost by a
substantial amount and it is evident that the decline in market value
is not due to a mere temporary condition, the amount to include as a
current asset should not exceed the market value.1
2

Hendriksen, Accounting Theory.
Temporary investments in common stocks of other corporations
are usually treated similarly to monetary current investments. Bal
1
2

AICPA, Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 20, “Accounting Changes” (New York:
AICPA, 1971), pars. 15 and 16.
AICPA, Accounting Research Bulletin No. 43, Restatement and Revision of Accounting
Research Bulletins (New York: AICPA, 1953), Chapter 3, sec. A, par. 9.
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ance sheet valuations are conventionally expressed in terms of either
cost or the lower of cost or market. Since a final sales price is not
known, they cannot be treated as receivables, and thus other valua
tion methods must be used. Cost is generally considered the most ver
ifiable but the lower of cost or market is generally accepted because
of the desire to record anticipated losses.3

Grady, Accounting Research Study No. 7:
If the cost of the investment apparently cannot be recovered if sold
in the current market, a part of its usefulness to the enterprise has
been impaired. Under these conditions it is customary to revalue the
cost to only that portion that could be recovered. Evidence of a per
manent market decline should be present, since temporary fluctuations
are common for many securities.4

Accounting questions involving intangibles
APB Opinion No. 17:
The Board concludes that a company should record as assets the
costs of intangible assets acquired from other enterprises or individ
uals. Costs of developing, maintaining, or restoring intangible assets
which are not specifically identifiable, have indeterminate lives, or
are inherent in a continuing business and related to an enterprise as a
whole—such as goodwill—should be deducted from income when
incurred.5

AICPA accounting interpretation of APB Opinion No. 17:
Question—APB Opinion No. 17 requires that intangible assets ac
quired after October 31, 1970 be amortized over a period not ex
ceeding 40 years. Does this Opinion encourage the capitalization of
identifiable internally developed intangible assets which have been
generally charged to expense in the past?

Interpretation—APB Opinion No. 17 does not change present ac
counting practice for intangible assets in any way except to require
that intangible assets acquired after October 31, 1970 be amortized.
Paragraph 6 notes that the costs of some identifiable intangible assets
are now capitalized as deferred assets by some companies while other
companies record the costs as expenses when incurred. This para
graph also specifies that the question of whether the costs of identi
fiable internally developed intangible assets are to be capitalized or
charged to expense is not covered by the Opinion. Therefore, the
Opinion does not encourage capitalizing the costs of a large initial
3
4
5

E. Hendrikson, Accounting Theory (Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, Inc,. 1970), p. 303.
Paul Grady, Accounting Research Study No. 7, Inventory of Generally Accepted Account
ing Principles for Business Enterprises (New York: AICPA, 1965), par. 239.
AICPA, Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 17, “Intangible Assets” (New York:
AICPA, 1970), par. 24.
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advertising campaign for a new product or capitalizing the costs of
training new employees.6

Hendriksen, Accounting Theory
In a few cases, costs that can be associated with future revenue
cannot be assigned directly to the product of the enterprise because
they do not represent value added to any specific products. In most
cases, these are selling and administrative costs that can be associ
ated clearly with future revenues. A common example is the carrying
forward of organization costs that cannot be associated with a prod
uct, usually because there is no product at the time they are incurred.
However, since they can be associated with the revenues of some fu
ture periods, they are usually capitalized and carried as intangible as
sets on the basis that they represent the value of the organization to
the firm in its future operations.
Accountants are generally reluctant to carry forward other selling
and administrative costs because of the uncertainty regarding their
association with future revenues. But a case can be made for delay
ing expense recognition in a few instances. If an extensive market
research program is carried out before placing a new product on the
market, these costs may be associated directly with the revenues ex
pected to be obtained from the new product.
• • • •
One note of caution should be made at this point. Selling and ad
ministrative costs should not be carried forward to be matched with
future revenue unless there is a reasonable assurance of future reve
nue with which it may be associated. The lack of current revenue or
the possibility of recording an operating loss in the current period is
not adequate reason for deferral. If no associated revenue is foresee
able, or if such revenue is highly uncertain, the expenses should be
recognized in the current period even if they result in an operating
loss.7

Nearly a week later Henry Parsons continued to mull over the Milby
case. While he was uncomfortable with the accounting problems involved, he
reminded himself that Milby was not a fly-by-night “swinger.” Rather, Milby
was a company with a long history of successful operations and was well
managed by men who had learned the business from the ground up. Never
theless, he also had to remind himself—as his partner, Randy Minert, had a
number of times—that the growth pattern in Milby’s earnings had twice been
preserved by poolings and once by an accounting change. Now accounting
again was proposed to elude a threat to a favorable earnings pattern.
6

7

AICPA, Unofficial Accounting Interpretations, Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 17,
“Intangible Assets,” Accounting and Auditing Problems, The Journal of Accountancy,
April 1971, p. 74.
Hendrikson, Accounting Theory, p. 186.
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Despite misgivings created by the foregoing thoughts, Parsons resolved
that only objective consideration of the current fact situation should influence
his firm’s decision on the accounting matters at issue. In appraising the cur
rent fact situation, Henry was much concerned about Milby’s future income
prospects. Would the 1970-1971 sales volume be economically sustainable?
After all, a very costly promotional effort had been mounted to attain the
current volume. Furthermore, a continuing commitment has now been made
to a commission rate increase of one and one-half per cent of sales. Also,
what if the securities loss were realized in the following year? With these
thoughts in mind, Parsons considered a range of possibilities for 1971-72 in
come:
#4

#2
#3
(Millions of Dollars)
$130.0
$125.0
$120.0
78.0
75.0
72.0
$ 52.0
$ 50.0
$ 48.0

$115.0
69.0
$ 46.0

$ 39.2

$ 39.2

$ 39.2

$ 39.2

.6

.6

.6

.6

2.0
1.0

1.9
1.0

1.8
1.0

1.7
1.0

.4
$ 43.2
$ 8.8
4.4

.4
$ 43.1
$ 6.9
3.4

.4
$ 43.0
$ 5.0
2.5

.4
$ 42.9
$ 3.1
1.5

$

$

$

$

#1

Sales...................................
Cost of goods sold.............
Selling, administrative,
and financing expenses:
1969-1970 actual.......
Adjustments to reflect
current conditionsAmortization of
deferred development
costs (l/3x$1.8MM)
Increased commissions
(11/2 % of sales)
General cost increases . .
Depreciation increase
(1/15 of $6MM modernization program) . .
Net income, before taxes
Income taxes
Net income before possible
securities loss
Possible securities loss (assuming no tax benefit)
Net income after possible
securities loss

4.4

1.0

$

3.4

3.5

1.0

$

2.5

2.5

1.0

$

1.5

1.6

1.0

$

.6

While Henry was puzzling over the significance of the foregoing figures
in relationship to the accounting proposals, he began perusal of APB Opinion
No. 20, “Accounting Changes.” He wished that the Opinion had been issued
a year earlier. If so, he might have avoided the difficult reporting problem
brewing with Lofton Foods.
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The case of Lofton Foods. Lofton Foods maintains a research and
development department whose principal activity is product development.
Most of the actual work is done on a contract basis with universities and
private research laboratories. In 1970, Lofton was caught in a cash squeeze
and cut back substantially on its contract research. As a result, R & D for
1970 was a relatively insignificant amount. The company, nevertheless,
changed its accounting for R & D costs from expensing such costs as incurred,
to deferring the costs and amortizing them over sixty months. H & M made
no mention of the accounting change in its report and approved the following
footnote to the December 31, 1970 financial statements: “It has been the con
sistent practice of the company to charge product development costs to ex
pense as incurred. Commencing with the current year, the company will de
fer such charges recognizing that the principal benefits are to future periods.
The costs so deferred will be amortized over sixty months. This change has
no material effect on the current financial statements.”
It was now apparent that the product development program was back
in full swing. In order to get a feel for the impact of the R & D policy and
the related accounting change on income, an income summary was prepared
by the in-charge auditor for the years 1969, 1970, and 1971 (estimated):

Year

Gross
Profit

1969
1970
1971

$88.7
74.2
80.5

Research &
Selling &
Administrative Development
Costs
Costs
(Millions of Dollars)
$57.2
55.3
57.1

$15.6
.3 (1)
3.3 (2)

Income
Taxes

Net
Income

$ 7.9
9.3
10.0

$ 8.0
9.3
10.1

Notes:
(1) Represents amortization of $1.5 million of incurred research and development
costs.
(2) Represents amortization of $16.3 million of research and development costs
incurred to date ($1.5 million incurred in 1969 and $14.8 million estimated to
be incurred in 1970).

As much as he would have liked to have thought through the Milby
and Lofton matters, Henry simply had to take some time out to plow through
the morning mail. He was moving through the stack with considerable dis
patch when he came upon a draft copy of Aptco Shipbuilding Company’s
third quarter financial statements, dated April 30, 1971.

The case of Aptco Shipbuilding. Aptco had run into some difficulties on
a major construction job, and Henry Parsons was concerned as to how the
matter would be reflected in the interim statements. The difficulties were en
countered on a contract for the construction of two huge ocean-going tugboats
at a “turnkey” price of $6.5 million and an estimated total cost of $5 million.
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Just prior to April 30, Henry had visited Aptco to review the progress
of interim audit work. At that time, informal talks with engineers indicated
that the work on these vessels was some 60 to 70 per cent complete. At the
same time some $4 million of costs were in. Henry’s impression at the time
was that Aptco’s management seemed somewhat “up-tight” about the final
outcome.
Aptco’s policy is to detail new construction income by contract in its
financial statements. On the April 30 interim financial statements, the tug
boat contract appeared as follows:

Contract description

Per cent
complete

Revenue
earned

To construct two ocean-going
tugboats at a “turnkey”
price of $6,500,000

80

$5,200,000

Costs
incurred

$4,000,000

Gross
income

$1,200,000

In view of his understanding of the facts, Henry Parsons immediately called
Aptco’s controller to question the reported income on this contract. He was
told that the job was carefully reviewed by top management and the project
engineers. The conclusion reached was that construction was further along
than was originally thought.
R. Milby, Inc. As if the Lofton question weren’t enough for the day, the
next item in the mail was a letter from Tom Milby which read as follows:
Mr. Henry A. Parsons
Helman & Minert, CPAs
3510 Milo Building
Chicago, Illinois
Dear Henry:
I would be obliged if you would attend a meeting to be held in the board
room of R. Milby, Inc., on June 11, 1971. Attending the meeting will be the same
group that met earlier in May — Allen Petrie, Herb Conners, Arnold Kendall, my
brother, Bill, and me.
My brother and I would like each of you, including Allen, to be prepared to
discuss and give recommendations concerning the various accounting and financing
alternatives available to R. Milby, Inc.
Allen Petrie has given some thought to presentation of the proposed account
ing change for marketable securities. So that you can consider his suggestion prior
to the meeting, he has prepared the following summary:
June 30
Balance sheet:
1971
1970
Marketable securities, at cost (quoted market 1971—
$5.6MM, 1970—$6.3MM)
$6.6MM
$6.3MM
Balance sheet footnote:
In prior years the Company has consistently used the lower of cost or quoted mar
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ket in valuing marketable securities on hand for financial reporting purposes.
Effective July 1, 1970, the company elected to change to the cost method of
valuing common stocks.

Auditor’s report:
... in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles which, except
for the change (as of July 1, 1970) to an acceptable alternative method of valu
ing marketable securities, as described in Note------ to the financial statements,
have been applied on a basis consistent with that of the preceding year.

Incidentally, we are considering entering into a sale and leaseback agreement
either with Milby Investments or an insurance company for the land and buildings
acquired in the 1968-1969 acquisition. We believe a fair price is $4 million. The
investor would issue a six per cent note to R. Milby, Inc., together with a lease for
an annual rental of $400,000. The note would be repaid by forgiveness of rentals
and an annual payment of $200,000 cash from the investor to R. Milby, Inc. When
the note is cleared, annual rental payments from R. Milby, Inc., would commence.
Will be looking forward to seeing you at Friday’s meeting.
Sincerely,

Thomas R. Milby
Chairman

Questions for Discussion
1. Taking the role of Allen Petrie, Herb Conners, Arnold Kendall, or Henry
Parsons (whichever is appropriate), be prepared to participate in the June
11, 1971 meeting at R. Milby, Inc., considering such issues as the follow
ing:
a. Your reactions and recommendations with respect to the accounting
proposals.
b. Your reactions and recommendations with respect to financing alterna
tives—a bank loan vis-a-vis a new stock issue. Are these the only
available alternatives?
c. Your reactions and recommendations concerning special auditing and
reporting for the benefit of the bank, assuming a bank loan is obtained.
d. Your reactions and recommendations with respect to the proposed sale
and leaseback of real estate.
e. Your reactions to press releases which include forecasts of 1970-1971
sales and income.

2. Herb Conners wonders whether the bank officer in charge of the Milby
account should be changed. Or should he stop eating lunch with Larry
Hopkins? To what extent should Arnold Kendall alert his brokerage staff
to Milby’s earnings prospects?
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3. Give your reactions and recommendations to Henry Parsons concerning
the Lofton Foods problem.
a. Was H & M’s action with respect to Lofton’s 1970 statements appro
priate?
b. Will the APB Opinion on accounting changes preclude comparable fu
ture problems?
c. What action, if any, should H & M take with regard to the Lofton
statements for 1971?
4. Give your reactions and recommendations to Henry Parsons concerning
the Aptco Shipbuilding problem.
a. What authority and responsibility does Aptco’s controller have for the
data in its interim financial statements?
b. What is H & M’s authority with respect to the data in Aptco’s interim
financial statements?
c. What specific action, if any, should H & M take with respect to the data
in Aptco’s interim financial statements?
d. If the tugboat contract is still incomplete at July 31, 1971 (Aptco’s
fiscal year end), what special auditing problems are posed for H & M?

Discussion of the R. Milby Case
This case provoked spirited discussion led by the case writer who played
the role of Tom Milby. Mr. Milby emphasized the fact that he really be
lieved that the $1.45 per share which would result from accounting for mar
ketable securities at cost and deferring the “special development costs” was
the most realistic view of the operating picture of his company. He was par
ticularly concerned about the possibility of writing down marketable securi
ties to market, pointing out that writing down securities $1 million by a
charge to income might well reduce the market value of R. Milby, Inc., by
$5 to $10 million, and emphasizing that this was not an operating loss or one
that necessarily would ever be realized.
The group was largely unsympathetic to Mr. Milby’s position. They
pointed to past poolings and the prior change in depreciation accounting as
evidence that the reported growth was not entirely realistic, and there was
general agreement among auditors, analysts, financial executives, and bankers
that Mr. Milby’s proposed accounting should not be encouraged. Other
sources of financing were suggested to Milby as preferable to the equity issue
which he was considering as a means of raising new capital for his moderniza
tion program, and which was the primary reason for his concern over 1971
earnings per share.
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On the specific issue of accounting for marketable securities, there was
some discussion of whether the loss, if recorded, was extraordinary in nature
since the company had regularly been making this kind of investment for sev
eral years and reporting profits on sales as ordinary income.
The problems of all interested parties in a case of this sort were recog
nized and discussed. Most of the discussants felt that the investment banker
and the auditor should take a strong position against the proposed account
ing. The dangers of a possible violation of SEC Rule 10b-5 were pointed out,
particularly if 1972 earnings did not support Milby’s assertion that his was
really a “$1.45 company.”
It was also observed that the commercial lending officer was in all prob
ability barred from giving information about Milby to his bank’s trust de
partment, although some questions were raised as to whether enough informa
tion could be given to stop additional trust department accumulation of the
stock as long as sales were not commenced. Even this amount of information
would presumably make the trust officer an insider, but an insider has no
responsibility to keep buying the stock of a company about which he has ad
verse information. Sale of such stock could subject him to liability, however.
At the end of the discussion, the auditors present were asked whether
they would accept the accounting proposed as “generally accepted” (with
appropriate disclosure of accounting changes) if they could not persuade
Milby to change it. The large majority said that they would not, although a
small number agreed with the observation that the accountants present were
being more righteous in the case dicussion than they would be in actual
practice, and said that they would give an opinion that the accounting did
fall within generally accepted accounting principles.
In discussing this case, the group concentrated on the Milby problems
and did not consider the Lofton Foods and Aptco Shipbuilding problems also
presented in the written case.
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Peter Hampden, CPA
By David F. Hawkins, Professor of Business Administration, Harvard Uni
versity

Peter Hampden, a third-year member of his firm’s audit staff, was debat
ing whether he should continue working as a public accountant. During his
college years, he had considered himself to be somewhat of an idealist with a
strong sense of public responsibility. Over the last few years, he had increas
ingly found himself questioning some of the decisions of his superiors on mat
ters which he considered involved ethical issues—the responsibility of the pro
fession to the client and statement users, and “fair” reporting. Hampden
realized these issues were difficult to resolve—especially those involving con
cepts of right and wrong as applied to auditor behavior. He also recognized
that his ethical standards were changing as he grew older and that he “did
not have all the answers.” Therefore, before he reached his career decision he
sought the opinion of a second person.
Hampden spoke to the firm’s senior partner about his problem. The
partner said that Hampden’s seniors had rated him “excellent and definite
partner material if he continued to develop in the future as he had in the
past.” The senior partner was also sympathetic to Hampden’s concern and
suggested they spend some time together during the following week discuss
ing it.
To facilitate their planned discussion, the senior partner suggested
Hampden prepare for him thumbnail descriptions of some of the situations
involving financial reporting that had troubled him over the last few years.
The senior partner also suggested that Hampden outline the “ethically cor
rect” action he would have taken if he had been the partner in charge. The
following is a copy of the material Hampden submitted to his senior partner.

Disclosure of Anticipated Accounting Change
A client company had invited the partner in charge of their audit to dis
cuss with their president some decisions made at a board of directors meeting
at which the preliminary third quarter results and the accounting principles
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policies to be followed in the annual report were discussed. The publication
of the third quarter results was to follow this meeting with the president. The
audit partner had brought me to this meeting to expand my knowledge of
how to maintain effective top management-auditor relations.
At its meeting the Board had decided “if it is feasible,” to change the
depreciation accounting policy followed in their annual report to stockhold
ers. It was anticipated that this change, if made, would permit the company
to show improved earnings per share over the previous year’s results. If the
old depreciation policy were followed, the company would most likely show
a decline in earnings.
The Board had asked the president to request their auditor to review the
company’s accounting department’s proposed adjustments to the asset ac
counts. Also, the president indicated that before the annual report was sub
mitted to stockholders other accounting principle changes might be necessary
“in order to put the company’s accounting on a more realistic basis.” If these
changes were made, the president planned to discuss them with the com
pany’s auditors.
In my opinion, the auditor should have insisted that the company indi
cate in its third quarter report to stockholders that they were contemplating a
change in accounting practices. None of the directors apparently thought this
was necessary and neither did the audit partner.

Disclosure of Tax Status of Lease Transaction

Our company had been requested to help a client draw up some sale
and leaseback agreements that would qualify for tax and financial reporting
purposes as leases and not as conditional sales. Subsequently, at the insist
ence of the Internal Revenue Service, the agreements were treated for tax pur
poses as conditional sales. The client was very disturbed by this ruling, but
on the advice of the company counsel decided not to challenge it. This law
yer, who had replaced the company counsel involved in the original transac
tion, described the sale and lease agreement as “a classic example of the
type of lease agreement involving nominal purchase options used to teach law
students how not to try and fool the tax authorities.”
After making his tax decision, the client discussed the financial reporting
implications of the decision with the partner in charge of the audit. In the
process of this discussion, the client indicated that he was very upset at the
“poor advice” given by his auditors and that he preferred to continue treating
the sale and leaseback as a lease for financial reporting purposes. If the
lease were capitalized, the company’s long-term liabilities would have in
creased about 17 per cent.
The partner in charge of the audit later agreed with the client’s treat
ment of the transaction as a lease. In his opinion, since the agreement had
been drawn up prior to Opinion No. 5, the provisions of the Opinion did not
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apply. No mention of the agreement’s tax status was indicated in the foot
notes to the annual statements.
Comment. In my opinion, at least the lease’s tax status should have
been disclosed; preferably, the lease should have been capitalized. Not taking
either of these actions leaves the auditor open to the criticism of (1) trying to
cover up his earlier poor advice and (2) being biased in his opinion of what
constitutes a full and fair presentation of financial data.
The economic substance of the lease transaction was equivalent to a con
ditional sale under Opinion No. 5. The legal and tax authorities used the
same criteria as stated in Opinion No. 5 to make their decision. These cri
teria are similar to those presented in tax guides to distinguish between gen
uine leases and conditional sales disguised as leases.
Responsibility for Disclosing Control and
Reporting Deficiencies

The founder-president of a client company raised $20 million through a
public stock sale for his new company to develop, manufacture, market, and
lease on a cancelable basis at an unusually low monthly rental price a revo
lutionary photo-copying system. To date, no major company had been able
to develop the technology and production capability needed to make this
kind of equipment at the low rental levels proposed by the client company.
At the time of the public offering, the client company also had not developed
the needed technology or production capability.
Soon after the public issue the stock’s price soared to four times its offer
ing price of $12.50. This upward movement was accompanied by optimistic
articles in the financial and trade press on the company’s prospects for
success.
Shortly after these funds were raised, I attended a public seminar during
which the client company’s president discussed his technique for raising ven
ture capital. He said:
Raising money is very much like running for office. You have to put
a campaign together. . . . The business plan you prepare must be a
lie, . . . but it must be a detailed and precise lie rather than a vague
and general lie. ... If you promise enough risk, loss, and catastrophe,
the financier will begin to wonder whether you’re hiding something
from him. . . . Go public as fast as you can.

Subsequently, the company went into bankruptcy, losing some $18 mil
lion on sales of $700,000. The principal causes for failure were poor control
over production costs and a decision to sell rather than lease its equipment.
This decision led to the cancellation of a number of letters of intent to
purchase.
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Comment. In cases such as these is it acceptable, by the public’s stand
ards, for the auditor to simply comment on the fairness of the financial state
ments and their adherence to generally accepted accounting principles?
Whose standards of conduct should prevail? Those of the AICPA or some
other? Who is responsible for telling the public about the poor control over
production costs and the cancellation of the letters of intent? Indeed, should
the public be told at all?
I have no answer to this kind of problem beyond saying that it is man
agement’s responsibility to disclose unfavorable information. If they will not,
the auditor should use all of his power to see that they do. Yet, is this his
function?

Responsibility of the Financial Press
In order to reflect better a change in their business, a client company
changed from accelerated to straight-line depreciation and started capitalizing
certain product development expenses. We agreed with the client that these
changes were desirable.
Subsequently, a prominent financial writer used this accounting change
as a perfect example of how companies change their accounting methods to
boost earnings. The writer failed to mention any of the reasons presented by
management in their annual report for the change in accounting.

Comment. As an individual auditor, I suspect that I cannot do much to
impose more responsible standards on the press; yet, this kind of reporting
disturbs me. What can be done about it? Can I as an individual auditor do
anything?

Responsibilities of Financial Analysts
Incidentally, while I am raising questions about the way financial re
porters discuss our client’s financial reports, I would like to discuss the impli
cations for me as an auditor of this kind of reporting of our client’s situation:
The ten per cent stock dividend recently announced by_______
makes_______ an attractive investment at current prices.
If you have not got_______ in your portfolio, now would be
an appropriate time to make a purchase at the current depressed
levels.
At present, the company is making huge capital investments, and
one can expect a return within the next two or three years. Investors
should not worry about the auditors qualifying _______’s recent
record profits by $1.4 million. It is only an accountant’s wrangle.
In any case, look at provisions in the income statement for de
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preciation which is up from $10.0 million to $12.5 million this year.
Such a provision is no more than a way of creating reserves out of
profits.

This company’s earnings for the current year were about the same as the
prior year. We disagreed with the company’s deferred tax accounting prac
tices. They refused to apply comprehensive tax allocation to some mining ex
penditures that they capitalized for book purposes, but wrote off on their tax
return as incurred. The stock is traded over-the-counter.

Comment. Why should auditors struggle to determine what are “fair”
reporting practices while this kind of reporting persists?
Questions for Discussion

1. If you were the senior partner, how would you respond to the cases pre
sented to you by Hampden? Do these involve ethical issues? Accounting
principle issues? Audit judgment issues?

2. Is it desirable that the auditor behave in the manner suggested by Hamp
den?

Discussion of the Peter Hampden Case
Several different aspects of this case were developed in the discussion.
First the management problem of how to deal with Hampden in this situation
was considered; then the role of the auditor implied in his view of his firm’s
responsibility was explored; and finally, some of the specific auditing, ac
counting, and disclosure issues in the case were discussed.
There was general agreement that the partner in this case had to re
spond in an understanding fashion to Hampden’s initiative, even though some
participants questioned Hampden’s judgment in going to the senior partner
rather than a partner on the specific engagement. It was also noted that the
senior partner had a sensitive management problem in dealing with the part
ners whom Hampden had bypassed. One partner in a large firm did observe
that his firm had recently established an institutional means for such expres
sions of concern on the part of relatively junior employees. The obvious po
tential which Hampden possessed was noted frequently, and the need to keep
such young men in the profession and not disillusioned was emphasized.
At the same time, however, the group was not terribly sympathetic to
Hampden’s concern in the specific cases which he had brought forward. To a
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large extent, it was felt that the responsibilities he urged upon the firm in
these situations were beyond those which auditors could be expected to take
in the future and certainly beyond currently perceived responsibilities. The
thought was expressed that, as he gained experience, he would understand
the difficulties inherent in his suggested courses of action.
The first three specific factual situations were reviewed. In the case of
the depreciation accounting change being considered, most of the participants
felt that the mere consideration of accounting changes did not require disclo
sure in a quarterly report where no actual changes had been reflected. At the
point where a change was actually decided upon, there was some feeling that
it should be reported to the public immediately, although a few participants
believed that disclosure in the first subsequent quarterly report was sufficient.
The problem of lease capitalization was discussed from various view
points. It was pointed out that the lease in question predated APB Opinion
No. 5; hence, capitalization was not required. In addition, the differing book
and tax treatments of the lease were felt to be reflected in the deferred tax
account; more detailed disclosure of these differences was not seen as neces
sary. On the other hand, there was dispute as to whether it was ethical not
to capitalize the lease even in the absence of an effective opinion at the time
the lease was drawn. There seemed to be considerable support for capitaliza
tion on the basis of the economic substance of the transaction.
Finally, the case of the company which raised capital on the basis of
hope for a technological breakthrough and finally went bankrupt when the
technology was not forthcoming on an economical basis was considered. It
was generally agreed that the auditor could not be expected to appraise either
the technology or the marketing and cost control problems of the company in
such a way as to predict failure before the fact. The company’s behavior, as
articulated by the president, was found unethical, and there was some feeling
that additional investigation by the investment banker was called for before
making the new issue public. Nevertheless, the magnitude of the loss was
largely attributed to speculative fervor on the part of buyers of the stock.
Despite the feeling that auditors should not be held responsible in such
cases as these, there was uncertainty expressed as to whether this answer
would be acceptable to people like Hampden. The case writer observed at
the end of the discussion that young people were no longer accepting
“reasonable explanations” such as those offered above and are demanding
more of the accounting profession both in terms of responsibilities assumed
and social significance. If these expectations are not fulfilled, the likelihood
of outstanding young talent remaining in the profession is sharply reduced.
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